¹ 5 C.F.R. § 339.301(a) (1989).

² 32 C.F.R. § 73, App. B § I.B.2.b. (1989); 32 C.F.R. § 55.3(a) (1988); 10 C.F.R. § 55.21 (1988).

³ American Psychology Ass'n, Ethical Principles of Psychologists, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 633 (1981)Google Scholar (Preamble).

⁴ Id. at 634 (Principle 3c); American Psychology Ass'n, Specialty Guidelines for the Delivery of Services by Clinical Psychologists, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 640, 645 (1981)Google Scholar (Guideline 2.2.2).

⁵ Wherever possible, terminology will be used that is preferred by individuals with disabilities. Thus “persons with disabilities” will be used instead of “the disabled” or “the handicapped.” When discussing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the term “disability” will be substituted for “handicap” except when using exact quotes.

⁶ See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982)).

⁷ 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988).

⁸ E.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1989). The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), federal legislation which would expand coverage for persons with disabilities to the private sector, retains this definition. S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(2) (passed Sept. 7, 1989); H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(2) (passed May 22, 1990); S. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989).

⁹ American Psychology Ass'n, supra note 4, at 633 (Principle If).

¹⁰ See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-23 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-08 (1979); Melton, & Garrison, , Fear, Prejudice, and Neglect: Discrimination Against Mentally Disabled Persons, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1007, 1015 (1987)Google Scholar.

¹¹ S. REP. NO. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1978).

¹² 29 U.S.C. § 701(7) (1982).

¹³ 118 CONG. REC. 11,789 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1972). The language and intent of these proposed amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were incorporated into sections of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

¹⁴ Id.

¹⁵ 119 CONG. REC. 24,587 (daily ed.July 18, 1973).

¹⁶ 29 U.S.C § 791(b) (Supp. V 1987).

¹⁷ 124 CONG. REC. 30,347 (1978).

¹⁸ Rehabilitation of the Handicapped Programs, 1976: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1502 (1976), quoted in Linn, , Uncle Sam Doesn 't Want You: Entering the Federal Stronghold of Employment Discrimination Against Handicapped Individuals, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1060 (1978)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982).

²⁰ 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.4 (1989).

²¹ 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).

²² Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1981)).

²³ Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 after Southeastern, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 171, 175 (1980) (discussing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)).

²⁴ 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982) (emphasis added).

²⁵ 119 CONG. REC. 6,145 (1973). While the Rehabilitation Act of 1972 was vetoed by President Nixon, it was subsequently enacted into law with modifications not germane here as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, S. REP. NO. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 2079-82.

²⁶ S. REP. NO. 1139, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1974). This report estimated that there were at least twenty-two million people with physical disabilities in this country and six million with mental disabilities. Id. at 32. Similar references to persons with mental illness and mental retardation occurred during discussions of the proposed amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 118 CONG. REC. 11,789 (1972) (comments of Sen. Charles Percy); 118 CONG. REC. 525 (1972) (comments of Sen. Hubert Humphrey); 117 CONG. REC. 45,974 (1971) (comments of Rep. Charles A. Vanik). Although this legislation was not enacted, its intent is thought to be incorporated into provisions of the Rehabilitation Act. 119 CONG. REC. 7,114 (1973) (comments of Rep. Charles A. Vanik).

²⁷ See infra notes 44-63 and accompanying text (discussing which psychological disabilities are covered by the Rehabilitation Act).

²⁸ S. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989).

²⁹ Id. at 2-3.

³⁰ E.g., S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201, 202, 302, 303, 304, 401 (1989); H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301, 303, 402, 403, 502 (1989).

³¹ S. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1989) (testimony in order: NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE (1986); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE (1988); CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, ACCOMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES (1983); Louis HARRIS & Assocs., THE ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM (poll, Mar., 1986); Louis HARRIS & ASSOCS., THE ICD SURVEY II: EMPLOYING DISABLED AMERICANS (poll, 1987); PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC REP. (1988); TASK FORCE ON THE RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES REP. (1989)).

³² S. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1989).

³³ Id.

³⁴ Id. at 36-38.

³⁵ S. 933, 101st Cong, 1st Sess. §§ 101 (4)(A), (B) (1989); H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201(3)(A), (B)(i) (1989).

³⁶ S. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1989).

