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Partisan Polarization Is the Primary Psychological Motivation behind Political Fake News Sharing on Twitter

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 May 2021

MATHIAS OSMUNDSEN Open the ORCID record for MATHIAS OSMUNDSEN [Opens in a new window] ,
ALEXANDER BOR Open the ORCID record for ALEXANDER BOR [Opens in a new window] ,
PETER BJERREGAARD VAHLSTRUP ,
ANJA BECHMANN Open the ORCID record for ANJA BECHMANN [Opens in a new window]  and
MICHAEL BANG PETERSEN Open the ORCID record for MICHAEL BANG PETERSEN [Opens in a new window]
MATHIAS OSMUNDSEN*
Affiliation:
Aarhus University
ALEXANDER BOR*
Affiliation:
Aarhus University
PETER BJERREGAARD VAHLSTRUP*
Affiliation:
Aarhus University
ANJA BECHMANN*
Affiliation:
Aarhus University
MICHAEL BANG PETERSEN*
Affiliation:
Aarhus University
*
Mathias Osmundsen, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, [email protected].
Alexander Bor, Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, [email protected].
Peter Bjerregaard Vahlstrup, Teaching Associate Professor, School of Communication and Culture—Information Science, Aarhus University, [email protected].
Anja Bechmann, Professor, School of Communication and Culture, DATALAB, Aarhus University, [email protected].
Michael Bang Petersen, Professor, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, [email protected].
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Abstract

The rise of “fake news” is a major concern in contemporary Western democracies. Yet, research on the psychological motivations behind the spread of political fake news on social media is surprisingly limited. Are citizens who share fake news ignorant and lazy? Are they fueled by sinister motives, seeking to disrupt the social status quo? Or do they seek to attack partisan opponents in an increasingly polarized political environment? This article is the first to test these competing hypotheses based on a careful mapping of psychological profiles of over 2,300 American Twitter users linked to behavioral sharing data and sentiment analyses of more than 500,000 news story headlines. The findings contradict the ignorance perspective but provide some support for the disruption perspective and strong support for the partisan polarization perspective. Thus, individuals who report hating their political opponents are the most likely to share political fake news and selectively share content that is useful for derogating these opponents. Overall, our findings show that fake news sharing is fueled by the same psychological motivations that drive other forms of partisan behavior, including sharing partisan news from traditional and credible news sources.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 115 , Issue 3 , August 2021 , pp. 999 - 1015
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association

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