1 But see Christopher R. Williams, Engaging Freedom: Toward an Ethics of Crime and Deviance, in Philosophy, Crime, and Criminology 167, 167-96 (Bruce A. Arrigo & Christopher R. Williams eds., 2006). See generally Erich Fromm and Critical Criminology: Beyond the Punitive Society (Kevin Anderson & Richard Quinney eds., Heinz D. Osterle & Kevin Anderson trans., 2000) (discussing Fromm's social theory and humanist perspective as a foundation for critical criminology).

2 See Christopher R. Williams & Bruce A. Arrigo, Introduction: Philosophy, Crime, and Theoretical Criminology, in Philosophy, Crime, and Criminology 1, 28-31 (Bruce A. Arrigo & Christopher R. Williams eds., 2006); Christopher R. Williams & Bruce A. Arrigo, Ethics, Crime, and Criminal Justice (2008).

3 This very point anchored the work of several Frankfurt School critics during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, especially the insights of Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm. See, e.g., Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom 34-39 (1941); Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society 7 (1964). Most recently, research on the phenomenology of crime has drawn attention to the visceral and emotional attractions of evil that make transcendent or freeing identities possible amidst a culture that imposes boundaries, order, stasis, and normativity. For the deviant/criminal in search of identity fulfillment, these are borders that are negotiated, contested, and crossed. See, e.g., Martha G. Duncan, Romantic Outlaws, Beloved Prisons: The Unconscious Meanings of Crime and Punishment (1996); Jack Katz, Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil (1988); Edgework: The Sociology of Risk-Taking (Stephen Lyng ed., 2005). For a preliminary review of this logic in contemporary penology see Arrigo, Bruce A., Punishment, Freedom, and the Culture of Control: A Review of Torture: America's Brutal Prisons, 9 Contemp. Just. Rev. 229, 229-33 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lynn S. Chancer, Fromm, Sadomasochism, and Contemporary American Crime, in Erich Fromm and Critical Criminology: Beyond the Punitive Society, supra note 1, at 40-42.

4 Dragan Milovanovic, Ethics of Edgework: Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Deleuze, in Philosophy, Crime, and Criminology 197, 214-15 (Bruce A. Arrigo & Christopher R. Williams eds., 2006).

5 Id. at 214. For additional criminological and cultural applications of life moments on the edge, see Edgework: The Sociology of Risk-Taking, supra note 3; Mike Presdee, Cultural Criminology and the Carnival of Crime (2000); Dragan Milovanovic, Critical Criminology at the Edge: Postmodern Perspectives, Integration, and Applications (2002).

6 See Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity (Elia Zureik & Mark B. Salter eds., 2005).

7 See, e.g., Elyn R. Saks, Refusing Care: Forced Treatment and the Rights of the Mentally Ill (2002) (exploring the rights of persons with psychiatric disorders including advanced directives).

8 See, e.g., Judith Lynn Failer, Who Qualifies For Rights?: Homelessness, Mental Illness, and Civil Commitment (2002) (reviewing the problem of rights claiming).

9 See, e.g., Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S. – Mexico Divide (2000) (examining the contradictions in U.S. border patrol policy).

10 See Doris Layton MacKenzie, What Works in Corrections: Reducing the Criminal Activities of Offenders and Delinquents 5 (2006) (“Intensive supervision, electronic monitoring, and home confinement are examples of increased community control.”).

11 See Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity, supra note 6.

12 The concept of a “risk society” implicates modernity and globalization. The concept refers to a reflexive and planned strategy to promote efficiency, health, and safety, given the hazardous practices of industry, government, medicine, science, and other institutional sectors of society. Examples of such hazards include contaminated air, water, and food supplies; global industrial pollution; and bioengineering that compromises or destroys ecosystems (e.g., kills animals, plants, and people). Although systematic responses to these risks are designed to promote a distributive form of justice and to neutralize class distinctions, the social transformation spawned by reflexive modernization emphasizes solutions through technology that undermine, eliminate, or make obsolete the more free-thinking role of the individual in society. See, e.g., Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage Publications 1992) (1986); Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (1999); The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory (Barbara Adam et al. eds., 2000). The relevance of this logic within the science of criminology features the disciplining of citizens through technologies of offender monitoring that seek to ensure compliance or minimize transgression. For applications in criminology, see for example Crime and the Risk Society (Pat O’Malley ed., 1998); Governing Risks (Pat O’Malley ed., 2005).

13 Institutional practices advancing such surveillance render human subjects nothing more than “‘docile bodies,’ ‘bodies of abject utility,’ and mere ‘functionaries of the state’ [which are] the results of panopticism.” Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of a Prison 210 (1977).

14 Containment of the body is insufficient to advance the culture of control. Language, cognition, perspective, and voice – as dimensions of the knowledge process – are all silenced and vanquished. The body is “empty;” it is a “body without organs … where stasis and repetition have been established. [This is a body] where flows and intensities [i.e., possibilities and becomings] have been subjected to molar forces.” See, Bruce A. Arrigo et al., The French Connection in Criminology: Rediscovering Crime, Law, and Social Change 8 (2005). Knowledge is territorialized in this process because behavior is scripted, coded, and configured to be consistent with “meritocracy and the preservation of commodity production [i.e., the status quo].” Id. at 9. In order not to be a docile body subjected to the panoptic gaze, in order not to have one's knowledge and identity vanquished and co-opted, one must appropriate the political activism of schizoanalysis. Schizoanalysis requires deterritorialization. This entails “destroying beliefs,” “representations,” and routinized practices that contest dominant cultural expectations about knowing, living, and being. Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 314-15 (Robert Hurley et al. trans., 1977).

15 See Fromm, supra note 3, at 183-204. (describing three mechanisms of escape in the face of the alienating and dehumanizing conditions that individuals in contemporary democratic societies confront, given the psychological and sociological effects of capitalism, authoritarianism, destructiveness, and automaton conformity). Automaton conformity is what the culture of control perniciously and invidiously seeks to secure. See infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.

16 For a review of various scientific breakthroughs emanating from evolutionary psychology, human genetics, brain biology and cognitive neuroscience – including an assessment of their ethical implications – see Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain (2005); Laurence R. Tancredi, Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals About Morality (2005); Neuroscience and the Law: Brain, Mind, and the Scales of Justice (Brent Garland ed., 2004).

17 Tancredi, supra note 16, at 11 (emphasizing the “brain as a physical organ [that shapes] moral responses … lead[s] to hard choices about how to deal with each other … [and] the potential for political control to create a homogenized moral society.”).

18 The concept of “hyper-reality” refers to the pervasive consumption of commodities amidst a culture of consumer capitalism and mass-mediated technology. Arrigo et al., supra note 14, at 20-21. However, the question is what “really” is consumed? In a society where reliance on computerized and digitized information represents the means by which commodities are exchanged, then what is consumed is not the object but the image-object. This is the society of the spectacle. See, e.g., Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (1970); Guy Debord, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle (Malcolm Imrie trans., Verso 1990) (1988); Georg Lukacs, Realism in Our Time: Literature and the Class Struggle (John Mander & Necke Mander trans., 1962); Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics (Rodney Livingstone trans., MIT Press 1971) (1968) (exploring the development and application of the mostly French avant-garde Situationist International movement as a form of theoretical critique of consumer society combined with radical artistic and social politics). If the image object is consumed, then our everyday existences are organized around a mass-mediated consumer culture. This is a culture in which an implosion of reality takes place; that is, form displaces substance, appearance supercedes reality, the counterfeit outpaces the authentic; replicas of truth possess significance beyond facts, evidence, or data. All of these conditions establish “hallucinatory resemblances” of the real. See Jean Baudrillard, Simulations 21-23 (1983). When these boundaries are undone, then implosion prevails, “and with it the very experience and ground of ‘the real’ disappears.” Steven Best & Douglas Kellner, Postmodern theory: Critical Interrogations 119 (1991). See also Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (Charles Levin trans., 1981) (arguing that political theories are rooted in symbolism and ideology and do not objectively reflect the realities of the human condition) [hereinafter Baudrillard, Political Economy]; Sean Cubitt, Simulation and Social Theory (arguing that contemporary culture is characterized by the consumption of objects valued for the their social meaning, rather than their utility) (2001).

19 See, e.g., Richard B. Buxton, An Introduction to Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging: Principles and Techniques (2002); Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging: An Introduction to Methods (Jezzard et al. eds., 2003); Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (Thatcher et al. eds., 2004).

20 When reality is simulated then what is “real” disappears. In a mass-mediated materialist culture, there are no commodities to purchase and no image-objects to consume. Rather, what remains are simulacra. See generally Baudrillard, supra note 18 (discussing conditions establishing hallucinatory resemblances of reality). Simulacra refer to “the proliferation of increased symbolic exchanges and the circulation of multiple simulations where codes of technology, sophisticated advertising, and computerized information produce a virtual authenticity, a hyper-reality, a world that is based on models of the real … .” Arrigo et al., supra note 14, at 21. These replicas of reality recast our understanding of humanity, individuality, and identity. See infra notes 64-91 and accompanying text.

21 For discussions of critical social theory see for example Ben Agger, Critical Social Theories: An Introduction (2d ed. 2006); Nick Crossley, Key Concepts in Critical Social Theory (2005). For discussions of philosophical criminology see for example Arrigo et al., supra note 14; Philosophy, Crime, and Criminology (Bruce A. Arrigo & Christopher R. Williams eds., 2006); Social Justice / Criminal Justice: The Maturation of Critical Theory in Crime, Law, and Deviance (Bruce A. Arrigo ed., 1999); Theory, Justice, and Social Change: Theoretical Integrations and Critical Applications (Christopher R. Williams & Bruce A. Arrigo 2004).

22 Thompson, Sean Kevin, Note, The Legality of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in Intelligence Interrogation, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1601, 1607 (2005).Google ScholarPubMed

23 See Harvey Rishikof & Michael Schrage, Technology vs. Torture, Slate, Aug. 18, 2004, http://slate.msn.com/id/2105332/.

24 Thompson, supra note 22, at 1602.

25 Id.

26 Rishikof & Schrage, supra note 23. Questions put to a subject when functional (MRI) technology is employed can vary. Examples might include, “Is your name Ms. ‘X’?,” “Do you know what day it is?,” “Is your date of birth … .?” Certainly, in the case of interrogating persons suspected of criminal wrongdoing or those who represent actual transgressors, these questions are more targeted and direct.

27 See Bandettini, Peter A. & Ungerleider, Leslie G., From Neuron to BOLD: New Connections, 4 Neurosci. 864, 864 (2001).Google ScholarPubMed When presented with a question, “the parts of the brain responsible for answering will cause certain neurons to fire, drawing blood flow.” Rishikof & Schrage, supra note 23. Functional (MRI) detects increases in neuronal activity, given the oxygen in the blood which causes changes in the brain's magnetic field. This means that fMRI relies on blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrasts to spot fluctuations in metabolic activity, and correspondingly, brain behavior. Thompson, supra note 22, at 1608. The fMRI scanner measures “circulatory adjustment owing to increased brain activity rather than brain activity itself” in which these changes, when detected, are calibrated. Id. The operator of the scanner then compares images of the changes “with the brain at rest.” Rishikof & Schrage, supra note 23. These changes appear as high-resolution, computer-generated, three-dimensional snapshots, identifying what part of the brain is or is not responding to the question posed to the subject. Thompson, supra note 22, at 1608.

