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Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy, I
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
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The attempt to give international society a minimum of government and order through the establishment of a League of Nations has proved only moderately successful. It is true that states have begun to play politics in Geneva, but they have not ceased the older and grimmer struggle for power in the world at large. The state is still today, as far as its international relations are concerned, primarily a military organization. Its specific aims in its struggle for power may be many, but among them the geographic objectives, the attainment of which will increase the state's relative military strength, are the oldest and the most persistent.
There are several types of geographic objectives, but in this analysis we shall concern ourselves with the strategic geographic objectives of foreign policy. Before we attempt to analyze these specific objectives, however, it is essential to consider briefly the phenomenon of expansion as such, which may be defined as a mere advancement of frontier in contrast to the conquest of a particular bit of territory for strategic reasons.
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- Copyright © American Political Science Association 1939
References
1 Cf. Maull, Otto, Politische Geographie (Berlin, 1925), p. 96Google Scholar.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Brunhes, Jean and Vallaux, Camille, La Géographie de l'Histoire (Paris, 1921), p. 341Google Scholar.
5 Fawcett, C. B., Frontiers (London, 1919), p. 63Google Scholar. There is a striking modern revival of this custom in the recently announced Russian determination to depopulate a zone on the Russian western border (New York Times, October 13, 1938, p. 1).
6 Haushofer, Karl, Grenzen in ihrer Geographischen und Politischen Bedeutung (Berlin, 1927), p. 74Google Scholar; von Scheliha, Renata, Die Wassergrenze im Altertum (Breslau, 1931), pp. 97–100Google Scholar.
7 “Supprimons par hypothèse la démarcation linéaire; supprimons même les travaux militaires de protection et d'attaque: la masse de conflits latents qui forme la base solide de la frontière de tension subsiste toujours, tant que le pays reste fait pour attirer les hommes et tant que de grands groupes organisés en nations ont besoin de la place au soleil que représente la zone de démarcation. Supprimée par un acte de la volonté humaine, la frontière militaire et politique renaîtrait spontanément de l'impérissable frontière ethnique, économique et sociale. Les frontières de tension ne peuvent réellement disparaître que si les États autonomes et souverains disparaissent aussi. La fin des frontières serait la fin des États, expressions concrètes des nations vivantes … ” (Brunhes and Vallaux, op. cit., p. 352).
8 Note also that the same bridgehead can be an offensive position for one state, but a defensive position for the other. Already in 1697 Ludwig von Baden said of Strassburg: “Für Deutschland dient diese Stadt zu nichts anderem als einer ständigen Versicherung des Friedens, für Frankreich aber ist sie eine immerfort aufstehende Kriegspforte, woraus es, so oft es nur will, in das platte Land vorbrechen kann.” Quoted in Hennig, Richard, Geopolitik (Leipzig, 1931), p. 140Google Scholar. In this connection it is interesting to note that the foreign concessions in China have been used as bridgeheads for military operations in the interior by the Western powers and Japan.
9 See this Review, Feb. and Apr., 1938.
10 Cf. Breasted, James H., A History of Egypt (London, 1912), p. 285Google Scholar, and Rostovtzeff, Michael, Caravan Cities (London, 1932), p. 101Google Scholar.
11 Hennig, op. cit., p. 210.
12 Hennig, op. cit., p. 211.
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