³⁷ Debate in the Senate, however, indicated concern about the broad scope of the bill's coverage of psychological conditions, some of which involve immoral, improper or illegal behavior. See 135 CONG. REC. 10,796 (1989) (comments of Sen. Rudman). The bill was subsequently amended to exclude sexual disorders, certain conduct disorders and illegal drug use and alcohol abuse from coverage. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictive amendments to the ADA).

³⁸ 135 CONG. REC. 10,768 (1989) (comments of Sen. Harkin).

³⁹ Id. at 10,779 (comments of Sen. Domenici).

⁴⁰ E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 (West Supp. 1990) (establishing right to money damages for individuals with disabilities if discriminated against by a business establishment).

⁴¹ E.g., CAL. GOV't CODE §§ 12940-56 (West 1989) (outlawing employment discrimination); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B §§ 19, 20 (1988) (addressing discrimination in housing); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 953 (Purdon 04 & Supp. 1989) (right to freedom from discrimination in employment, housing and public accomodation).

⁴² E.g., CONN. CONST, amend. XXI (adopted Nov. 28, 1984); FLA. CONST, art. I, § 2 (adopted Nov. 5, 1974); MASS. CONST, amend. CXIV (ratified by voters, 1980).

⁴³ E.g., CAL. GOV't CODE § 19230 (West 1990) (“It is the policy of this state to encourage and enable disabled persons to participate fully in the social and economic life of this state and to engage in remunerative employment.“).

⁴⁴ E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).

⁴⁵ Id.. at 1097-1102.

⁴⁶ Id.

⁴⁷ Id. at 1100-02.

⁴⁸ Id. at 1102-03.

⁴⁹ Forrisi v. Heckler, 626 F. Supp. 629 (M.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).

⁵⁰ Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985).

⁵¹ Forrisi, 626 F. Supp. at 631-32.

⁵² Carty, 623 F. Supp. at 1185.

⁵³ E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).

⁵⁴ Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1217, 1221 (W.D. Wash. 1983), aff'd, 752 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1985).

⁵⁵ Schmidt v. Bell, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 839, 845-46 (E.D. Pa. 1983).

⁵⁶ Guerriero v. Schultz, 557 F. Supp. 511, 513 (D.C. 1983).

⁵⁷ Id.

⁵⁸ School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Friedman, 96 Pa. Commw. 267, 271-80, 507 A.2d 882, 885-93 (1986).

⁵⁹ Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1274-77 (8th Cir. 1985).

⁶⁰ Doe v. New York U., 666 F.2d 761, 769 (2d Cir. 1981).

⁶¹ Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health — Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402, 1404-08 (5th Cir. 1983).

⁶² Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666, 668 (11th Cir. 1983).

⁶³ Larson, , What Disabilities Are Protected Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973? 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 236-38 (1986)Google Scholar. None of the cases cited in this paragraph used the E.E. Black test for disability. Plaintiffs in New York U., Region 13, and Stutts would seem to meet the test by virtue of their job expectations or training. However, in Gardner, the plaintiff, a civil engineering technician with the Army Corps of Engineers, was not selected for a higher grade assignment in Saudi Arabia because there was no reasonable accommodation for his manicdepression at this remote location. His disability would not exclude him from other jobs in his field, however. Gardner, 752 F.2d at 1283-84.

⁶⁴ Compare S. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989) (outlining the scope of the ADA) with 29 U.S.C. 794 (1982) (outlining the scope of the Rehabilitation Act).

⁶⁵ Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1989); S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(2)(A) (1989); H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(2)(A) (1989).

⁶⁶ S. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989).

⁶⁷ S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 104(a), 510 (1989).

⁶⁸ Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1228, 1231 n.8 (7th Cir. 1980); Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 129 (D.D.C. 1984); 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12 (Apr. 12, 1977); 43 Fed. Reg. 2,132, 2,137 (1978).

⁶⁹ 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1985). See Whillock, 598 F. Supp. at 129 n.3.

⁷⁰ S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(b)(4) (1989).

⁷¹ Id. at § 511.

⁷² E.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 281-82 (3d ed. 1980).

⁷³ 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). See supra note 21 and accompanying text (quoting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).

⁷⁴ Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 403-06 (1979).

⁷⁵ Id. at 406.

⁷⁶ Id. at 413.

⁷⁷ S. 933, 101st Sess. § 102(a) (1989); H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(a) (1989).

⁷⁸ S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(7) (1989); H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess § 201(5) (1989).

⁷⁹ Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 310 (5th Cir. 1981). See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing Prewitt).

