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Health Law 2010: It's Not All about the Money

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 January 2021

Peter D. Jacobson  and
Soniya Keskar Mathur
Peter D. Jacobson
Affiliation:
University of Michigan School of Public Health
Soniya Keskar Mathur
Affiliation:
Department of Health Management and Policy, University of Michigan School of Public Health
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Extract

It would be naïve to argue that money isn't the driving force motivating health care delivery in 2010. At nearly 17% of GDP, health care delivery is a large and growing industrial enterprise that is the largest employer in many communities. Save for free clinics, generating revenue is fundamental to every aspect of the delivery system. From insurance reimbursement rates to the cost of purchasing the latest technology, the surest explanation for understanding changes in the health care system and concomitant development of legal doctrine is, indeed, to “follow the money.”

Determining who controls the money flows usually explains who the dominant players are, and how they are able to organize and change the delivery system. Unquestionably, the most straightforward way to understand how the system functions, where its vulnerabilities lie, and why it is so difficult to institute significant reforms is to identify who controls the money.

Type
Article
Information
American Journal of Law & Medicine , Volume 36 , Issue 2-3 , June 2010 , pp. 389 - 404
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics and Boston University 2010

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