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Riding Waves or Making Waves? The Services and the U.S. Defense Budget, 1981–1993

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

James H. Lebovic
James H. Lebovic
Affiliation:
George Washington University
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Abstract

Bureaucratic politics is the favored explanation of those addressing the perversities of defense budgeting. But it is arguably devoid of politics, given its dependence on either aggregate top-down or horizontal models. I seek to redirect analysis. I disaggregate defense spending (by service and weapon type) and study budget sensitivity to program pressures in the buildups and builddowns of the Reagan-Bush eras. Applying a two-equation model to time-series cross-sectional data, the analysis shows weapon budgets increasing with program diversification and a commitment to defense spending. In turn, it shows programs diversifying to accomodate service objectives: when turning to missions, the services increased program varieties while concentrating program resources.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 88 , Issue 4 , December 1994 , pp. 839 - 852
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1994

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