It was inevitable that the end of the World War should be followed by a revival of interest in the systematic development of the law of nations. Such a result was foreseen by W. E. Hall as long ago as 1890, but the extent of the revival and its consequences were pictured by him in terms altogether too sanguine. Many of the people who have expected the experience of the war to be capitalized in an immediate clarification of the laws of war must have been greatly disappointed by the events of the past years. A struggle which aroused so many passions, which divided a large part of the human race into hostile camps, could not possibly have produced the conditions necessary for building a new law which would embody the common views of people in many countries; but perhaps it did serve to direct attention to the lawless character of international relations in certain fields, and thus gave to politicians and lawyers opportunity for extending and improving the law governing such relations. If there has not been a general unanimity of opinion as to the method to be followed and the direction to be taken, the opportunity has not been neglected, and currents are now under way and agencies have been created which promise a continued if not a consistent progress for the future.

“ I have often taken occasion to remark that next to the Church, the Mixed Courts are the most successful international institution in history.” (Farewell address of Sir Maurice Amos, Judicial Adviser to the Egyptian Government, Alexandria, March 25,1925, trans.)

The “ Council crisis” in the League of Nations in 1926 has presented a problem in actual international cooperation of some moment. Whether it is permanently solved or only temporarily settled, it can not fail to have a profound effect upon the fundamental bases of international law. The difficulties and decisions at Geneva give practical interpretations to the “ juridic equality” of states, which is the most elusive characteristic of the unit of international relationship. Subjective considerations—“ particular national, historic, cultural and other qualifications”—did not prevail over objective considerations—the effort “ to give the widest and most equitable representation” on the Council. Progress may be said to lie on the objective side in international affairs, since there sound and practical general principles may best be evolved.

The object of the present article is to attempt an interpretation of paragraph two of Article 10 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice in order to discover, if possible, the position of the British Empire and of the British Dominions in regard to the election of judges of the Permanent Court.