Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jkksz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-05T00:17:52.672Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Explaining Interethnic Cooperation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

James D. Fearon  and
David D. Laitin
James D. Fearon
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
David D. Laitin
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Though both journalists and the academic literature on ethnic conflict give the opposite impression, peaceful and even cooperative relations between ethnic groups are far more common than is large-scale violence. We seek to explain this norm of interethnic peace and how it occasionally breaks down, arguing that formal and informal institutions usually work to contain or “cauterize” disputes between individual members of different groups. Using a social matching game model, we show that local-level interethnic cooperation can be supported in essentially two ways. In spiral equilibria, disputes between individuals are correctly expected to spiral rapidly beyond the two parties, and fear of this induces cooperation “on the equilibrium path.” In in-group policing equilibria, individuals ignore transgressions by members of the other group, correctly expecting that the culprits will be identified and sanctioned by their own ethnic brethren. A range of examples suggests that both equilibria occur empirically and have properties expected from the theoretical analysis.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 90 , Issue 4 , December 1996 , pp. 715 - 735
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1996

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Banton, Michael. 1983. Racial and Ethnic Competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Barth, Fredrik, ed. 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston: Little Brown.Google Scholar
Bates, Robert. 1983. “Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa.” In State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. Rothchild, Donald and Olorunsola, Victor A.. Boulder, CO: Westview.Google Scholar
Boehm, Christopher. 1994. Blood Revenge: The Anthropology of Feuding in Montenegro and Other Tribal Societies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.Google Scholar
Bremmer, Ian, and Taras, Ray. 1993. Nation and Politics in the Soviet Successor States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Calvert, Randall. 1995. “Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions.” In Explaining Social Institutions, ed. Knight, Jack and Sened, Itai. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Cohen, Abner. 1969. Custom and Politics in Urban Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Colson, Elizabeth. 1974. Tradition and Contract. Chicago: Aldine.Google Scholar
Cornell, Bradford. 1995. “A Hypothesis on the Origins of Ethnic Discrimination.” Rationality and Society 7 (01):4–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Deutsch, Karl. 1966. The Nerves of Government. New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
Downs, George, and Rocke, David. 1990. Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.Google Scholar
Downs, George, and Rocke, David. 1995. Optimal Imperfection? Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Dumont, Paul. 1982. “Jewish Communities in Turkey during the Last Decades of the 19th Century.” In Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, vol. 1, ed. Braude, Benjamin and Lewis, Bernard. New York: Holmes and Meier.Google Scholar
Dubnow, S. M. 1916. History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, vol. 1. Trans. Friedlaender, I.. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America.Google Scholar
Ellison, Glenn. 1994. “Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching.” Review of Economic Studies 61 (07):567–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1994. “Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem.” Paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York.Google Scholar
Fudenberg, Drew, and Tirole, Jean. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Gagnon, V. P. 1994/1995. “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia.” International Security 19 (Winter):130–66.Google Scholar
Gambetta, Diego. 1993. The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Gellner, Ernest. 1988. “Trust, Cohesion, and the Social Order.” In Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. Gambetta, Diego. London: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Gluckman, Max. 1955. Custom and Conflict in Africa. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.Google Scholar
Goldscheider, Calvin, and Zuckerman, Alan S.. 1984. The Transformation of the Jews. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Green, Edward, and Porter, Rob. 1984. “Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information.” Econometrica 52 (01): 87–100.Google Scholar
Greif, Avner. 1989. “Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders.” Journal of Economic History 49 (12):857–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greif, Avner. 1994. “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society.” Journal of Political Economy 102 (10):912–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hardin, Russell. 1995. One for All. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Hasluck, Margaret. 1954. The Unwritten Law in Albania. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hobbes, Thomas. 1985 [1651]. Leviathan. New York: Penguin Books.Google Scholar
Horowitz, Donald. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Kandori, Michihiro. 1992. “Social Norms and Community Enforcement.” Review of Economic Studies 59 (01):63–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaplan, Robert D. 1993. Balkan Ghosts. New York: Vintage.Google Scholar
Knappert, Jan. 1965. “Language Problems of the New Nations of Africa.” African Quarterly 5 (1):95–105.Google Scholar
Laitin, David. 1995a. “Marginality: A Microperspective.” Rationality and Society 7 (01):31–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laitin, David. 1995b. “National Revivals and Violence.” Archives Européennes de Sociologie 36 (1):3–43.Google Scholar
Landa, Janet Tai. 1994. Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.Google Scholar
Lederhendler, Eli. 1989. The Road to Modern Jewish Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, I. M. 1961. A Pastoral Democracy. London: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lohmann, Susanne. 1997. “A Theory of Domestic-International Linkage.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Milgrom, Paul, North, Douglass, and Weingast, Barry. 1990. “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade.” Economics and Politics 2 (03):1–23.Google Scholar
Miller, Willian Ian. 1990. Bloodtaking and Peacemaking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Moore, Sally Falk. 1978 Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Morrison, Donald, Mitchell, Robert, and Paden, John. 1989. Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook. New York: Paragon House.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morrow, James D. 1992. “Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining.” International Studies Quarterly 36 (06):153–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moynihan, Daniel P. 1993. Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Olzak, Susan. 1992. The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Posen, Barry. 1993. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” Survival 35 (Spring):27–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Robert, with Leonardi, Robert and Nanetti, Raffaella Y.. 1993. Making Democracy Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Rieder, Jonathan. 1985. Canarsie. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Samatar, Said S. 1982. Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Tajfel, Henri, ed. 1982. Social Identity and Intergroup Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Taylor, Michael. 1976. Anarchy and Cooperation. London: Wiley.Google Scholar
Wagner, R. Harrison. 1993. “The Causes of Peace.” In Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End, ed. Licklider, Roy. New York: New York University Press.Google Scholar
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.