Chief Justice Hughes and his associates, Dr. Bello-Codesido, of Chile, and Dr. Castro Urena, of Costa Rica, by a unanimous award rendered in Washington January 23,1933, have brought to an end a boundary dispute between Guatemala and Honduras which for nearlya hundred years has embittered the relations of these countries and at times has brought them to the verge of war. The territory which was affected by the dispute runs in a northeasterly direction from thevicinity of Cerro Brujo, a mountain on the frontierof El Salvador, to the Gulf of Honduras. Its length, from Cerro Brujo to the sea, is about 125 miles. Its width along the coast, from British Honduras to the Ulua River, is about 100 miles.

Japan has refused to submit to the decision of the League of Nations which condemns the invasion of Manchuria in September, 1931, and the setting up there of a so-called“independent state of Manchukuo,” and has announced her withdrawal from the League. Should Japan's connection with the League be actually severed at the end of the period of two years' notice required by the Covenant, the continuance of her mandate over certain islands in the Pacific is sure to be called in question. The matter is one that is already disturbing several governments. Japanese statesmen insist that their mandate will not be affected by Japanese withdrawal from the League. Certain German statesmen think that the islands ought to be returned to them.

Arbitration in the Nineteenth Century. While arbitration was employed for the settlement of international disputes throughout the nineteenth century, it was employed more frequently in the later than in the earlier part of the century. In most cases, resort to arbitration depended upon an ad hoc agreement between the states concerned; the tribunal to which a dispute was referred was created ad hoc, and it ceased to function when the particular dispute was disposed of. It was hardly before the middle of the century that states began to agree in advance to have resort to arbitration, and these agreements were usually very restricted. General bipartite arbitration treaties were all but unknown prior to 1850; and even when they became more numerous their provisions were seldom all-embracing. Increasingly, however, states began to agree in advance to arbitrate special questions. In a few cases, provisions for the arbitration of certain disputes were included in multipartite instruments: the Universal Postal Convention of October 9, 1874 (Article 16), the General Act of Brussels of July 2, 1890 (Article 55), and the Convention on Railway Freight Transportation of October 14, 1890 (Article 57), are outstanding examples.

In the case of the Mexican Union Railway, Ltd., decided in February, 1930, the British-Mexican Claims Commission, set up in accordance with the Convention of November 19,1926, added another stone to the somewhat unsteady structure of decisions on the Calvo Clause. The majority of the Commissioners enthusiastically adopted the considerationsof the United States-Mexican General Claims Commission in the North American Dredging Case, “ not thinking it necessary to repeat them, or possible to express them better.” Even the British Commissioner, Sir John Percival, who dissented, differed from the majority mainly in regard to the application of the opinion in the North American Dredging Case to the case at bar, and was not less cordial in his approval of that opinion.

The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at Geneva, September 26, 1928, is intended to provide for the final settlement of every dispute, of whatever nature it may be. Chapter II is evoted to legal disputes, while Chapter III, Articles 21-28, lays down rules concerning the settlement of non-legal disputes. This idea of a recourse to arbitration for the settlement of purely political conflicts, which Chapter III puts forward, may appear to be inconsistent with a long evolution which has tended to emphasize the judicial character of arbitration. It is true that occasionally states have submitted such conflicts to an arbitral tribunal, but it is for the first time that a provision to this effect has been inserted in a multipartitetreaty. A treaty of this kind has a legislative character and exercises a great influence upon the development of international law. The importance of the General Act is all the greater since some twenty states, including three great Powers, have already ratified it. This treaty, which may be compared only to the Hague Convention,could largely contribute to a revision of the common conception of arbitration. Does it attempt to do so, or is it rather intended to leave this conception unchanged and to create a new method of pacific settlement? In either case, how should the new conception of arbitration be defined? Since purely political disputes cannot be settled by the application of a rule of law, are the powers of the tribunal unlimited? These questions deserve closer consideration, especially since the relevant provisions of Chapter III of the General Act have already inspired certain opinions which, it is believed, are not only contrary to the true meaning of this treaty, but also,if generally adopted, would destroy the very foundations of international arbitration. Now, one of the essential ideas underlying the General Act is not to impair in the least what has already proved useful, but to develop the existing means for the pacific settlement of disputes. Chapter III constitutes an important step forward. Its evolutionary character and its exact meaning can best be realized in the light of the practice of statesand of the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals.