Some of the worst human rights catastrophes of the twentieth century were famines created or manipulated by governments. In 1932 at least five million Ukrainians starved to death, while hunger was largely unknown across the border in Russia.The Soviet government imposed disastrous grain quotas on the Ukraine, then let its own citizens literally collapse in the streets while it exported grain to further its “revolutionary” objectives.The Ethiopian famine of 1983-1985, preserved in popular memory as a natural disaster of biblical proportions, most fiercely struck those parts of the country that harbored irredentist movements. In a stunning, but telling, rejoinder to international pity for the purportedly hapless Ethiopian government, the Ethiopian foreign minister told a U.S. chargé d’affaires that “food is a major element in our strategy against the secessionists.” Since 1994, more than two million out of a population of twenty-two million in North Korea have starved to death, while South Koreans, affected by similar weather patterns, have remained completely untouched by famine. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), trying to distribute aid earmarked for famine victims, have watched helplessly as the government callously interfered and have arrived at the conclusion that “the authorities are deliberately depriving hundreds of thousands of truly needy Koreans of assistance.”

The international dimensions of terrorism had been identified prior to World War II. Nonetheless, no agreement could be reached on an acceptable definition, or appropriate action, and the 1937 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, adopted by the League of Nations, was ratified by a single country. The issue resurfaced in the late 1950s when private individuals perpetrated an alarming number of incidents endangering civil aviation during transnational flights. These incidents led to the adoption of three distinct conventions on the subject, namely the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.

Following September 11, 2001, the Security Council took a number of important steps in the fight against terrorism. It condemned global terror and recognized the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter in responding forcefully to those horrific attacks. Perhaps its most significant action in this area, however, was the adoption of Resolution 1373 which established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (the CTC). Addressing the significance and substance of this Security Council action, this essay reviews the work of the CTC to date, highlighting some of its accomplishments, and then touches upon some of the challenges the CTC will likely confront as it progresses with its mission. How it chooses to confront these challenges will surely have a considerable impact on its future work.

Addressing accountability for human rights atrocities takes on particular significance in postconflict situations. To the extent that mechanisms for accountability facilitate the pursuit of justice against individual perpetrators, the reform of institutions staffed by perpetrators, and the initiation of reconciliation processes, identifying those who committed atrocities is a fundamental aspect of a peacekeeping mission.

The international community has established tribunals to try those who committed atrocities and will not be tried in domestic courts. Such tribunals, however, limit the scope of prosecutions to high-ranking officials, and do not command sufficient resources to pursue the multitude of individuals who participated in atrocities. Domestic courts have jurisdiction to try individuals who participated in atrocities, but judicial systems in postconflict. countries find themselves in disarray and generally unable to cope with sensitive cases, because of both the subject matter and the potential number of cases.

During 2002, countries from all regions, especially Africa, resorted to the International Court of Justice; only one of the Court's 2002 judgments involved an OECD countiy. The Court's work during the year also shows the continued importance of boundary issues for states and for the Court.

The Court again completed a substantial program of work, resolving three cases with final judgments. In February, it triggered substantial controversy by finding that a Belgian court's warrant for the arrest of the then foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“Congo”) violated international law. In October, it resolved a complex of boundary disputes between Cameroon and Nigeria, although by year-end Nigeria had not yet implemented the Court's key requirement—withdrawal from the Bakassi Peninsula. In December, comparing sparse effectivités, it concluded that Malaysia, and not Indonesia, had sovereignty over two small disputed islands.

The fifty-eighth session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights opened with the United States in an observer seat for the first time ever. The Commission ultimately adopted ninety-two resolutions and eighteen decisions, thirty-nine of which were adopted by roll-call vote. Subsequently, at its July 2002 session, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC, the parent body of the Commission) approved nearly all of the Commission's decisions by similar votes. The United States was also reelected to the Commission for its fiftyninth session during a separate ECOSOC meeting.

The debate during the Commission's deliberations was more chaotic and fractious than in prior years, reflecting the membership of an increased number of repressive governments that sought to block international scrutiny of their human rights practices.

In United States v. Duarte-Acero, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not regulate the extraterritorial conduct of U.S. government agents. Additionally, the court held that the Covenant is not self-executing and therefore that it does not create individual rights that are judicially enforceable in U.S. courts.