¹ The most articulate of Strauss' students include Walter Berns, Joseph Cropsey, Harry V. Jaffa and Allan Bloom.

² The bulk of Strauss' criticism of contemporary political theory and political science is to be found in three books: Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953)Google Scholar, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe, 1958)Google Scholar, and What Is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, 1959)Google Scholar. The last named is a collection of essays and book reviews which have appeared in various journals. Henceforth the volumes will be cited as NRH, TM and WPP, respectively.

³ WPP, p. 17 and p. 25 f.

⁴ WPP, p. 38. See also the epilogue by Strauss, in Storing, Herbert J. (ed.) Essays on the Science of Politics (New York, 1962), especially pp. 311, 322, 325Google Scholar; Berns, Walter, “The Behavioral Sciences and the Study of Political Things: The Case of Christian Bay's The Structure of Freedom,” this Review, Vol. 55 (09, 1961), p. 550Google Scholar, and Cropsey, Joseph, “On the Relation of Political Science and Economics,” this Review, Vol. 54 (03, 1960), pp. 3–14Google Scholar.

⁵ WPP, pp. 18–25 and passim.

⁶ By a “mechanical” interpretation of nature Strauss means one which attempts to understand the present in terms of the past (i.e., in terms of efficient rather than “final causes”), and the complex in terms of the more simple (i.e., the whole in terms of its parts).

⁷ WPP, pp. 18–25 and passim.

⁸ WPP, p. 26.

^8a Strauss differentiates “political philosophy” from both “political theory” and “political thought in general”; see WPP, pp. 11–15.

⁹ WPP, p. 20, NRH, p. 6.

¹⁰ NRH, p. 4.

¹¹ WPP, pp. 41, 54, 55.

¹² NRH, p. 6.

¹³ WPP, pp. 72–3.

¹⁴ WPP, p. 21.

¹⁵ WPP, p. 22.

¹⁶ WPP, p. 21.

¹⁷ WPP, p. 24. As Walter Berns puts it: The political, generally speaking, is not visible to any of our senses, or even a combination of them. Racial segregation in the United States is seen by the observer because he can see the injustice of the practice; racial segregation in South Africa is seen by the same observer because of an understanding of justice and injustice that is not confined by a parochial “value system.” Through the “eye of the mind” we are able to see the injustice and hence the political. Walter Berns, “The Behavioral Sciences ….” Op. cit., p. 550.

The above example is, incidentally, rather surprising given the contention of Strauss and his disciples that the modern world is characterized by moral regression rather than moral progress. After all, it is only very recently in human history that dominant opinion has come to regard slavery itself as morally bad.

¹⁸ WPP, p. 22.

¹⁹ NRH, p. 53.

²⁰ NRH, p. 54.

²¹ NRH, pp. 1–8. According to Strauss the dilemma is that: “The more we cultivate reason, the more we cultivate nihilism.” (Ibid., p. 6.)

²² One wonders why, in these passages at least, Strauss identifies modern positivism, and related positions, with both materialism and a “mechanical” conception of natural science, rather than with the critique of the possibilities of knowledge which culminates in Hume. Certainly modern positivists as well as other “moderns” who take heir bearings from the same tradition, would not accept his categories. See, for example, Feigl, Herbert and Brodbeck, May, Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York, 1953)Google Scholar and Nagel, Ernest, The Structure of Science (New York, 1960)Google Scholar.

²³ See de Santillana, Giorgio, The Origins of Scientific Thought (New York, 1961)Google Scholar, and Gillispie, Charles C., The Edge of Objectivity (Princeton, 1960)Google Scholar.

²⁴ By the “whole” I assume Strauss means the “natural order” of the universe and man's place in that order.

²⁵ Although Strauss and his disciples often imply otherwise, they would certainly admit that one cannot argue from conventional standards to the existence of a natural order. Such an argument would be akin to maintaining, on the other side, that natural right cannot exist because people disagree as to the content of any number of very important moral imperatives.

Strauss' assertion, incidentally, that one cannot understand any society except in terms of its purpose, is merely an assertion. Most societies are characterized by the presence of many conflicting human purposes.

