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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 May 2012
We have readily assumed that, within Muslim countries, fundamentalists will most oppose American influence and policies, but Lisa Blaydes and Drew A. Linzer find a striking and perhaps surprising regularity: Anti-Americanism is most pronounced in the least observant Islamic countries. Moreover, opposition to the United States does not seem to be related to any particular American policies or to American culture generally. Anti-Americanism arises instead, they argue in “Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World,” from elite strategy, in which fundamentalist political factions fan anti-American sentiments to compete with more secular groups. That competition is most intense, and hence the anti-American strategy most frequently employed, in Islamic countries in which divisions between secular and religious forces are most pronounced. Employing a mix of statistical and case study methods, Blaydes and Linzer find that, within countries, observant Muslims are likelier to express anti-American sentiments; between countries, competition between secular and religious forces, and not fundamentalism, inspires anti-U.S. sentiment.
1 The Managing Co-editor, as a previous co-author with one of the authors of this article, recused himself from all consideration of it.
2 Most famously, Alexander tried to merge Persian and Macedonian loyalties by integrating Persians into the Macedonian army, by giving Persians command of some units, and (not least) by the mass marriage of his leading officers to daughters of the Persian aristocracy.
3 Thus models of democratic voting assume that candidates focus their attention on “swing” voters, not those already committed to their (or the opposition's) side.
4 In the United States, for example, many decisions about localized spending are made by the supposedly neutral civil servants of the General Services Administration (GSA), and laws (e.g., the Hatch Act) specifically forbid elected officials from attempting to influence the GSA's decisions. For evidence on the extent to which such decisions can, in fact, be politicized, see Gordon, Sanford C., (2011), “Politicizing Agency Spending Authority: Lessons from a Bush-era Scandal,” this Review, 105: 717–34Google Scholar.
5 Lupu, Noam and Pontusson, Jonas (2011), “The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution,” this Review, 105: 316–36Google Scholar.
6 The authors conjecture, but do not prove, that their result will hold also in bodies elected at large (e.g., by proportional representation).
7 See for example, Gerber, Alan S., Gimpel, James G., Green, Donald P., and Shaw, Daron R. (2011), “How Large and Long-lasting Are the Persuasive Effects of Televised Campaign Ads? Results from a Randomized Field Experiment,” this Review, 105: 135–50Google Scholar.
8 In the middle stages of the experiment, subjects could choose to read stories that agreed with the frame initially presented, that were completely unrelated to it, or that contradicted the initial frame.
9 Tacitus: Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus imperium; atque, ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant. (“They plunder, they slaughter, they steal, and this they falsely name empire; they make a desert, and they call it peace”).
11 One widely accepted guide to such norms is given by the American Anthropological Association's Code of Ethics, particularly Section III. http://www.aaanet.org/issues/policy-advocacy/upload/AAA-Ethics-Code-2009.pdf
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