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Some Thoughts on the Constitutionality of Good Samaritan Statutes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 February 2021

Barry Sullivan
Barry Sullivan*
Affiliation:
Middlebury College, University of Chicago
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Abstract

Good Samaritan laws provide legal immunity to persons who assist in medical emergencies. Because good Samaritan laws eliminate the common law right of victims to secure redress for their injuries, these statutes raise certain constitutional questions. The Article begins by examining the vulnerability of good Samaritan statutes to federal constitutional attack on substantive due process and equal protection grounds. It then considers the susceptibility of such laws to state constitutional attack on the same grounds. The Article concludes that while such statutes are not likely to violate federal substantive due process and equal protection provisions, they may be held unconstitutional on similar state grounds.

Type
Articles
Information
American Journal of Law & Medicine , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , Spring 1982 , pp. 27 - 43
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics and Boston University 2020

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Footnotes

†

This paper was originally presented at the National Conference on Legal Implications of Emergency Medical Care sponsored by the American Society of Law & Medicine and the American Bar Association in New Orleans, Louisiana on May 17-19, 1979. The aim of that presentation was to provide a framework for considering the constitutionality of good Samaritan laws, rather than any definitive answers as to the constitutionality of particular statutes. In preparing this paper for publication, the same objective has been pursued.

References

1 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-332 (Supp. 1981); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090 (Supp. 1980); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-1471 (West Supp. 1981); ARK. Stat. Ann. § 72-624 (Supp. 1979); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2395-2398 (West Supp. 1981); COLO. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-108 (Supp. 1976); Conn. GEN. Stat. § 52-557b (1980); DEL. CODE Ann. tit. 16, §§ 6801-6802 (Supp. 1980); FLA. Stat. Ann. § 768.13 (West Supp. 1982); GA. Code § 84-930 (1981); HAWAII Rev. Stat. § 663-1.5 (Supp. 1979); IDAHO Code § 5-330 (1979); I I I . Ann. Stat. ch. Ill, § 4404 (Smith-Hurd 1981); IND. Code Ann. § 34-4-12-1 (Burns 1973); IOWA Code Ann. § 613.17 (West Supp. 1981); KAN. Stat. Ann. § 65-2891 (1980); KY. Rev. Stat. § 411.148 (Supp. 1980); LA. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 37:1731-1732 (West 1980); ME. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 164 (1980); MD. Ann. Code art. 43, § 132 (Supp. 1981); MASS. Ann. Laws ch. 112, § 12B (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1975); Mich. Comp. LAWS Ann. § 691.1501 (Supp. 1981); Minn. Stat. Ann § 604.05 (West Supp. 1981); Mivv Goof. Ann. § 73-25-37 (Supp. 1981); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 190.195 (Vernon Supp. 1981); Mont. Com: Ann. § 17-410 (1967); Nfb. Riv. Stat. 25-1152 (1979); Xrw Riv. Stat. § 41.500 (I9S0); N.H. Riv. Stat. Ann. § 508.12 (Supp. 1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:62A-1 (West Supp. 1980); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-3 Co -4 (1976); N.Y. Kduc. Law g 6527(2) (McKinncy Supp. 1981); N\C. Gfn. Stat. § 20-166(d) (1978); N.I). Cfnt. Codi: §§ 43-17-37 to -38 (1978); Ohio Ri v. Code Ann. § 2305.23 (Page 1981); Oki.a. Stat. Ann. tit. 76. § 5 (West Supp. 1981); Ok. Ri v. Stat. § 30.800 (1979); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §$ 8331*2 (Purdon 1981); R.I. Gin. Iaws § 5-37-14 (1976); S.C. Code Ann. § 15*1-310 (I.aw. Co-op. 1976); S.I. Codifiid Lwvs Ann. § 20-9*3 (1979); Tfnn. Codi; Ann. i; 63-622 (Supp. 1981); Trx. Stat. Ann. art. la (Vrrnon Supp. 1981); Utah Conr. Ann. § 58 12-23 (Supp. 1981); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(b) (1973); Va. Code § 8.01-225 (Supp. 1981); Wash. Ri v. Coor. Ann. § 4.24.300 (Supp. 1981); W. Va. Codi: § 55-7-15 (1981); Wts. Stat. Ann. § 448.06(7) (West Supp. 1981); Wyo. Stat. $ 33-26*143 (1977).

