¹ Thus, some authors have considered Marxist philosophy the key; others have stressed the over-all significance of Soviet ideology; still others claim that Soviet foreign policy represents simply a continuation of Russian nationalism, traditionalism, and imperialism; the theory of bureaucratic tyranny has been advanced in several variants; the Byzantium theory of Russian-Western conflict explains Soviet foreign policy in terms of its inherent antagonism towards the West; the need for security or the necessity for expansion is another rationale; and geographical location, Asiatic influence and heritage, urge to the sea, Gorer's swaddling hypothesis, social psychology explanations of “national character,” and many other theories have been developed to clarify, explain and interpret Soviet foreign policy, either by themselves or in combination with others. See Glaser, William A., “Theories of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Classification of the Literature,” World Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 27, pp. 128–152 (July, 1956)Google Scholar. See also Reshetar, John S. Jr.,, Problems of Analyzing and Predicting Soviet Behavior, Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science (New York, 1955)Google Scholar.

² The extreme view, that Soviet foreign policy is “too enigmatic to be analyzed at all and leaps must therefore be made into the dark,” (British Foreign Secretary Macmillan was reported to have said in a foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons that Soviet moves could be interpreted “either as reassuring signs of a new policy” or as “sinister warnings of a more subtle but just as deadly threat. One can speculate on all that for ever …. What we have to do is to act.” The Economist, June 25, 1955, p. 1105Google Scholar) is widespread but irrelevant; a search for some theory of Soviet foreign policy is preferable to such a view, if only because the decisions of Soviet policy-makers have affected the non-totalitarian world more than have decisions of the leadership of the latter: the Second World War, the cold war, and the Korean war illustrate this fact abundantly.

³ On the “interohangeability” of political and military weapons, see especially Fainsod, M., How Russia Is Ruled (Harvard, 1954), p. 285Google Scholar; also de Huszar, G. B., “Strategy and Tactics of Expansion,” in Huszar, et al. , Soviet Power and Policy (New York, 1955), p. 395Google Scholar. For strategy and tactics in political movements, see Heberle, R., Social Movements, an Introduction to Political Sociology (1941), p. 359Google Scholar; Ebenstein, W., Today's Isms (New York, 1954), p. 72Google Scholar; Historicus, , “Stalin on Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 27 (1949), p. 157CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Neumann, Sigmund, Permanent Revolution: the Totalitarian Stale in a World at War (New York, 1942) ch. 1Google Scholar; Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., The Permanent Purge (Harvard, 1956), p. 24CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Diplomaticus, “Stalinist Theory and Soviet Foreign Policy,” Review of Politics, Vol. 14, (1952) p. 468CrossRefGoogle Scholar; X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25 (1947), p. 566CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Das Reich, May 11, 1941, p. 1Google Scholar.

⁵ Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, January 30, 1941, p. 1Google Scholar.

⁶ Lenin, , Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder (New York, 1920), p. 31Google Scholar.

⁷ Bulganin, N. A., Tridtsat' let Sovetskykh vooruzhennylh sil (Moscow, 1948), p. 12Google Scholar. Cf. also World Today, Vol. 11 (1955), p. 492Google Scholar; Garthoff, Raymond L., Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe, Illinois, 1953), p. 30Google Scholar; and pertinent articles in Red Star (24 March, 1955, Soviet Marshal Rotmistrov; 20 May, 1955, Major-General Kalachnik; 28 May, 1955, Col. Kashirin and Col. Federov) and Soviet Fleet (6 May, 1955, Major-General Korniyenko). See especially Galay, N., “New Trends in Soviet Military Doctrine,” Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Vol. 3 (June, 1956), pp. 3–12Google Scholar.

⁸ “The Socialist ideology can exist by nature only in constant contest, in fight.” Neues Deutschland, January 23, 1957, p. 1Google Scholar.

