¹ This literature is reviewed in my “Perceptions of Time, Perceptions of Alternatives, and Patterns of Communication as Factors in Crisis Decision-Making,” as the earlier version of this paper, noted above, was entitled. See also Horvath, F. E., “Psychological Stress: A Review of Definitions and Experimental Research,” in von Bertalanffy, L. and Rapoport, Anatol, eds., General Systems Yearbook, IV (Ann Arbor, Society for General Systems Research, 1959)Google Scholar.

² Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Ministerium des k. and k. Hauses und des Äusseren, Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914; Diplomatische Aktenslücke des Österreich-ungarischen Ministeriums des Aussern, Bittner, Ludwig and Pribram, Alfred, Srbik, Heinrich and Uebersberger, Hans, eds., vol. VIII (Vienna and Leipzig, 1930.)Google Scholar

France, Commission for the Publication of Documents Relative to the War of 1914, Documents Diplomatiques Francais (1871–1914), 3d series, vols. X and XI (Paris, 1936)Google Scholar.

Great Britain, Foreign Office, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914, vol. XI, Gooch, G. P. and Temperley, Harold, eds. (London, 1926)Google Scholar.

Montgelas, Max and Schücking, Walther, eds., Outbreak of the World War, German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky (New York, Oxford University Press, 1924)Google Scholar.

Russia, Komissiia po izdaiiu dokumentov spokhi imperializma: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v ipokhu imperializma; dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarkogi i vremennogo pravitel 'stv 1878–1915 gg., seriia III, toma IV and V (Moskva-Leningrad, 1931 and 1934).

In this paper references to these collections are made by document number, rather than page number.

³ The reaction of Sir Arthur Nicholson, British Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was typical: “I have my doubts as to whether Austria will take any action of a serious character and I expect the storm will blow over” (Great Britain, op. cit., #40). At about the same time Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote, “I went to bed with a feeling things might blow over … we were still a long way, as it seemed, from any danger of war”. Churchill, Winston S., The World Crisis, 1911–1914 (New York, 1928), p. 208 Google Scholar. As late as July 28 the Kaiser wrote of the crisis in the Balkans, “A great moral victory for Vienna; but with it every reason for war drops away” (Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #271).

⁴ For a full description of the coding operations, see North, Robert C. et al. , Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1963)Google Scholar. Some problems of sampling in the use of historical documents are discussed in Holsti, op. cit., pp. 21–22.

^4a For a more detailed discussion of the data and scaling methods see, ibid., pp. 19–20.

⁵ In earlier studies of the 1914 crisis using content analysis data, the data were divided into twelve periods of approximately equal volume of documentation as in Table I; thus time periods early in the crisis are longer than those in the days immediately preceding the outbreak of war. See Holsti, Ole R. and North, Robert C., “History as a ‘Laboratory’ of Conflict,” in McNeil, Elton B., ed., The Nature of Human Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, 1965)Google Scholar; Holsti, and North, , “Perceptions of Hostility and Economic Variables,” in Merritt, Richard, ed., Comparing Nations (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965)Google Scholar; North, et al. , “Perception and Action in the Study of International Relations: The 1914 Crisis,” in Singer, J. David, ed., The International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research: Empirical Studies in International Relations (1965, in press)Google Scholar; Holsti, et al. , “Violence and Hostility: The Path to World War,” paper read at American Psychiatric Association meeting, Los Angeles, Calif. (05, 1964.)Google Scholar

The statistical tests of hypotheses 1a, 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b are based on these twelve periods.

⁶ Hoyos's assessment that time was working against the Dual Monarchy was supported by General Conrad, Austro-Hungarian Chief-of-Staff: “In the years 1908–1909 it would have been a game with open cards,” he said. “In 1912–1913 the chances were in our favour. Now it is a sheer gamble [ein va-banque spiel].” Quoted in Taylor, Edmund, The Fall of the Dynasties (Garden City, 1963), p. 206 Google Scholar.

⁷ Austria-Hungary, op. cit., #10118.

⁸ Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #48.

⁹ Great Britain, op. dt., #411.

¹⁰ France, op. cit., #550.

¹¹ Winston Churchill mobilized the British Navy contrary to a decision of the Cabinet. “At the Cabinet [meeting of August 1] I demanded the immediate calling out of the Fleet Reserves and the completion of our naval preparations …. However, I did not succeed in procuring their assent …. I went back to the Admiralty and gave forthwith the order to mobilise. We had no legal authority for calling up the Naval Reserves, as no proclamation had been submitted to his Majesty in view of the Cabinet decision, but we were quite sure that the Fleet men would unquestioningly obey the summons.” Churchill, op. cit., pp. 230–231.

¹² Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #390.

¹³ Ibid., #433.

¹⁴ Great Britain, op. cit., #368.

¹⁵ In some cases, the escalation of measures and counter-measures was sustained almost by accident, or by the failure to perceive the effects of one's actions. The mobilization of the Russian Baltic fleet is a good example: “On 25 July, when the Tsar looked over the minutes and resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the 24th, he not only approved them by adding ‘agreed,’ but, where it was the question of mobilizing the districts of Kiev, Moscow, Odessa and Kazan and the Black Sea fleet, he inserted in his own hand ‘and Baltic’ without any of his ministers drawing his attention to the fact that the mobilization of the Baltic fleet constituted an act of hostility toward Germany.” Albertini, Luigi, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1953), II, p. 558 Google Scholar.

Although the Russian Baltic Fleet was no match for the German Navy, the Kaiser apparently felt genuinely threatened. In response to Bethmann-Hollweg's plea that the German Fleet be left in Norway, he wrote, “there is a Russian Fleet! In the Baltic there are now five Russian torpedo boat flotillas engaged in practice cruises, which as a whole or in part can be at the Belts within sixteen hours and close them. Port Arthur should be a lesson! My Fleet has orders to sail for Kiel, and to Kiel it is going to sail!” Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #221.

¹⁶ This test is used to determine if there is a systematic difference between scores in two samples or populations. Each item is given a rank order score; in the case of hypothesis la, each time period receives a rank score based on the adjusted frequency with which time is perceived as a salient factor in decision-making. The value of U (the statistic in this test) is given by the number of times that a score in one group (July 29-August 4) precedes a score in the other group (June 27–July 28). Thus, the lower the value of U, the more significant is the difference. Siegel, Sidney, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York, 1956), pp. 116–127 Google Scholar.

¹⁷ A question of possible interest to deterrence theorists is: Would the “capacity to delay response” have materially altered the outcome in 1914? Although we can only speculate, one point does seem clear. The ability of the weapons system to delay response successfully may be a necessary, but is not a sufficient, factor. None of the states in 1914 had the ability to unleash a rapid destructive blow, crippling the retaliatory capabilities of the adversary. But during the final week prior to the outbreak of general war, decision-makers in the capitals of Europe increasingly attributed this ability and intent to potential enemies. Thus the capacity to delay response is not likely to be effective unless decision-makers: (a) perceive the net rewards of delay to be higher than those of immediate action; and (b) are willing to attribute the same preferences to the adversary's decision-makers.

¹⁸ The inter-coder reliability was 0.87.

¹⁹ There may, of course, be political and strategic reasons for such assertions, quite aside from the way in which the situation is actually perceived. This is particularly likely in documents which are intended for wide public circulation. On the other hand, the most “private” documents— intended only for circulation within the various decision groups–do not differ materially from the entire set of documents in respect to the findings reported here. See, for example, the Kaiser's marginal annotations, or the various minutes of Sir Eyre Crowe, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

²⁰ An earlier study of the 1914 crisis revealed, for example, that German decision-makers were fully aware of Germany's inability to wage a successful two-front war in 1914. Zinnes, Dina A., North, Robert C., and Koch, Howard Jr., “Capability, Threat and the Outbreak of War,” in Rosenau, James N., ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York, 1961)Google Scholar. Tirpitz, Admiral wrote, “It [the German Government,] was convinced from the very beginning that we should not win … that government itself was most, deeply convinced of its hopelessness.” von Tirpitz, Alfred, My Memoirs (London, Hurst & Blackett, Ltd., 1919)Google Scholar.