28 Thompson, supra note 22, at 1602. Some critics concerned with the legal and psychological implications of this technology, as well as the limits of relying on it when making determinations of criminal responsibility, suggest that some of the theoretical and empirical claims of cognitive neuroscience and brain biology are overstated. See Morse, Stephen J., Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 397 (2006).Google Scholar

29 Buxton, supra note 19.

30 In part, the thesis of this Article focuses on the potential ethical limits of relying on such instrumentation – especially as a disciplinary tool of the criminal justice apparatus – by exploring the panoptic power this technology socially promotes, the ontological commitments it culturally imposes, and the quality of freedom it psychically endorses, particularly amidst a climate of conspicuous mass mediated consumer-driven capitalism. See infra notes 44-115 and accompanying text.

31 A number of recent studies emphasize the possible merits of utilizing fMRI as a more sophisticated version of the polygraph machine. See, e.g., Langleben, Daniel D. et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NeuroImage 727, 727-32 (2002)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Lee, Tatia M.C. et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 15 Hum. Brain Mapping 157, 157-64 (2002)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. In these instances, “the decision to lie,” rather than “one's emotional response to lying” is measured. Thompson, supra note 22, at 1609 (emphasis added).

32 See, e.g., Farah, Martha J. & Wolpe, Paul Root, Monitoring and Manipulating Brain Function: New Neuroscience Technologies and their Ethical Implications, 34 Hastings Center Rep. 35 (2004)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Kelly, Heather O’Beirne, Abu Ghraib: Informing Congress About the Science, 18 Psychol. Sci. Agenda 1, July 2004, http://www.apa.org/science/psa/jul4ghraib.htmlGoogle Scholar; Sententia, Wrye, Neuroethical Considerations: Cognitive Liberty and Converging Technologies for Improving Human Cognition, 1013 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 221, 221-28 (2004).CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

33 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 1611-36; Rishikof and Schrage, supra note 23.

34 Beckman, Mary, Crime, Culpability, and the Adolescent Brain, 305 Sci. 596 (2004)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, by a 5-4 vote, that the execution of persons under the age of eighteen was unconstitutional based, in part, on scientific evidence derived from brain studies research. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). See also Charles L. Scott, Roper v. Simmons: Can Juvenile Offenders be Executed?, 33 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 547 (2005) (for an analysis of Roper emphasizing both legal and psychiatric concerns).

35 See, e.g., Ayala, Francisco J., The Biological Roots of Morality, 2 Biology & Phil. 232, 232-52 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Edward O. Wilson, The Biological Basis of Morality, Atlantic Monthly, Apr. 1998, at 53-70; Laurence R. Tancredi, Neuroscience Developments and the Law, in Neuroscience and the Law: Brain, Mind, and the Scales of Justice 71, 80-94, 103-08 (Brent Garland ed., 2004).

36 Gazzaniga, supra note 16, at 88-89 (“The brain determines the mind, and the brain is a physical entity, subject to all the rules of the physical world. The physical world is determined, so our brains must also be determined. If our brains are determined, and the brain is the necessary and sufficient organ that enables mind, [then the question becomes whether our] thoughts that arise from the mind [are] also determined? [Moreover,] is the free will we seem to experience just an illusion? And, if free will is an illusion, must we revise our concepts of what it means to be personally responsible for our actions?”).

37 This issue as it implicates health-related concerns is increasingly problematic, particularly in an era of global violence and crime. See generally Gostin, Lawrence O., Public Health Law in an Age of Terrorism: Rethinking Individual Rights and Common Goods, 21 Health Affairs 77 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (exploring the appropriate balance between public goods and individual rights).

38 See, e.g., P.D.G. Skegg, Law, Ethics, and Medicine (1984) (discussing the role of the court in addressing compelling, though competing, interests). See Appelbaum, Paul S., A Theory of Ethics for Forensic Psychiatry, 25 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 233, 233-246 (1997)Google ScholarPubMed (discussing the principles of truth telling and respect for persons as consistent with the value of forensic psychiatry research and practice). See also Candilis, Philip J. & Martinez, Richard, Commentary: The Higher Standards of Aspirational Ethics, 34 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 242, 242 (2006)Google ScholarPubMed (arguing for normative criteria in forensic practice that exceed the minimal obligations of ethics and law). But see Adshead, Gwen, Evidence-Based Medicine and Medicine-Based Evidence: The Expert Witness in Cases of Factitious Disorder by Proxy, 33 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 99, 99-104 (2005)Google ScholarPubMed (exploring whether “doctors use scientific evidence to make diagnoses in the same way that the courts use evidence to make judgments”).

39 Indeed, as Rishikof and Schrage note in response to the potential use of fMRI instrumentation to avoid future prisoner abuse cases such as Abu Ghraib and to extract much needed information consistent with national security interests, “America must consider different ways to procure valuable information from terrorists, unlawful combatants, and insurgents.” They point out that “[i]t isn't obvious that being attached to a Functional MRI scanner is the moral equivalent of being deprived of sleep for 36 hours in a cold cell.” Thus, it's plausible that “interrogation methods based on non-consensual and passive medical interventions … are less objectionable than methods based on the threat and reality of physical beatings.” Rishikof & Schrage, supra note 23.

40 Thompson, supra note 22, at 1615-18 (exploring this question based on international humanitarian law). Thompson explains that “[a]lthough fMRI does extract information from the detainee against the detainee's will, [the question is whether] it compel[s] an act against one's will … . [Even though the] fMRI does not require the detainee to affirmatively act, as it never requires the detainee to verbalize the information.” Id. at 1618. Thus, Thompson argues, “because fMRI secures information from the detainee against the detainee's free will, it must be regarded as ‘coercive’ under [the law].” Id. at 1618. Additional concerns about the ethical legitimacy of utilizing fMRI technology in criminal interrogation instances address its potential as a form of torture; as an expression of cruel, inhumane or degrading behavior; and as a type of conduct that shocks the conscience of society. Id. at 1623-36.