²⁶ The difficulty of formulating a definition of “normal” or “healthy” which would enable one to fully differentiate even between very close cases is not, as Strauss would admit, a legitimate argument against regarding the terms as primarily descriptive. For discussions of these issues see Nagel, op. cit., pp. 485–502. See also Hare, R. M., The Language of Morals (London, 1952)Google Scholar; Noel-Smith, P. H., Ethics (Penguin Books Ltd.: Middlesex, 1954)Google Scholar, and Baier, Kurt, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca, 1958)Google Scholar.

²⁷ Most discussions of this kind between individuals of similar cultural background do not proceed this far. However, one could not explain what one means by the expression “good” car to a Martian who only knew the referent of the word car, except by pointing to differences between existing cars.

²⁸ For a discussion of some of these issues see Braybrooke, David, “The Relevance of Norms to Political Description,” this Review, Vol. 52 (12, 1958), pp. 989–1006Google Scholar.

²⁹ The examples are from an article by Robert A. Dahl in which he makes just this point, in reply to a student of Strauss who had criticized his Preface to Democratic Theory. Dahl, Robert A., “A Rejoinder,” this Review, Vol. 51 (12, 1957), p. 1060Google Scholar.

³⁰ NRH, pp. 59–61.

³¹ NRH, p. 61.

³² The break seems to have come with the publication of “What Is Political Philosophy,” in the Journal of Politics in 08, 1957Google Scholar. The essay is reprinted in an expanded form in the book of the same title.

³³ NRH, p. 7.

³⁴ NRH, pp. 81–164.

³⁵ NRH, pp. 163–4.

³⁶ NRH, pp. 77–181.

³⁷ According to Strauss, Hobbes recognized that a consistent materialism would lead to selfnegating skepticism. Thus he adopted a “methodical” materialism. The natural world remains fundamentally unknowable. However, we can know the concepts we use to master the world, since they are our free creation. Hence science must always retain a hypothetical character. NRH, pp. 171–5.

³⁸ NRH, pp. 181–3 passim.

³⁹ NRH, p. 181 and pp. 202–251. Most English and American political theorists, Strauss notes, fail to see that Locke is essentially a consistent (though more respectable) Hobbesian. Rather they assume that the contradictions which they seem to find in Locke's political philosophy are a sign of confusion and failure to realize the implications of his own thought. However, if one examines Locke carefully one recognizes that he was “cautious” rather than naive or stupid, and one can uncover his Hobbesian premises. Of course, contemporary historians of political philosophy, mistakenly believing that the history of political philosophy represents a progression, are all too inclined to misunderstand philosophers of the past, and to assume that they were victims of their epoch or culture. Thus, they fail to realize that the discovery of simple-minded errors is the beginning of the quest for the real intention of these philosophers. One can only recognize this if one takes the history of political philosophy seriously and becomes aware that Locke and Hobbes were giants. See WPP, pp. 221–232. (It is surprising that Strauss should so fully agree with contemporary historians of political philosophy on who the “greats” in the history of political philosophy really were. After all, given the inability of contemporary historians to understand not only classical political philosophy but most political philosophy, we might expect Strauss to come up with some seminal thinkers whom these historians had failed to notice.)

⁴⁰ NRH, p. 182 and p. 231.

⁴¹ NRH, pp. 252–323 and WPP, pp. 41–55. I have used WPP because NRH carries the analysis only through Burke. The essential difference between Strauss' earlier and later work revolves about the relationship between Machiavelli and Hobbes, and does not seem to affect his interpretation of the consequences of their thinking.

⁴² See Cropsey, op. cit.

⁴³ NRH, p. 23 and pp. 244–5.

⁴⁴ NRH, pp. 7–8.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ We may leave aside some dilemmas which Strauss' position seems to involve, for example: In what sense is a norm which can be violated natural? In what sense can someone be called a “base” or evil person if his acts are the result of error rather than of willfulness? And, of course, why is the natural good? If the natural is good by definition, the statement that something is good because it is natural is a tautology and adds nothing. But, if the statement is not analytic, one can still legitimately ask why “the natural” is necessarily good.

