In more than one respect the part played by Grotius (1583–1645) in the history of jurisprudence presents perplexing features. His chief glory lies in the department of law; yet he was more of a philologist and of a theologian than of a jurist. He is often called the father of international law; yet his principal book, the famous book of 1625, was not a treatise devoted to international law. His book, by reason of many of its qualities, looks obsolete: written in Latin, full of quotations and authorities unknown to modern readers, silent about medieval and modern history, it is still a young and living book, younger even than it was two centuries ago.

Grotius was three times in France, each in widely contrasting circumstances. The first visit was in 1598–9, when at the age of fifteen he accompanied Count Justin of Nassau and Barneveld as one of the suite of these envoys from the States General of Holland to Henry IV. The second sojourn from 1621 to 1631, covers the period after his escape from prison at Loevestein, ten years spent, with the exception of the spring and summer of 1623, in Paris. The third from 1634 to 1645, is the period of his Swedish service, when he was Ambassador of Queen Christina to the Court of Louis XIII. Thus of the sixty-two years of Grotius’s life, one third was spent in Paris. It is the second of these French sojourns which now concerns us, for it was during this period that Grotius prepared and published his magnum opus, De Jure Belli ac Pacis.

The Immigration Act of 1924 provides that, with certain exceptions, “no alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States,” and carefully defines the term “ineligible to citizenship.”

As the Permanent Court of International Justice completes the third year of its activities, its r61e in the international life of our time and the prospect for its cumulating contribution to international law begin to stand out more clearly. During 1920, while its Statute was being drafted, the general conception as to its functions was more or less nebulous. In 1921, while the protocol promulgating the Statute was being ratified and while the judges were being chosen, doubts were still being entertained as to the need for the court and the opportunities which would be permitted to it. In 1922, the organization of the court, the promulgation of the rules of procedure and the handing down of three advisory opinions served to beget confidence. The year 1923 was such a busy one for the court, and the satisfaction with its five advisory opinions and its judgment in the Wimbledon case was so general that lawyers began to foresee great activities in store for it, and foreign offices began to count its existence a factor in current international affairs.

In the October,1924, number of this Journal the writer examined the changes in the conception of war since the middle ages with the conclusion that under present international law “acts of war” are illegal unless committed in time of war or other extraordinary necessity but the transition from a state of peace to a “state of war” is neither legal nor illegal. A state of war is regarded as an event, the origin of which is outside of international law although that law prescribes rules for its conduct differing from those which prevail in time of peace. The reason for this conception, different from that of antiquity and the middle ages was found in the complexity of the causes of war in the present state of international relations, in the difficulty of locating responsibility in the present regime of constitutional government, and in the prevalence of the scientific habit of attributing occurrences to natural causes rather than to design. It was recalled, however, that the problem of eliminating war has gained in importance while the possibility of solving it through the application of law has improved with the development of jural science. Thus efforts have been made to eliminate war(1) by defining responsibility for bringing on a state of war,(2) by defining justifiable self-defense, and(3) by providing sanctions for enforcement.

What is Pan-Americanism? The term itself is new. It appears to have been employed first by the New York Evening Post in discussions relating to the International American Conference which was held at Washington in 1889–1890. It was used in imitation doubtless of such terms as Pan-Slavism, Pan-Hellenism, and Pan-Islamism, which, along with numerous combinations of the sort, became current during the third quarter of last century. The new term was quickly admitted into the columns of other newspapers, and, as in the course of a few years its use became general, it found its way into the editions of the dictionaries and encyclopedias which subsequently appeared. To such works of reference inquirers who have but a vague notion of its meaning are most likely to turn for their first instruction on the subject. Unfortunately, however, from this source but little enlightenment is to be obtained.