2 D.C. CODI: Ann. § 2-142 (Supp. V 1978).

3 V.I. Com; Ann. tit. 27, § 42 (Supp. 1979).

4 The common law recogniml no duty to render emergency assistance, and therefore liability could not be premised upon a failure to act. “(T]he law has persistently refused recogonise the moral obligation of common decency and common humanity, to come to the aid of another human being who is in danger, even though the outcome is to cost him his life.*’ W. Prossir, Handbook or the I,aw of Torts, § 56 at 310 (4th ed. 1971). If a person chooses to render emergency medical assistance, however, the person lending assistance assumes the duly of exercising reasonable care to avoid increasing injury or harm. Id. at 343. If the person lending assistance is medically-trained, he must exercise the care that would be appropriate to the level of skill and knowledge of the average practitioner at that level of training, acting under similar circumstances. Id. § 32 at 162. As Gregory and Kalvcn ha\c noted, good Samaritan laws “do not deal directly with a duty to rescue but arc conccrned with conferring immunity on doctors for alleged malpractice to encourage them to give emergency assistance to others who arc in trouble.* C. Grfcory & H. Kauin, Jr.. Cams and Mati rials on Torts 273 (2d ed. 1969). For a dis-cussion of the reasons for and against the common law position, and an argument that the creation of a common law duty to rescue would be consistent with existing patterns in the common law and with the law’s ideal of liberty, sec Wcm rig. The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 Yaix L.J. 247 (1980).

5 See, e.£.( 2 I>. Lolisfu. & H. Williams, Midical Malpractice c 21.35 (1978); Comment, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Practice, 64 Collm. L. Rev. 1301. 1308 (1964). See also AMA Principle of Midical Ethics, ch. II, § 4 (1953).

6 D. Louism. fc H. Williams, Midical Malpractice c 21.35 (1978) (“no cases have been found where a ph>sician was sued for malpractice for rendering emergency treatment outside of a medical office or hospital”). Id. at c 21.35. See also Note. The Xot-So*Good Samaritan IMU270 New Knc. J. Mid. 1003 (1964), cited in, 2 I). Louisill & H. Williams. Midical Malpractice. 21.35, n.21 (1978); R. Bergen, /Imuer to Letter. 180 J. A.M.A. 138 1962), cited in, 2 I). Louisill & 11. Williams. Midical Malpractice, c 21.35, n.22 (1978). But see G. Annas, L. Glantz & B. Katz, The Rights of Doctors, Nurses and Allied Health it Professional 105-07 (1981).

7 D. Louisell & H. Williams, Medical Malpractice: 21.35 (1978). See Kearney, I why Doctors arc Bad Samaritans, Rfadir's Dtc., May 1963, at 87; Note, Torts: California Good Samaritan Legislation: Exemptions from Civil I.iability While Rendering Emergency Medical Aid, 51 Calif. L. Ri.v. 816. 818 (1963); Letter from William Byron Rumford, Chairman of the California Assembly Committrc on Public Health, to the Colum. L Rrw. March 23, 1964; A Doctor at a Bridge, an editorial broadcast by WABC-TV, New Vork City, I)ec. 18 21, 1903, all cited in, 64 Collm. L. Rr.v. 1301. nn.2-3 (1964).

8 Indeed, the preliminary report of the Emergency Medical Care Liability Law Project notes that:

A convincing argument can be made that existing legislation adds little or no protection to the common law protection for those who choose to act in an emergency situation, and that, due to the infrequency of lawsuits actually brought, Good Samaritan legislation was a response to an imagined, rather than real, problem. In fact, the number of reported eases has increased since the enactment of such legislation. Of the seven known reported cases … five were reported since 1974, whereas only two had been reported prior to 1974. Finally, even if litigation should arise in the future, the vagueness, ambiguity, and inconsistency of much of the existing legislation is more likely to encourage than to discourage lawsuits against providers of emergency assistance.

Emergency Medical Care Liability Law Project. Preliminary Report: The Current Status and Utility of American Emergency Medical Care Liability IMW, May 10. 1979, at 26.