²¹ Great Britain, op. cit., #103.

²² Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #247.

²³ Russia, op. cit., #118.

²⁴ After the outbreak of war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, Grey wrote: “The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would ‘press the button” in the interests of peace” (Great Britain, op. cit., #263).

²⁵ Russia, op. cit., #170.

²⁶ Montgelas and Sehücking, op. cit., #487.

²⁷ “ Then I must mobilize too ! … He [Nicholas] expressly stated in his first telegram that he would be presumably forced to take measures that would lead to a European war. Thus he takes the responsibility upon himself." Ibid., #399.

²⁸ “The responsibility for the disaster which is now threatening the whole civilized world will not be laid at my door. In this moment it still lies in your [Nicholas] power to avert it.” Ibid., #480.

²⁹ To students of strategy the assertions of the Kaiser and the Tsar may appear to be a “real life” application of the tactics of “commitment: a device to leave the last clear chance to decide the outcome with the other party, in a manner that he fully appreciates; it is to relinquish further initiative, having rigged the incentives so that the other party must choose in one's favor.” Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (New York, Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 37 Google Scholar.

The behavior of military leaders in St. Petersburg and Berlin proved, however, that neither monarch was merely bluffing. After Sazonov and General Tatischev had browbeaten the vacillating Nicholas into ordering general mobilization, the former called General Ianuschkevitch and said: “Now you can smash the telephone. Give your orders, General, and then–disappear for the rest of the day.”

In Berlin Moltke effectively undermined belated German efforts to restrain Austria-Hungary by wiring: “Stand firm to Russian mobilization. Austria-Hungary must be preserved. Mobilize at once against Russia. Germany will mobilize.”

In Vienna Conrad von Hotzendorf insured himself against any second thoughts Francis Joseph might have had by ordering mobilization one day ahead of schedule.

One factor which contributed to the perceptions of a single alternative was the rigidity of the various mobilization plans. The Russian attempt to mobilize against only Austria was anathema to the Russian generals because no such plan had been drawn up. According to General Dobrorolski, “The whole plan of mobilization is worked out ahead to its final conclusion and in all its detail. … Once the moment is chosen, everything is settled; there is no going back; it determines mechanically the beginning of war.” Cowles, Virginia, The Kaiser (New York, 1964), pp. 343–46.Google Scholar

Similarly the Kaiser's last minute attempt to reverse the Schlieffen plan—to attack only in the east—shattered Moltke, who replied: “That is impossible, Your Majesty. An army of a million cannot be improvised. It would be nothing but a rabble of undisciplined armed men, without a commissariat …. It is utterly impossible to advance except according to plan; strong in the west, weak in the east.” Moltke, Erinnerungen, quoted Ibid., pp. 348–9.

³⁰ Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #575.

³¹ Austria-Hungary, op. cit., #11203; France, op. cit., #532, #725.

³² Great Britain, op. cit., #447. These statements explain, in part, the Kaiser's violent reaction to Grey's telegram of July 29 that, “There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we know very well that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid.” Ibid., #286. Upon reading this, Wilhelm wrote, “The net has been suddenly thrown over our head, and England sneeringly reaps the most brilliant success of her persistently prosecuted purely anti-German world policy …” Montgelas and Schüeking, op. cit., #401.

³³ “Thus, there remains nothing for the Austro-Hungarian Government to do unless it is willing to make the final sacrifice of its status as a Great Power, but to enforce its demands by the use of heavy pressure, or, if need be, by taking military measures." Ibid., #423.

