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Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 May 2011

TORUN DEWAN  and
ARTHUR SPIRLING
TORUN DEWAN*
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
ARTHUR SPIRLING*
Affiliation:
Harvard University
*
Torun Dewan is Professor of Political Science, Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, UK WC2A 2AE ([email protected]).
Arthur Spirling is Assistant Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 ([email protected]).
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Abstract

Cohesive government-versus-opposition voting is a robust empirical regularity in Westminster democracies. Using new data from the modern Scottish Parliament, we show that this pattern cannot be explained by similarity of preferences within or between the government and opposition ranks. We look at differences in the way that parties operate in Westminster and Holyrood, and use roll call records to show that the observed behavior is unlikely to be determined by preferences on any underlying issue dimension. Using a simple variant of the agenda-setting model—in which members of parliament can commit to their voting strategies—we show that the procedural rules for reaching collective decisions in Westminster systems can explain this phenomenon: in the equilibrium, on some bills, members of the opposition vote against the government irrespective of the proposal. Such strategic opposition can reinforce government cohesiveness and have a moderating effect on policy outcomes. We introduce new data from the House of Lords, the Welsh Assembly, and the Northern Ireland Assembly to distinguish our claims from competing accounts of the data.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 105 , Issue 2 , May 2011 , pp. 337 - 358
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2011

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