41 Sociological research examining the notion of coercion and sanction in modern society indicates that social relations and cultural meanings are very much a part of the punishment prescription. See, e.g., David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory (1990). Building on this analysis is the form that punishment assumes in ultramodern society. This is a society steeped in a postmodern attitude; that is, a period “marked by the birth of a new aesthetic – one devoid of absolutist, positivist, essentialist [modernists] notions of justice, peace, community, society, culture, and so on.” T.R. Young & Bruce A. Arrigo, The Dictionary of Critical Social Sciences 252 (1999). See also Agger, supra note 21, at 139-43 (commenting on postmodern theory based on the views of Baudrillard and Foucault). This postmodern attitude represents a critical and evolving perspective in which modernist claims to truth, reason, and progress (e.g., the scientific method, capital logic, rugged individualism, deep structures of meaning, predictability, stasis, logocentricism) are deconstructed as fictions or artifacts of the presumed Enlightenment period “rational subject.” Young & Arrigo, supra at 251. Instead, the ultramodern or postmodern age celebrates and affirms “knowledge as local, truth as positional [and], understanding as relational.” Id. See also Stuart Henry & Dragan Milovanovic, Constitutive Criminology: Beyond Postmodernism (1996) (exploring the theoretical contours of postmodernism in the realm of philosophical criminology).

42 See, e.g., Baudrillard, Political Economy, supra note 18. In ultramodern society, what is “consumed” transitions from the commodity itself, to the image-object, to the image object's sign-exchange value. Bruce A. Arrigo, The Ontology of Crime: On the Construction of the Real, the Image, and the Hyper-real, in Philosophy, Crime, and Criminology 41, 45-51 (Bruce A. Arrigo & Christopher R. Williams eds., 2006). This transition reconstitutes the capitalistic fetish from one of being to having; from one of having to appearing; and, ultimately, from one of appearing to simulacra. Id. Thus, sign-exchange value refers to the consumption of simulated realities that are “[a]nchored in the discourse of technology and the logic of media-manufactured symbol.” Id. at 51.

43 See Arrigo, supra note 3.

44 See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (Paul Rabinow ed., Robert Hurley et al. trans., New Press 1997) (1994); Michel Foucault, Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 (James D. Faubion ed., Robert Hurley et al. trans., New Press 2000) (1994); Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., Pantheon Books 1980) (1972) [hereinafter Foucault, Power/Knowledge].

45 Foucault, supra note 13, at 194.

46 Indeed, as one sociologist noted, “to write today about punishment and classification without Foucault, is like talking about the unconscious without Freud.” Stanley Cohen, Visions of Social Control: Crime, Punishment, and Classification 10 (1985).

47 Garland, supra note 41, at 132.

48 Id. at 133-34; Arrigo et al., supra note 14, at 12-13.

49 The legal, medical and penal “apparatuses” operate to advance totalizing representations of power as knowledge/truth. This is “not because [power] embraces everything but because it comes from everywhere.” Foucault, Power/Knowledge, supra note 44, at 93. Thus, for example, medicine (i.e., psychiatry) represents an all-encompassing expression of knowledge/truth enacted through the instrumentality of scientific discoveries (i.e., fMRI brain scanning technology) and medical breakthroughs (i.e., its application in the case of interrogating criminal suspects/offenders). The law (especially the criminal justice apparatus) represents an all-encompassing expression of knowledge/truth when it functions to police or socially control these discoveries and breakthroughs through the activities of codification, reification, legitimation. See Arrigo, Bruce A. & Williams, Christopher R., Chaos Theory and the Social Control Thesis: A Post-Foucauldian Analysis of Mental Illness and Involuntary Civil Confinement, 26 Soc. Just. 177, 179-84 (1999)Google Scholar. For applications in medical justice, see Bruce A. Arrigo, Madness, Language, and the Law (1993) (applying Foucault's power thesis to the problem of civil commitment); Bruce A. Arrigo, Punishing the Mentally Ill: A Critical Analysis of Law and Psychiatry (2002) (applying Foucault's thesis to the case of disciplining psychiatric difference) [hereinafter Arrigo, Punishing the Mentally Ill]; Bruce A. Arrigo, the Contours of Psychiatric Justice: A Postmodern Critique of Mental Illness, Criminal Insanity, and the Law (1996) (applying Foucault's power thesis to the issue of criminal insanity).

50 This analysis resembles the Marxist critique of ideology, capital logic, and exploitation/alienation but goes well beyond it. See Agger, supra note 41, at 140; Garland, supra note 41, at 132.

51 Agger, supra note 41, at 140.

52 Garland, supra note 41, at 137-38.

53 Arrigo et al., supra note 14, at 12; Foucault, supra note 13, at 192-96.

54 Foucault's notion of the “soul” refers to the internalization of disciplinary knowledge/truths, absent the need for external mechanisms of restraint or coercion (e.g., torture, banishment, ostracism). This is the point at which the individual is thoroughly disciplined and rendered a docile body. See Garland, supra note 41, at 137-38.

55 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, supra note 44, at 39.

56 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (Richard Howard trans., Pantheon Books 1965) (1961).

57 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon Books 1973) (1963).

58 See e.g., 1 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (Robert Hurley trans., Pantheon Books 1978) (1976); 2 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1978) (1976).

59 Foucault, supra note 13.

60 See Foucault, Power/Knowledge, supra note 44, at 39.

61 Garland, supra note 41, at 138, 146 (“[P]ower shapes the actions of individuals and harnesses their bodily powers to its ends. In this sense power operates ‘through’ individuals rather than ‘against’ them and helps constitute the individual who is at the same time its vehicle.”).

