Law is the whole of the rules which regulate the relations of men. At the commencement of civilization and, even at the present day, primitive peoples and nations not in a complete state of civilization have clothed these rules with supernatural attributes; they have been represented as having been imposed upon mankind by a supernatural power; they have been given the effect of magic formulas, which, it is to be supposed, result in the chastisement and punishment of those who violate their dictates. Following the development of humanity step by step, three separate domains of law have been marked out: private law, or the law of men in the character of individuals; public or political law, or law as applied to men in their capacity as members of the state; and finally, the law of nations or international law, in other words, the law of states.

The history of international law is essentially a history of the law governing the members of the international community of states in their relations with one another. Inasmuch as the observance of well-established customs of the law of nations implies the existence of an international community of states based upon a general recognition of the fundamental principles of territorial sovereignty and legal equality of independent states, such a law (in the strict and full sense of this term) could not possibly have been developed prior to the rise of the modern European state system, at the close of the Middle Ages or during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of our era. Nevertheless, we are by no means without evidence of the observance in intercommunity intercourse of certain rules and customs, even during antiquity and the Middle Ages, mainly with a religious sanction. This was especially the case in Greece, where there were developed rules and customs of intermunicipal law which, in many respects, bear a truly remarkable resemblance to our modern system of international jurisprudence.

It has always been urged, both by sceptics and by believers, that the test of the practicability of international arbitration stands on the question of sanctions. And yet, by a striking inconsistency, the same authors who agree on the primordial importance of this problem have constantly failed to resolve it. In fact they have hardly ever attempted to explain its terms.

In spite of my reluctance to quote my own work, I am obliged to say that the only book ever devoted to this one great problem was my comprehensive treatise on “ Sanctions of International Arbitration,” the French edition of which appeared in 1905, with a preface by Baron d’Estournelles de Constant. President Roosevelt, whose great energies and high statesmanship were then devoted both to the negotiations of the Peace of Portsmouth and to the preparation of the program of the Second Hague Conference, courteously permitted me to dedicate the book to him, and therefore I dare say that, though the study of all the great European authors who, since Grotius, have led the way to the present state of international law was my constant guide, I did not lack of American inspiration.

The early Romans had their præfecti prætorio, or military judges, afterwards replaced by magistri militum, who exercised a jurisdiction somewhat corresponding to modern courts-martial and military commissions. It is true that there has been much dispute in regard to the exact limits of this jurisdiction, as conferred by the laws which have been handed down to us, yet its general outlines have been pretty well agreed upon.

When Count Mouravieff, at the order of the Emperor of Russia, convoked the first peace conference by the circular of the 12th/24th August, 1898, hardly any one foresaw the importance which this first move was to take, which seemed then in the opinion of the writer Mommsen like “ a printer’s error in the history of the world.”

In order to realize the extent of the development to which coming periodical peace conferences are destined it is sufficient to examine the facts of yesterday and the road already traversed.

The object of the first Russian project was very limited; its purpose was to call together a certain number of Powers to study the possibility of “ putting a limit ” on armament for the purpose of diminishing the financial burdens of the states, but the exchanges of opinion which preceded the assembly of these “ disarmament conferences ” having shown that the chances of success were very feeble, a second circular by Mouravieff (January 11, 1899) extended the first program by attaching thereto particularly “the possibility of preventing armed conflicts by pacific means ” and the reduction of “ the laws and customs of war ” to a system of rules. These two new subjects changed the character of the assembly, the title of which even was modified. It was called thenceforth the “ Peace Conference.” And, in fact, the conference in obedience to the very force of things soon completed the transformation of accession to principle, subordinated the premature question of disarmament, and applied its efforts towards justifying its title by concentrating all its force on the matter of pacific adjustment of international conflicts.

Section 2 of the organic act of the Department provided that every bill, order, resolution or vote of both houses of Congress which the President approved, or which he suffered to become effective without his approval, should be sent by the President to the Secretary of State; that every such document returned by him to Congress with his disapproval and then passed by a two-thirds vote should be sent by the Speaker of the House or the President of the Senate, according to which body it had originated in, to the Secretary of State; that he should as soon as possible cause it to be printed in at least three newspapers; should deliver one printed copy to each senator and representative; and should send two printed copies duly authenticated to the governors of all the States. He was to preserve the original laws carefully and cause them to be recorded in books.

London, July 5, 1911.

Whereas by a Protocol dated the 1st day of December, 1909, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Chile resolved that, as they had not been able to agree as to the amount equitably due to the claimants in the Alsop case, they would submit the whole controversy to His late Majesty King Edward VII as an amiable compositeur to determine the amount equitably due to the said claimants; and

Whereas on account of his untimely death His late Majesty was not able to carry out the duty which he had undertaken; and

Whereas at the request of the two Governments We agreed to act in place of His late Majesty; and

Whereas We determined to designate a Commission to study the papers submitted to Us on either side, and submit a Report to Us for Our consideration as to the amount equitably due to the said claimants; and