¹ For further discussion of the concept of participation and its importance in political science, see Milbrath, Lester W., Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965)Google Scholar; and Zolberg, Aristide R., Creating Political Order (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966)Google Scholar.

² Since the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April, 1964, the United Republic of Tanzania has kept two autonomous political parties, the Afro-Shirazi Party on Zanzibar and TANU on the mainland. For the moat important literature on TANU see Bienen, Henry, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967)Google Scholar. See also Bennett, George, “An Outline History of TANU,” Makerere Journal (No. 7, 1963), 15–32Google Scholar; and Glickman, Harvey, “One Party System in Tanganyika,” The Annals, 358 (03, 1965), 136–149Google Scholar. For party activity on Zanzibar see Lofchie, Michael F., “Zanzibar,” in Coleman, James S. and Rosberg, Carl Jr. (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1964), 482–511Google Scholar. For literature on the administration and its relation to the party, see Tordoff, William, Government and Politics in Tanzania (Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1967)Google Scholar; and Dryden, Stanley, Local Administration in Tanzania (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968)Google Scholar.

³ In Tanzania, the term village generally means a wide area of dispersed homesteads. There are few concentrated villages as those found in the West.

⁴ The TANU Youth League is usually the most important of the rural affiliates because it serves as a village police force. In most areas members have the right of arrest. They also serve as messengers, official escorts, and general party functionaries. Most TYL are between ages 18–35 and as a group may carry on commercial ventures such as operating a local bar or sponsoring sport or ceremonial activities. In some areas the youth groups have been subject to criticism from party leaders for becoming overzealous, taking the law into their own hands, holding illegal trials and occasionally forcing younger boys to drill with imitation rifles. Changes since the Arusha Declaration (1967) have included other, more politically oriented youth movements such as the Green Guards.

⁵ The administrative organization of the party is more complex than this brief statement suggests. For example, in some districts there are interim branch offices between the district and local branches. In other areas the village development committee (VDC), which ostensibly is a part of the local government apparatus, is often one and the same as the rural party branch. The officers, by government decree, are the same. In the early months of 1970 some village branches were reportedly to be consolidated into new TANU local branch offices which would be coterminous with district council wards. A new TANU constitution in 1965 reorganized the party structure in terms of the working and executive committees, and the annual conference of delegates at each level. Party leaders were empowered to summon witnesses, take evidence, and call for documents. A commission of inquiry was also established which gave citizens a means of airing their grievances against wielders of party and government authority. The commission received some 1627 complaints in 1966–67, some 439 were rejected as out of its jurisdiction, 114 were investigated, 54 found justified, and 443 under consideration at the end of 1967. See: Tanzania, Permanent Commissions on Inquiry: Annual Report, 1966–67 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1968)Google Scholar. Also see a review article on this unique constitutional entity by Martin, Robert, Journal of Modern African Studies, VII (04, 1969), 178–183CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ With the Arusha Declaration, the party has been charged with implementing the teachings of African Socialism and self-reliance. The party was declared the supreme government institution in Tanzania during the 14th TANU Conference (June, 1969), with the government its instrument in implementing policies. (East African Standard, June 9, 1969). See Tanzania, The Arusha Declaration (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967)Google Scholar. Also see Nyerere, Julius K., Freedom and Socialism (London: Oxford University Press, 1968)Google Scholar, and Ujamaa—Essays on Socialism (London: Oxford University Press, 1968)Google Scholar.

⁷ Although traditional chiefs, sub-chiefs, and headmen were officially removed from power in 1963, many were able to retain influence by taking party or administrative jobs. Other traditional leaders relied on their religious-magical, ritual, and customary law functions to retain local influence. A headman usually presided over what is now designated as a village. See Miller, Norman N., “Political Survival of Traditional Leadership,” Journal of Modern African Studies, VI (07, 1968), 183–201CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ Based mainly on the institution of chieftaincy, the traditional political system in its purest form would be equated with pre-European administration (Tanzania, 1890). Remnants from the traditional system persist into the present period. Both German and British administrators relied on chiefs for indirect rule, and although chiefs were often appointed, in lieu of hereditary claimants, their local authority was considerable in terms of law, tax collections, and riutal. Ibid., pp. 188–196.

⁹ Those messages classified as indicating coercive pressure were 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 34, 35, 38, 39; mildly coercive: 15, 17, 20, 32, 37, 40; non-coercive: all others.

¹⁰ Messages 11, 28, 30, 39.

¹¹ The Permanent Commission of Inquiry was established essentially to hear such abuses. Tanzania, The Permanent Commission, op. cit.

¹² The Arusha Declaration and subsequent pressures by Julius Nyerere have been aimed at keeping party and government officials from making personal gain by virtue of their positions. The efforts have been more successful on the national and regional levels, than with the isolated rural leadership.

¹³ For details of the sample survey, see the Appendix.

¹⁴ Regarding satisfaction expected, an important arenthetical question is what is the rural party's ability to actually satisfy expectations. In most areas the local party leaders are increasingly able to control resources. The party has been declared the supreme governing body of the nation and the national party propaganda gives local leaders and cell chairmen continuous support and legitimacy. The result is party control over such basic resources as new jobs, local wages, access to some schooling, appointment to honorific positions, access to important meetings, free transportation, and the like.

¹⁵ Other approaches to analyzing participation such as formal-informal, and leader-follower typologies or the comparing of relative degrees of commitment to various roles, are considered less appropriate for an African rural party setting.

¹⁶ Indicating the problem of getting totally can-did responses from farmers on government matters. There is good reason to believe farmers are guarded in an interview situation and are less critical of the government in an interview than they are in their day-to-day exchanges.

¹⁷ Observations indicate the figures are high; farmers are inclined to falsely claim membership or to claim current membership if annual dues were paid in any one year.

¹⁸ The above specific criticisms were leveled against rural party leaders by the then Regional Commissioner for Tabora, Wambura, R. S. in “TANU and the Government” (Tabora: District Council Pamphlet, 1963, cyclostyled)Google Scholar. The comments are indicative of similar problems in many areas of Tanzania.

¹⁹ Selected as representative comments from a survey of rural party organizations in Tabora district, 1966–66 and 1968.

²⁰ In the general elections of 1965, the voters' expectation that many of the incumbents had gotten rich in office led them to vote the man out of office on the basis that another man should have a chance at wealth. See Mwansasu, Bismark and Miller, Norman N., “The Fall of a Minister,” in Cliffe, Lionel (ed.), One-Party Democracy (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967)Google Scholar.

²¹ Party directives in 1969 indicate awareness of this problem and an increased desire by the national party to facilitate local-level communication.

²² A Tabora District official and a Uyui village official interviewed 1965–66. The situation typified here was essentially the same in 1968, during a restudy of the area.

²³ See Huntington, Samuel “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics, XVII (04, 1965), 386–430CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁴ Hyden, Goran, Political Development in Rural Tanzania (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969)Google Scholar, based on research in the Bukoba area, is directly related to the above findings. Comparison of the two studies shows similarities in the high degree of confidence the peasant has in the party, particularly as a “parental” authority; both studies indicate, however, the peasant feels the government does little for the people (pp. 180–212). Misuse of party authority exists in Bukoba, and many complaints similar to those in Tabora were reported by Hyden. These include extortion, peculation, undue court pressure, irregular party procedures, and coercion of Asians. Active resistance to the party directives also occurs, particularly surrounding the orders to up-root coffee trees. Clashes are common, often between old and young coffee planters in the party (pp. 184–191). Similar findings also exist on the multi-faceted nature of the party, and that the party essentially operates in an immobilized, pedestrian society. Both studies indicate a significant improvement for peasants' opportunities to participate in local political issues since 1963 (p. 139). Difficulty in making distinctions between claimed party membership and actual party membership was also reported by Hyden (p. 151). In both studies party support exists outside party membership, and membership does not necessarily mean compliance with the party. Dissatisfaction with income, education and housing are similar in both studies (pp. 200–201).

By contrast, several differences exist in the findings. Bukoba region has more highly developed communication facilities, and there is a greater dependence on the Village Development Committees to disseminate news. Higher levels of literacy and wealth explain some of the differences. Hyden's findings also differ on the assertion that the district and regional level officials are usually equalitarian and corrective of abuses. He points out the numerous dismissals President Nyerere has instigated for abusive or incompetent Regional and Area Commissioners. A further difference lies in the degree of expressed alienation and cynicism; Hyden reports far less than exists in Tabora Region (p. 216).

Only partial agreement exists on the role of traditional authority (pp. 106–124). In Bukoba, peasants are divided on the chief's contemporary legitimacy, whereas in Tabora, traditional leaders still exercise considerable authority. The Bukoba study indicates the Haya have a more cosmopolitan outlook than do the Nyamwezi—again a function of greater wealth, more educational possibilities, and proximity to an urban center, Kampala (p. 157). Political involvement, the level of discussion about politics, the frequency of such discussions, and relative political knowledge are all about equal in the two studies (pp. 217–228). The comparisons were discussed with Professor Hyden in Nairobi, July, 1969.

²⁵ The model's key variables are suggested by the empirical findings of the study; the model should have the capability of explaining how local-level participation occurs, and at the same time, serve to suggest propositions on peasant political behavior.

²⁶ The importance of local-level analysis is a recurring theme in recent literature in the subfields of political anthropology, local politics and development administration. For a methodological discussion of the implication of these sub-fields, see essays by Fred Burke, David Brokensha, Ronald Cohen, Nelson Kasfir, Alvin Magid, Melvin Perlman, Aiden Southall, Marc Swartz, and Rodger Yeager in Miller, Norman N. (ed.), Research in Rural Africa (East Lansing, Michigan: African Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1969), parts I, IIGoogle Scholar. For a discussion of processional analysis at the local level see Swartz, Marc, et al., Political Anthropology (Chicago: Aldine, 1967)Google Scholar; also see Swartz, (ed.), Local-Level Politics (Chicago: Aldine, 1968)Google Scholar. A number of local-level studies relate directly to the present article. For comparisons on the evolution of political changes in Tanzania see particularly Liebenow, J. Gus, “Response to Planned Political Change in a Tanganyika Tribal Group,” this Review, L (06, 1956), 442–461Google Scholar; and Liebenow, , “Legitimacy of Alien Relationships: The Nyatura of Tanganyika,” The Western Political Quarterly, XIV (03, 1961), 64–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For comparisons on the role of chiefs and traditional political systems in Tanzania see Cory, Hans, The Indigenous Political System of the Sukuma (New York: Eagle Press, 1954)Google Scholar. For comparison to local government processes see Burke, Fred G., Local Government and Politics in Uganda (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1965)Google Scholar.