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Military Coercion in Interstate Crises

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 October 2005

BRANISLAV L. SLANTCHEV
BRANISLAV L. SLANTCHEV
Affiliation:
University of California–San Diego
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Abstract

Military mobilization simultaneously sinks costs, because it must be paid for regardless of the outcome, and ties hands, because it increases the probability of winning should war occur. Existing studies neglect this dualism and cannot explain signaling behavior and tacit bargaining well. I present a formal model that incorporates both functions and shows that many existing conclusions about crisis escalation have to be qualified. Contrary to models with either pure sunk costs or tying-hands signaling, bluffing is possible in equilibrium. General monotonicity results that relate the probability of war to an informed player's expected payoff from fighting do not extend to this environment with its endogenous distribution of power. Peace may involve higher military allocations than war. Rational deterrence models also assume that a commitment either does or does not exist. Extending these, I show how the military instrument can create commitments and investigate the difficulties with communicating them.

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ARTICLES
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 99 , Issue 4 , November 2005 , pp. 533 - 547
Copyright
© 2005 by the American Political Science Association

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