1 Greene, Jeremy A. & Riggs, Kevin R., Why is There No Generic Insulin? Historical Origins of a Modern Problem, 372 New Eng. J. Med. 1171, 1171 (2015).CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

2 First Amended Class Action Complaint at 3, In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2018), ECF No. 141; see Cefalu, William T. et. al., Insulin Access and Affordability Working Group: Conclusions and Recommendations, 41 Diabetes Care 1299, 1301-02 (2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (noting the list price increases over time for the same drugs, Lantus, Humalog, and NovoLog).

3 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1299.

4 Id. at 1307.

5 Id. at 1306.

6 In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25185 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2019).

7 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1304, 1307.

8 In re Insulin Pricing Litig., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25185 at *8, 43, 50.

9 Id. at *26-27.

10 Id. at *42-43.

11 Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Right of Retail Buyer of Price-Fixed Product to Sue Manufacturer on State Antitrust Claim, 35 A.L.R. 6th 245, at *2.

12 Antitrust Modernization Commission: Report and Recommendations 268 (2007), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3D7-SX4Y] [hereinafter AMC Report].

13 See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1520-21 (2019) (holding that consumers who purchase iPhone apps directly from Apple are direct purchasers and not barred by the indirect purchaser rule). In light of its decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the Court had no occasion to reconsider the indirect purchaser rule. Id. at 1521 n.2.

14 Greene, supra note 1, at 1171.

15 Id.

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 1171-72.

19 Id. at 1172.

20 Id. at 1171.

21 Id. at 1172.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id.

26 Id.

27 Id.

28 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1301.

29 Greene, supra note 1, at 1171.

30 Ryan Knox, Insulin Insulated: Barriers to Competition in the United States Insulin Market 4 (Aug. 24, 2019) (unpublished paper) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3441664 [https://perma.cc/ZY42-ATDW]).

31 Greene, supra note 1, at 1171.

32 See, e.g., Drug Pricing in America: A Prescription for Change, Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 116th Cong. 25 (2019) (statement of Sen. Debbie Stabenow, Member, S. Comm. on Fin.). Addressing top executives for the seven largest pharmaceutical companies: “American families fund the National Institutes of Health …. [which] contributed more than $200 billion in grants … to your companies and others …. American taxpayers, we are happy to help you be able to develop these drugs, but … the bargain ought to be that they ought to be able to afford the medicine after they have helped to develop it.” Id.

33 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 123 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 2017).

34 Dan Mendelson, Follow the Pill: Understanding the U.S. Commercial Pharmaceutical Supply Chain, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 4 (Feb. 28, 2005), https://www.kff.org/other/report/follow-the-pill-understanding-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/NNR7-E5RA].

35 Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Engineering, & Med., supra note 33, at 37; see Greene, supra note 1, at 1173.

36 Greene, supra note 1, at 1173.

37 Id. at 1173-47; see Canoy, Marcel & Tichem, Jan, Lower Drug Prices Can Improve Innovation, 14 Eur. Competition J. 278, 278 (2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“Drug prices can be too high when the price exceeds the value of the drug to society.”).

38 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1300.

39 Greene, supra note 1, at 1174.

40 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1310.

41 See Knox, supra note 30, at 4 (The insulin market has been “insulated from the traditional expectations and trends of pharmaceutical markets, especially concerning price and competition.”).

42 Id. at 7.

43 Insulin Price Fixing Charged to 3 Companies, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 1, 1941 (noting that Eli Lilly was indicted for conspiracy to “bring about arbitrary, uniform and noncompetitive prices for insulin.”).

44 Eli Lilly & Co., 95 F.T.C. 538, 540 (1980).

45 Id. at 540-41.

46 Id. at 542, 546.

47 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1304.

48 Id. at 1301.

49 Id.

50 Id. at 1303-04.

51 Id.

52 Id.at 1299. Lock-step mechanism describes a continued pattern by insulin manufacturers to immediately match the others’ price increases: “when one insulin manufacturer increases the price for a given insulin formulation, the other insulin manufacturers often increase their prices by a similar amount shortly thereafter.” Id. at 1301. See id. at 1305 fig.4 (illustrating how from 2012 to 2016, the three companies almost simultaneously increased prices for rapid-acting insulin products, forming a pricing graph that looks like a staircase). [Note: see R3(c) (pg 74) for citing tables and figures.]

