Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-xbtfd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-20T01:03:08.943Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Bias in Perceptions of Public Opinion among Political Elites

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 March 2018

DAVID E. BROOCKMAN  and
CHRISTOPHER SKOVRON
DAVID E. BROOCKMAN*
Affiliation:
Stanford Graduate School of Business
CHRISTOPHER SKOVRON*
Affiliation:
Northwestern University
*
David E. Broockman is an Assistant Professor, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 655 Knight Way Stanford, CA 94305-7298 ([email protected]), https://people.stanford.edu/dbroock/.
Christopher Skovron is a Postdoctoral Scholar, Institute for Policy Research and Institute on Complex Systems, Northwestern University, 2040 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208 ([email protected]), http://sites.northwestern.edu/cskovron/.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The conservative asymmetry of elite polarization represents a significant puzzle. We argue that politicians can maintain systematic misperceptions of constituency opinion that may contribute to breakdowns in dyadic representation. We demonstrate this argument with original surveys of 3,765 politicians’ perceptions of constituency opinion on nine issues. In 2012 and 2014, state legislative politicians from both parties dramatically overestimated their constituents’ support for conservative policies on these issues, a pattern consistent across methods, districts, and states. Republicans drive much of this overestimation. Exploiting responses from politicians in the same district, we confirm these partisan differences within individual districts. Further evidence suggests that this overestimation may arise due to biases in who contacts politicians, as in recent years Republican citizens have been especially likely to contact legislators, especially fellow Republicans. Our findings suggest that a novel force can operate in elections and in legislatures: Politicians can systematically misperceive what their constituents want.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 112 , Issue 3 , August 2018 , pp. 542 - 563
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2018 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

The authors’ names appear in alphabetical order. We thank seminar participants at Michigan, Northwestern, Stanford, and the American Political Science Association’s Annual Meeting as well as Jon Bendor, Jamie Druckman, Don Green, Vince Hutchings, Geoff Kabaservice, Skip Lupia, Neil Malhotra, Fabian Neuner, Ken Shotts, Stuart Soroka, Laura Stoker, Nick Valentino, and Rob Van Houweling for helpful feedback. Remaining errors are our own. Skovron acknowledges the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program for support. The CCES data used in this article were supported by the National Science Foundation, Awards #1430505 and #1225750. Replication materials are available at the American Political Science Review Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DQZXQB.

