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Oversight of Marketing Relationships between Physicians and the Drug and Device Industry: A Comparative Study

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 January 2021

Timothy Stoltzfus Jost
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Abstract

Throughout the world, complex mutually-dependent relationships exist between physicians and pharmaceutical and medical device companies. This article focuses on one particular aspect of these relationships—payments made by drug and device companies to physicians and their organizations and institutions to market drugs and devices. It is widely believed that drug and device company marketing to physicians creates conflicts of interest that corrupt physician judgment and increase the cost of medical care. This article examines first the economic basis of physician/industry relationships that causes conflicts to arise. It next considers the measures that a number of developed countries have taken to respond to these relationships. Finally, it proposes an approach that would comprehensively address the problems caused by drug and device company marketing to physicians.

Type
Article
Information
American Journal of Law & Medicine , Volume 36 , Issue 2-3 , June 2010 , pp. 326 - 342
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics and Boston University 2010

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References

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50 Canadian Medical Association Policy, Guidelines for Physicians in Interactions with Industry § 44 (2007).

51 Id. § 49.

52 Hans-Dieter Lippert & R. Ratzel, Kommentar zur Musterberufsordnung der deutschen Ärzte, § 33(2)-(3) (2006) [hereinafter MBO].

53 MBO §§ 33-34. See also Hans-Dieter Lippert & Rudolph Ratzel, Arzt und Industrie nach den Besculüssen des 106. Deutschen Ärztetags 46 NJW 3301 (2003).

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58 Peck et al., supra note 57, at 433.

59 Moynihan, supra note 29, at 416.

60 See Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education, ACCME Standards for Commercial Support-Standards to Ensure the Independence of CME Activities, 1-3 (2007).

61 See Memorandum of Understanding between the Ass’n of the British Pharm. Indus., the Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Auth., and the Medicines and Healthcare Prod. Regulatory Agency, (Nov. 3, 2005) available at http://www.abpi.org.uk/links/assoc/PMCPA/Memo_understanding_nov3.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).

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63 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(f),(n),(q) & (r), 353 (2006).

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77 Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6002

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66 See, e.g., Beamtenstatusgesetz [BeamtStG] [Civil Service Law] Feb. 5, 2009, § 42 (F.R.G.).

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70 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2010).

71 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A) (2010).

72 United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69 (3rd Cir. 1985). Actually, there isn't at this time. There are older cases that conflict with Greber but they are based on the statute before it was amended.

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