62 Contemporary penology, especially in America, with its emphasis on the discourse of “corrections” (i.e. “secure housing units,” “electronic monitoring and/or surveillance,” “intensive probation supervision,” and “solitary confinement”) draws attention to the apparatuses of power, the doctrinal texts and discursive practices, that render the subject's soul docile. Through such instrumentality, the “perfection of power” is born, making its actual exercise (i.e., the infliction of physical harm) “unnecessary.” Foucault, supra note 13, at 210.

63 Arrigo et al., supra note 14, at 12; Garland, supra note 41, at 134.

64 Agger, supra note 41, at 140 (“Baudrillard goes further than Foucault in that he argues that postmodernity moves beyond what Marx called the mode of production into a mode of simulation and information displacing the process of power from [Marxist-based] production per se to information and entertainment.”). See also Mike Gane, Baudrillard's Bestiary: Baudrillard and Culture 94 (1991) (“Baudrillard elaborates the genealogy of the orders of simulation over the period of European history since the Renaissance … [I]t rivals that of Foucault … in its vast ambitions to elaborate not theoretical modes [of] production but modes of simulation.”).

65 Agger, supra note 41, at 140. See also Douglas Kellner, Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond 76-84 (1989).

66 Gane, French Social Theory 152-61 (2003). And yet despite similarities to his predecessors, Baudrillard takes us into a whole new era of social development: beyond Marx, beyond neo-Marxism, beyond the Situationists, beyond modernity, and beyond theory itself. We leave behind the society of the commodity and its stable supports; we transcend the society of the spectacle and its dissembling masks; and we bid farewell to modernity and enter the postmodern society of simulacrum, an abstract nonsociety devoid of cohesive relations, shared meaning, political struggle, or significant change. Steven Best & Douglas Kellner, The Postmodern Turn 95 (1997).

67 Baudrillard, Political Economy, supra note 18, at 185-86. Gane, supra note 66 at 155 (“[T]he transition from the commodity form proper towards the object form was essentially a coupling of function (use value) with aesthetic value [sign-exchange-value].”).

68 Agger, supra note 41, at 141; Kellner, supra note 65, at 76-84.

69 Gane, supra note 66, at 154-55.

70 Arrigo et al., supra note 14, at 20.

71 Consider the example of McDonald’s. The commodity that is consumed is not merely the food items that the company sells, but also a sense of family, community, and fun. Thus, the representational meaning for the McDonald's advertisement campaign, commodified through its chain store distribution efforts, is one in which the public devours an evolving McDonald's world. Agger, supra note 41, at 141-42. See also George Ritzer, The McDonaldization of Society (2004); George Ritzer, McDonaldization: The Reader (2002). See generally Bohm, Robert M., “McJustice”: On the McDonaldization of Criminal Justice, 23 Just. Q. 127, 127-46 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (examining applications in the criminal justice sphere).

72 Best & Kellner, supra note 66, at 101 (“Baudrillard's hyperreal is the end of a new result of a historical simulation process in which the natural world and all its referents have been gradually replaced with technology and self-referential signs.”).

73 Agger, supra note 41, at 140.

74 Arrigo, supra note 42, at 50-51.

75 Kellner, supra note 65, at 79.

76 Id.; Best & Kellner, supra note 66, at 101 (“Simulation models generate simulacra, representations of the real, that are so omnipresent that it is henceforth impossible to distinguish the real from simulacra.”).

77 Arrigo, supra note 42, at 51.

78 Best & Kellner, supra note 66, at 101.

79 Arrigo et al., supra note 14, at 20-21 (discussing the notion of social entropy in criminology); Baudrillard, Simulations, supra note 18, at 56-57 (discussing the media as a DNA model).

80 Kellner, supra note 65 at 84-89.

81 Best & Kellner, supra note 66, at 101.

82 As Baudrillard observed, “Now the ‘structural law of value’ reigns, and models take precedence over things, while ‘serial production yields to generation by means of models … Digitality is its metaphysical principle … and DNA its prophet. [The conditions of] a capitalist-productivist society [give way] to a neo-capitalist cybernetic order that aims at total control.” Baudrillard, Simulations, supra note 18, at 103.

83 Baudrillard, Simulations, supra note 18, at 3.

84 Id. at 146. The expressions of this hyper-real reproduction are simulacra. “Simulacra are mere signs and images of the real that come to constitute a new realm of experience, the ‘hyper-real.’ [Simulacra and hyper-reality signify] the end result of a historical simulation process in which the natural world and all its referents have been gradually replaced with technology and self-referential signs.” Best & Kellner, supra note 66, at 101.

85 Best & Kellner, supra note 66, at 102.

86 See, e.g., Ben Agger, Fast Capitalism: A Critical Theory of Significance (1989); Mark Gottdiener, The Theming of America: Dreams, Media Fantasies, and Themed Environments (2d ed. 2001).

87 Kellner, supra note 65, at 81.

88 Id. at 80-81.

89 Agger, supra note 41, at 141.

90 In Baudrillard's hyper-reality of simulation and simulacra, the individual no longer is a subject, an object, or a fixed image; rather, the social reality (i.e. the ontology) of the individual is dramatically reconceptualized where the absence of anchored meaning or stable identity (i.e. the void) gives way to illusion that is taken to be authentic even though it is not. Best & Kellner, supra note 66, at 102. See also Walter Benjamin, Illuminations 217-51 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1969) (offering a theory of mechanical reproduction that pre-dates and is extended by Baudrillard's own thesis).

91 This is not to imply that the theoretical contributions of Foucault and Baudrillard are altogether parallel or necessarily always complementary. See, e.g., Jean Baudrillard, Forget Foucault (1977) (questioning some of the basic concepts of radical French social theory including, among others, Foucault's positions on sexuality and power). See also Kellner, supra, note 65, at 131-39. Rather, the point is that Foucault's views on power and Baudrillard's interpretation of culture are assimilable for purposes of the present inquiry. Id. at 139-43 (suggesting several points of integration between the two theorists). “In our capitalist democracies, political advertising and politically managed media politics attempt to manipulate desire and fear into channels sympathetic to various power elites and their values and institutions … Whereas Foucault analyz[ed] discourses, practices and institutions which exercise power and knowledge, Baudrillard analyze[d] how media, information technologies and simulations function to transform contemporary society and everyday life … . [Thus,] let us make use of both Foucault and Baudrillard … forgetting neither as we forge our own theories of contemporary society.” Id. at 141.

92 Foucault and Baudrillard's insights emerge from within the cultural and critical studies tradition of French social theory. See, e.g., Gane, supra note, 66 at 146-48, 152-61. Fromm's critique is situated mostly within the theorizing of the early Frankfurt School which, at that time, endeavored to construct a brand of Freudian Marxism, mindful of the impact of mass culture and monopoly/late capitalism. See Kevin Anderson, Erich Fromm and the Frankfurt School Critique of Criminal Justice, in Erich Fromm and Critical Criminology: Beyond the Punitive Society, supra note 1, at 83-84.

93 For Fromm, the effects of monopoly/late capitalism represented a “crisis of contemporary society” stemming from the “great promise of unlimited progress – the promise of domination of nature, of material abundance, of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, and of unimpeded personal freedom … .” Erich Fromm, To Have or to Be? at xxii-xxiii, 1 (1976). Among other forces, Fromm traced this crisis to advances brought about by the industrial age, including “the substitution of the computer for the human mind [which led to the belief that] we were on our way to unlimited production and, hence, unlimited consumption; that technique made us omnipresent; that science made us omniscient.” Id. at 1. However, for Fromm, the “illusion” of such advances was linked to an understanding of two fundamental modes of human existence: having versus being. Id.

94 Id. at 1-2.

95 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 140-204. See also Erich Fromm, The Sane Society 12-21 (1955) (exploring the pathology of normalcy, the herd mentality, and society as sick).

96 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 103-04 (the capitalistic system “molded the whole personality of man and accentuated the contradictions … [I]t developed the individual – and made him more helpless; it increased freedom – and created dependencies of a new kind”).

97 Id. at 107-08 (“[C]apitalism not only freed man from traditional [feudal] bonds, but it also contributed tremendously to the increasing of positive freedom, to the growth of an active, critical, responsible self.”).

98 Id. And, in the extreme, Fromm noted that “[t]he achievement of wealth and comfort for all was supposed to result in unrestricted happiness for all. The trinity of unlimited production, absolute freedom, and unrestricted happiness formed the nucleus of a new religion, Progress … . It is not at all astonishing [therefore] that this new religion provided its believers with energy, vitality, and hope.” Fromm, supra note 93, at 2.

99 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 108.

100 Id. at 110 (“It becomes [the individual’s] fate to contribute to the growth of the economic system, to amass capital, not for purposes of [one’s] own happiness or salvation, but as an end in itself. [The individual therefore becomes] a cog in the vast economic machine – an important one if he [or she] ha[s] much capital, an insignificant one if he [or she] ha[s] none – but always a cog to serve a purpose outside of [the self].”).

101 Id. at 111.

102 Fromm, supra note 93, at 2.

103 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 239-54 (discussing the illusion of individuality).

104 Fromm, The Sane Society, supra note 95, at 60-63. Notwithstanding the accomplishments of capitalism, negative freedom prevails. “By making the individual free politically and economically, by teaching [the person] to think for [self] and freeing [the person] from [ ] authoritarian pressure[s], one hoped to enable [the person] to feel ‘I’ in the sense that he [or she] was the center and active subject of his [or her] powers and experienced himself [or herself] as such. [However, f]or the majority, individualism was not much more than a façade behind which was hidden the failure to acquire an individual sense of identity.” Id. at 62.

105 For Fromm, the possibility of a positive freedom was associated with our capacity for spontaneous conduct. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 255-74 (reviewing freedom as spontaneity). “[P]ositive freedom consists in the spontaneous activity of the total, integrated personality.” Id., at 258 (emphasis in original). His more humanistic regard for the retrievability of this notion occupied considerable attention in his subsequent writings. See, e.g., Fromm, supra note 93, at 168-202 (describing prospects for human change and prospects for an altered society); Fromm, The Sane Society, supra note 95, at 339-52 (discussing the necessary political and cultural transformations). See also Rainer Funk, Erich Fromm's Life and Work, in Erich Fromm and Critical Criminology: Beyond the Punitive Society, supra note 1, at 3-18 (providing an overview of Fromm's critical and humanistic social-psychological framework); Richard Quinney, Socialist Humanism and the Problem of Crime: Thinking About Erich Fromm in the Development of Critical/Peacemaking Criminology, in Erich Fromm and Critical Criminology: Beyond the Punitive Society, supra note 1, at 21-30 (conceptualizing how to make society free from crime and violence).

106 Linked to these strategies was Fromm's concern for whether expressions of independent thought and affect were possible, absent intrusion from or regulation by the state. “The right to express our thoughts, however, means something only if we are able to have thoughts of our own; freedom from external authority is a lasting gain only if the inner psychological conditions are such that we are able to establish our own individuality.” Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 241 (emphasis in original).

107 Id. at 135, 140-204.

108 Destructiveness is a technique of escape as described by Fromm. Id. at 177-83. Because it is closely aligned with authoritarianism, expressed through sadistic and/or masochistic inclinations, it will not be discussed here. See infra notes 109-113 and accompanying text. “[S]ado-masochistic strivings [can be] differentiated from destructiveness, although they are mostly blended with each other. Destructiveness is different since it aims not at active or passive symbiosis but at the elimination of an object.” Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 178.

109 For Fromm, “[a]uthority is not a quality one person ‘has,’ in the sense that [one] has property or physical qualities. Authority refers to an interpersonal relation in which one person looks upon another as somebody superior to him [or her].” Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 164.

110 Id. at 142-44. “Masochistic dependency is conceived as love, or loyalty, inferiority feelings as an adequate expression of actual shortcomings, and one's suffering as being entirely due to unchangeable circumstances.” Id. at 143. Among other examples, sadistic rationalizations include “‘I rule over you because I know what is best for you, and in your own interest you should follow me without opposition.’ Or, ‘I am so wonderful and unique, that I have a right to expect that the other people become dependent on me.’ [Or,] ‘I have done so much for you, and now I am entitled to take from you what I want.’” Id. at 144.

111 “Both the masochistic and sadistic strivings tend to help the individual to escape his [or her] unbearable feeling of aloneness and powerlessness … [the person is] filled with a terror of aloneness and insignificance.” Id. at 151.

112 Id. at 158.

113 Id. at 151-52.

114 See id. at 185-86.

115 Id. at 185-96.

116 See Foucault, Power/Knowledge, supra note 44.

117 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.

118 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. As a totalizing expression of Foucaultdian power, medical justice harnesses all thought and action so that they are defined as compatible with the normalizing and homogenizing ends of the system itself. Arrigo & Williams, supra note 49, at 177-79. Thus, for example, the psychiatric and legal communities, as state-sanctioned regulatory systems, exercise their material will and force on persons with mental illness by defining the conditions under which involuntary diagnostic evaluation and civil commitment (short-term or protracted) can occur and by providing the disciplinary apparatuses (i.e. the psychiatric hospital, the correctional facility) in which such subsequent confinement can take place. Arrigo, Punishing the Mentally Ill, supra note 49, at 75. Thus, through the instrumentation of medical justice, “mental illness is ‘policed’ [such] that this policing (i.e., civil confinement) fills a social function; namely, the surveillance and disciplining of public hygiene.” Id.

119 fMRI is a type “psychiatric neuroimaging.” See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text. When fMRI is applied in the criminal law for purposes of interrogating suspects of transgressions or of extracting information from criminal offenders, the link between science and the law (i.e., medical justice) is made apparent. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (giving particular examples of fMRI applications in medical justice).

120 See Agger, supra note 41, at 140.

121 In a post-Marxian or a post Freudo-Marxian context, materialist culture refers to Foucault's efforts to “chart the trajectories of power in contemporary society through studies of hospitals, mental institutions, prisons and other disciplinary institutions.” Kellner, supra note 66, at 139. In addition, however, materialist culture refers to Baudrillard's treatment of the omnipresence of simulation, hyper-reality, and the sign-exchange values of consumer society in which “the illusion of power, the mirage of power, the signs of power behind which exist only other signs, or, strictly speaking, nothing” remains. Id.

122 See Agger, supra note 41, at 140.

123 The fact that there is an observable and quantifiable neuroscientific basis to cognitive states of brain activity (i.e., the decision to lie rather than an affective response to it) should come as no surprise. See Tancredi, supra note 16, at 121-23 (commenting on the neuroscience of detecting lies, including “brain fingerprinting”). However, to then fully define these experiences (i.e., the thoughts, sensory-motor tasks, and impulses) by that which is observable and quantifiable through the fMRI technology, reduces these phenomena to only neuroscience's interpretation of them. Thus, we are left with a “text” of the whole experience based on a targeted neuroscientific assessment of one constituent part. This is a form of deterministic and reductionistic logic that is inherently flawed. See, e.g., Gazzaniga, supra note 16, at 120-42 (exploring the limits of relying on brain biology, given such things as false memories). See also M.R. Bennett & P.M.S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience 355-77 (2003) (exploring various epistemological/ontological problems of reductionism through the natural scientific method).

124 See, e.g., Bennett & Hacker, supra note 123 (exploring various epistemological/ontological problems of reductionism through the natural scientific method); Robert Almeder, Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy (1998) (arguing that some questions defy answering by scientific method); Nicholas Rescher, The Limits of Science (1984).

125 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. See also Gazzaniga, supra note 16, at 123-25 (commenting on the role of neuroscience in the courtroom).

126 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.

127 Gazzaniga, supra note 16, at 85-102 (reviewing the relationship between free will, personal responsibility, and the law and its significance for, inter alia, jury decision making). “Based on the modern understanding of neuroscience and on the assumptions of legal concepts … [b]rains are automatic, rule-governed determined devices, while people are personally responsible agents free to make their own decision.” Id. at 89-90.

128 Arrigo et al., supra note 14, at 36.

129 Id.

130 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

131 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.

132 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.

133 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.

134 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.

135 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing proposed applications of fMRI technology in the instance of lie detection technology, counterterrorism surveillance, interrogation of domestic or international detainees, and capital punishment for juveniles).

136 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.

137 Gazzaniga, supra note 16, at 99-102 (exploring the relationship between neuroscience and criminal responsibility). “[I]n truth, neuroscience can offer very little to the understanding of responsibility. Responsibility in a human construct that exists only in the social world, where there is more than one person. It is a socially constructed rule that exists only in the context of human interaction. No pixel in a brain scan will ever be able to show culpability or nonculpability.” Id. at 99-100. However, criminal justice efforts to apply insights derived from cognitive neuroscience suggest (perhaps demand) just the opposite. “If a defense lawyer can provide evidence that a defendant had a ‘defect in reasoning’ that led to his [or her] inability to stop from committing the crime, then the defendant … can be exculpable. The defense wants a brain image or a neurotransmitter assay to show beyond a reasonable doubt that [the accused] was not thinking clearly, indeed could not think clearly and stop [the] behavior.” Id. at 100. See also Tancredi, supra note 35, at 105-06. “Perhaps the most developmentally advanced technology for lie detection is Brain Fingerprinting which has already been admitted into evidence in one [criminal] case, though it has not gained wide acceptance in the scientific community.” Id. at 105. But see Matthews, Steve, Establishing Personal Identity in Cases of DID, 10 Phil., Psychiatry, & Psychol. 143 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (discussing some recent criminal cases where brain fingerprinting has been used to address the culpability of defendants with Dissociative Identity Disorder).