References

REFERENCES

Achen, Christopher H. 1977. “Measuring Representation: Perils of the Correlation Coefficient.” American Journal of Political Science 21: 805–15.Google Scholar
Achen, Christopher H. 1978. “Measuring Representation.” American Journal of Political Science 22: 475–510.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Achen, Christopher H., and Bartels, Larry M.. 2016. Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Ahler, Douglas J., and Broockman, David E.. Forthcoming. “The Delegate Paradox: Why Polarized Politicians Can Represent Citizens Best.” Journal of Politics. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2958017.Google Scholar
Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Schaffner, Brian. 2015. “CCES Common Content, 2014.” Computer file. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/XFXJVY.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Bartels, Larry M. 2008. Unequal Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Bawn, Kathleen, Cohen, Martin, Karol, David, Masket, Seth, Noel, Hans, and Zaller, John. 2012. “A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics.” Perspectives on Politics 10 (3): 571–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bendor, Jonathan, and Bullock, John G.. 2008. “Lethal Incompetence: Voters, Officials, and Systems.” Critical Review 20 (1–2): 1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bergan, Daniel E. 2009. “Does Grassroots Lobbying Work? A Field Experiment Measuring the Effects of an Email Lobbying Campaign on Legislative Behavior.” American Politics Research 37: 327–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bergan, Daniel E., and Cole, Richard T.. 2015. “Call Your Legislator: A Field Experimental Study of the Impact of Citizen Contacts on Legislative Voting.” Political Behavior 37 (1): 27–42.Google Scholar
Berinsky, Adam J., and Lenz, Gabriel S.. 2014. “Red Scare? Revisiting Joe McCarthy’s Influence on 1950s Elections.” Public Opinion Quarterly 78 (2): 369–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blee, Kathleen M., and Creasap, Kimberly A.. 2010. “Conservative and Right-Wing Movements.” Annual Review of Sociology 36: 269–86.Google Scholar
Broockman, David E., and Ryan, Timothy J.. 2016. “Preaching to the Choir: Americans Prefer Communicating to Copartisan Elected Officials.” American Journal of Political Science 60 (4): 1093– 107.Google Scholar
Butler, Daniel M., and Dynes, Adam. 2016. “How Politicians Discount the Opinions of Constituents with Whom They Disagree.” American Journal of Political Science 60 (4): 975–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Butler, Daniel M., and Nickerson, David W.. 2011. “Can Learning Constituency Opinion Affect How Legislators Vote? Results from a Field Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 6: 55–83.Google Scholar
Caughey, Devin, and Warshaw, Christopher. 2015. “Dynamic Estimation of Latent Opinion Using a Hierarchical Group-Level IRT Model.” Political Analysis 23 (2): 197–211.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Caughey, Devin, and Warshaw, Christopher. Forthcoming. “Policy Preferences and Policy Change: Dynamic Responsiveness in the American States, 1936–2014.” American Political Science Review.Google Scholar
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Druckman, James N., and Jacobs, Lawrence R.. 2006. “Lumpers and Splitters: The Public Opinion Information that Politicians Collect and Use.” Public Opinion Quarterly 70 (4): 453.Google Scholar
Eggers, Andrew C., and Lauderdale, Benjamin E.. 2016. “Simulating Counterfactual Representation.” Political Analysis 24 (2): 281– 90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellis, Christopher, and Stimson, James A.. 2012. Ideology in America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Enos, Ryan D., and Hersh, Eitan D.. 2017. “Campaign Perceptions of Electoral Closeness: Uncertainty, Fear and Over-Confidence.” British Journal of Political Science 47 (3): 501–19.Google Scholar
Erikson, Robert S. 2013. Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Erikson, Robert S., MacKuen, Michael B., and Stimson, James A.. 2002. The Macro Polity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Fang, Lee. 2013. The Machine: A Field Guide to the Resurgent Right. NewYork: The New Press.Google Scholar
Fenno, Richard F. 1977. “U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration.” American Political Science Review 71 (3): 883–917.Google Scholar
Fiorina, Morris P., and Levendusky, Matthew S.. 2006. Disconnected: The Political Class versus the People. Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences of America’s Polarized Politics. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 49–71.Google Scholar
Gilens, Martin. 2012. Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Gilens, Martin, and Page, Benjamin I.. 2014. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens.” Perspectives on Politics 12 (3): 564–81.Google Scholar
Goss, Kristin A. 2008. Disarmed: The Missing Movement for Gun Control in America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Grossmann, Matt, and Hopkins, David A.. 2015. “Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats: The Asymmetry of American Party Politics.” Perspectives on Politics 13 (1): 119–39.Google Scholar
Grossmann, Matt, and Hopkins, David A.. 2016. Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hacker, Jacob S., and Pierson, Paul. 2005. Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Hacker, Jacob S., and Pierson, Paul. 2015. Confronting Asymmetric Polarization. In Solutions to Political Polarization in America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hall, Andrew B. 2015. “What Happens When Extremists Win Primaries?” American Political Science Review 109 (1): 18–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, Andrew B., and Snyder, James M.. 2015. “Candidate Ideology and Electoral Success” working paper).Google Scholar
Hanretty, Chris, Lauderdale, Benjamin E., and Vivyan, Nick. 2016. “Comparing Strategies for Estimating Constituency Opinion from National Survey Samples.” Political Science Research and Methods 1–21.Google Scholar
Hedlund, Ronald D., and Friesema, H. Paul. 1972. “Representatives’ Perceptions of Constituency Opinion.” Journal of Politics 34 (3): 730–52.Google Scholar
Henderson, John, and Brooks, John. 2016. “Mediating the Electoral Connection: The Information Effects of Voter Signals on Legislative Behavior.” The Journal of Politics 78 (3): 653–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hill, Seth J. 2017. “Representation of Primary Electorates in Congressional Roll Call Votes” (working paper). http://www.sethjhill.com/SJH_PrimariesRollCalls.pdf.Google Scholar
Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Shapiro, Robert Y.. 1995. “The Rise of Presidential Polling the Nixon White House in Historical Perspective.” Public Opinion Quarterly 59 (2): 163–95.Google Scholar
Jacobson, Gary C. 2013. “How the Economy and Partisanship Shaped the 2012 Presidential and Congressional Elections.” Political Science Quarterly 128 (1): 1–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kastellec, Jonathan, Lax, Jeffrey R., Malecki, Michael, and Phillips, Justin H.. 2015. “Polarizing the Electoral Connection: Partisan Representation in Supreme Court Confirmation Politics.” Journal of Politics 77 (3): 787–804.Google Scholar
Kingdon, John W. 1967. “Politicians’ Beliefs about Voters.” American Political Science Review 61 (1): 137–45.Google Scholar
Krimmel, Katherine, Lax, Jeffrey R., and Phillips, Justin H.. 2016. “Gay Rights in Congress: Public Opinion and (Mis) Representation.” Public Opinion Quarterly 80 (4): 888–913.Google Scholar
Kuklinski, James H., and Elling, Richard C.. 1977. “Representation Role, Constituency Opinion, and Legislative Roll-Call Behavior.” American Journal of Political Science 21 (1): 135–47.Google Scholar
Lax, Jeffrey R., and Phillips, Justin H.. 2009a. “Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness.” American Political Science Review 103 (3): 367–85.Google Scholar
Lax, Jeffrey R., and Phillips, Justin H.. 2009b. “How Should We Estimate Public Opinion in the States?”American Journal of Political Science 53 (1): 107–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lax, Jeffrey R., and Phillips, Justin H.. 2012. “The Democratic Deficit in the States.” American Journal of Political Science 56 (1): 148–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lax, Jeffrey R., Phillips, Justin H., and Zelizer, Adam. 2017. “The Party or the Purse? Unequal Representation in the U.S. Senate.” http://www.columbia.edu/~jrl2124/partypurse.pdf. Accessed March 4 2018.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Layman, Geoffrey C., Carsey, Thomas M., Green, John C., Herrera, Richard, and Cooperman, Rosalyn. 2010. “Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics.” American Political Science Review 104 (02): 324–46.Google Scholar
Lelkes, Yphtach, and Sniderman, Paul M.. 2016. “The Ideological Asymmetry of the American Party System.” British Journal of Political Science 46 (4): 825–44.Google Scholar
MacGuffie, Robert. 2009. “Rocking the Town Halls—Best Practices.” http://d35brb9zkkbdsd.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/townhallactionmemo.pdf.Google Scholar
Mann, Thomas E., and Ornstein, Norman J.. 2013. It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
McCarty, Nolan. 2015. “What We Know and Do Not Know about Our Polarized Politics.” In Political Polarization in American Politics, eds. Hopkins, Daniel J. and Sides, John. London: Bloomsbury.Google Scholar
McCarty, Nolan, Poole, Keith T., and Rosenthal, Howard. 2006. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Miler, Kristina C. 2010. Constituency Representation in Congress: The View from Capitol Hill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Miller, Warren E., and Stokes, Donald W.. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” American Political Science Review 57: 45–56.Google Scholar
Noel, Hans. 2012. “The Coalition Merchants: The Ideological Roots of the Civil Rights Realignment.” Journal of Politics 74 (1): 156–73.Google Scholar
Park, David K., Gelman, Andrew, and Bafumi, Joseph. 2004. “Bayesian Multilevel Estimation with Poststratification: State-Level Estimates from National Polls.” Political Analysis 12 (4): 375–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parker, Kim, Horowitz, Juliana, Igielnik, Ruth, Oliphant, Baxter, and Brown, Anna. 2017. “America's Complex Relationship with Guns.” Pew Research Center Report.Google Scholar
Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Verba, Sidney, and Brady, Henry. 2012. The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Shor, Boris. 2015. “Polarization in American State Legislatures.” In American Gridlock: The Sources, Character, and Impact of Political Polarization, eds. Thurber, James A. and Yoshinaka, Antoine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Skocpol, Theda, and Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander. 2016. “The Koch Network and Republican Party Extremism.” Perspectives on Politics 14 (3): 681–99.Google Scholar
Skocpol, Theda, and Williamson, Vanessa. 2011. The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Squire, Peverill. 2007. “Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 7 (2): 211–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tausanovitch, Chris, and Warshaw, Christopher. 2014. “Representation in Municipal Government.” American Political Science Review 108 (3): 605–41.Google Scholar
Theriault, Sean M. 2006. “Party Polarization in the US Congress.” Party Politics 12 (4): 483–503.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Theriault, Sean M. 2013. The Gingrich Senators. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Thomsen, Danielle M. 2014. “Ideological Moderates Won’t Run: How Party Fit Matters for Partisan Polarization in Congress.” Journal of Politics 76 (3): 786–97.Google Scholar
Tversky, Amos, and Kahneman, Daniel. 1973. “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability.” Cognitive Psychology 5 (2): 207–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Uslaner, Eric M., and Weber, Ronald E.. 1979. “U.S. State Legislators’ Opinions and Perceptions of Constituency Attitudes.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 4 (4): 563–85.Google Scholar
Warshaw, Christopher, and Rodden, Jonathan. 2012. “How Should We Measure District-Level Public Opinion on Individual Issues?” Journal of Politics 74 (1): 203–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weissberg, Robert. 1978. “Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress.” American Political Science Review 72 (2): 535– 47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wlezien, Christopher. 1995. “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending.” American Journal of Political Science 39 (4): 981–1000.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: Link

Broockman and Skovron Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DQZXQB
Link
Supplementary material: PDF

Broockman and Skovron supplementary material

Online Appendix

Download Broockman and Skovron supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 2 MB
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.