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How the Workplace Affects Employee Political Contributions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 August 2021

JAN STUCKATZ Open the ORCID record for JAN STUCKATZ [Opens in a new window]
JAN STUCKATZ*
Affiliation:
Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, France
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Abstract

How important is the workplace for employees’ political donations? Contrary to research on workplace political mobilization, existing work assumes that most individual donors contribute ideologically. I link donations of employees and Political Action Committees (PACs) from 12,737 U.S. public companies between 2003 and 2018 to show that 16.7% of employee donations go to employer-PAC-supported candidates. I investigate the dynamics between employee and PAC donations within firm–legislator pairs over time and find that both rank-and-file employees and executives contribute more dollars to company-supported politicians. Firm–employee donation alignment is stronger on powerful and ideologically moderate politicians with high value for the employer. Results from a difference-in-differences design further show modest changes in the partisan composition of employee donations after swift changes in the partisan donations of corporate PACs. The results suggest investment-related rather than ideological motives for alignment and highlight the importance of corporations for money in politics.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 116 , Issue 1 , February 2022 , pp. 54 - 69
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association

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