138 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.

139 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.

140 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.

141 See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.

142 Foucault addresses the dispersal of power “through a multiplicity of sites, discourses, practices, and strategies” understood as the “logic of production” within a “libidinal economy,” operating at the level of “micropolitics” or “the micropolitics of everyday life.” See Kellner, supra note 66, at 133, 138. Baudrillard problematizes Foucault's interpretation. “[T]here is an important dimension missing (the media, communications, information, simulations) in Foucault's account of power, which Baudrillard supplements.” Id. at 133. Dismissing Foucault because of his emphasis on the micropolitics of power or the micropolitics of desire (i.e. sexuality), Baudrillard argues that, “When power blends into desire and desire blends into power, let's forget them both.” Baudrillard, supra note 91, at 19. For Baudrillard, the discourse of Foucaultdian power/desire, although presenting an epistemological shift from fetishizing the commodity to fetishizing the body through doctrinal texts and discursive power relations, nonetheless remains steeped in the logic of “rationalist” capital. Id. at 24. Thus, according to Baudrillard, examining the discourse of Foucaultdian liberation, “be it the liberation of labor or sexual liberation [reproduces] capitalist rationalist and rationalizing discourses of production.” Kellner, supra note 66, at 137. See also Baudrillard, supra note 91, at 24 (describing how Foucault's position on the body and power/desire is a replica or model of capital logic).

143 See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.

144 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.

145 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 142.

146 Id.

147 Gazzaniga, supra note 16, at 100 (discussing the limits of this reasoning in the criminal law). See also Williams & Arrigo, Introduction: Philosophy, Crime, and Theoretical Criminology, supra note 2 at 9-12 (reviewing the development of modern criminology as rational hedonism and positivistic science respectively).

148 Gazzinga, supra note 16, at 100-01 (discussing this application of cognitive neuroscience in the law as flawed and problematic).

149 Not wanting to deal with one's feelings of terror given the experience of powerlessness and insignificance, the subject unconsciously submits to the intrusion displacing or removing the burden of freedom (i.e., aloneness, isolation). See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.

150 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 142.

151 See, e.g., The Sociology and Politics of Health: A Reader (Michael Purdy & David Banks eds., 2001); Andrew Scull, Madhouse: A Tragic Tale of Megalomania and Modern Medicine (2005); Andrew Scull, Social Order/Mental Disorder (1992) (presenting applications in medical justice).

152 Fromm identifies three forms of sadistic tendencies. These include: (1) making others dependent on the individual resulting in absolute power or dominion over other individuals such that they become “instruments”; (2) ruling over others absolutely to the point that they are exploited materially and/or psychically; and (3) exposing others to either physical or mental suffering. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 140-44.

153 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.

154 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.

155 Williams & Arrigo, Introduction: Philosophy, Crime, and Theoretical Criminology, supra note 2, at 10-11. Examples of such “excessive investment” include a sustained focus on the quantifiable cause, etiology, and nature of crime, without consideration for justice rendering, peacemaking, and humanism. Id. at 15-19 (exploring an alternative philosophical basis for understanding crime).

156 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 143-44.

157 Id. at 144.

158 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.

159 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.

160 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 145-147 (describing this cycle of sadistic abuse in the context of a marital relationship).

161 See J. Reid Meloy & Alan R. Felthous, Introduction to this Issue: Serial and Mass Homicide, Behav. Sci. & L. 289-90 (2004) (discussing limits of fMRI in evaluating sadistic behavior).

162 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 150-62.

163 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.

164 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.

165 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.

166 See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.

167 See, e.g., Nils Christie, Crime Control As Industry (2000); Nils Christie, A Suitable Amount Of Crime (2004). See also Jeffrey I. Ross & Stephen C. Richards, Convict Criminology (2003) (exploring the problems of crime as industry from the perspective of ex-convicts turned academicians).

168 Fromm, The Sane Society, supra note 95, at 217-32 (reviewing the economic conditions that give rise to social disorganization and psychic disequilibrium).

169 Fromm, supra note 93, at 196 (calling for a limit set on the application of science within the realm of industry and defense). “While it would be hobbling of human development if one set any limits to the demand for knowledge, it would be extremely dangerous if practical use were made of all the results of scientific thinking … [C]ertain discoveries in genetics, in brain surgery, in psychodrugs, and in many other areas can and will be misused to the great damage of [society]. This is unavoidable as long as industrial and military interests are free to make use of all new theoretical discoveries as they see fit.” Id.

170 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, supra note 3, at 191. For Fromm, the absence of critical thinking or insight gives rise to “pseudo thinking.” Id. at 194 (“[T]he problem is whether the thought is the result of one's own thinking, that is, of one's own activity …”).

171 Id. at 205 (“[P]seudo acts [replace] original acts of thinking, feeling, and willing, leads eventually to the replacement of the original self by a pseudo self. The original self is the self which is the originator of mental activities. The pseudo self is only an agent who actually represents the role a person is supposed to play but who does so under the name of the self.”).

172 Id. at 206.

173 Id.

174 Id.

175 Fromm, supra note 93, at 69-86 (describing the acquisitive society).

176 Rishikof & Schrage, supra note 23.

177 Erich Fromm, The Revolution of Hope 56-140 (1968) (describing what it means to be human and the steps needed in order to foster the humanization of technological society).

178 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

179 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.