1 H. B. 2, 83d Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013) (codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 171.0031, 245.010 (West 2015)).

2 Manny Fernandez, Abortion Restrictions Become Law in Texas, but Opponents Will Press Fight, N.Y. Times (July 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/perry-signs-texas-abortion-restrictions-into-law.html.

3 Id.

4 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Strikes Down Texas Abortion Restrictions, N.Y. Times (June 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/us/supreme-court-texas-abortion.html.

5 Health & Safety § 171.0031.

6 Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2298, 2310 (2016).

7 Health & Safety § 245.010.

8 Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2301; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (holding that an undue burden “is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus” and that “the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it”).

9 Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2303; Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 687-88 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (finding that the two provisions each imposed an undue burden on women's abortion access, and that they together created an “impermissible obstacle” in the path of women).

10 Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2303.

11 Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 581, 590 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the district court's determination on the admitting privileges requirement was wrongly decided on procedural grounds, and the surgical center requirement was not an undue burden on enough women affected by the provision.)

12 Id.

13 Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318.

14 Id.

15 Id. at 2311.

16 Id. at 2311-12.

17 Id. at 2312.

18 Id. at 2318.

19 Id. at 2315.

20 Id. at 2316-18 (finding that the provisions would leave the state of Texas with only seven or eight facilities).

21 Id. at 2320 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 894-95).

22 Id. at 2320.

23 Id. at 2309 (majority opinion) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98).

24 Id. at 2318.

25 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973) (holding that the right to make decisions about childbearing free from intrusion “necessarily includes the right of a woman to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (though not explicitly stating abortion is not a fundamental right, finding that “the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty”).

26 See Gillian, E. Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2025, 2025 (1994)Google Scholar. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-87 (holding that the 24-hour waiting period does not constitute a substantial obstacle because it being a burden on some women is not enough to invalidate the requirement), with Casey, 505 U.S. at 893-98 (holding that the spousal notification requirement is invalid because it will be a substantial obstacle on those for whom it is especially burdensome, such as women in abusive marriages).

27 Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2321.

28 Id. at 2326 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 875).