53 Id. at 1300.

54 Id. at 1301; see id. at 1302 (Sticker, or list price for Eli Lilly’s Humalog increased by 138% from 2009 to 2015; net price, or price actually paid to manufacturers, increased by 6%); see id. at 1302 (List price for Novo Nordisk’s NovoLog increased by 353% from 2001 to 2016; net price increased by 3 to 36%); see id. at 1306 (List price for Sanofi’s Lantus increased by 252% from 2007 to 2016; net price increased by 57%, and actually decreased from 2014 to 2016).

55 Id. at 1301.

56 Mendelson, supra note 34, at 24.

57 Yoo, Kwanghyuk, Pharmacy Benefit Managers and Generic Pharmaceuticals Pricing Conspiracy: Unveiling Lock-In Mechanisms, Structural Shortcomings and Antitrust Evidence, 64 S.D. L. REV. 43, 77 (2019)Google Scholar.

58 Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Engineering, & Med., supra note 33, at 31; see id. at 82 (noting that the United States is unique in this respect, as other developed nations regulate drug prices at some level).

59 Id. at 31-32.

60 Id. at 41.

61 Id. at 42.

62 Id. at 44.

63 Id. at 44-45.

64 Id.

65 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1300; see Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Engineering, & Med., supra note 33, at 45 (Figure 4-2 shows the flow of goods and money for biopharmaceutical products).

66 Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Engineering, & Med., supra note 33, at 40.

67 Mendelson, supra note 34, at 2.

68 Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Engineering, & Med., supra note 33, at 51.

69 Yoo, supra note 57, at 55.

70 Mendelson, supra note 34, at 14.

71 Id. at 21.

72 Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Engineering, & Med., supra note 33, at 48.

73 Yoo, supra note 57, at 55.

74 See Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Engineering, & Med., supra note 33, at 48.

75 Mendelson, supra note 34, at 22. But see Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1306 (noting that while formularies can be helpful negotiating tools, they are often changed, which can harm patients with increased costs and adverse health effects).

76 See Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Engineering, & Med., supra note 33, at 51.

77 Id.

78 Id. at 52.

79 Id. at 51.

80 See id. at 51, 58.

81 See id. at 48, 51 (“[F]rom a payer’s perspective, effective bargaining cannot take place without the ability either to exclude drugs from a formulary or place them in unfavorably high tiers.”).

82 See Yoo, supra note 57, at 54.

83 Id. at 51.

84 Id. at 52.

85 Mendelson, supra note 34, at 14.

86 Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Engineering, & Med., supra note 33, at 59; Yoo, supra note 57, at 54.

87 See Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Engineering, & Med., supra note 33, at 59.

88 Mendelson, supra note 34, at 18.

89 Id.

90 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1304.

91 See id. at 1301.

92 Id.

93 Mendelson, supra note 34, at 18.

94 See Yoo, supra note 57, at 76.

95 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1305.

96 Yoo, supra note 57, at 77.

97 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1305; Yoo, supra note 57, at 77.

98 See Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Engineering, & Med., supra note 33, at 59 (stating that from 2010 to 2014, rebates increased from 18% to 28% of list price for brand name drugs).

99 See Yoo, supra note 57, at 54.

100 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1302.

101 Yoo, supra note 57, at 59.

102 Id. at 76.

103 See, e.g., Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1309 (“As list prices increase, the profits of the intermediaries in the insulin supply chain (wholesalers, PBMs, pharmacies) increase since each may receive a rebate, discount, or fee calculated as a percentage of the list price.”); Yoo, supra note 57, at 75 (“[R]ebate arrangements between PBMs and manufacturers may not always work against the interests of pharmacies, but rather can serve high reimbursement for them.”); id. at 51 (“[T]he bona fide roles of PBMs have been generally understood as utilizing some of those rebates and discounts to reduce costs to health plan providers (health insurers), retail pharmacies and consumers.”).

104 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1300.