⁹ Stalin, , Istoria vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (Moscow, 1938), p. 339Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Stalin, , Sochineniia, Vol. V (Moscow, 1947), p. 62Google Scholar. “Socialism in one country” is a strategic concept: the ideological goal “will be more rapid and more thorough, the more thoroughly Socialism fortifies itself in the first victorious country, the faster this country is transformed into a base for the further unfolding of world revolution, into a lever for the further disintegration of imperialism.” Stalin, , “Oktiabrskaia revoliutsia i taktika russkikh kommunistov,” Voprosy Leninizma, 11th ed. (Moscow, 1945) p. 104Google Scholar.

¹¹ Stalin, Sochineniia, ibid.

¹² Laski, Harold J., The Secret Battalion; an Examination of the Communist Attitude to the Labour Party (London, 1946), p. 37Google Scholar.

¹³ Cf. Arendt, H., The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1951)Google Scholar; Moore, B. Jr.,, Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power (Harvard, 1950)Google Scholar; Towster, J., Political Power in the USSR, 1917–1947 (New York, 1948)Google Scholar; Friedrich, C. J., “The Unique Character of Totalitarian Society,” p. 52Google Scholar, and section on “Totalitarianism and Ideology” (Inkeles, A., Litell, F. H., and Gurian, W.) p. 87, in Totalitarianism, ed. Friedrich, (Harvard, 1954)Google Scholar; Northrop, F. S., Meeting of East and West (New York, 1946)Google Scholar; Historicus, op. cit.; Diplomatics op. cit. For additional valuable material see Florinsky, M., Fascism and National Socialism (New York, 1936)Google Scholar; Rader, M., “The Conflict of Fascist and Democratic Ideals,” Antioch Review, Vol. 3 (1943), p. 250CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schuman, F. L., Russia Since 1917: Four Decades of Soviet Politics (New York, 1957)Google Scholar; “X,” op. cit.

¹⁴ The recently published and widely debated book Not By Bread Alone by Vladimir Dudintsev proved to be such an exception to this rule that it caused quite a stir within the Soviet Union.

¹⁵ American viewers had this fact solidly and vividly confirmed by Khruschchev when he appeared on the CBS television network's “Face the Nation” on June 2, 1957, and prophesied that “your grandchildren in America will live under socialism.”

¹⁶ Zhdanov, A., The International Situation (Moscow, 1947), p. 22Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Ob oppozitsii (Moscow, 1928), p. 465Google Scholar.

¹⁸ McKenzie, Kermit E., “The Soviet Union, the Comintern and World Revolution,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 65 (1950), p. 214CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ Stalin, , Voprosy Leninizma, 11th ed. (Moscow, 1945), p. 104Google Scholar.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 54.

²¹ Stalin, , Sochineniia, Vol. V (Moscow, 1947), p. 62Google Scholar.

²² Khrushchev, Speech before the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, Feb. 14, 1956, Second (evening) Session. XX s'ezd kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza 14–25 fevralia 1956 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet. Gos. izd-tvo pol. literatury (Moscow, 1956), p. 10Google Scholar.

²³ Ibid., p. 452.

²⁴ Sulzberger, C. L., “Soviet Foreign Policy—New Methods, Old Aims,” N. Y. Times, January 30, 1956, Editorial PageGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ Neues Deutschland, Jan. 23, 1957, p. 1Google Scholar.

²⁶ Khrushchev, supra, pp. 34–35.

²⁷ Abridged Proceedings, Seventh World Congress, The Communist International, No. 17–18, Vol. XII, p. 128 (Sept. 20, 1935)Google Scholar.

²⁸ Soviet nationalism, however, was claimed not to be of the old-fashioned kind: it was alleged to be different on the ground that it was built upon the conglomeration of races and nations composing the Soviet Union. “The strength of Soviet patriotism lies in the fact that it is based not on racial or nationalist prejudices but … on the fraternal partnership of working people of all the nations of our country.” (Stalin, speech of Nov. 6, 1944, quoted in Carr, E. H., The Soviet Impact on the Western World (1949), p. 98Google Scholar.) It was a combination of old nationalism, history, military exploits, etc., plus new nationalism, glorification of revolution, the common heritage of the Soviet regime, the common struggle against others, and common identification in terms of domestic struggle for security in the Soviet Union first.

