1 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).

2 441 U.S. 1 (1979).

3 50 U.S.L.W. 4911 (U.S. June 28, 1982).

4 440 U.S. 205 (1979).

5 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).

6 The Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976), provides that “[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court … and shall recover three-fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.”

7 See McCready v. Blue Shield of Va., 649 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).

8 The Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia, Inc. is the professional organization of Virginia psychiatrists.

9 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).

10 469 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Va. 1979) (close cooperation between Blue Shield and the Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia did not constitute an illegal “contract, combination, or conspiracy” to establish violation of Sherman Act), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 624 F2.d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981).

11 102 S. Ct, 2452 (1982).

12 Justice Blackmun, concurring in the result, identified two other issues left unresolved by the majority. The first is whether the state could accept a patient “for care and treatment” pursuant to its involuntary commitment laws, and then constitutionally refuse to provide any treatment. The second issue left open is whether an individual has a protected liberty interest in preserving those skills he had at the time of commitment, that is, whether he has a right to such training “as is reasonably necessary to prevent … pre-existing self-care skills from deteriorating because of his commitment” (original emphasis). Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. at 2463-65.

13 “[T]he Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several professionally acceptable choices should have been made.” 102 S. Ct. at 2461, citing Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3rd Cir. 1980) (Seitz, C.J., concurring).

14 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).

15 The Supreme Court used the term “antipsychotic drugs” as medications used in treating psychoses, especially schizophrenia. These drugs, such as Thorazine, Mellaril, Prolixin, and Haldol are mind-altering and carry a significant risk of serious adverse side effects.

16 Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).

17 The court of appeals reserved for the district court on remand the question of what procedural safeguards would protect the patient's substantive rights.

18 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).

19 The substantive issue involves a definition of the constitutionally protected interest, as well as identification of conditions that might outweigh it. The procedural issue concerns the minimum procedures required by the Constitution to protect the substantive interest.

20 Potentially dispositive questions of state law can be certified to the SJC. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).

21 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 653 F.2d 836 (3rd Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 50 U.S.L.W. 3998.27 (U.S. July 2, 1982).

22 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982). For a discussion of Youngberg, see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying Text

23 — Va. —, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982).

24 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).

25 See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d at 643 P.2d at 957, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 340, and cases cited therein.

26 Id.

27 In Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980), the California Court of Appeal concluded that under that state's common law an afflicted child could maintain an action and could “recover damages for the pain and suffering to be endured during the limited life span available to such a child,” and special damages resulting from the child's impaired condition. In Turpin v. Sortini, 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1981), a different panel of the court of appeal disagreed with the conclusion in Curlender and dismissed the plaintiff child's cause of action on demurrer. For a discussion of the Curlender decision, see Selected Recent Court Decisions, 7 Am. J.L. & Med. 42 (1981)Google Scholar.

28 To support its decision, the court curiously cited cases that denied wrongful life plaintiffs a right of action, e.g., Gleitman v. Cogsgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 698 (1967) (“Ultimately, the infant's complaint is that he would be better off not having been born. Man, who knows nothing of death or nothingness, cannot possibly know whether that is so.”).

29 385 Mass. 772, 434 N.E.2d 185 (1982).

30 429 U.S. 97 (1976).

31 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982).

32 “Heroic efforts” to resuscitate include intracardial injection of epinephrine or other drugs, intracardial heart massage, or electric shock treatment.

33 Jurisdiction is established by Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119, §§ 24, 26 (West 1969) by which the juvenile court may, upon petition, commit a child found “in need of care and protection” to the custody of the Department of Social Services. The statutory grant of jurisdiction carries with it the power to use the necessary means to exercise and enforce that jurisdiction. Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. at 704, 434 N.E.2d at 605, citing Police Comm'r of Boston v. Municipal Court of the Dorchester Dist., 374 Mass. 640, 374 N.E.2d 272 (1978).

34 The “best interests” test is the test generally applied by courts when the case involves a child. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978) (“In a case like this one, involving a child who is incompetent by reason of his tender years, we think that the substituted judgment doctrine is consistent with the ‘best interests of the child’ test.”).

35 Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass, at 710, 434 N.E.2d at 609 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).