⁸⁰ E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (1989).

⁸¹ See supra note 21 and accompanying text (quoting Rehabilitation Act section 504).

⁸² Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405-13 (1979).

⁸³ “Such (technological) advances also may enable attainment of these goals without imposing undue financial and administrative burdens upon a State.” Id. at 412. The issue of such burdens was not directly addressed in Southeastern; since Davis’ disability rendered her unqualified for the program, no substantial modification of the goals of the program were required and no accommodation could benefit her. Id. at 413-14.

⁸⁴ Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 928 (E.D. Pa. 1982).

⁸⁵ Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1251-52 (6th Cir. 1985).

⁸⁶ Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 307-10 (5th Cir. 1981). See also supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act).

⁸⁷ Section 504 also appears to require accommodation. The Supreme Court in Southeastern subsumed accommodation under the term “affirmative action,” and indicated that, although not possible in Southeastern, certain situations could require accommodation — presumably in section 504 cases. Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 412-13. Although the Court used the term “affirmative action” to encompass accommodation, affirmative action more accurately refers to actions designed to remedy past discrimination, such as altering standards generally or giving preference to members of a group subjected to past discrimination when qualifications are equal. Accommodation, in contrast, is directed toward present barriers without regard for remediation of historic discrimination.

Other courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have construed section 504 as requiring accommodation. See Majors v. Housing Auth. of DeKalb, Ga., 652 F.2d 454, 456-57 (5th Cir. 1981); Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557, 564 (5th Cir. 1980); Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1980), vacatedon other grounds, 451 U.S. 390 (1981); Crawford v. University of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047, 1049, 1054 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 637-38 (D.S.C. 1977). The Fifth Circuit relied on implementing regulations of section 504 and Southeastern to reach this result in Majors. Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 397; Majors, 652 F.2d at 456-57.

Commentators have also argued that section 504 requires accommodation. See Wegner, , The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 442-43 (1984)Google Scholar; (accommodation as implied under constitutional and statutory provisions that prohibit the denial of rights or opportunities). Martin, , Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 888-93Google Scholar (statutory construction of section 504 mandates accommodation).

⁸⁸ Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 400; Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 310.

⁸⁹ Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 305.

⁹⁰ Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1217, 1222-23 (W.D. Wash. 1983). See also supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing Boyd).

⁹¹ Boyd, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1222-23.

⁹² Schmidt v. Bell, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 839, 847. See also supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing Schmidt).

⁹³ Schmidt, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 846.

⁹⁴ Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1283-84 (8th Cir. 1985).

⁹⁵ S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (b)(5) (1989); H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(b)(1) (1989).

⁹⁶ See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (discussing approaches to reasonable accomodation under the Rehabilitation Act).

⁹⁷ E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (1989).

⁹⁸ Id.

⁹⁹ jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1251-52 (5th Cir. 1981); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181, 1188-89 (D. Md. 1985); Alderson v. Postmaster Gen., 598 F. Supp. 49, 55 (W.D. Okla. 1984).

¹⁰⁰ Jasany, 755 F.2d at 1248; Alderson, 598 F. Supp. at 54.

¹⁰¹ Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla., 772 F.2d 759, 764-65 (11th Cir. 1985).

¹⁰² School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1987).

¹⁰³ Coley v. Secretary of Army, 689 F. Supp. 519, 521-24 (D. Md. 1987). See also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 51 v. Baker, 677 F. Supp. 636, 638 (N.D. Cal. 1987).

¹⁰⁴ Ignacio v. United States Postal Serv., 30 M.S.P.R. 471 (1986) (citing Ignacio, No. 0384005 at 10-18 (EEOC, Sept. 4, 1984)).

¹⁰⁵ Ignacio, No. 0384005 at 11-14.

¹⁰⁶ Id. at 11.

¹⁰⁷ Id. at 11-12.

¹⁰⁸ Ignacio v. United States Postal Serv., 30 M.S.P.R. 471, 484-87 (Spec. Pan. 1986). However, this position was strongly criticized for its “blanket deference.” Dancy v. Kline, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 377, 380; 639 F. Supp. 1076, 1080 (N.D. 111. 1986).

¹⁰⁹ H.R. 2,273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(3)(B) (1989).

¹¹⁰ S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(8)(B) (1989).

¹¹¹ Courts also occasionally refer to a reasonableness standard, which is generally not defined, and may refer to a greater or lesser amount of factual justification as the court chooses.