²⁹ Khrushchev, Speech before the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, supra, p. 39.

³⁰ New York Times, March 6, 1956, p. 1, col. 8.

³¹ New York Times, Jan. 31, 1956, p. 8.

³² Ponomarev, B. in Pravda, March 31, 1956, p. 1Google Scholar.

³³ The present trend represents a softening—but not change—of Stalin's practical goals for Soviet foreign policy: “(1) to utilize every contradiction and conflict among surrounding capitalist groups and governments for the purpose of disintegrating imperialism; (2) to spare no pains or means to assist the proletarian revolutions of the West; (3) to take all necessary measures to strengthen the national liberation movement in the east; and (4) to strengthen the Red Army.” “The Party before and after the Seizure of Power,” Works, Vol. V (1947), p. 111Google Scholar.

³⁴ VIII s'ezd Rossiiskoi kommunisticheskoi partii (Bolshetrikov), Moskva, 18–23 marta 1919 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet. (Moscow, 1919) p. 337Google Scholar.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Rezoliutsii XIX s'ezda kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, 5–14 oktiabria 1952 g. Gos. izd-stvo pol. literatury, 1952, p. 56.

³⁷ New York Times, Feb. 26, 1956, p. 2, col. 8; for the text of the resolution, see XX s'ezd kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiwza, supra, pp. 409 and 499.

³⁸ Lenin, , Collected Works, Vol. XXI, Bk. 1 (1932), p. 152Google Scholar.

³⁹ Jaroslawski, E., Aus der Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowiet-Union, Part I (1931), p. 167Google Scholar, quoted in Marx, F. M. (ed.), “Totalitarian Politics, Symposium on the Totalitarian State,” Proc., American Philosophical Society, Vol. 82 (1940), p. 10Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Khrushchev, Twentieth Party Congress, supra, p. 41.

⁴¹ “To strengthen by all means the fraternal relations with the People's Republic of China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, the (East) German Democratic Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of (North) Korea, the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Mongolian Peoples Republic, remembering that the greater the unity and might of the Socialist countries the more secure is the cause of peace.

“To strengthen by all means friendship and cooperate with the fraternal people of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.” Ibid.

⁴² “To reinforce indefatigably the bond of friendship and cooperation with the republic of India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria and other states that stand for peace. To support countries that refuse to be involved in military blocs; to cooperate with all forces seeking to preserve peace.

“To develop and strengthen friendly relations with Finland, Austria, and other neutral countries.” Ibid.

⁴³ “To conduct an active policy of further improving relations with the United States of America, Britain, France, Western Germany, Japan, Italy, Turkey, Iran and other countries, with a view to strengthening mutual confidence, extending trade, and expanding contacts and cooperation in the sphere of cultural science.” Ibid., pp. 41 and 42.

⁴⁴ Stalin, , Sochineniia, Vol. V (1947), p. 62Google Scholar. Italics added.

⁴⁵ Khrushchev, Twentieth Party Congress, supra, p. 10.

⁴⁶ On Soviet attempts for economic integration of its satellites, see Schwartz, H., “Soviet Tightens Economy of Bloc.” New York Times, March 25, 1956, p. 19Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Twentieth Party Congress, supra, p. 310.

⁴⁸ Khrushchev, supra, p. 10.

⁴⁹ “It is the sacred duty of every state where the working class is in power to preserve and develop mutual friendship and cooperation, and the unity of the Socialist states will continue to strengthen with each day.” Pravda, June 20, 1957.

⁵⁰ For Soviet propaganda as a factor economizing the material cost of world domination, see Lasswell, H. D., “The Strategy of Soviet Propaganda,” Proceedings, The Academy of Political Science, Vol. 24 (1951), p. 214CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵¹ Cf. Goodman, Elliot R., “The Soviet Union and World Government,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 15 (1953), p. 251CrossRefGoogle Scholar.