¹ The position to which I am taking exception is well exemplified by Professor Joad. He writes: “The democrat does not, at any rate in the twentieth century, regard democracy as an ideal form of government, but as the least objectionable form of government that is practicable. It is not a best so much as a second-best, embraced because of the frailties of human nature and accepted less for its own merits than for fear that worse may befall if it be rejected. Thus no systematic defense of democracy is possible, for the reason that democracy is not itself the product of a systematic theory.” Joad, C.E.M., Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics (New York, 1938), p. 770.Google Scholar

To guard against misconceptions, I should add that it may be possible to support democracy as a “second-best” form of government on the basis of a different, and possibly more easily substantiated, theory of ethics than that which is required to support it as the ideal form of government. I shall not deal with that question in this article.

² Lerner, Max, Ideas Are Weapons (New York, 1939), p. 5.Google Scholar See also Hallowell, John H., The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology—with Particular Reference to German Politico-Legal Thought (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1943), Chap. IGoogle Scholar, and the same author's “The Decline of Liberalism,” in Ethics, Vol. 52 (1941–42), pp. 323–349.

³ See Lovejoy, Arthur O., “Reflections on the History of Ideas,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 1 (1940), pp. 3–23, at pp. 17–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Dennis, Lawrence, The Coming American Fascism (New York, 1936), p. 105.Google Scholar

⁵ Two phrases commonly associated with the basic idea of democracy—“equality or rights” and “human dignity”—do not appear here, but it is believed that their substance is included.

⁶ Mill, John Stuart, “Utilitarianism,” in Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government (New York, 1910), p. 4.Google Scholar

⁷ Ibid., p. 36.

⁸ Mill, op. cit., p. 29.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 10–15.

¹⁰ Mill, John Stuart, A System of Logic (2 vols., 10th ed., London, 1879), Vol. II, pp. 484 ff.Google Scholar

¹¹ Mill, John Stuart, “On Representative Government,” Chap. III, in Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government (New York, 1910).Google Scholar

¹² The later development of Utilitarian ethics and its application to democratic theory is omitted because of its reliance upon intuitive principles. Henry Sidgwick, for example, might well have developed a theory of democracy on the foundation of his ethical Utilitarianism. That system, however, as Sidgwick was careful to point out, rested upon the intuitively derived principles of “prudence,” “justice,” and “rational benevolence” (Sidgwick, Henry, The Methods of Ethics (7th ed., London, 1907Google Scholar).

The same remarks apply to the Ideal Utilitarianism of Hastings Rashdall. See his The Theory of Good and Evil (2 vols., 2nd ed., London, 1924), especially Bk. I, Chaps. VII–VIII. The utilitarianism of Stace, W. T. as set forth in The Concept of Morals (New York, 1937)Google Scholar seems to me to belong in a different category and will be dealt with in connection with the theory of Ralph Barton Perry (see pp. 867–875 below).

¹³ Hudson, Jay William, Why Democracy? (New York and London, 1936), p. 62.Google Scholar This recent formulation of idealistic political theory is relied upon heavily in the following paragraphs because it is perhaps the most careful statement of the case for democracy based upon Idealist philosophy. Among moderns, Idealist democratic theory can be traced back at least as far as Rousseau. However, most Idealists, like T. H. Green, who gave the first full expression of ethical theory by an Idealist in English, have not devoted themselves at all fully to a consideration of the theory of democracy.

The theory of rights described above has been adopted by political theorists who consider themselves far removed from the Idealists. Mr. Laski, for instance, defines rights as “those conditions of social life without which no man can seek, in general, to be himself at his best.” Laski, Harold J., A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925), p. 91.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Hudson, op. cit., pp. 70–76, and Hocking, William Ernest, Man and the State (New Haven, 1926), Chap. XXI.Google Scholar

¹⁵ A major difficulty arises out of the fact that even the development of mental and moral capacities may depend upon material goods of which there is a limited supply and which therefore “admit of being competed for.” In so far as Idealists attempt to meet this difficulty, it is generally by arguing that the fully developed self is characterized above all by good will.

¹⁶ Hudson, op. cit., pp. 73–79; Hocking, William Ernest, The Lasting Elements of Individualism (New Haven, 1937), p. 35Google Scholar; Lindsay, A. D., I Believe in Democracy (London, 1940), pp. 11–12Google Scholar; Swabey, Marie Collins, Theory of the Democratic State (Cambridge, 1937), p. 19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ Hudson, op. cit., p. 28.

¹⁸ To be sure, Idealists might seek further support for their arguments by reference to their general metaphysical position regarding the relation of the individual self to God, or the Absolute; but the theory, as stated above, can stand alone.

