Having argued in Part One against extensive judicial or regulatory interference with private personnel credentialing in the health care field, this Article now shifts its focus to emphasize the anticompetitive hazards inherent in credentialing as practiced by professional interests. Competitor-sponsored credentialing is shown to be a vital part of a larger cartel strategy to curb competition by standardizing personnel and services and controlling the flow of information to health care consumers. Instead of altering the conclusions reached in Part One, however, Part Two sets forth a new and hitherto unexplored agenda for antitrust enforcement, one that the authors believe will increase the quantity and quality of information available to consumers and offer a fairer competitive environment to individuals and groups disadvantaged by the denial of desirable credentials. The specific targets singled out for antitrust scrutiny are (1) the practice of "grandfathering," by which new candidates for credentials are required to meet tougher requirements than were met by existing credential holders; (2) agreements to standardize educational programs if they go beyond setting and applying accrediting standards and impair the freedom of institutions to decide independently whether to offer unaccredited training; (3) agreements by which independent certifying or accrediting bodies limit the nature or scope of competition among themselves; and (4) mergers and joint ventures in credentialing and accrediting. The legal theory supporting antitrust attacks in the latter two categories is strengthened by the apparently original insight that commercial information and opinion are themselves articles of commerce such that agreements and combinations restricting their nature and output can be characterized as restraints of trade. Among the many self-regulatory institutions in the health care field whose operation or sponsorship is called into question by the analysis herein are the leading medical specialty boards, the Liaison Committee on Medical Education, various accrediting and certifying bodies in the allied health occupations, and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.

While state medical licensure laws ostensibly are intended to promote worthwhile goals, such as the maintenance of high standards in health care delivery, this Article argues that these laws in practice are detrimental to consumers. The Article takes the position that licensure contributes to high medical care costs and stifles competition, innovation and consumer autonomy. It concludes that delicensure would expand the range of health services available to consumers and reduce patient dependency, and that these developments would tend to make medical practice more satisfying to consumers and providers of health care services.

City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital presented the United States Supreme Court with its first opportunity to consider whether a state or municipality has a constitutional duty to pay for medical treatment received by an individual in police custody. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had held that the city had an eighth amendment duty to pay for an arrestee's treatment. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, observing that eighth amendment rights and duties are not implicated prior to conviction and that fourteenth amendment due process concerns were met once the arrestee received adequate medical care. No obligation to pay arises, the Court held, absent a specific state law provision requiring such payment. Because arrestees are subject to physical restraints similar to those imposed on convicted prisoners, this Case Comment argues that courts undertaking to determine the scope of a state's duty to provide treatment to arrestees should apply a due process standard which draws upon eighth amendment analysis. The Comment concludes that under such an eighth amendment equivalence approach, no duty to pay arises because the state's failure to pay the health care provider does not reflect "deliberate indifference" towards the recipient of the treatment.