² On the early, rather ill-defined difference within the American government between these two conceptions of the alliance, see Reston's, James sensitive report, New York Times, February 20, 1949, IV, p. 3.Google Scholar

³ See statements by Secretary of State Acheson, President Truman, and General Bradley: Hearings, North Atlantic Treaty, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 1st Secs., p. 44; Department of State Bulletin (hereafter cited as Bulletin), XX (May 22, 1949), 645; XXI (August 9, 1949), 186–88; New York Times, April 6, 1949, p. 3.

⁴ Testimony by General Bradley on July 29, 1949, Hearings, Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 71.Google Scholar

⁵ Hearings, North Atlantic Treaty, pp. 12–13, 22–24, 33.Google Scholar

⁶ Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 8894; New York Times, May 11, 1949, p. 1.

⁷ Hearings, Mutual Defense Assistance Program of 1950, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 22 Google Scholar; Hearings, To Amend the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 27 Google Scholar; New York Times, June 6, 1950, p. 3; ibid., June 8, 1950, p. 6.

⁸ Bulletin, XXI (August 8, 1949), p. 193.

⁹ See the recollections of Kennan, George F. in Russia, the Atom, and the West (New York, 1957), pp. 88–91 Google Scholar, and the contemporaneous impressions of SenatorDulles, John Foster in the Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 13086.Google Scholar

¹⁰ The North Atlantic Council, meeting in New York on September 15, 1950, agreed to adopt a “forward strategy” that would resist aggression as far eastward as possible. Ismay, Lord, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954 (Paris, 1954), p. 32.Google Scholar SHAPE planners developed the forward strategy after the Headquarters was established in 1951.

¹¹ Statement on June 27, 1950, Bulletin, XXIII (July 3, 1950), p. 5.

¹² New York Times, May 25, 1951, p. 4.

¹³ Testimony on August 30, 1950, asking for additional Mutual Defense Assistance Program appropriations, the largest portion of which was intended for NATO countries. Bulletin, XXIII (September 11, 1950), p. 437.

¹⁴ Hearings, Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duly in the European Area, Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 79, 80, 106–7.Google Scholar

¹⁵ The concept of the “year of maximum danger,” although never more than a guide line for rearmament, was based upon a calculation of the time by which Russia would acquire sufficient atomic capacity to be in a position to utilize her numerical superiority in mobilized manpower for exerting intensive political or even military pressure—a concept that had been reflected in NSC 68. See General Bradley's, General Vandenberg's, and General Twining's explanations in Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1953, Senate Committee on Appropriations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 332–34, 385.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See General Gruenther's statement in Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1952, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 82d Congress, 2d Sess., p. 218 Google Scholar; also, General Eisenhower's statement as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, First Annual Report (Paris: SHAPE, 1952), p. 27.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See, for example, statements by Prime Minister Churchill on December 6, 1951, Parl. Deb. (H.C.), vol. 494, p. 2592, and by the forthcoming Secretary of State, Dulles, on February 16, 1952, in the Congressional Record, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1800–02, later repeated in office in a statement to the North Atlantic Council, New York Times, December 16, 1955, p. 1 Google Scholar, and in Congressional testimony in May, 1956, Hearings, Mutual Security Appropriations for 1957, Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 4, 5, 13.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Statement on Defense, 1957; see also, Statement on Defense, 1965 and Churchill's speech to the House of Commons on March 1, 1955, in Parl. Deb (H.C.), vol. 537, pp. 1894–1905. Churchill evidently made a fundamental strategic decision to bring military policies into balance with economic limitations by relying more heavily on strategic air-power and nuclear weapons in 1952, soon after coming to office. See Murphy's, Charles articles in Fortune: January, 1953, pp. 80 ff.Google Scholar, and December, 1953, pp. 77 ff.

¹⁹ See, for example, statements by President Eisenhower and Supreme Allied Commander General Norstad. Bulletin, XXX (April 26, 1954), p. 619; XXXVI (February 18, 1957), p. 254.

²⁰ New York Times, April 25, 1954, p. 27; January 8, 1954, p. 2; July 25, 1954, p. 1; August 14, 1954, p. 3; Bulletin, XXXI (October 18, 1954), pp. 562–66.

²¹ Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, XCIX (November, 1954), pp. 507–23.

²² New York Times, December 22, 1954, p. 4.

²³ Testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense McNeil and Secretary of Defense McElroy in Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959, House Committee on Appropriations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 369, 378.Google Scholar New York Times, March 14, 1958, p. 1; October 27, 1958, p. 1. The chief factors supporting this conclusion were said to be the higher casualty rate, the greater depth of the battle line, and the more complex logistics required.