³⁴ “Instead of mediation, a serious word to Petersburg and Paris, to the effect that England would not help them would quiet the situation at once.” Ibid., #368.

“If Grey wanted really to preserve peace he need only as Prince Henry suggested on 20th July intimate to the two allies France and Russia –not to mobilize but to wait, until the pour parlers which I was directing had succeeded or otherwise between Vienna and Russia.” Ibid., #720.

³⁵ Ibid., #368.

³⁶ Great Britain, op. cit., #264.

³⁷ “France did not wish to join in the war that seemed about to break out, but she was obliged to join in it, because of her alliance.” Ibid., #447.

³⁸ “But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action in Vienna.” Ibid., #99.

³⁹ On July 30, Bethmann-Hollweg concluded a telegram to Vienna: “Under these circumstances we must urgently and impressively suggest to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the acceptance of mediation on the above mentioned honorable conditions. The responsibility for the consequences that would otherwise follow would be an uncommonly heavy one both for Austria and for us.” Montgelas and Schücking, op. cit., #395.

⁴⁰ For an attempt to adjust for linguistic differences–that is, the necessity to use a different number of words in various languages to express the same idea–see Dina A. Zinnes, “Expression and Perception of Hostility in International Relations,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1963, pp. 137–43.

⁴¹ Hypothesis 4a clearly presupposes the existence of a quantitative definition of “overload.” This problem ia discussed, but not resolved, below.

⁴² Taylor, op. cit., pp. 220–21.

⁴³ This hypothesis is not dissimilar to Lasswell's prediction that “style grows terse … when the crisis is recognized as serious.” Lasswell, Harold D. et al. , The Language of Politics (New York, George Stewart, 1949), p. 28 Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ A more comprehensive description of the normal patterns of communication in 1914 may be found in Zinnes, op. cit., pp. 20–24.

⁴⁵ Miller, James G., “Information Input Overload and Psychopathology,” The American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 116 (1960), pp. 695–704 CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

⁴⁶ Miller, “Information Input Overload," Self Organizing Systems—1962, n. p.

⁴⁷ A full report of the findings from this simulation will be found in a doctoral dissertation by Charles F. Hermann, Northwestern University.

⁴⁸ Holsti, et al., “The Management of International Crisis: Affect and Action in American-Soviet Relations, October 1962,” to appear in a reader edited by Richard C. Snyder and Dean Pruitt, in press. The theoretical and practical implications of such future studies may be somewhat different. For example, should one find that 1914-like results appear only in every tenth case, the social scientist might reject the hypotheses. The criteria of practical relevence might be less rigid. Given twentieth century military technology, such findings should give little rise to complacency. As Brodie, op. cit., p. 175, has pointed out, today a single case of deterrent failure is too many.

⁴⁹ Stone, Philip J. et al. , “The General Inquirer: A Computer System for Content Analysis and Retrieval Based on the Sentence as a Unit of Information,” Behavioral Science, Vol. 7 (1962), pp. 484–494 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁰ Holsti, , “An Adaptation of the ‘General Inquirer” for the Systematic Analysis of Political Documents,” Behavioral Science, Vol. 9 (1964), pp. 382–88CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

⁵¹ Robinson, op. cit., pp. 7–8.

⁵² A series of assertions which tend to contradict the hypotheses in this paper may be found in Abel, Theodore, “The Elements of Decision in the Pattern of War,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 6 (1941), pp. 853–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar, in which the author writes:

“1. The decision to fight, unless the opponent abandons resistance without a struggle, is not reached on the spur of the moment. In every case the decision is based upon a careful weighing of chances and of anticipating consequences …. In no case is the decision precipitated by emotional tensions, sentimentality, crowd-behavior, or other irrational motivations.

”2. The rational, calculating decision is reached far in advance of the actual outbreak of hostilities.”