¹ The reader's familiarity with the proposals of the President's Committee on Administrative Management is assumed in this essay. See President's Committee on Administrative Management, Report, with Special Studies, submitted to the 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., in accordance with Public Law No. 739.

² The provision for six administrative assistants to the President is, in the opinion of the author, not a very important part of the proposals of the President's Committee. If the administration is not unified in its fundamental organization from the ground up, these six liaison officers cannot give it unity. They would perhaps be useful, but would be too much outside the main stream of administrative activity and too uncertain as to their status and function to be able to assist very greatly in integrating the administrative process.

³ Both the Mead bill (House) and the Byrnes bill (Senate) specifically deny the President power to extend the classified services to positions filled by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Cf. H.R. 8277, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., and S. 2970.

⁴ The Committee's preoccupation with “management” is nowhere more obvious than in its proposals regarding “staff agencies.” The chief executive is in reality a chief legislator, and the Committee is a bit optimistic in expecting to interest him currently in the routine processes of management. If the indefatigable Cleveland, burning the midnight oil in the interest of administrative reform, could not cope with the inevitable mountain of details, it is futile to expect a president of this generation to give any routine supervision to the processes of institutional management. The attempt to make these processes direct wards of the President is liable to leave them orphans still.

If it is desired to give weight to fiscal management, it would seem to be more effective to entrust it comprehensively to an established department with the traditions and prestige of the Treasury. Major questions of policy would be brought to the President's attention as readily as now, and the Secretary of the Treasury could give considerably more interest and attention to the lesser questions than can the President. Cf. Buck's, A. E. proposals in the Committee's Report, with Special Studies, p. 147ffGoogle Scholar. Closer association with the Treasury is also to be considered for the Civil Service Commission (or Administrator) if it is desired to put the weight of an institution behind control processes. It is not reasonable to expect a Civil Service Administrator to get very much of the President's time or attention.

⁵ The use of the corporate device to organize operations within major departments may be regarded in some instances as a type of functional decentralization. Subject to unitary supervision, such corporations would not destroy the lines of authority and responsibility essential in an integrated administrative structure. Unsupervised corporations, corporations with vague functions, and corporations with supervisory responsibility for subordinate administrative units, are a “different breed of cats.”