²⁴ Parl. Deb. (H.C.), vol. 537 (1955), pp. 2182–83; vol. 549 (1956), p. 1035; vol. 564 (1957), pp. 1765, 1766; vol. 583 (1958), pp. 395, 410. It is significant that in 1958 even Field Marshal Montgomery was stating, albeit in retirement, that when both sides achieved “nuclear sufficiency” in due course, the West would not commit suicide by using its nuclear deterrent against a minor Russian aggression with conventional forces. Journal of Ihe Royal United Service Institute, CIII (November 1958), pp. 468–87.

²⁵ Neither Secretary Dulles nor any other official spokesman followed up the hint, which Dulles introduced in an article in 1957, that nuclear weapons now “need not involve vast destruction and widespread harm to humanity” and that “in the future it may thus be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, (October 1957), p. 31.

²⁶ New York Times, March 12, 1959, p. 12.

²⁷ See Secretary of Defense McElroy's statement of this position in Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1969, pp. 370, 378, 389.Google Scholar Both President Eisenhower's and Secretary McElroy's positions were in distinct contrast to the testimony of Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor in March, 1959. General Taylor saw “many situations short of general war” in Western Europe in which he could “visualize attack by satellites alone.” In such situations, he said, the United States might engage in “rather prolonged operations of the conventional type.” Hearings, Major Defense Matters, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 50, 56–57.

²⁸ New York Times, April 21, 1959, p. 1. This view is in accordance with General Norstad's statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 6, 1959, that NATO “would deal with any situation that could be dealt with, with conventional weapons, if possible.” Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1959, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 466.Google Scholar

²⁹ New York Times, October 8, 1958, p. 12.

³⁰ Ibid., June 25, 1956, p. 22; Bulletin, XXXVI (February 18, 1957), 251–55; XXXVII (December 16, 1957), 952–55; “The Sword and the Shield of NATO,” Army, VIII (December, 1957), 44–47; Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1958, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 185 ff.Google Scholar; Hearings, Mutual Security Appropriations for 1969, Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 564–65; Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1959, pp. 445–47, 466.Google Scholar

³¹ For the sake of this discussion let us assume that the ally in question has at least a dozen relatively invulnerable missiles, including mobile and massively-shielded solid-fuel or pre-packaged liquid-fuel missiles and, possibly, sea-launched missiles, for the present generation of soft-based liquid-fuel IRBM's would seem to be virtually useless as a second-strike capability.

³² In December, 1957, the United States secured the approval of the NATO heads of government to placing IRBM's and distributing nuclear stocks on allied territory, in accordance with the negotiation of bilateral agreements. However, the only agreements negotiated by 1960 were with Great Britain, Italy, and Turkey. See note 35.

³³ On the technical and economic feasibility of other countries acquiring nuclear warheads by their independent efforts, see Knorr, Klaus, “Nuclear Weapons: ‘Haves’ and ‘Have-Nots,’” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36 (October 1957), pp. 167–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Simons, Howard, “World-wide Capabilities for Production and Control of Nuclear Weapons,” Daedalus (Summer, 1959), pp. 385–409.Google Scholar

³⁴ Hearings, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 2d Secs., pp. 156, 446 ff., 525–27.

³⁵ Under the Anglo-American agreement, signed on February 22, 1958, the British own and operate the missiles the United States places on British territory, the United States owns their nuclear warheads, and the decision to launch the missiles is joint. Bulletin, XXXVIII (March 17, 1958), pp. 418–19. However, the agreements that the United States negotiated with Italy in March, 1959, and with Turkey in October, 1959, were reported to provide that the decision to launch the missiles placed on foreign territory would require the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe as well as of both governments. Manchester Guardian, March 31, 1959. New York Times, October 11, 1959, p. 1. The United States has failed to obtain France's agreement to a similar scheme. At the end of October, 1959, the government announced that it would not establish any more Thor missile bases in Europe. Ibid., October 31, 1959, p. 1.

³⁶ “Disengagement” refers to proposals containing the first and usually one or more of the following four elements: the withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from the Germanies or beyond; arms limitation and control within a central European zone; a political settlement concerning the two Germanies; a guarantee of the agreement by the United States, the Soviet Union, and possibly other signatories. The following observations do not apply to the mere limitation and inspection of existing forces in central Europe.

³⁷ Conceivably, twelve to eighteen German divisions conventionally armed (assuming that the prohibition of German nuclear weapons would be part of any bargain acceptable to the Soviet Union) could perform some of the functions of NATO's present shield; but they would be greatly hampered by the absence of advance joint planning and integration with NATO, as well as by the adverse psychological effect of their political isolation. Only if armed forces in the area of Soviet and American withdrawal were strictly limited by reliable inspection, would this liability be somewhat mitigated, providing that Soviet troops had withdrawn at least to the eastern Polish border.

³⁸ Russia, the Atom, and the West, pp. 62–63.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 54.