The growing problem of physician sexual misconduct has captured the attention not only of the medical and legal communities, but of the public as well. State medical boards, administrative agencies with generous rules of evidence and varying levels of expertise, face the difficult task of responding to patients’ allegations of physician sexual abuse. This Article, based in large part on the author's survey of current state medical board practice, reveals an increasing reliance on expert psychiatric testimony to explain the behavior of complainants and accused physicians. Drawing analogies from the use of psychiatric evidence in child sexual abuse cases, the author examines the factors that boards must consider in determining the admissibility of expert testimony in physician sexual misconduct cases, and calls upon states to establish clear evidentiary rules to govern the use of such testimony in administrative hearings.

Improving global health conditions has been one of the most important and difficult challenges for the world community. Despite concerted efforts by international organizations, like the World Health Organization, great disparities in health conditions remain between developed and developing countries, as well as within those countries. The World Health Organization has achieved some successes through its Health for All strategy; however, it can and should encourage member nations to enact national and international laws to protect and promote the health status of their populations. A comparison to the lawmaking efforts in other areas by international organizations indicates that WHO may have the authority and the means to institutionalize efforts to improve global health conditions.

This Article proposes a procedure for making decisions to forego life-sustaining treatment for adult, developmentally disabled, public wards who are not competent to make health care decisions. Few commentators or cases address the special considerations involved in making life-sustaining treatment decisions for this patient population. The proposal attempts to fill this gap with a patient-centered process that allows decisionmakers, without prior judicial approval, to forego lifesustaining treatment for adult, developmentally disabled, public wards who have been reliably diagnosed with specific medical conditions.

This Article discusses the rights of prisoners, pretrial detainees, and the involuntarily committed to receive high-cost medical treatments. More specifically, the Article analyzes U.S. Supreme Court and lower court case law dealing with the medical care rights of those in state custody and argues that, under a proper understanding of this case law, the financial considerations of states should play no role in determining the rights of these people to receive high-cost medical care. Finally, the Article defends the current medical care standard against various critiques.

Proposals to ration health care in the United States meet a number of objections, symbolic and literal. Nonetheless, an acceptance of the idea of rationing is a necessary first step toward universal health insurance. It must be understood that universal health care requires an acceptance of rationing, and that such an acceptance must precede enactment of a program, if it is to be economically sound and politically feasible. Commentators have argued that reform of the health care system should come before any effort to ration. On the contrary, rationing and reform cannot be separated. The former is the key to the latter, just as rationing is the key to universal health insurance.

In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). This Note examines the legislative history of the ADA and uncovers Congress's intent to impose a duty on health care providers to treat people with disabilities unless an individual poses a “direct threat” to the health or safety of others. This Note posits that, with the passage of the ADA, Congress imposed a statutory duty on health care providers to give care to people infected with HIV who qualify under the statute. This Note concludes that while the “direct threat” exception may lessen the impact of the ADA, those infected with HIV should enjoy greater access to health care than ever before.

In an effort to clarify the concept of “medically futile care,” two types of futile care are identified: 1) care that produces no demonstrable effect; and 2) care that produces an effect that is believed by the speaker to be of no net benefit. It is the second type of futile care, when a patient or surrogate and the clinician disagree over the benefit that the patient will receive from an intervention, that is most interesting morally and that cannot properly be labelled medically futile. As such, decisions to limit access to care deemed futile should not rest with medical professionals. This Article argues for a limited duty of clinicians to provide life-prolonging and some other fundamental care that is equitably funded and desired by the patient while competent, even if the clinician believes that such interventions will produce no net benefit.

Recent news stories, medical journal articles, and two state voter referenda have publicized physicians’ providing their patients with aid-in-dying. This Note distinguishes two components of aid-in-dying: physician-assisted suicide and physiciancommitted voluntary active euthanasia. The Note traces these components’ distinct historical and legal treatments and critically examines arguments for and against both types of action. This Note concludes that aid-in-dying measures should limit legalization initiatives to physician-assisted suicide and should not embrace physician-committed voluntary active euthanasia.

Environmental destruction and its attendant effects on the animal world, including human beings, has moved to the forefront of United States and worldwide policy. The effect of this deterioration on human health is unclear. Much debate focuses on the cases of cancer, along with other diseases, that are environmentally induced. Congress has responded with various environmental laws. These laws focus primarily on controlling chemicals placed into the environment, largely by industry. This Note proposes that such a singular focus is inadequate and ultimately costly. A more sensible and efficient strategy to environmental protection places emphasis on controlling inputs to the productive process before the need arises to contain such substances. The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (“TSCA“) takes this approach. This Note reviews the means by which TSCA attempted to accomplish its goals and concludes that TSCA's implementation has largely been ineffective. The Note then discusses three possible explanations for TSCA's failure. Finally, the Note proposes how TSCA might be made more effective in regulating new chemicals.

Health care rationing has gained greater visibility in the United States and the United Kingdom, for quite different reasons. As patients in both countries become more aware that potentially beneficial medical services can be denied them on economic — as opposed to purely medical — grounds, they are beginning to seek help from the judiciary. This Article contends that as rationing becomes more explicit, the doctrine of informed consent will come under increased pressure. The Article suggests that courts and legislatures consider imposing a legal obligation on physicians to inform their patients when potentially effective treatment is to be withheld for economic or other non-clinical reasons.

Over the past decade, there has been an increase in the hospitalization of minors in private, for-profit, psychiatric facilities. This increase suggests a tension between what is medically necessary and what is financially desirable. This Note discusses the hospitalization of minors in private, for-profit, mental health facilities and its attendant implications. This Note then examines various state efforts aimed at protecting minors from inappropriate psychiatric hospitalization. Finally, while there is no catch-all solution to the problem, this Note offers specific recommendations for reforming the for-profit psychiatric industry.

The structure and principal decision-making processes of the American health care system have, in recent years, evolved to closely resemble those of the legal-judicial system. This transformation reflects important common values that underlie both systems, including the values of life and liberty. This Article analyzes quasi-legal features of the health care system and draws conclusions about how those features might be used to address the problem of health care rationing. It concludes that coverage rules, if properly developed, can provide the sort of objective framework necessary to evaluate claims of health care needs. This Article also demonstrates that by defining legitimate health care needs, society can thereby potentially eliminate or forestall the need to ration necessary care. This can be achieved by using carefully developed coverage rules, rather than the informal rules currently in place, in conjunction with already existing due process methods for interpreting and implementing those rules.

In 1989 and 1991, the Oregon legislature enacted a series of initiatives to extend health coverage to uninsured state residents. Among these initiatives is an act that seeks to extend a modified set of Medicaid benefits to state residents with family incomes below the federal poverty level. This act also reduces benefits the state is now required to provide to Medicaid-enrolled women of childbearing age and children. This Article explores the legal context in which the Oregon Medicaid experiment must be evaluated. It argues that by reducing the level of coverage to which tens of thousands of exceedingly poor, Medicaid-eligible women and children are entitled, the experiment falls outside the scope of valid research that the United States Department of Health and Human Services may either sanction or fund. The Article also discusses the implications of the Oregon experiment, if approved, for the future direction of the Medicaid program in particular, and for health care reform for the poor, generally.

The increasing use of human tissues in medical research has spawned a host of ethical and legal debates. Legal analysis in this area has almost exclusively focused on the question of property rights in both the tissues used in research and in the resulting products. One illustrative case is Moore v. Regents of the Unversity of California, in which a patient sued his doctor for conversion of his spleen which had been removed for therapeutic purposes. The doctor later used the spleen to develop a patented and profitable cellline. This Comment examines and rejects the property law approach to this issue. Instead, this Comment proposes two legislative changes which would 1) eliminate any trade in human tissues and 2) require doctors to inform their patients of any research interest in proposed medical procedures. These proposals resolve the problem presented in Moore, and avoid the misleading, and inevitably unanswerable, question of property rights.