9 See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).

10 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519 (1973) provides that:

A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others. 519(a).

A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with subsection (a) of this section shall not be liable in civil damages unless his acts constitute gross ncgligence or unless he will receive or expects to receive remuneration. Nothing contained in this subsection shall alter existing law with respect to tort liability of a practitioner of the healing arts for acts committed in the ordinary course of his practice. § 519(b).

As a practical matter, these provisions arc probably unenforceable and therefore hortatory at best. See Franklin, , Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment. 25 Stas. L. Rev. 51 (1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 See Alaska Stat. § 09.65.090 (Supp. 1983); Ariz. Rr.v. Stat. Ann. § 32-1471 (West Supp. 1981); Ark. Stat. Ann. Jä 72-624 (Supp. 1979); Dee. Code Ann, tit. 16, § 6801 (Supp. 1980); n.C. Com: Ann. § 2-142 (Supp, V 1978); Kea. Stat. Ann. § 768.13 (West Supp. 1982); Ga. Coor. § 81-930 (1981); Hawaii Ri:v. Stat. § 633-1.5 (Supp. 1979); Idaho Coor § 5-330 (Supp, 1979); Ind. Code Ann. § 3*1*4-12-1 (Burns 1973); Iowa Cod*: Ann. § 613.17 (West Supp. 1981); Mi . Rr.v. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 164 (1980); Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 132 (Supp. 1981); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.05 (W'est Supp. 1981); Mi*s. Code Ann. § 7325-37 (Supp. 1981); Mont. Code Ann. § 17-410 (1967); Neb. Rrv. Stat. § 25-1152 (1979); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41500 (1980); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.12 (Supp. 1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:62A-1 (West Supp. 1980); N.M. Stat. Ann. $ 24-10-3 to -4 (1976); N.C. Grs. Stat. § 20-166(d) (1978); Onto Rev. Code Ann. § 2305*23 (Page 1981); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 76, § 5 (West Supp. 1981); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8332 (Purdon 1981); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-1 310 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.I). Codified Laws Ann. § 20-9-4-.1 (1970); Tens. Code Ann. § 63-622 (Supp. 1981); Tex. Stat. Ann. art. 1(a) (Vernon Supp. 1981); Vt. Stat.. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(b) (1973); Va. Code § 8.01-225 (Supp. 1981); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. $ 4.24.300 (Supp. 1981); W. Va. Code $ 55-7*15 (1981); Wvo. Stat. § 33-26-143 (1977).

12 ALA. Code: $ 6-5-332 (Supp. 1981); Cae. BUS. * Prof. Cod"; §§ 2395-2398 (West Supp. 1981); Coi.o. Rev. Stat. § 13*21-108 (Supp. 1976); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557”) (1980); Medical Practice Act § I, Iu" Ann. Stat. ch. Ill, § 4401 (Smith-Hurd 1981); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-2891 (1980); Ky. Rev. Stat. $ 411.148 (Supp. 1980); LA. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sg 37:1731-1732 (West 1980); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 112, § 12B (Michie/Law. Coop. 1975); Mich. Comp. L\w$ Ann. § 691.1501 (Supp. 1981); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 190.195 (Vernon Supp. 1981); N.Y. KDL'C. Law § 6527 (McKinney Supp. 1981); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 43-17-37 to *38 (1978); OR. Rev. Stat. § 30.800 (1979); R.l. Gen. Laws § 5-37*14 (1976); Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-23 (Supp. 1981);’ V.l. Code Ann. tit. 27, § 42 (Supp. 1979); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 448.0 (West Supp. 1981).

13 Examples of persons deemed to have “medical training” for purposes of good Samaritan laws include: Alabama: “any doctor of mcdidnc or dentistry, nurse, member of any rescue squad, member of any police or fire department, member of any organized volunteer fire department … [Alabama licensed] emergency medical technician, intern or resident practicing in an Alabama hospital with [AMA approved] training programs, Alabama State troopers or medical aidman functioning as part of the military assistance to safety and traffic program… .Ala. Code § 6-5-332 (Supp. 1981); Arizona: “health care provider licensed or certified to practice as such in this stale or elsewhere, or a licensed ambulance attendant, driver or pilot … or any other person …’* ARIZ. Rrv. Stat. Ann. § 32-1471 (Supp. 1981); California: “licensee,** CAL. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2395 (West Supp. 1981); Connecticut: licensed physician, surgeon, dentist, registered nurse, practical nurse, medical technician, CPR operator or aide trained by the American Red Cross or American Health Association, volunteer fireman, policeman, teacher, ski patrol member, lifeguard, etc. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52*557b (1980); Kansas: “health carc provider'* (person licensed to practice any branch of the healing arts and trained assistants). Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-2891 (1980); Missouri: “person trained to provide first aid in a standard recognized training program.” Mo. Ann. Stat. § 190.195 (Vernon 1976).

14 The following slate statutes condition immunity on the expectation that no re-muneration, charge, or compensation will be forthcoming: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia* Hawaii, Indiana. Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, Virgin Islands. See supra note 1. See aim 2 D. Louise u. & II. Williams, Medical Malpractice f 21.40 (1978),

15 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.65.090 (Supp. 1980); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 663*15 (Supp. 1979).

16 See, c.g” Cal. Bus. & Pm or. Code § 2395 (West Supp. 1981); Medical Practice Act § I III. Ass. Stat. ch. Ill, § 4404 (Smlih-Hurd 1981); Fla. Stat. Ahh. § 768.13 (West Supp. 1982)

17 See, e.g., Neb;. Rev. Stat. § 25-1152 (1979).

18 Id.

19 The omission of a “good faith” requirement appears to he intentional because Nebraska*” good samaritan law previously contained such a requirement. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1152 (Supp. 1963). The Code was amended in 1975, however, to delete the words “good faith.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1152 (1975). No case construing this statute has been reported.

20 To suggest that a person may be deprived, without recompense, of the opportunity to earn a livelihood and participate in the most ordinary pursuits of life seems at least inconsistent with the view that people shun the state of nature and join together in civil society to safeguard their liberty and property. See, J. Locke, Of Civil Government 179 (1922 ed.).

21 2 I). Lodiseli. & H. Williams, Medical Malpractice c 21.56 (1978). See generally W. Prosser, Handbook OV the Law ok Torts* ch. 5 § 28 at 139 *10 (4th "I. 1971).

22 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina F.nvtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32 (1978); Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929); New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).

23 U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.

24 Id.

25 See Comment, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1312-15 (1964).

26 See infra notes 87-110 and accompanying text.

27 See, e.g., Monaghan, Of 44Liberty” anci “Property ” 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405 (1977); Rosenblum, Schoolchildren: Yes, Policemen: jVo—Some Thoughts About the Supreme Court's Priorities Concerning the Right to a Hearing in Suspension and Removal Cases. 72 Nw. U.L. Riv. M6 (1977).

28 See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).

29 G. Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 502 (10th ed. 1982).

30 See J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust; A Theory or Judicial Review 19-20 (1980).

31 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

32 381 VS, 479 (1965) (righi to privacy in decision to procreale).

33 364 U.S. 479 (I960) (statute requiring teacher io list organizations and affiliations held unconstitutional under fourteenth amendment). See atso Moore v, City of East Cleve land, 431 US, 494 (1977) (sanctity of the family unit); Roe v, Wade, 430 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy in decision to bear child). Cf. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 VS, 216 (1978) (no right of unwed father to block adoption of illegitimate child).

34 G. Gunther, Cases and Materials oh Constitutional LAW 503 (10th ed. 1980).

35 See infra notes 55*86 and accompanying text,

36 Gunther, foreword: tn Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Xewer Equal Protection, 86 Hakv. L. Rev, 1, 18*19 (1972).

37 174 US. 96 (1898).

38 id. at 106. See also Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 343-44 (1949).

39 Gunther, supra note 36. Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (where the Court used strict scrutiny to invalidate a statute which was found to impede right to interstate travel) with Dandridgc v, Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (where the Court used minimal scrutiny to uphold a statute found not to impede right to interstate travel).

40 See Gunther, supra note 36.

41 Suspect classifications are those which result in discrimination against members of minority groups. Traditional suspect classifications are race, ancestry and alienage. L. Tribe, American Constitutional LAW, §§ 16-13 to 16-22 (1979).

