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“Killer” Amendments in Congress

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

John D. Wilkerson
John D. Wilkerson*
Affiliation:
University of Washington
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Abstract

For more than three decades, social choice theorists and legislative scholars have studied how legislative outcomes in Congress can be manipulated through strategic amendments and voting. I address the central limitation of this research, a virtual absence of systematic empirical work, by examining 76 “killer” amendments considered during the 103d and 104th congresses. I trace the effects of these amendments on their related bills using archival sources, test for strategic voting using NOMINATE as the baseline measure of legislator preferences across a range of issues, and explore with OLS regression why some killer amendments are more strategically important than others. The findings indicate that successful killer amendments and identifiable strategic voting are extremely rare. In none of the cases examined could the defeat of a bill be attributed to adoption of an alleged killer amendment.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 93 , Issue 3 , September 1999 , pp. 535 - 552
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1999

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