105 Mendelson, supra note 34, at 9.

106 Yoo, supra note 57, at 70.

107 Mendelson, supra note 34, at 18.

108 Id. at 9.

109 Id. at 2.

110 Yoo, supra note 57, at 75.

111 Mendelson, supra note 34, at 10-11.

112 Id. at 12.

113 Id. at 14, 19.

114 Id. at 19.

115 Yoo, supra note 57, at 79-80.

116 See id. at 51, 75.

117 See Mendelson, supra note 34, at 14.

118 Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Engineering, & Med., supra note 33, at 32.

119 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1303.

120 Yoo, supra note 57, at 49.

121 Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Engineering, & Med., supra note 33, at 60.

122 Id. at 58.

123 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1306.

124 Id. at 1299.

125 Id.

126 Id. at 1300.

127 Id. at 1307. But see id. (noting that the study does not account for patients who have not met their deductible, patients whose insurance plans do not include insulin, or uninsured patients).

128 Id. at 1299.

129 Id. at 1306.

130 Kerkert, Darby et al., Cost-Related Insulin Underuse Among Patients with Diabetes, 179 Jama Internal Med. 112, 113 (2019).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

131 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1308-09.

132 Id. at 1308.

133 Id.

134 Id.

135 Id. at 1309.

136 Id.

137 Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Engineering, & Med., supra note 33, at 58-59.

138 Id. at 59.

139 Id.

140 Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1304.

141 See Drug Pricing in America: A Prescription for Change, Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 116th Cong. 51 (2019) (statement of Dr. Olivier Brandicourt, Chief Executive Officer, Sanofi) (“Ultimately, we set the listing price.”).

142 Yoo, supra note 57, at 77.

143 See Drug Pricing in America: A Prescription for Change, Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 116th Cong. 16 (2019) (statement of Dr. Olivier Brandicourt, Chief Executive Officer, Sanofi) (“[T]o maintain a strong environment for innovation in the United States, the government should not directly control the price of medicines, either through Federal Government price controls, or worse, outsourcing price decisions to other countries.”).

144 Katie Thomas, Drug Makers Accused of Fixing Prices on Insulin, N.Y. Times (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/health/drugmakers-lawsuit-insulin-drugs.html (“The rising costs of drugs has led to several hearings in Congress and has drawn the attention of President Trump, who this month pledged to address the issue and said the industry was ‘getting away with murder.’”).

145 See 2020 State and Federal Legislative & Regulatory Priorities, Am. Diabetes Ass’n, https://www.diabetes.org/advocacy/advocacy-priorities [https://perma.cc/WU3B-96FD] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020); Patriot Act with Hasan Minhaj: Drug Pricing (Netflix, Inc. original series Feb. 17, 2019).

146 Am. Diabetes Ass’n, supra note 145.

147 Sarah J. Tribble, Timeline: Insulin Market Under Scrutiny, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 30, 2017), https://khn.org/news/timeline-insulin-market-under-scrutiny/ [https://perma.cc/4SA5-GHFG].

148 Id.

149 Selena Simmons-Duffin, The House Passed Its Prescription Drug Plan—Here’s What’s in It, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/12/12/787190604/how-the-house-prescription-drug-plan-would-try-to-lower-drug-prices? [https://perma.cc/D3JJ-F9M8].

150 Id.

151 Id.

152 See id.

153 Tribble, supra note 147.

154 Class Action Complaint at 9, Chaires v. Sanofi U.S., No. 1:17-CV-10158 (D. Mass. filed Jan. 30, 2017).

155 Tribble, supra note 147.

156 Hagens Berman: Judge Denies Insulin Makers’ Motion to Dismiss Class-Action Lawsuit Regarding Skyrocketing Insulin Prices, Bus. Wire (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190215005526/en/Hagens-Berman-Judge-Denies-Insulin-Makers%E2%80%99-Motion [https://perma.cc/3KKW-PSLS].

157 First Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2018), ECF No. 141; see also id. at 3 (“The legitimate use of discounts and rebates that actually reduce the manufacturers’ net selling prices … are not at issue in this case.”).