42 Traditionally, fundamental rights include the rights to equal access to voting, equal access to the judicial process and the right to interstate travel. L. Tribe, supra note 41, §§ 16-7 to 16-12.

43 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

44 Gunther, supra note 36, at 8.

45 See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979) (freedom to associate as a political party and right to cast votes effectively); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimacy a suspect classification); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).

46 Gunther, supra note 36, at 8.

47 Id. at 20-24.

48 This statement is perhaps difficult to verify, given the tentative development of the law in this area. As a predictive statement, however, it appears to be accurate. See, e.g.. Craig v. Botcn, 129 U.S. 190 (1976) (sex as possible suspect classification); Recti v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (sex as possible suspect classification); Gunther, supra note 36.

49 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

50 Id. at 197. See atso supra note *18.

51 See, e.g, Canterbury v. Spence, 161 F.2d 772, 788-789 (1972); McKenna v. Cedars of Lebanon Ilosp.. 93 Cai. App. 3d 282. 155 Gal. Rptr. 631 (1979); Colby v. Schwartz, 78 Cai. App. 3d 885, 144 Cai. Rptr. 624 (1978).

52 See, e.g., Goedecke v. Price, 19 Ariz. App. 320, 506 P.2d 1105 (1973); Toman v. Creighton Memorial St. Josephs Hosp, Inc., 191 Neb. 751, 217 N.W.2d 484 (1974).

53 See supra note 51.

54 See e.g., Ellis v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 251 S.W.2d 577 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952); Daniels v. Evans, 107 N.H. 407, 224 A.2d 63 (1966).

55 See supra note 41.

56 438 VS. 59 (1978). See also Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F5d 1161 (5th Cir. 1979).

57 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).

58 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1976).

59 U.S.C. § 2210(H)(1) (1976).

60 co 42 U.S.C. § 1210(c) (1976).

61 Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. v. United Slates Atomic Energy Comm., 431 F. Supp. 203, 222-25 (W ” 1977).

62 Id. at 222.

63 Id. at 222-23.

64 Id. at 223-24.

65 Id. at 224-25.

66 438 U.S. 59 (1978).

67 Id. at 83.

68 Id. at 84.

69 Id.

70 Id. at 86-87. In weighing the reasonableness of the particular ceiling contained in the Act. the Court said:

Assuming, arguendo, that the $560 million fund would not insure full recovery in all conceivable circumstances—and the hard truth is that no one can ever know—it does not by any means follow that the liability limitation is therefore irrational and violative of due process. ‘I he legislative history clearly indicates that the $560 million figure was not arrived at on the supposition that it alone would necessarily be sufficient to guarantee full compensation in the event of a nuclear incident. Instead, it was conceived of as a “starting point*’ or a working hypothesis. The reasonableness of the statute's assumed ceiling on liability was predicated on two cotollary considerations—expert appraisal of the exceedingly small risk of a nuclear incident involving claims in excess of $560 million, and the recognition that in the event of such an incident. Congress would likely enact extraordinary relief provisions to provide additional relief, in accord with prior practice.

Id. at 81-85.

71 Id. at 87.

72 id.

73 Id, at 88.

74 Id. at 90-91.

75 id, at 91.

76 Id. at 93-94.

77 Id. at 94.

78 See Anirson v. Olson. 270 N.W.2d 125. 135 n.G (N.H. 1978).

79 See 42 U.S.C. § 22l0(a)-2210(p) (I97fi).

80 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1970); Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 86-87 11.31.

81 243 U.S. 188 (1917).

82 Id, at 201. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Knvtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 93 (1978).

83 431 F. Supp. Ill (W.I). Okla. 1977). For a restatement of the Sparks holding, see Ducharme v. Merrill-National Laboratorio”, 574 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978) cert. denied. 439 U~S. 1002 (1978). See also Wolfe v. Merrill-National laboratories, 433 F. Supp. 231, 236 (M.I). Tcnn. 1977); Stephens v. Wyeth LaWatories, Inc., No. 77-L 0274-S (W.D. La. 1977).

84 42 U.S.C. § 2476(j)(l) (1976).

85 42 U.S.C. § 247G(k)(2)(a) (1976), repeated by. Pub. I.. 95-629 (1978).