¹¹² Pushkin v. Regents of U. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1383 (10th Cir. 1981).

¹¹³ Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977); Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 114 (W.D. Va. 1981).

¹¹⁴ NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).

¹¹⁵ Pushkin. 658 F.2d at 1383.

¹¹⁶ Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, 742 F.2d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1984), cert, dismissed, 471 U.S. 1062 (1985).

¹¹⁷ City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985).

¹¹⁸ 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 337 (2d ed. 1984).

¹¹⁹ Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1383-91.

¹²⁰ Id.

¹²¹ Id. at 1383.

¹²² Id. at 1387.

¹²³ Id. at 1391.

¹²⁴ See, e.g., Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985); Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, 742 F.2d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 1984), cert, dismissed, 471 U.S. 1062 (1985); Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1983); Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621-22 (9th Cir. 1982); Maine Hum. Rights Comm'n v. Canadian Pac, Ltd., 458 A.2d 1225, 1231 (Me. 1983).

¹²⁵ Strathie, 716 F.2d at 231.

¹²⁶ School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987). See also infra notes 173-175 and accompanying text (discussing Arline).

¹²⁷ Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88.

¹²⁸ Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 400-03 (1979).

¹²⁹ Id. at 414.

¹³⁰ Doe v. New York U., 666 F.2d 761, 779 (2d Cir. 1981).

¹³¹ Id. at 778.

¹³² Id. at 777.

¹³³ Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health — Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d at 1412 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing New York U., 666 F.2d at 761).

¹³⁴ Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1412.

¹³⁵ Id. at 1409-12; Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1372. See supra notes 115, 119-23 and accompanying text (discussing Pushkin test).

¹³⁶ See U.S. CONST, art. 1, § 8; amend. XIV, § I; see also Wegner, supra note 87, at 421-26.

¹³⁷ City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-42 (1985).

¹³⁸ See supra notes 130, 133 and accompanying text.

¹³⁹ Pushkin v. Regents of U. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1383-84 (10th Cir. 1981).

¹⁴⁰ Campbell v. Kruse, 431 F. Supp. 180 (1977), vacated and remanded, 434 U.S. 808 (1977).

¹⁴¹ Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1383-84 (citing Campbell, 431 F. Supp. at 183).

¹⁴² Campbell, 658 F.2d at 1384. The Supreme Court may, however, have been merely applying its policy that a constitutional question need not be decided if the issue can be addressed through statutory means. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J. concurring).

¹⁴³ Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1384.

¹⁴⁴ Id. at 1383.

¹⁴⁵ Id. at 1384.

¹⁴⁶ Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1983).

¹⁴⁷ S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(7) (1989); H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(7) (1989).

¹⁴⁸ plyler v. Doe, 457 u s. 202, 216 n.14 (1982); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1983); Sterling v. Harris, 478 F. Supp. 1046, 1052-53 (N.D. 111. 1979).

¹⁴⁹ H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b)(1) (1989).

It shall be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this Act that an alleged application of qualifications … has been demonstrated by the covered entity to be both necessary and substantially related to the ability of an individual to perform or participate, or take advantage of the essential components of such particular program, activity, job, or other opportunity and such performance, participation, or taking advantage of such essential components cannot be accomplished by applicable reasonable accommodations, modification, or the provision of auxiliary aids or services.

Id. (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁰ S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess § 103(a) (1989) (emphasis added).

¹⁵¹ Pushkin v. Regents of U. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). This position has been criticized by other courts. See, e.g., Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113, 117-18 (8th Cir. 1985); Doe v. New York U., 666 F.2d 761, 776-77 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Wegner, supra note 87, at 484-91. Wegner argues that the defense should bear the burden of persuasion when it admits reliance on plaintiff's disability in reaching the exclusionary decision, but should only have to produce rebuttal evidence when claiming plaintiff was excluded for reasons other than disability. Id. at 490-91. Allocating the burden of proof to the defense when disability-related inability is an issue significantly advances the purpose of eliminating exclusion of persons with disabilities based on stereotyped judgments. Id. at 489.

¹⁵² see Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1387.

¹⁵³ However, the terms “substantially related” in the House bill are similar to those used to describe the intermediate level of review. See Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health — Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402, 1412 (5th Cir. 1983); New York U., 666 F.2d at 778-79. At the very least, these authorities imply a more rigorous standard of review than the rational basis test.

¹⁵⁴ See infra note 190 and accompanying text.

