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The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816–1985

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

D. Scott Bennett  and
Allan C. Stam III
D. Scott Bennett
Affiliation:
The Pennsylvania State University
Allan C. Stam III
Affiliation:
Yale University
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Abstract

We present a model of war duration which incorporates both realpolitik and domestic political variables. We hypothesize that strategy, terrain, capabilities, and government type, among other variables, will play key roles in determining the duration of war. We test these hypotheses using hazard analysis and find empirical support for our key arguments. We find that the realpolitik variables play a greater role than regime behavior and type in determining war duration. We also find that historically, on average, mobilization and strategic surprise have little effect on war duration and that wars are not duration dependent.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 90 , Issue 2 , June 1996 , pp. 239 - 257
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1996

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