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Social Choice in a Representative Democracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Jean-Pierre Benoît  and
Lewis A. Kornhauser
Jean-Pierre Benoît
Affiliation:
New York University
Lewis A. Kornhauser
Affiliation:
New York University
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Abstract

Citizens of a representative democracy are twice removed from legislation. First, they do not deliberate and vote directly on legislation. Rather they elect assemblies that enact such legislation in their stead. Second, and less commonly remarked, citizens do not vote directly for assemblies. Rather they vote for individual candidates, with the candidates receiving the most votes elected. We examine the efficiency properties of these voting systems.

Type
Research Notes
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 88 , Issue 1 , March 1994 , pp. 185 - 192
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1994

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