¹⁹ Hobhouse, , Liberalism (New York, 1911), p. 123.Google Scholar

²⁰ Ibid., p. 130. Since Hobhouse nowhere fully develops a justification of democracy, one can only surmise that he would support the principle of equality along lines similar to the Idealists. There is at least a hint of such an approach in the passages quoted above.

²¹ H. J. Paton's coherence theory of Good appears to me to be substantially the same as Hobhouse's theory of the Rational Good as far as concerns its application to the theory of democracy. On the problem of individual versus social good, note, for example, his statement that although goodness ultimately resides in the actions of individuals, “the goodness of an individual seems to belong to him primarily when he wills to make himself a vehicle of the whole, when he wills his actions and determines his life as an element in the wider coöperative activity of the whole.” Paton, H. J., The Good Will (London, 1927), p. 307.Google Scholar

²² See Perry, Ralph Barton, General Theory of Value (New York and London, 1926), p. 115.Google Scholar

²³ Perry, Ralph Barton, Shall Not Perish from the Earth (New York, 1940), p. 21.Google Scholar

²⁴ Perry, , General Theory of Value, p. 88.Google Scholar

²⁵ See Murphy, Arthur E., The Uses of Reason (New York, 1943), pp. 97–105Google Scholar, and Stace, W. T., The Destiny of Western Man (New York, 1942), pp. 264 ff.Google Scholar and especially p. 278.

²⁶ Rader, Melvin, No Compromise—the Conflict between Two Worlds (New York, 1939), pp. 82–83.Google Scholar Cf. Perry's standards of intensity, preference, and inclusiveness. Op. cit., Chap. XXI.

²⁷ Perry, , General Theory of Value, p. 655.Google Scholar

²⁸ See W. T. Stace, op. cit., Chaps. XI and XII, especially pp. 262–277, and also The Destiny of Western Man (New York, 1942), Chap. XII.

²⁹ Cf. the statement by Arthur E. Murphy that “when men coöperate freely, through their reasonable acknowledgement of mutual responsibilities, as members of a ‘kingdom of ends,’ a level of conduct is achieved which is of peculiar value, a moral order which makes sense of much in human nature that without it would remain frustrated and unfulfilled.” Murphy, Arthur E., The Uses of Reason (New York, 1943), p. 117.Google Scholar See further the whole of Pt. II, Chap. I.

³⁰ Perry, op. cit., pp. 669–674.

³¹ Perry, , Shall Not Perish from the Earth, p. 29.Google Scholar

³² Perry, Ralph Barton, The Moral Economy (New York, 1909).Google Scholar Notice this passage: “Justice imputes a certain inviolability to the claims of that unit of life which we term loosely a human, personal, moral, free, or rational being. There is some sense in which you are a finality; making it improper for me simply to dispose of you, even if it be my sincere intention to promote thereby the well-being of humanity” (p. 64). And again: “Discussion involves mutual respect, in which each party acknowledges the finality of the other as a vehicle of truth. This, I believe, is that moral equality, that dignity and ultimate responsibility attaching to all rational beings alike, without which justice cannot be fulfilled” (p. 66).

³³ Speaking, in The Moral Economy, of presumptive equality, Perry wrote: “I … mean that there is an idea that the best life is for all; and that if there are many that are incapable of entering into it, then they must be helped to be capable. And I mean, furthermore, that this idea works irresistibly. It commands the support of the whole army of interests. It will never be abandoned because it makes for the increase of life on the whole; and hence no social order will henceforth be stable that is not based upon it.” Especially the last sentence suggests that Perry is arguing only that more people find satisfaction in a just society than in an unjust one.

³⁴ It must be remembered that we are not concerned with mere individual instances in which action in accordance with democratic principles cannot be shown to be to a person's interest in that instance taken by itself. All that is required is that on the whole democratic institutions tend to maximize the individual's satisfaction. He cannot expect to be permitted to enjoy such institutions if he insists on abiding by them only in those instances in which they benefit him.

³⁵ For a strong statement of the position that democracy must be based upon “transcendental” values, which are “not susceptible to empirical proof” and “must be accepted upon faith,” see John H. Hallowell, “The Decline of Liberalism,” loc. cit. (note 1 at p. 342). Note also Willmoore Kendall's assertion that the principle of majority rule is “self-evident” and incapable of proof or disproof. Kendall, Willmoore, “The Majority Principle and the Scientific Élite,” Southern Review, Vol. 4 (1938–1939), pp. 463–473, at p. 465.Google Scholar An elaboration of the dangers involved in the refusal to analyze the basis for democratic beliefs may be found in an article by Hook, Sidney on “The Philosophical Presuppositions of Democracy,” in Ethics, Vol. 52 (1941–1942), pp. 275–296, at pp. 275–276.CrossRefGoogle Scholar