158 Id. at 3.

159 Id. at 5.

160 Id. at 7.

161 Id.

162 Id. at 7-8.

163 Id. at 8.

164 Examining the Actions of Drug Companies in Raising Prescription Drug Prices: Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong. 53 (2019) (statement of Rep. Carolyn Maloney, Member, H.R. Comm. on Oversight & Reform) (“[T]hree drug companies are now under a lawsuit because of price fixing, running the prices up, not making affordable drugs available. This is outrageous that this is allowed to happen in this country …. What is going on, it sounds like the wild west …. They can do whatever they want, these drug companies.”); Eric Sagonowsky, Insulin Pricing Lawsuit Against Sanofi, Novo Nordisk and Eli Lilly Moves Forward, FiercePharma (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/insulin-pricing-class-action-lawsuit-to-proceed-against-sanofi-novo-and-lilly [https://perma.cc/QUP3-MHM9] (“Insulin giants are facing unprecedented scrutiny for their pricing, thanks to a growing gap between their retail stickers and prices after behind-the-scenes discounts and rebates. And now they’ll have to face class-action claims about those very practices.”); Thomas, supra note 144 (“Michael Carrier, an antitrust professor at Rutgers Law School, described the filing of the lawsuit as ‘big news’ and said it was interesting because it turned its attention to the inner workings of the pharmacy benefit managers, which until now ‘have floated under the radar of sustained drug pricing scrutiny.’”).

165 See generally Defendants’ Notice of Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Class Action Complaint, In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2018), ECF No. 158.

166 Stipulation and Order, In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2018), ECF No. 201.

167 In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25185, at *20 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2019).

168 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2018).

169 Id. § 1961(1), (5).

170 Defendants’ Notice of Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Class Action Complaint at 23-24, In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2018), ECF No. 158.

171 Id. at 24-25.

172 Id. at 25.

173 Id.

174 Id. at 24.

175 Id. at 27.

176 Id. at 28.

177 Id. at 27.

178 Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Class Action Complaint at 3, 15, 37, 42, 51, In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2019), ECF No. 181.

179 Id. at 4.

180 Id. at 30-31.

181 In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25185, at *8 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2019).

182 Id. at *22.

183 Id. at *25.

184 Id. at *24.

185 Id. at *28.

186 Id. at *27 (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 739 (1977)).

187 In re Insulin Pricing Litig., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25185 at *27.

188 Id. at *39-40.

189 Id. at *31.

190 Id. at *41-42; but see Mendelson, supra note 34, at 14 (PBMs do not purchase drugs, nor are they “a direct link in the physical supply chain;” instead, “PBMs work with third party payers … to manage consumer drug purchases.” (emphasis added)). As such, insulin manufacturers could not be liable to PBMs as direct purchasers because they are not purchasers at all. See id.

191 Bus. Wire, supra note 156; Sagnowsky, supra note 164.

192 Bus. Wire, supra note 156.

193 Sagonowsky, supra note 164.

194 Id.

195 Gregory P. Joseph, Civil RICO: A Definitive Guide 3 (3d ed. 2010).

196 Id.

197 Id.

198 Id.

199 In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25185, at *27-28 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2019).

200 McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., 80 F.3d 842, 855 (3d Cir. 1996).

201 Brief for Texas, Iowa, and 29 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17-204) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].

202 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 723-25 (1977).

203 Id. at 726-27.

204 Id.

205 Id. at 726.

206 Id. at 728-29.

207 Kemper, supra note 11, at *2.

208 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 753-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

209 Id. at 765-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

210 Richman, Barak D. & Murray, Christopher R., Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 69, 78 (2007)Google Scholar (“[O]nly after intense lobbying by Justice White did he obtain a six-vote majority … motivated by stare decisis.”).

211 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 745.

212 Duffy, Matthew M., Note, Chipping Away at the Illinois Brick Wall: Expanding Exceptions to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1709, 1730, 1733 (2012).Google Scholar

213 VanderWeele, Meagan P., Note, In re ATM Fee Litigation: Ninth Circuit Uses Illinois Brick to Build a High Wall for Indirect Purchaser, 12 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 121, 130, 132 (2013).Google Scholar

214 Duffy, supra note 212, at 1711.

215 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 744-45.

216 Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 216 (1990).

217 AMC REPORT, supra note 12, at 268.

218 Id.

219 Id. at vi.

220 See, e.g., In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25185 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2019).

221 Lande, Robert H., New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of Antitrust Violations, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 447, 448 (2010).Google Scholar

222 Id. at 450.

223 AMC Report, supra note 12, at 266.

224 Duffy, supra note 212, at 1729.

225 Kemper, supra note 11, at *3.

226 Duffy, supra note 212, at 1728-29.

227 Lande, supra note 221, at 450.

228 See AMC Report, supra note 12, at 268.

229 Id. at i.

230 Id. at vi.

231 Id. at 266.

232 Id. at 273; see also id. at 274 (“The authority of states to establish antitrust standards that differ from federal law is well established.”).

233 Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 12. The court examined the “long history of state common-law and statutory remedies against monopolies and unfair business practices” finding that “these matters have traditionally been regulated by the states and that the United States Congress intended the federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies.” Kemper, supra note 11, at *2.

234 AMC Report, supra note 12, at 267.

235 Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).

236 Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 2.

237 See Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1521 n.2 (“In light of our ruling in favor of the plaintiffs in this case, we have no occasion to consider that argument for overruling Illinois Brick.”)

238 Richman & Murray, supra note 210, at 108.

239 Kemper, supra note 11, at *2.

240 Duffy, supra note 212, at 1710.

241 See id.

242 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730 (1977).

243 Id. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

244 Civil RICO actions are subject to the same four-year statute of limitations. JOSEPH, supra note 195, at 237.

245 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 761-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For more information about the procedural safeguards against multiple liability, see Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 19-21.

246 AMC Report, supra note 12, at 266; but see Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 20 (noting that under the Class Action Fairness Act, state indirect purchaser claims are now frequently removed to and consolidated in federal court, further reducing the risk of multiple liability).

247 Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 18.

248 Id. at 5.

249 Lande, supra note 221, at 453.

250 See id. at 453-54.

251 Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 21.

252 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732-33 (1977).

253 Id. at 741-42.

254 Id. at 759 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

255 Duffy, supra note 212, at 1727.

256 Id. at 1725.

257 See, e.g., In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25185 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2019); Cefalu, supra note 2, at 1303 (noting that the series of transactions is unknown to every party involved because rebates and discounts are kept confidential).

258 Duffy, supra note 212, at 1727.

259 Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 5, 13-14.

260 Id. at 14.

261 Id.

262 Richman & Murray, supra note 210, at 98; but see JOSEPH, supra note 195, at 189 (“There is not a fully developed, coherent body of law concerning damages under RICO, probably due in part to the very small number of private civil RICO actions that survive to trial.”).

263 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737, 740 (1977).

264 AMC REPORT, supra note 12, at vi.

265 Id. at 277.

266 Richman & Murray, supra note 210, at 99.

267 VanderWeele, supra note 213, at 123.

268 Shores, David F., Antitrust Decisions and Legislative Intent, 66 MO. L. REV. 725, 740 (2001)Google Scholar.

269 Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 29 (emphasis added).

270 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 748 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Richman & Murray, supra note 210, at 89.

271 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).

272 Shores, supra note 268, at 780.

273 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746-47.

274 Lande, supra note 221, at 449 n.12 (noting eighty-four significant successful settlements of indirect purchaser cases).

275 Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 22.

276 Id.

277 Richman & Murray, supra note 210, at 96 (“Empirical evidence suggests that international cartels are underpoliced” and “studies of several long-term cartels indicate that those cartels over time grew more stable, became more sophisticated in … escaping detection, and imposed average overcharges that increased with the life of the cartel …. But this sort of illegal behavior is sensitive to enforcement efforts.”); see also Lande, supra note 221, at 453 (“[A] system designed to give both direct and indirect purchasers a reasonable expectation of receiving at least some compensation would always give lawyers … an incentive to file.”).

278 Richman & Murray, supra note 210, at 94.

279 Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 6; Lande, supra note 221, at 448, 448 n.6.

280 AMC REPORT, supra note 12, at 273; Richman & Murray, supra note 210, at 90 (“Despite the doctrine’s ossification into an absolute rule that precludes the possibility of either optimizing the compensation-deterrence trade-off or balancing them on a case-by-case basis, compensation remains a desirable objective.”).

281 Richman & Murray, supra note 210, at 90.

282 Duffy, supra note 212, at 1717.

283 Lande, supra note 221, at 447-48.

284 Richman & Murray, supra note 210, at 91; see also AMC Report, supra note 12, at vi (“Such a system that compensates the uninjured and denies recovery to the injured seems fundamentally unfair.”).

285 Duffy, supra note 212, at 1728.

286 Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).

287 Id. at 1519.

288 Id.

289 Id. at 1521-22.

290 Id. at 1520-22.

291 Id. at 1520.

292 Id. at 1517.

293 Id. at 1523.

294 Id.

295 Id.

296 Id. at 1524.

297 Id.

298 Id. at 1525.

299 Id.

300 Id. at 1521 n.2.

301 See, e.g., id. at 1522.

302 See, e.g., Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 29 (noting the broad language of section 4 of the Clayton Act); Richman & Murray, supra note 210, at 94 (arguing that the indirect purchaser rule enables antitrust violators to evade enforcement in the way they structure their business relationships with direct purchasers); Duffy, supra note 212, at 1727 (noting that damages calculations are always complicated in antitrust cases).

303 See Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1530 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Maybe the Court proceeds as it does today because it just disagrees with Illinois Brick.”). In discussing the Amici’s argument to overrule Illinois Brick, “Maybe there is something to these arguments; maybe not.” Id. at 1531.

304 Id. at 1531.

305 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 7.

306 Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 4.

307 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(b), cmt. b, c (Am. Law Inst. 1965).

308 See Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1526 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

309 Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 34 (emphasis added).

310 Joseph, supra note 195, at 51.

311 Id. at 53.

312 Amicus Brief, supra note 201, at 34; JOSEPH, supra note 195, at 51.

313 Compare Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1530 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“To evade the Court’s test, all Apple must do is amend its contracts.”), with id. at 1523 (majority opinion) (“[I]f accepted, Apple’s theory would provide a roadmap for monopolistic retailers to structure transactions … so as to evade antitrust claims by consumers and thereby thwart effective antitrust enforcement.”).

314 Compare id. at 1529 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“This exalts form over substance …. But we’ve long recognized that antitrust law should look at ‘the economic reality of the relevant transactions’ rather than ‘formal conceptions of contract law.’”), with id. at 1523 (majority opinion) (“Apple’s rule would elevate form (what is the precise arrangement between manufacturers or suppliers and retailers?) over substance (is the consumer paying a higher price because of the monopolistic retailer’s actions?). If the retailer’s unlawful monopolistic conduct caused a consumer to pay the retailer a higher-than-competitive price, the consumer is entitled to sue the retailer under the antitrust laws.”).

315 Id. at 1530 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

316 Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 747 F.2d 384, 392 (7th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).

317 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985).

318 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 390, 392.

319 Id. at 390.

320 Id. at 399.

321 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497.

322 Hawkes, Robert Taylor, Note, The Conflict over RICO’s Private Treble Damages Action, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 902, 924 (1985)Google Scholar’

323 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496-97.

324 In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25185, at *36 n.9 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2019).

325 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 483.

326 Id. at 485.

327 Id. at 493-95.

328 McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., 80 F.3d 842, 855 (3d Cir. 1996). The plaintiffs conceded that if they lacked antitrust standing, they lacked RICO standing as well. Id.

329 See Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 (1992).

330 See id.

331 Id. at 269.

332 Id. at 268.

333 Id. at 269-70.

334 Id. (emphasis added).

335 Id.

336 See, e.g., County of Oakland v. Detroit, 866 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1989); Fiala v. Wasco Sanitary Dist., No. 10 C 2895, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39534 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2012).

337 Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1018 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008).

338 Id. at 1051.

339 Id. at 1051-52, 1053.

340 Id. at 1051-52.

341 Id. at 1053.

342 Id.

343 Id. at 1055-56.

344 Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Class Action Complaint at 30, In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2019), ECF No. 181.

345 Id. at 4.

346 Id. at 32.

347 In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-CV-0699-BRM-LHG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25185, at *24-25 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2019).

348 Id. at *27-28.

349 Id. at *36 (“[C]ourts may apply the indirect purchaser rule to RICO actions with the same force as under antitrust law.” (emphasis added)).