86 See supra notes 7-9.

87 See generally, Wright v. Central I)uPage Hosp. Ass’n, 63 III. 2d 313. 347 N.EJ2d 736 {1976); Herkcy v. Agar Mfg. Co.. 90 Misc. 457. 153 N.Y.S. 369 (App, Div. 1915); Turkingion, Equal Protection of the Laws in Illinois, 25 De Paul L. Rev. 385 (1976); Comment, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 Colum. L. Rlv. 1301, 131245 (1964); IX Mandelkek & D. Netsch, State and Local Government in a Federal System (1977). See Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp.. 591 FM 1164 (5th Cir. 1979).

88 See Brennan, , State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. I. Rev. 489 (1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 102 S. Ct. 1070 (1982). See aim Developments in the Law, The interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324 (1982).

89 See, e.g., Robins v. Prune yard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 889, 592 P*2d 341, 153 Cal Rptr, 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 US, 74 (1980) where the California Supreme Court refused to follow the United State* Supreme Court’s decision in Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), on the ground that the free speech provision of the California Constitution is more comprehensive than the protection afforded by the first amendment. See also Johnson v. Hastett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974). Because the independent state grounds doctrine is gaining momentum in the states, it is no longer sufficient to criticuc state supreme court decisions as wrongly decided under federal constitutional principles when at least some states have embraced the task of departing from federal precedents and creating their own constitutional law. See Redish, legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice insurance Crisis; Constitutional implications, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 759 (1977).

90 See, e.g.t Anderson v. Little k Davenport Funeral Home, 242 Ga. 751, 251 S.E.2d 230 (1978); Arncson v. Olson, 270 X\W.2d 125, 132 (N.D. 1978); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 Minn. L. Ri;v. 91 (1950). See aim Comment, State Economic Substantive Due Process: A Proposed Approach, 88 Yale L.J. 1487 (1979).

91 In Illinois, for example, the state supreme court invalidated the $500,000 statutory ceiling on medical malpractice recoveries on the ground that it violated the special legislation prohibition of the Ilinois Constitution. See Wright v. Central I)uPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 III 2d 313, 330, 347 N.EJ2d 736” 743 (1976). See aim Grace v. Hewlett” 51 III, 2d 478, 487. 283 N.EJd 474, 479 (1972).

92 Federal courts have sometimes been reluctant to entertain constitutional attacks on state legislation because they arc unwilling to substitute their judgment for that of clected state legislatures. This has led to undcrenforcement of federal constitutional rights in some instances* State judges may be more Hilling to consider such challenges. See generally .Sager, lair Measure: The I-egal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. I., Rev. 1212 (1978). See also Paulsen, supra note 90. at 92-95.

93 242 Ga. 751. 231 ST..2d 250 (1978).

94 Ga. Coin Ann. § 88-3114 (1972) provides that:

Any person including agents and employes, who is licensed to furnish ambulance service and who in good faith renders emergency care to a person who is a victim of an accident or emergency shall not be liable for any civil damages to such victim as a result of any act or omission by such person in rendering such-emergency care to such victim.

95 242 Ga. at 753, 251 S.E.2J at 252 (citing C & S Nat’l Bank v. Mann. 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975); Simpson v. State. 218 Ga. 337, 127 S.E.2d 907 (1962): Ledger-En cjuircr Co. v. Brown. 213 Ga. 538. 100 S.E.2d 166 (1957)).

96 242 Ga. at 755, 251 S.E.2d at 253 (citing C & S Nat’l Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E5d 593 (1975): McLcnnon v. Aldredge, 223 Ca. 879, 159 S.E.2d 682 (1967)).

97 Ga. Code Ann. § 84*930 (1981).

98 242 Ga. at 754, 251 S.E.2d at 252-53.

99 See supra note II and accompanying text. See also Developments in the Law The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv. L” Rr.v, 1324, 1355-419 (1982).

100 270 N.WJ2d 125 (M.D. 1978).

101 Id. at 135.

102 Id.

103 Id.

104 id. at 135-136.

105 id. at 136.

106 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976).

107 id. at 870. 555 P.2d at 410.

108 Id. at 871, 555 P.2d at 411.

109 id.

110 Id. at 871-77, 555 P.2d at 411-17.