¹⁵⁵ S. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1989).

¹⁵⁶ Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989).

¹⁵⁷ Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).

¹⁵⁸ Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.

¹⁵⁹ Compare id. with S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(a) (1989); H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(b)(3) (1989).

¹⁶⁰ H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(b)(3) (1989).

¹⁶¹ S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(a) (1989).

¹⁶² s. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1989).

¹⁶³ See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text (discussing employers’ defenses under the ADA for exclusionary job criteria).

¹⁶⁴ Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).

¹⁶⁵ See Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health — Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402, 1402 (5th Cir. 1983).

¹⁶⁶ Id. See also supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (discussing Region 13 and Doe v. New York U.).

¹⁶⁷ See infra text accompanying notes 261-66 & note 266 (discussing Region 13 and the exclusionary criteria used).

¹⁶⁸ Doe v. New York U., 666 F.2d 761, 777 (2d Cir. 1981).

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Wegner, supra note 87, at 490. Wegner maintains that lowering the burden of proof is an unsuitable way to protect a valid exclusion. The author suggests establishing eligibility criteria with a high threshold that reflect legitimate needs to ensure public safety. Id. She bases her argument on whether the safety hazard is “foreseeable.” Id. This position begs the question of the level of risk that is “foreseeable.” A low level of risk would probably satisfy the rational basis standard but not the stricter Pushkin standard.

¹⁷⁰ E.g., Lewis v. Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 320 N.W.2d 426, 430-31 (Minn. 1982); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 861-63 (7th Cir. 1974), cert, denied sub nom. Brennan v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); see also infra notes 188-196 and accompanying text (discussing Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications (BFOQ)).

¹⁷¹ See, e.g., Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 769 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 474 U.S. 936 (1985); Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422-23 (9th Cir. 1980); Kelley v. Bechtel Power Corp., 633 F. Supp. 927, 933-35 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 570, 572 (Minn. 1979).

¹⁷² School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987).

¹⁷³ Id. at 288.

¹⁷⁴ Id.

¹⁷⁵ Id. at n.18.

¹⁷⁶ Andersen v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 89 NJ. 483, 497-98, 446 A.2d 486, 492-93 (1982).

¹⁷⁷ Andersen, 89 N.J. at 498, 446 A.2d at 493, 495; Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422-23 (9th Cir. 1980).

¹⁷⁸ Chicago & North Western R.R. v. Labor & Indus. Comtn'n, 91 Wis. 2d 462, 471, 283 N.W.2d 603, 608, (1979), aff'd, 98 Wis. 2d 592, 297 N.W.2d 819 (1980).

¹⁷⁹ Mantolete, 767 F.2d at 1422.

¹⁸⁰ Id. at 1423.

¹⁸¹ H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b)(1) (emphasis added).

¹⁸² S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(a) (1989) (emphasis added).

¹⁸³ s. REP. NO. 116, 101st. Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1989).

¹⁸⁴ S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 103 (a) (1989); H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b)(1) (1989).

¹⁸⁵ H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b)(1) (1989).

¹⁸⁶ S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(a) (1989).

¹⁸⁷ S. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1989).

¹⁸⁸ Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).

¹⁸⁹ Id. at 333.

¹⁹⁰ Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Empl. Prac. Comm'n of Cal., 121 Cal. App. 3d 791, 797, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551 (1981); Maine Hum. Rights Comm'n v. Canadian Pac, Ltd., 458 A.2d 1225, 1231-33 (Me. 1983). See Lewis v. Remmele Eng'g, 314 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1981); Rose v. Hanna Mining Co., 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 267, 268-69 (Wash. 1980).

¹⁹¹ Lewis v. Metro. Transit Comm'n, 320 N.W.2d 426, 430-31 (Minn. 1982).

¹⁹² Id. at 430-33, (citing Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. 499 F.2d 859, 861-63 (7th Cir. 1974), cert, denied sub nom. Brennan v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 419 U.S. 1122 (1975)).

¹⁹³ See Longoria v. Harris, 554 F. Supp. 102, 103-08 (S.D. Tex. 1982).

¹⁹⁴ BFOQs have not, to the author's knowledge, been asserted as defenses to discrimination charges under the Rehabilitation Act.

¹⁹⁵ See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.

¹⁹⁶ S. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1989).

¹⁹⁷ H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b)(1) (1989).

¹⁹⁸ S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(a) (1989).

