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Free Association and the Theory of Proportional Representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Robert Sugden
Robert Sugden*
Affiliation:
University of Newcastle upon Tyne
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Abstract

Several of the earliest advocates of proportional representation upheld the “principle of free association”: that electors should be free to choose the constituencies to which they belong. This article analyzes this principle in game-theoretic terms and investigates how far the free association “game” can be simulated through proportional representation. It is assumed that each voter's prime concern is that his most-preferred candidate should be elected. If preferences are single peaked, the outcome of an election based on free association can be predicted; the same outcome would result from a modified form of the single transferable vote.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 78 , Issue 1 , March 1984 , pp. 31 - 43
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1984

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