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Constitutional Law in 1924–1925: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1924

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Robert E. Cushman*
Affiliation:
Cornell University

Extract

The decisions arising under the commerce clause of the Constitution during the 1924 term of the Supreme Court did not involve any striking extension of national authority in that field. There was no case approaching in significance the Recapture Clause Case decided in the previous term. However, the reinforcement of a familiar principle through a striking application of it, or the lucid and pungent expression of an old doctrine, lends some significance to several cases which otherwise have no far-reaching importance.

In the case of Brooks v. United States the court sustained the constitutionality of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1919. The act subjected to heavy penalties any one who transported or caused to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce any motor vehicle, knowing it to have been stolen, and any one who, with the same guilty knowledge, “shall receive, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any motor vehicle, moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce.” It is certainly no surprise to learn from the opinion of Chief Justice Taft that the power to regulate commerce which is broad enough to enable Congress to bar from interstate transportation lottery tickets, diseased cattle, adulterated food, prize-fight films, and the like, and to penalize the interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes, is a power which can likewise be used to punish those who abuse the privileges of interstate and foreign commerce by using them in the furtherance of larceny or the disposal of stolen goods.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1926

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References

1 Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456. See comment in this Review, vol. 19, p. 51.

2 267 U. S. 432.

3 Act of Oct. 29, 1919, 41 Stat. at L. 324.

4 247 U. S. 251.

5 266 U. S. 127.

6 Act of Feb. 28, 1920, 41 Stat. at L. 456.

7 The clause reads: “No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another ….”

8 See the earlier important interstate controversy brought before the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, decided in 1906.

9 266 U. S. 405.

10 158 U. 8. 564.

11 266 U. S. 474.

12 Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342.

13 In Spokane and Inland R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, the Federal Employers' Liability Act, applicable to “every common carrier by railroad engaging in commerce between states,” was held to apply to electric interurban lines.

14 Newark v. Central R. Co. of N. J., 267 U. S. 377, holds that congressional power over foreign and interstate extends to the authorization of a railroad bridge with draws over a navigable bay lying wholly within the boundaries of a state.

15 253 U. S. 245.

16 See Professor Corwin's comment on the case in the Review, vol. 14, p. 641.

17 268 U. S. 501.

18 Act of Dec. 17, 1914, 38 Stat. at L. 785; Act of Feb. 24, 1919, Chap. 18, 40 Stat. at L. 1057, 1130.

19 249 U. S. 86.

20 268 U. S. 5.

21 It is held in Edwards v. Cuba R. Co., 268 U. S. 628, that subsidies of lands, physical property, and money paid by the government of Cuba for the construction of roads on the island, in consideration of which the roads were to reduce certain rates, are not income of the roads within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.

22 268 U.S. 466.

23 267 U. S. 87.

24 The constitutional provision for the pardoning power of the President is in the following words: “and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.” Art. II, Sec. 2., U. S. Const.

25 See the interesting comment on this case by Dean J. P. Hall in 20 Ill. Law Rev. 165. See Story on the Constitution (5th ed.) Sec. 1503, and Kawle, p. 165.

26 Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383.

27 Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298.

28 267 U. S. 132.

29 See his note on this case in 20 Ill. Law Rev. 162.

30 The court throws further light upon the meaning of “probable cause” justifying search and seizure in the cases of Steele v. United States, 267 U. S. 498, and Dumbra v. United States, 268 U. S. 435.

31 266 U. S. 34.

32 The familiar rule laid down in the case of United States v. Evans, 213 U. S. 297, that no writ of error may be allowed the government in a criminal case where the verdict is for the accused, is held in United States v. Weissman, 266 U. S. 377, to apply in a case in which the trial judge had directed a general verdict of not guilty because the indictment was defective.

33 266 U. S. 373.

34 For supplementary opinion upon the same point overruling petition for rehearing see Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U. S. 442.

35 268 U. S. 178.

36 The case of Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R. Co., 268 U. S. 633, sets up the barrier of due process of law against the attempted revival of claims against the earner already barred by the Interstate Commerce Act.

37 266 U. S. 42.

38 Act of Oct. 15, 1914, 38 Stat. at L. 738.

39 19 Wallace 505.

40 267 U. S. 80.

41 Silberschein v. United States, 268 U. S. —, holds that the decisions of the director of the Veteran's Bureau are final “unless the decision is wholly unsupported by evidence, or is wholly dependent upon a question of law, or is seen to be clearly arbitrary or capricious.”

42 United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344.

43 268 U. S. 295.

44 268 U. S. 563.

45 268 U. S. 588.

46 257 U. S. 377.

47 262 U. S. 371.

48 267 U. S. 203.

49 261 U. S. 72.

50 268 U. S. 378.

51 268 U. S. 402.

52 268 U. S. 346.

53 1 Fed. (2d) 798.

54 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters 243.

55 176 U. S. 581.

56 In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 XI. S. 390, Justice McReynolds makes this statement regarding the meaning of the term “liberty” as used in the due process clause: “Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”

57 Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U. S. 167.

58 Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516.

59 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78.

60 A clear statement of this distinction is found in Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197.

61 268 U.S. 652.

62 Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616.

63 Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47.

64 268 U. S. 510.

65 262 U. S. 390.

66 267 U. S. 552.

67 262 U. S. 522.

68 243 U. S. 426.

69 267 U. S. 188.

70 245 U. S. 304.

71 266 U. S. 497.

72 267 U. S. 540.

73 Endicott Johnson Co. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U. S. 285, upheld as consistent with due process of law a New York statute providing that the wages, salary, or income of a judgment debtor may be garnisheed up to 10% by his creditor without notice to such debtor provided he has an income or wage of as much as $12 per week, and requiring that the employer must pay this amount from wages due the debtor or become liable himself to the judgment creditor.

74 268 U. S. 473.

75 188 U. S. 189.

76 266 U. S. 271.

77 Numerous objections under the Fourteenth Amendment were raised against the California inheritance tax law but the act was upheld in Stebbins & Hurley v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137.

78 266 U. S. 187.

79 266 U. S. 379.

80 268 U. S. 643.

81 267 U. S. 359.

82 Two cases involving questions of due process in the computation of rates are Banton v. Belt Line Ry. Corp. 268 U. S. 413, and Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Works of Washington, 268 U. S. 39.

83 267 U. S. 493.

84 267 U. S. 330.

85 268 U. S. 258.

86 268 U. S. 276.

87 Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50.

88 Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189.

89 266 U. S. 570.

90 267 U. S. 307.

91 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610.

92 267 U. S. 317.

93 268 U. S. 325.

94 120 U. S. 489.

95 Ozark Pipe Line Co. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 71, Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203.

96 266 U. S. 32.

97 Fort Smith Spelter Co. v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 267 U. S. 231.

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