¹⁹⁹ Doe v. New York U., 666 F.2d 761, 777 (2d Cir. 1981). See also supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.

²⁰⁰ New York U., 666 F.2d at 777.

²⁰¹ Id.

²⁰² Id. at 777-80.

²⁰³ Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422-23 (9th Cir. 1985).

²⁰⁴ Id.

²⁰⁵ Lewis v. Remmele Eng'g, Inc., 314 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 1981).

²⁰⁶ Montgomery Ward v. Bureau of Labor, 280 Or. 163, 168-69, 570 P.2d 76, 79 (1977).

²⁰⁷ Id. at 165-69; 570 P.2d at 77-79.

²⁰⁸ Maine Hum. Rights Comm'n v. Canadian Pac, Ltd., 458 A.2d 1225, 1234 (Me. 1983).

²⁰⁹ Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Empl. Prac. Comm'n of Cal., 121 Cal. App. 3d 791, 799, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548, 552 (1981).

²¹⁰ E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1104 (D. Haw. 1980).

²¹¹ Id.

²¹² Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621-23 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 32.14 (1982)).

²¹³ 29 C.F.R. §32.14 (1989).

²¹⁴ Bentivegna, 694 F.2d at 622-23. The evidence in this case related diabetes to other conditions associated with risk. Id. at 622.

²¹⁵ Id. at 622-23.

²¹⁶ Id. at 623 n.3.

²¹⁷ Maine Hum. Rights Comm'n v. Canadian Pac, Ltd., 458 A.2d 1225, 1234 (Me. 1983)

²¹⁸ Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985).

²¹⁹ Id. at 1424-25.

²²⁰ Pacific Motor Trucking Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 64 Or. App. 361, 367, 668 P.2d 446, 450 (1983), rev. denied, 295 Or. 773, 670 P.2d 1036 (1983).

²²¹ H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b)(1) (1989). This section provides: “It shall be a defense to a charge of discrimination … that an alleged application of qualification standards … has b e e n demonstrated by t h e covered entity to b e b o t h necessary a n d substantially related to the ability of an individual to perform …. “ Id. (emphasis added).

²²² S. REP. N O. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1989).

²²³ Id. at 26.

²²⁴ See Morse, , Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S.C.L. REV. 527, 601 (1978)Google Scholar.

²²⁵ See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.

²²⁶ See, e.g., School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987); see also supra notes 111-35 and accompanying text (discussing standard of review).

²²⁷ See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text (discusssing BFOQs).

²²⁸ Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88 (1987); Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422-23 (9th Cir. 1985); Kelley v. Bechtel Power Corp., 633 F. Supp. 927, 934 (S.D. Fla. 1986); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1104 (D. Haw. 1980); Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 89 N.J. 483, 493, 446 A.2d 486, 491 (1982).

²²⁹ Rose v. Hanna Mining Co., 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 267, 267-68 (Wash. 1980). The Rose court ruled in favor of a plaintiff with a history of epilepsy. The court noted that the company's physician had never been in Rose's work-place, the smelter, but that the plaintiff's own physician had observed each task performed at the smelter and concluded that, with exception of one task, Rose's condition would not pose a significant danger. Id.

²³⁰ See supra text accompanying notes 111-12 (disscussing the rational basis standard); see also infra notes 244-69 and accompanying text (discussing problems posed by limitations on predictability of risks to health and safety).

²³¹ See, e.g., Arline, 480 U.S. at 288; see also supra notes 111-35 and accompanying text (discussing standard of review).

²³² See supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.

²³³ See supra note 201 and accompanying text.

²³⁴ E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1104 (D. Haw. 1980); Maine Hum. Rights Comm'n v. Canadian Pac, Ltd., 458 A.2d 1225, 1234 (Me. 1983).

²³⁵ E.E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1104.

²³⁶ Id.

²³⁷ Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir. 1982); Maine Hum. Rights Comm'n, 458 A.2d at 1231, 1234.

²³⁸ Maine Hum. Rights Comm'n, 458 A.2d at 1234.

²³⁹ See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1980); Pacific Motor Trucking Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 64 Or. App. 361, 368, 668 P.2d 446, 450 (1980), rev. denied, 295 Or. 773, 670 P.2d 1036 (1983).

²⁴⁰ See supra notes 24 (defining handicap under the Rehabilitation Act), 38 (defining disability under the ADA), 80, 94, 107-08 (discussing the reasonable accomodation requirement under the Rehabilitation Act), 95-96 (discussing the reasonable accomodation requirement under the ADA), 109-10 (discussing reassignment requirements under the ADA) and accompanying text.

