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Executive-Legislative Federalism in West Germany

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Peter H. Merkl
Peter H. Merkl
Affiliation:
University of California, Santa Barbara
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Extract

The form of government which we call federalism can readily be illustrated with examples from history. Its institutional structure and constitutional intricacies, however, still present real difficulties of definition by logical construction and have given rise to many conflicting interpretations of the term. Kenneth C. Wheare, in one of the more recent attempts at general definition, describes the federal principle as the “coordinate division of powers” between the central and regional governments, which in their respective spheres are “mutually independent” and “coequally supreme.” Such language envisions a system in which both central and regional governments have a complete set of the three branches of government with full powers in their respective spheres of jurisdiction, and a minimum of institutional overlap or interdependence.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 53 , Issue 3 , September 1959 , pp. 732 - 741
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1959

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References

1 Federal Government (3d ed., London, 1953), pp. 1–7, 13–15, 32–33Google Scholar.

2 Brie, Siegfried, Theorie der Staatenverbindungen (Stuttgart: Enke, 1886), p. 103Google Scholar.

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4 See William Anderson's book review, this Review, Vol. 40 (Oct., 1946), p. 995.

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8 Compiled from Reichsamt, Statistisches, Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich 1930, pp. 510–511Google Scholar; and Bundesamt, Statistisches, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1956, p. 395Google Scholar.

9 It would be misleading to count the actual vetoes as a measure of the influence of the Bundesrat, since these vetoes only record its failures to utilize the levers of power at its disposal. Schaefer, Hans, Der Bundesrat (Koeln: Heymanns, 1955), pp. 73–96Google Scholar; and Karlheinz Neunreither's article in this issue of this Review, above, p. 713.

10 The Bundesrat seldom makes use of its right to initiate bills. Schaefer, op. cit., pp. 60–65.

11 For details of this procedure of supervision, see Maunz, Theodor, Deutsches Staatsrecht (6th ed., Muenchen: Beck, 1956), p. 163Google Scholar.

12 Weber, Werner, Spannungen und Kraefte im westdeutschen Verfassungssystem (Stuttgart: Vorwerk, 1951), p. 93Google Scholar; Eschenburg, Theodor, Staat und Gesellschaft in Deutschland, (Stuttgart: Schwab, 1956), pp. 631–632Google Scholar; and Neunreither, op. cit.

13 The proportion of the average Land budget used for personnel expenditures is far higher than that of the federal budget, which again demonstrates the greater preoccupation of the Laender governments with administrative duties.

14 Computed from Wirtschaftskunde der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, 1955), pp. 469–475Google Scholar; Bundesminister der Justiz, op. cit., pp. 5–6; and der Justiz, Bundesminister, Die Bundesgesetzgebung waehrend der ersten Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestags 1949/1953, Beilage zum Bundesanzeiger, no. 161 (Aug. 22, 1953), p. 7Google Scholar.

15 Laski, Harold J., The Foundations of Sovereignty (New York, 1921), pp. 17–29Google Scholar; Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (New Haven, 1917), pp. 268–275Google Scholar; and Emerson, Rupert, State and Sovereignty in Modern Germany (New Haven, 1928), pp. 94–114Google Scholar. Also Friedrich, Carl J., “Federal Constitutional Theory and Emergent Proposals,” in Macmahon, Arthur W., Federalism, Mature and Emergent (Garden City, N. Y., 1955), p. 512Google Scholar.

16 K. C. Wheare, op. cit., pp. 5–7, 25–26.

17 Haas, Diether, “Bundesgesetze ueber Organisation und Verfahren der Landesbehoerden,” Archiv des oeffentlichen Rechts, LXXX (1955), 81et seq.Google Scholar; and Kurt Held, “Der autonome Verwaltungsstil der Laender und das Bundesratsveto nach Artikel 84(1) des Grundgesetzes,” ibid., pp. 50–80. Also Laforet, Wilhelm, “Verwaltung und Ausfuehrung der Bundesgesetze,” Die Oeffentliche Verwaltung (1950), p. 221et seq.Google Scholar; and Pathe, Karl, “Die Ausfuehrung der Bundesgesetze,” Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (1951), p. 681et seq.Google Scholar

18 There are a few cases in which the federal supervision and control goes farther than this, but they concern mostly federal subjects of jurisdiction, the administration of which had been delegated to the Laender. Apart from the collection of federal taxes by the Laender, this category is not very important.

19 Schaefer, Hans, “Bundesaufsicht und Bundeszwang,” Archiv des oeffentlichen Rechts, LXXVIII (1952/1953), 1–49Google Scholar; and Zinn, Georg August, “Die Bundesaufsicht nach dem Grundgesetz,” Die Oeffentliche Verwaltung (1950), p. 522et seq.Google Scholar Also Bundesverfassungsgericht, , Entscheidungen, III, 49et seq.Google Scholar

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