⁴⁷ NRH, pp. 7–8. See also NRH, p. 164.

⁴⁸ At least this is the conventional view of Kant's efforts. Since Strauss seems to reject this view it is possible that he conceives of Kant havng had another, more esoteric, enterprise.

⁴⁹ Modern writers generally use the term “clasical physics” to describe the Newtonian world view, and the term “modern physics” to describe developments since quantum and relativity heory. In this essay classical physics refers to Aristotelian physics, Newtonian physics is reerred to as modern physics, and post-Newtonian physics is referred to as contemporary physics.

Of course, the restoration of classical natural right would not resurrect creative political philosophy. Since it would be the “truth,” all that would be left after this restoration would be the practical application of the “truth.”

⁵⁰ E. Nagel, “The Causal Character of Modern Physical Theory,” in Feigl and Brodbeck (eds.), op. cit., pp. 419–437. Incidentally, there seems to be little difference, for theoretical purposes, between a universe in which the fundamental categories are particles of matter and one in which matter and energy are interchangeable.

⁵¹ Morgenau, Henry, The Nature of Physical Reality: A Philosophy of Modern Physics (New York, 1960)Google Scholar.

⁵² Nagel, The Structure of Science, op. cit., pp. 287–288.

⁵³ E. Nagel, “Teleological Explanation and Teleological Systems,” in Feigl and Brodbeck, op. cit., pp. 537–558.

⁵⁴ See footnote 39 above. Strauss' reinterpretation of political philosophy has another interesting implication. He asserts that while modern social scientists are pigmies compared to Locke, so Locke was a pigmy compared to Thomas or Aristotle. This we may indeed accept, but Strauss' position further entails the proposition that Locke and Hobbes were pigmies compared to Strauss and his disciples.

⁵⁵ WPP, p. 38.

^55a In his epilogue to the Storing volume, op. cit., which, unfortunately, came to my attention only after this essay had been written, Strauss seems to change front on a number of points. On the issue which concerns us here he cites Aristotle to prove that “the practical sciences do not depend on the theoretical sciences or are not derivative from them.” (309). This is true because: “The principles of action (of the practical sciences) are the natural ends of man of which he has by nature some awareness.” (Ibid.) The argument is not very convincing, nor, for that matter, very clear.

⁵⁶ WPP, p. 18.

⁵⁷ NRH, p. 177 and pp. 285–6.

⁵⁸ WPP, p. 23.

⁵⁹ NRH, p. 8 and WPP, p. 38. Strauss' assertion that the passions and desires of men are “subhuman” is only an assertion.

⁶⁰ For a discussion of these rules of procedure see Kaufman, Felix, Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York, 1944), pp. 33–66Google Scholar.

⁶¹ For a general discussion of these issues-which elaborates most of the points made above in answer to arguments developed by Maritain, Gilson, Wheelwright and other Catholic or ”classical” thinkers, see Nagel, Ernest, Sovereign Reason (New York, 1954), pp. 1–35Google Scholar. I have not developed the above points in detail, because it is almost impossible to determine where Strauss really stands. I am aware of Catholic and other conventional views of the classics, but, since Strauss' views are, he argues, unconventional, a criticism of conventional views might be wide of the mark.

⁶² See TM and WPP, especially pp. 40–55 of the latter.

⁶³ WPP, pp. 27–40 and 78–94.

⁶⁴ WPP, pp. 221–233.

⁶⁵ WPP, p. 36.

⁶⁶ Republic, VIII, 557.

⁶⁷ Republic, VI, 448–497.

⁶⁸ For example, NRH, p. 1; TM, p. 13, and WPP, pp. 85–6. See also Jaffa, Harry V., Crisis of the House Divided (New York, 1959), p. 409Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ For Strauss, see NRH, pp. 181–2, 245, and WPP, pp. 47 and 49. See also Jaffa, op. cit., pp. 75 and 314, and Berns, W., Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment (Baton Rouge, 1957), p. 45Google Scholar.