²⁴¹ See supra notes 147-64 and accompanying text.

²⁴² See supra notes 181-87, 194-98 and accompanying text.

²⁴³ See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.

²⁴⁴ See supra notes 199-209 and accompanying text (discussing probability of risk).

²⁴⁵ MONAHAN, J., THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 34 (1981)Google Scholar.

²⁴⁶ Shapiro, , The Evaluation of Clinical Predictions: A Method and Initial Application, 296 NEW ENC. J. MED. 1509, 1512 (1977)Google Scholar.

²⁴⁷ See J. MONAHAN, supra note 245, at 34; Shapiro, supra note 246, at 1512.

²⁴⁸ See, e.g., ZISKIN, J. & FAUST, D., COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 6, 76, (4th ed. 1988); Morse, supra note 224, at 592-600; Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom﹜ 38 MD. L. REV. 539, 565-88 (1979)Google Scholar.

²⁴⁹ See Bersoff, , Psychologists and the Judicial Process, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 153 (1986)Google Scholar; Comment, supra note 248, at 544-54.

²⁵⁰ Comment, supra note 248, at 563 n.108.

²⁵¹ See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-23 (1982) (proper standard for adequate state protection of involuntarily committed mentally retarded individual is whether professional judgment was exercised; courts must show deference to judgment of qualified professional, whose judgment is presumptively valid); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-08 (1979) (involuntary psychiatric hospitalization of a minor is individual medical decision that must be left to the judgment of physicians) (quoting In re Roger S, 19 Cal. 3d 921, 942, 569 P.2d 1286, 1299 (1977): “neither judges nor administrative hearing officers are better qualified than psychiatrists to render psychiatric judgments.“).

²⁵² Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health — Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402, 1410 (5th Cir. 1983).

²⁵³ See supra notes 199-220 and accompanying text (discussing inquiries into health and safety), 115, 119-29 and accompanying text (discussing the factual basis standard of review).

²⁵⁴ Doe v. New York U., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).

²⁵⁵ Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1402.

²⁵⁶ New York U., 666 F.2d at 772.

²⁵⁷ Id.

²⁵⁸ Morse, supra note 224, at 556, 599.

²⁵⁹ CHESSICK, R., INTENSIVE PSYCHOTHERAPY OF THE BORDERLINE PATIENT 139, 194 (1977)Google Scholar. See also Waldinger, , Intensive Psychodynamic Therapy with Borderline Patients: An Overview, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 267, 271 (1987)Google Scholar.

²⁶⁰ See A. Goldstein, Patient's Expectancies and Nonspecific Therapy as a Basis for (Un)spontaneous Remission, in A. GOLDSTEIN & S. DEAN, THE INVESTIGATION O F PSYCHOTHERAPY 202-05 (1966) (spontaneous remission may result from nonspecific interventions by individuals other than professional therapists).

²⁶¹ Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health — Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402, 1406 (5th Cir. 1983).

²⁶² Pope, , Assessment and Management of Suicidal Risk: Clinical and Legal Standards of Care, in 6 DIVISION 42 OF THE AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC, THE INDEPENDENT PRACTITIONER: BULLETIN OF THE DIVISION OF PSYCHOLOGISTS IN INDEPENDENT PRACTICE 17, 18 (1986)Google Scholar.

²⁶³ Rosen, , Detection of Suicidal Patients: An Example of Some Limitations in the Prediction of Infrequent Events, 18 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 397 (1954)Google Scholar.

²⁶⁴ A false positive m this context is a prediction of an individual as suicidal when he or she actually is not. See also id. at 402.

²⁶⁵ Region 13 704 F.2d at 1406-07.

²⁶⁶ Although this issue apparently was not raised by the plaintiff or considered by the court, if the exclusionary decision was based on the possibility that Doe might pass on her acceptance of suicide as an alternative to her clients, the decision appears discriminatory. See Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1409, 1412. It is doubtful that the criterion of “nonacceptance of suicide as an alternative” was applied to any of the other therapists at Region 13, although suicide may be accepted as an alternative by individuals without emotional problems and who are not actively suicidal. The rule appears discriminatory on its face, if applied only to individuals with disabilities. In addition if the exclusion was based on this factor, a reasonable accommodation would have been possible. It is unlikely that the opportunity would arise for the plaintiff to convey her acceptance of suicide to patients who were not depressed or potentially suicidal, or that any such communication, whether direct or indirect, would fall on fertile soil. Doe could have been prohibited from treating only those patients for whom suicidal potential was an issue. It would probably not be an undue burden for her supervisor to review her caseload.

