The author focuses this Article upon the aspect of the Saikewicz decision which determines that the kind of “proxy consent” question involved in that case requires for its decision “the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created.” This aspect of the decision has drawn much criticism from the medical community on the ground that it embroils what doctors believe to be a medical question in the adversarial processes of the court system. The author criticizes the decision from an entirely opposite perspective, arguing that the court's opinion fails in not laying down guidelines that would assure a truly adversary process in Saikewicz-type cases. He agrees with the Saikewicz court that our democratic institutional structure and societal commitment to individual liberty require that persons not competent to consent for themselves to acts of euthanasia be protected by a process of “detached but passionate investigation and decision.” However, he points out that this ideal of the court system was not realized in Saikewicz itself and is not likely to be realized in other cases without reform of some of the procedures currently being employed by the courts in “proxy consent” cases. Drawing on previous articles that he has written in related areas, he then proposes a set of guidelines that he believes not only will remove existing procedural deficiencies, but also may reform some aspects of the existing system that have drawn criticism from the medical community.

This Article examines the question of civil liability arising, both in tort and in contract, as a result of the “wrongful birth” of a child following an unsuccessful sterilization operation. After a general overview of the concept and background of wrongful birth, the Article deals with tort liability in a sterilization-wrongful-birth action, suggesting in particular that there are four stages in the sterilization process at which a physician's conduct may fall below the standard required by law, and discussing the effect of negligence at each of the four stages. The alternative claim for breach of warranty is then examined, with emphasis on the practical difficulties involved in establishing contractual liability in this type of case. Finally, the Article discusses public policy and assessment of damages issues involved in the wrongful birth action, and evaluates the merits of some of the arguments that have been advanced under these headings—particularly the “overriding benefit” theory—to defeat claims for wrongful birth.

The Medicine and Law Committee of the American Bar Association's Section of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law was established in 1973 to meet the growing needs arising from the interface between law and the medical and health sciences. Although joint work had been conducted by the ABA and the American Medical Association prior to 1973, the organization of the Committee marked the first major project of any Section of the ABA aimed specifically at identifying and understanding the effects of medicine and the health sciences upon the everyday practice of law. As such, it provides a common ground to hundreds of attorneys whose practices involve medicolegal issues, and offers them the opportunity to learn from each other, to keep abreast of recent developments, and to approach constructively many theoretical and practical problems.

Park v. Chessin, a recent New York case, marked the first step toward judicial acceptance of the theory of “wrongful life.” Wrongful life suits involve a cause of action brought by an infant, against a physician, alleging that the physician's failure to inform the child's parents of the possibility of their bearing a severely defective child was the proximate cause of the infant's birth, and thus resulted in harm to the infant. This Note explores recent legal developments that give precedential support to the development of the theory of wrongful life. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the awarding of monetary damages is an appropriate remedy for the wrongful life plaintiff, and it examines possible methods for measuring those damages. The Note concludes with an analysis of the capability of courts to adjudicate wrongful life suits, and of the possible ramifications of judicial acceptance of the theory of wrongful life.