²⁶⁷ Doe v. New York U., 666 F.2d 761, 768, 772 (2d Cir. 1981).

²⁶⁸ Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1409.

²⁶⁹ Comment, supra note 248, at 558-60.

²⁷⁰ Morse, supra note 224, at 600-25.

²⁷¹ For example, gaps may exist in the precision of prognostic statements or in the quantification of probabilities.

²⁷² This assumes that the psychologist following the guidelines is knowledgeable and upto- date in his or her field.

²⁷³ American Psychology Ass'n, supra note 3, at 633-35 (Principle 1(a)) (“psychologists … provide thorough discussion of the limitations of their data, especially where their work touches on social policy“); (Principle 2) (“Psychologists recognize the boundaries of their competence and the limitations of their techniques“); (Principle 4) (“psychologists base their statements on scientifically acceptable psychological findings and techniques with full recognition of the limits and uncertainties of such evidence“); (Principle 4(g)) (“Psychologists present the science of psychology … fairly and accurately, avoiding misrepresentation through sensationalism, exaggeration, or superficiality. Psychologists are guided by the primary obligation to aid the public in developing informed judgments, opinions, and choices.“).

²⁷⁴ On cross examination, however, the experts may have to reveal the underlying facts or data upon which they based their conclusion. FED. R. EVID. 705. See Loftus, , Experimental Psychologist as Advocate or Impartial Educator, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV., 63, 73 (1986)Google Scholar. C.f. Rivlin, , Forensic Social Science, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 61 (1973)Google Scholar; Wolfgang, , The Social Scientist in Court, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 246 (1974)Google Scholar.

²⁷⁵ See, e.g., Loftus, supra note 274, at 63-77; Yarmey, , Ethical Responsibilities Governing the Statements Experimental Psychologists Make in Expert Testimony, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 101, 112 (1986)Google Scholar; Loftus, & Monahan, , Trial by Data: Psychological Research as Legal Evidence, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 270, 279-80 (1980)Google Scholar; Camper & Loftus, The Role of Psychologists as Expert Witnesses in the Courtroom: No More Danieb in the Lion's Den, 9 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV., 1-13 (1985).

²⁷⁶ E.g., Doe v. New York U., 666 F.2d 761, 765 (2d Cir. 1981).

²⁷⁷ Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health — Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983).

²⁷⁸ Forrisi v. Heckler, 626 F. Supp. 629, 631-32 (M.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 931, 933-34 (4th Cir 1986) (employee with acrophobia does not have a disability); School Dist. Of Philadelphia v. Friedman, 96 Pa. Commw. 267, 271-80, 507 A.2d 882, 885-93 (1986) (employee with personality disorder causing chronic tardiness found not to have disability); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181, 1189 (D. Md. 1985) (plaintiff was not entitled to reassignment as a reasonable accommodation). Cases holding that no reasonable accommodation was available for the plaintiff include: Schmidt v. Bell, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 839, 847 (E.D. Pa 1983); Boyd v. U.S. Postal Service, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1217, 1222-23 (W.D. Wash. 1983), aff'd, 752 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1985); Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1283-84 (8th Cir. 1985). In Region 13, the plaintiff was found not to be “otherwise qualified”, and no reasonable accommodation appears to have been considered. Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1412. The grant of mandatory preliminary injunction allowing the plaintiff in New York U. to enter the university was reversed, and she was given little hope of prevailing on the merits. New York U., 666 F.2d at 779-80.

²⁷⁹ Pushkin v. Regents of U. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1376 (10th Cir. 1981).

²⁸⁰ Id. at 1390.

²⁸¹ New York U., 666 F.2d at 761.

²⁸² Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1402.

²⁸³ Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1372.

²⁸⁴ Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1404.

²⁸⁵ New York U., 666 F.2d at 770.

²⁸⁶ See Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1384.

²⁸⁷ See Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1404-06; New York U., 666 F.2d at 772.

²⁸⁸ New York U., 666 F.2d at 772.

²⁸⁹ See id. at 779.

²⁹⁰ Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1402.

²⁹¹ See supra notes 147-70 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA).