1 See UN Doc. S/14944 (April 1, 1982), which states in part:

The Security Council, mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, expresses its concern about the tension in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).

The Security Council accordingly calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to exercise the utmost restraint at this time and in particular to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region and to continue the search for a diplomatic solution.

The Security Council will remain seized of the question.

For a factual account of the UN actions, see Parsons, , The Falklands Crisis in the United Nations, 31 March–14 June 1982, 59 Int’l Aff. 169 (1983)Google Scholar; Connell-Smith, , The OAS and the Falklands Conflict, World Today, Sept. 1982, at 340–47 Google Scholar. See also Dupuy, R.-J., L’Impossible Agression: les Malouines entre l’O.N.U. et l’O.E.A., 1982 Annuaire Français Droit Int’l 337 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 UN Doc. S/14947 (April 2, 1982).

3 UN Doc. S/RES/502 (April 3, 1982). The resolution was adopted by 10 votes in favor (France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Togo, Uganda, the United Kingdom, the United States and Zaire), 1 against (Panama) and 4 abstentions (China, Poland, Spain and the USSR). Thus, the United Kingdom obtained a solid and wide base of support. Sir Anthony Parsons stated that “the result was better than we have dared to hope for.” See Parsons, supra note 1, at 172.

4 See UN Doc. S/PV.2345, at 31–32 (April 1, 1982). Regardless of the fundamental question of sovereignty, the point is, of course, that between the time of the first aggression (1833) and the Argentine invasion (1982), the United Nations Charter (and indeed all the inter-American instruments) was adopted, which prescribes that “[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered” (Art. 2, para. 3), and, more importantly, that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (Art. 2, para. 4).

Professor Antonio Remiro-Brotons, on the other hand, argues that the Argentine invasion was not incompatible with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. See A. Remiro-Brotons, Derecho Internacional Público, Principios Fundamentales 145–48 (1982).

5 Cf. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London), The Falkland Islands. The Facts 12 (HMSO 1982). In addition to unilateral financial and other economic sanctions (initiated on April 3), on April 6, 1982, the British Government formally requested that the European Economic Community (EEC) join in the economic sanctions against Argentina. On April 16, the EEC decided to impose a ban on imports of Argentine products and to cut off arms sales to that country. The sanctions were unanimously approved by the EEC Council of Ministers and have been characterized as “the strongest punitive measures ever taken by the EEC” (see N.Y. Times, April 15, 1982, at A19, col. 3). See European Communities, Council Regulations Nos. 877/82 (April 16, 1982) and 1176/82 (May 18, 1982), and ECSC Council Decisions 82/221/ECSC and 82/320/ECSC, reprinted in 21 ILM 547–50 (1982). On April 17, 1982, other members of the Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, New Zealand) and Hong Kong joined in the EEC action. See Daoudi, & Dajani, , Sanctions: the Falklands episode, World Today, April 1983, at 150–60 Google Scholar; Doxey, , International Sanctions: Trials of Strength or Tests of Weakness, J. Int’l Stud. (London), Spring 1983, at 79 Google Scholar; Amine, , Economic Sanctions: Falkland Islands (Malvinas), 23 Harv. Int’l L.J. 404 (1983)Google Scholar. See also Dupuy, P.-M., Observations sur la pratique récente des “Sanctions.” De l’Illicite, 87 Rev. Generale Droit Int’l Public 505 (1983)Google Scholar.

6 See remarks by Secretary of State Haig, Alexander M. Jr., made at the State Department on April 30, 1982, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1982, at 8, col. 5 Google Scholar.

7 Logistical and material assistance provided by the United States during the conflict was widely reported in the U.S.A. as well as in Great Britain. See, e.g., Ashford, , Changes in Atlantic Alliance: Britain and America take the special out of relationship, The Times (London), Nov. 10, 1982 Google Scholar (commentary from Washington). See also Ashford, Anglo American Relations, Part 1, The Times, Jan. 24, 1983; and id., Part 2, The Times, Jan. 25, 1983. Concerning the use of the “Paveway II laserguidance kit” and laser technology available to Great Britain as a defense against air attacks on ships, a top-secret weapon made by Texas Instruments, and supplied by the United States, see New Scientist, Nov. 25, 1982, at 483; also Parry, , Laser bomb threat cut short Falkland fighting, The Guardian, Nov. 25, 1982 Google Scholar.

In addition, Great Britain relied heavily on the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) which, the London Times reported, “had early warning of Argentina’s mobilisation for the Falkland invasion simply by the increased volume of military radio traffic, and changes in the transmitting points made it possible to determine not only which units were involved but to plot their movements,” and that “NSA intercepts of Argentinian traffic during the Falklands war were crucial to British success.” See FOCUS. Exit Smiley, enter IBM, The Times, Oct. 31, 1982, at 11.

Cf. also P.-M. Dupuy, supra note 5, at 512.

Despite the severity of the economic sanctions, a reasonable argument could be made that U.S. logistical and material assistance to Great Britain probably caused the greatest damage to Argentina since it had a direct impact on the outcome of the conflict. For a comprehensive and detailed account of U.S. aid to Great Britain during the Malvinas-Falklands crisis and its impact on the outcome of the conflict, see America’s Falklands War, The Economist, March 3, 1984, at 29.

8 See Reagan Removes U.S. Economic Ban on Buenos Aires: arms sanctions remain, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1982, at A1, col. 6.

9 Remarks by Secretary of State Haig, supra note 6.

10 This study does not address the sanctions adopted by the members of the EEC (or by other countries) against Argentina. For a discussion of these issues, see references in note 5 supra. Although a comprehensive discussion of the many complex juridical problems posed by the sanctions is beyond the scope of this inquiry, the author considered it useful to place in proper perspective certain issues that touch upon basic concepts of competence and whose importance, from the standpoint of international law, transcends the subject of the present inquiry.

11 Under this provision, sanctions were applied against Rhodesia on Dec. 16, 1966, by Security Council Resolution 232, and on May 29, 1968, by Resolution 253. For an extensive discussion of the Rhodesian crisis, see R. Zacklin, the United Nations and Rhodesia (1977). Even though the resolution adopted by the Security Council was binding upon its members, some of the permanent members of that body did not even feel obliged to justify their imports of chromium ore from Rhodesia once the sanctions were imposed. For instance, the so-called Byrd Amendment to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. §98–98h), passed by the U.S. Congress in 1971, allowed chrome and other “strategic and critical” materials to be imported from Rhodesia. In view of that amendment, the Security Council adopted three resolutions (No. 314 of Feb. 28, 1972, No. 318 of July 28, 1972, and No. 320 of Sept. 29, 1972) that reaffirmed its imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia and urged all members to comply with them. See Note, , The Rhodesia Chrome Statute: The Congressional Response to United Nations Economic Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, 58 Va. L. Rev. 511 (1972)Google Scholar. See also Note, , International Sanctions—United Nations Security Council Resolution—Economic Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, 14 Va. J. Int’l L. 320(1974)Google Scholar; McDougal, & Reisman, , Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AJIL 1 (1968)Google Scholar; Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1972).

Article 41 of the UN Charter was also applied against South Africa, by virtue of a 1977 decision of the Security Council to impose on all states an obligation not to supply arms to that country. The Council justified its sanctions on the determination that South Africa’s acquisition of arms and related material constituted a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. See SC Res. 418 (Nov. 4, 1977). See also UN Doc. S/12436 (1977), reprinted in 31 U.N.Y.B. 161 (1977).

12 Cf Blum, , Economic Boycotts in International Law, 12 Tex. Int’l L.J. 5 (1977)Google Scholar.

13 In connection with the concept of economic measures, it has been argued that the “use or threat of force,” which is prohibited under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, includes not only military force but also economic coercion. See, e.g., Paust, & Blaustein, , The Arab Oil Weapon—A Threat to International Peace, 68 AJIL 410 (1974)Google Scholar. See also Buchheit, , The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, in Economic Coercion and the New International Economic Order 39, 67–68 (Lillich, R. ed. 1976)Google Scholar. For an opposite view, see Bowett, , International Law and Economic Coercion, 16 Va. J. Int’l L. 245 (1976)Google Scholar; Bowett, , Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 id. at 1–2 (1972)Google Scholar. See also Muir, , The Boycott in International Law, in Lillich ed., supra, at 19 Google Scholar.

This question has been frequently discussed ever since the San Francisco Conference in 1945 rejected a Brazilian amendment to Article 2(4) which, if adopted, would have prohibited not only the “threat or use of force” but also the threat or use of economic coercion. For the text of the Brazilian amendment, see Doc. 215, 1/1/10, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 559 (1945); for its rejection, see Doc. 784, 1/1/27, id. at 334–39, 405, 609. See also Report of the Rapporteur of Committee I to Commission I, Doc. 885, 1/1/34, id. at 387 and 400.

The narrow interpretation of the concept of “force” has generally prevailed among Western states, while the Communist bloc and most of the Third World countries have favored a broader construction of Article 2(4) embodying also economic coercion. See, e.g., Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, 20 UN GAOR Annex 3 (Agenda Items 90 & 94) at 77, 84, 85, UN Docs. A/5746, A/AC.119/L.6, A/AC.119/L.7, A/AC.119/L.15, and A/AC.119/L.8 (1965).

The fact that Articles 2(4) and 39 of the UN Charter have been construed by some writers as not including economic coercion should not be interpreted as a rejection of the notion that certain economic activities of a state may not violate other provisions of the UN Charter. Cf. Lillich, , The Status of Economic Coercion under International Law, 12 Tex. Int’l L.J. 17, 19 (1977)Google Scholar. See also Shihata, , Arab Oil Policies and the New International Economic Order, 16 Va. J. Int’l L. 261 (1976)Google Scholar.

14 Cf. Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals, supra note 13, at 2; also his International Law and Economic Coercion, supra note 13, at 247.

15 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 194, as amended, 8 UST 1767, TIAS No. 3930, 278 UNTS 168, Art. XXIII. For instance, in 1952 the Netherlands was authorized by the contracting parties of GATT to take retaliatory measures by restricting the import of wheat from the United States because of unjustified American trade restrictions on milk products from the Netherlands. See Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United States, GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 1st Supp. 32 (1953). See also J. Jackson, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, ch. 7, at 396–432 (1977); J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, particularly ch. 8, §8.5, at 178–87 (1967); K. Dam, The GATT, Law and International Economic Organization 260, 366 (1970).

Although the EEC relied on Article 113 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 298 UNTS 3, as the substantive legal basis for the suspension of imports from Argentina, the EEC defended its decision to impose trade sanctions against that country under Article XXI of the GATT, which prescribes that individual parties have the right to take any action they consider necessary for the protection of their “essential security interests . . . taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.” See U.S. Export Weekly, May 11, 1982, at 193. See also EEC Council Regulation No. 877/82, supra note 5. However, as J. L. Amine pointed out:

Military confrontations of the sort involved in the Falkland crisis may provide the most justifiable case in which the combatants may invoke Article XXI; however, it is less clear that third parties states—such as members of the EEC other than Great Britain—whose security interests are not directly at stake can justifiably derogate from GATT obligations.

Amine, supra note 5, at 409.

16 Gold, , The “Sanctions” of the International Monetary Fund, 66 AJIL 737, 744 (1972)Google Scholar.

17 Art. 88, European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, April 18, 1951, 261 UNTS 140.

18 And also in the so-called Act of Chapultepec, adopted at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City 1945, as Resolution VIII, Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarities. See International Conferences of American States, Supp. No. 2, at 68 (1942–54).

For the Rio Treaty, see TIAS No. 1838, 62 Stat. 1681, 21 UNTS 77.

19 Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, supra note 13, at 253–54 (footnotes omitted).

20 This questionable argument was emphatically defended by the United States at the time the Security Council considered the Dominican case in September 1960, and on several occasions thereafter. See 15 UN SCOR (893d, 894th and 895th mtgs.), UN Docs. S/PV.893–95 (1960). See also UN Doc. S/4484 (Sept. 8, 1960).

21 For a discussion of this issue, see Akehurst, , Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, with special reference to the Organization of American States, 42 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 175 (1967)Google Scholar; Claude, , The OAS, the UN and the United States, Int’l Conciliation, No. 547, March 1964 Google Scholar; Halderman, , Regional Enforcement Measures and the United Nations, 52 Geo. L.J. 89 (1963)Google Scholar; de Aréchaga, Jiménez , La Coordination des systèmes de l’ONU et de l’OEA pour le règlement pacifique des différends et la sécurité collective, 111 Recueil Des Cours 419 (1964 I)Google Scholar; Bowett, , Interrelatión de los Estados Americanos y las Naciones Unidas dentro del marco de la seguridad collectiva, 40 Rev. Facultad de Derecho De Mexico 861 (1964)Google Scholar; Paolillo, , Regionalismo y accion coercitiva regional en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, 1962 Anuario Uruguayo de Derecho Internacional 22 Google Scholar; Paolillo, , Nuevas Reflexiones en torno a una debatida cuestión: Facultades de las entidades regionales en materia de acción coercitiva, [1964] 3 id. at 173 Google Scholar; Castañeda, , Conftictos de competencia entre las Naciones Unidas y la Organización de Estados Americanos, 5 Foro Internacional 303 (1964–65)Google Scholar; Sepúlveda, , Las Naciones Unidas, el Tratado de Río y la OEA, 7 id. at 68 (1966–67)Google Scholar; Ruda, , Relaciones de la OEA y la UN en cuanto al mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad internacionales, 1961 Rev. Jurídica de Buenos Aires 15 Google Scholar; Etzioni, M., The Majority of One (1970)Google Scholar. Although Dr. Etzioni maintains that the adoption of enforcement measures by regional organizations must have prior Security Council authorization, she confuses the concept of “collective security” with “collective self-defense” when, for example, she refers to the dual character of the inter-American system “as a collective security arrangement under the authority of Article 51 [of the UN Charter] and as a regional organization under the authority of Chapter VIII.” Id. at 110.

See also Levin, A., UN-Oas Relations in the Peace and Security Field (UNITAR 1974)Google Scholar, reprinted in Regionalism and the United Nations 147 (B. Andemicael ed. 1979).

22 See U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s letter transmitting the North Atlantic Treaty to the President of the United States on April 7, 1949, reprinted in Message from the President of the United States transmitting the North Atlantic Treaty to the Senate, in Documents Relating to the North Atlantic Treaty, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Doc. No. 48, at 6 (1949). In fact, the Rio Treaty mentions Article 51 of the UN Charter several times. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter (and 3 of the Rio Treaty) the American states are authorized to take measures of self-defense “until the Security Council of the United Nations has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”

23 See, e.g., 1 The Inter-American System: Treaties, Conventions and Other Documents, pt. II (a compilation annotated by F. V. García-Amador, 1983). Its chapter X (pp. 261–341) is entitled “The System of Collective Security [of the OAS].” It is astonishing that the author of that volume would state with reference to the concept of “regional action” provided for in Article 52, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter that it “includes action in the area of peaceful settlement as well as in the area of collective security. The latter is provided for in Article 53 [of the UN Charter], as well as in Article 51 for cases concerning the exercise of self-defense.” Id. at 400. The author cites no authority for this interpretation.

It is unfortunate that the OAS Charter itself uses the expression “Collective Security” as the title of its chapter VI (Articles 27 and 28), which clearly does not contain provisions on collective security. In both of these cases the concept of collective self-defense (which has an entirely different meaning) is assimilated into that of collective security. Article 64 of the OAS Charter, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires (2 UST 2394, TIAS No. 2361, 119 UNTS 3, as amended, 21 UST 607, TIAS No. 6847), goes even further by providing that an “Advisory Defense Committee shall be established to advise the Organ of Consultation on problems of military cooperation that may arise in connection with the application of existing special treaties on collective security,” which clearly implies that the Rio Treaty is one of collective security. It would be far beyond the scope of the present study even to attempt to describe the documents and/or occasions demonstrating the misuse of the concept of collective security by the OAS.

For an extensive discussion of the concept of collective security, see Claude, I., Power and International Relations 286–300 (1969)Google Scholar; Kelsen, , Collective Security and Collective Self–Defense under the Charter of the United Nations, 42 AJIL 783 (1948)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Betsalel, R., Seguridad Colectiva en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas (1965)Google Scholar; Kunz, J., Sanctions in International Law, 54 AJIL 324 (1960)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, reprinted in The Changing Law of Nations 621 (1969).

24 Kunz, , The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 42 AJIL 111, 120 (1948)Google Scholar.

25 See Bowett, D., Self-Defense in International Law 269 (1958)Google Scholar. See examples of state practice provided by this author in International Law and Economic Coercion, supra note 13, at 249– 50 and Economic Coercion and Reprisals, supra note 13, at 7–8.

Professor Ian Brownlie points out that “the condition for giving lawful aid [to a third state] is the existence of an unlawful resort to force. And, because the justification of the action is defence of a third state, aid should be for that purpose only and the joint military effort should be consonant with the requirement of proportionality.” International Law and The Use Of Force By States 331 (1963).

26 GA Res. 2131 (XX), operative para. 2 (1965).

27 GA Res. 2625 (XXV) (1970).

28 See note 13 supra. The principle of nonintervention as formulated in Resolutions 2131 and 2625 was repeated, without essential changes, in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 as Principle VI. It was also included in the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, GA Res. 36/103, adopted in December 1981.

29 GA Res. 3171 (XXVIII) (1973).

30 GA Res. 3281 (XXIX) (1974).

31 See Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, supra note 13, at 246.

32 See Schachter, , Alf Ross Memorial Lecture: The Crisis of Legitimation in the United Nations, 50 Nordisk Tidsskrift Int’l Ret. ACTA Scandinavica Juris Gentium 3, 13 (1981)Google Scholar. With reference to resolutions that are not unanimous, Schachter suggests that “the size and composition of [the] majority must be taken into account in judging the weight to be given the resolution.” Id. at 14. James Fawcett asserts:

[N]umbers cannot alone be decisive; so a resolution adopted after the UN had come to include the great majority of countries of the world must be more representative of opinion and authoritative than earlier resolutions; further, a small minority of powerful countries may put the authority of a resolution in question.

See Law and Power in International Relations 42 (1982). For a similar view, see Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (rendered by Professor René-Jean Dupuy as Sole Arbitrator on Jan. 19, 1977), sec. IIC, translated in 17 ILM 3, 27–31 (1978). For a different opinion, see Dolzer, , New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, 75 AJIL 553 (1981)Google Scholar. There is, of course, a vast literature on the legal effect of UN resolutions. Some of the most important works are cited by Schachter, supra, at 4 n.9.

33 SC Res. 330 (March 21, 1973). See also 27 U.N.Y.B. 173 (1973).

34 GA Res. 1803 (XVII) (Dec. 14, 1962) and 3016 (XXVII) (Dec. 18, 1972).

35 GA Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).

36 GA Res. 2993 (XXVII) (Dec. 15, 1972).

37 This resolution was adopted by 12 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions (France, the United Kingdom and the United States).

The United States indicated then that it did not accept the premise that coercive economic measures were being used in Latin America in a manner likely to endanger peace and security. See 27 U.N.Y.B. 173(1973).

38 OAS Charter, supra note 23.

39 See Muir, supra note 13, at 34.

40 See Buchheit, supra note 13, at 68.

41 Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals, supra note 13, at 3–5. See also Lillich, The Status of Economic Coercion, supra note 13, at 22–23; Lillich, Economic Coercion and the International Legal Order, in Lillich ed., supra note 13, at 73–86. For an opposing view, see Boorman, , Economic Coercion in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and the Ensuing Economic Issues, 9 J. Int’l L. & Econ. 205 (1974)Google Scholar, reprinted in Lillich ed., supra note 13, at 255.

The late Professor Clive Parry observed that the use of this criterion is particularly difficult; quoting Judge Hudson, he noted that “the thought of man is not triable, for the Devil himself knoweth not the thought of man, how much more difficult is it to ascertain with any certainty the thought or motive and intent of a state?” See Parry, , Defining Economic Coercion in International Law, 12 Tex. J. Int’l L. 1, 4 (1977)Google Scholar. A similar view is taken by Professor M. Akehurst, who observed: “There is clearly something artificial about trying to analyze the psychology of collective entities such as states.” See A Modern Introduction to International Law 45 (1970).

It should be noted that Professor Bowett states elsewhere that the “motive or purpose” of a state is “notoriously difficult to elucidate.” See Reprisals involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AJIL 1, 3 (1972).

42 This criterion is reported to be well established within the context of municipal law. Several cases decided by British and U.S. courts are mentioned by Bowett in International Law and Economic Coercion, supra note 13, at 24.

43 The decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests Case offers an interesting example of how the Court imputed an intention to the Government of France on the basis of a statement made by that Government. In 1974 Australia (and New Zealand) sought an order from the ICJ declaring that the atmospheric nuclear tests being conducted at that time by France were illegal under international law. In June 1974, prior to the Court proceedings, the Government of the defendant state (France) publicly declared that, after the series of tests then being contemplated, it would be able to move to underground testing. Subsequently, the Government of France confirmed that statement of policy. When the case came up before the ICJ for decision, the Court held that inasmuch as the French Government had announced its intentions publicly, its statements “constitute an undertaking possessing binding legal effect” under international law. In consequence, the Court declared that there was no longer any issue in dispute before it, and it dismissed the case. See Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), 1974 ICJ Rep. 253, 269 (Judgment of Dec. 20). There was, however, no evidence that the French Government had any intention of actually making a commitment of the kind attributed to it by the Court.

44 Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals, supra note 13, at 3–5.

45 Remiro-Brotons uses the expression “permitted influence” to describe acts of diplomacy and trade that are commonplace between states, and, though intended to influence the conduct of another state, do not constitute a violation of the principle of nonintervention. See A. Remiro-Brotons, supra note 4, at 90–91 and 183.

46 See Macdonald, , Economic Sanctions in the International System, 7 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 61, 83 (1969)Google Scholar.

McDougal and Feliciano state:

The employment of economics as an instrument of coercive policy may, in broad statement, be described as the management of access to a flow of goods, services, and money, as well as to markets, with the end of denying the target-state such access while maintaining it for oneself. All the familiar methods of economic warfare developed in the last two world wars may be included, such as the blocking or freezing of the target’s assets; the imposition of import and export embargoes, total or selective; blacklisting of foreign firms and individuals who deal with the target-state; drying up of foreign supplies by preclusive buying; control of re–exportation from a nonparticipant’s territory; and control of shipping through selective admission to credit, insurance, stores, fuel, port and repair facilities. . . . Other techniques include the creation of artificial scarcity and high prices and the retarding of technological development through cartelization schemes and the control of patents, the refusal to grant loans or to pay for previous loans, and, of course, the taking, expropriation, or confiscation of enterprises and property. . . .

McDougal, M. & Feliciano, F., Law and Minimum World Public Order 30–31 (1971)Google Scholar (footnotes omitted). Lloyd Brown-John, C. classifies economic sanctions into three main groups: “embargoes, boycotts, and blockades and quarantines.” See Multilateral Sanctions in International Law. A Comparative Analysis 16 (1975)Google Scholar.

47 Buchheit, supra note 13, at 54.

48 See notes 41 and 42 supra.

49 Buchheit states:

A judgment on the permissibility of coercive action, whether that judgment be moral, practical or legal, must take into account the intensity of the method of compulsion employed in relation to the intended goal and the degree of provocation. Thus, it is possible that even nonviolent methods of coercion, such as the use of propaganda, may be adjudged impermissible when employed without sufficient provocation.

Buchheit, supra note 13, at 50.

50 Lillich, Economic Coercion and the International Legal Order, supra note 41, at 81–82.

51 See note 67 infra.

52 See note 9 supra and accompanying text.

53 See Res. I, Serious Situation in the South Atlantic, OEA/Ser.F/II.20, doc. 28/82, rev.3 (April 28, 1982). The resolution was approved by 17 votes in favor and 4 abstentions (Chile, Colombia, the United States, and Trinidad and Tobago).

54 See Res. II, Serious Situation in the South Atlantic, OEA/Ser.F/II.20, doc. 80/82, rev.2, operative para. 5, at 3 (May 29, 1982).

55 See Report of CEPCIES to CIES, OAS Doc. CIES/3703, corr.1, at 18–19 (Oct. 9, 1982).

56 The title of the resolution in its original language was “Medidas Coercitivas,” a term that in Article 53 of the UN Charter is used in the English text as “Enforcement Action.” See Final Report, XVII Annual Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at the Ministerial Level, OEA/Ser.H/XII.40, CIES/3772, rev.1, at 12 (1982).

57 On April 3, the Security Council determined that “there exists a breach of the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).” That determination was made in furtherance of the Security Council’s responsibility under Article 39 of the UN Charter. However, Article 39 further provides that once such determination has been made, the Security Council “shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The Council did not decide to take (or to authorize) measures against Argentina as it had, for example, against Rhodesia when, by Resolution 232, it decided that all member states of the UN should refrain from, inter alia, the importation of a list of key Rhodesian products and the sale of arms, aircraft, motor vehicles and oil to Rhodesia. See note 11 supra.

58 It is not apparent to this writer what specifically is meant by the phrase “or any other competent international organization.”

59 Akehurst, supra note 21, at 222.

60 Buchheit, supra note 13, at 67. See also Lillich, Economic Coercion and the International Legal Order, supra note 41, at 81–84.

61 The logistical and material support that the United States gave to the United Kingdom and the economic measures against Argentina could, in principle, be justified on the basis of collective self-defense if, because of the Argentine invasion of the islands, the security of the United States had been reasonably endangered. Self-defense would have been permitted in that case, subject only to the principles of necessity and proportionality.

With regard to the logistical and material support provided by the United States to Great Britain, it is interesting to note that some officials of the (military) Government of Argentina alleged that the United States appeared to have its own vested interests in the outcome of the armed conflict, especially in view of the fact that no claim was made by the U.S. Government to the effect that its security interests were at stake as a result of the conflict.

62 See Remarks by Secretary of State Haig, supra note 6.

63 Id. Subsequent U.S. conduct involving the use of force does not seem to lend credence to that contention. Thus, for example, on Oct. 25, 1983, the United States and five Caribbean states invaded Grenada. At the outset, the United States justified its action on the grounds that it was designed to: (1) protect innocent lives, particularly those of approximately 1,000 Americans on Grenada; (2) forestall further chaos on the island; and (3) “assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to the Island of Grenada.” See Excerpts from President Reagan’s Statement on the Landing of U.S. Forces on Grenada, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1983, at A7.

For many, however, it is impossible to view this action except against a backdrop of obvious acts of aggression and intervention in matters that were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Grenada. For example, the Times of London in an editorial on Oct. 26, 1983, stated, inter alia, that the “United States and its Caribbean allies have committed an act of aggression against Grenada. They are in breach of International Law and the Charter of the United Nations” (p. 13).

See also Linowitz, , Grenada: Critical Questions, Wash. Post, Oct. 31, 1983, at 13 Google Scholar. See also The Situation in Grenada, a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in November 1983 (by 108 votes in favor, 9 against and 27 abstentions) that deeply regretted that “measures involving the use of force were embarked upon as a solution to the problem of Grenada.” GA Res. 38/7 (Nov. 2, 1983).

64 47 Fed. Reg. 19,842 (1982), reprinted in 21 ILM 684 (1982).

65 The authority to make such determinations was delegated to the Secretary of State by executive order. Prior to the Malvinas conflict, a determination of this nature had been made only once (and was subsequently repealed), blocking credits to Chile because of the Letelier-Moffitt case. See U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, April 30, 1982, reprinted in 21 ILM 682–84 (1982).

66 Cf. J. Jackson, Legal Problems, supra note 15, ch. 15, §15.1, “Use of Trade Control for Political Purposes,” at 941.

67 See Statement of Ambassador Alberto Martínez Piedra, U.S. representative to the Inter-American and Social Council (translated by the author from the Spanish version as reported by the Associated Press on Oct. 21, 1982), reproduced in OAS Dep’t of Public Information, Servicio Informative Oct. 22, 1982, at 1.

68 Statement by the same official (translated by the author from the Spanish version as reported by Agence France Press on Oct. 21, 1982), reproduced in id. at 2.

69 See note 64 supra.

70 Cf. Daoudi & Dajani, supra note 5, at 158. The head of the Argentine delegation to the 17th Annual Meeting of the Inter-American and Social Council claimed—not unexpectedly— that “even before they were implemented, the mere announcement of the adoption of these measures did serious injury to the target country, because it immediately affected its foreign credit and its contractual opportunities.” See Statement by Ambassador Raúl A. Quijano, in the First Working Session of Committee I, 19 October, in Final Report, supra note 56, at 68–72.

71 The OAS acted after the Security Council had already begun to deal with the conflict. The 20th Meeting of Consultation acted twice, on April 26–28, 1982, and again on May 27–29, 1982. From the jurisdictional standpoint, the fact that a regional arrangement such as the OAS decides to deal with a conflict after the Security Council has been seized of the matter, unusual though it may be, is not per se inconsistent with the jurisdiction that the Security Council exercises on the same question. This was a case of parallel consideration of the same conflict, i.e., “concurrent” jurisdiction of both organizations. As Professor John Norton Moore observed, “there seems to be a general understanding that regional organizations may exercise concurrent jurisdiction, at least in the absence of United Nations action terminating regional jurisdiction.” See The Role of Regional Arrangements in the Maintenance of World Order, in 3 The Future of the International Legal Order 122, 148 (Black, C. & Falk, R. eds. 1971)Google Scholar.

The convocation of the OAS Meeting of Consultation to consider the Malvinas conflict, however, was unprecedented as a case of “concurrent” jurisdiction for two main reasons: first, the OAS unilaterally decided to assume jurisdiction after the Security Council had taken action and remained seized of the question; and second, one of the parties to the conflict was a major Western power that was not a member of the OAS, a fact that a priori creates a serious obstacle to the effective use of a regional forum.

72 See P.-M. Dupuy, supra note 5, at 517–18. Margaret Doxey asserts that the measures against Argentina were “adopted on a voluntary basis by Western Governments . . . in contrast to the major case of UN Sanctions Against Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) which were mandatory for all UN members in terms of a series of Security Council resolutions.” See Doxey, supra note 5, at 80 (emphasis added). There is no basis in international law to substantiate the notion that states not involved in, or affected by, a situation under consideration by the Security Council may apply coercive measures against another state on a “voluntary basis.”

73 West Papua is the name used by those in favor of self-determination. During the period of Dutch control, West Papua was generally known as West New Guinea or Dutch (West) New Guinea. At the time of the dispute with the Netherlands, it was known in Indonesia as West Irian. In 1969, it was renamed “the Province of Irian Jaya.” See West Papua: The Obliteration of a People 4 (Tapol, London 1983). See also The Indonesia Papua New Guinea Border: Irianese Nationalism and Small State Diplomacy (R. J. May ed., Australian National University, Canberra, 1979); J. Southwood & P. Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror (London 1983); M. Donelan & M. Grieve, International Disputes. Case histories 1945–1970, at 83–87 (1973).

With reference to East Timor, see Kohen, A. & Taylor, J., An Act of Genocide: Indonesia’s Invasion of East Timor (Tapol 1979)Google Scholar; Border and Territorial Disputes 294–301 (Day, A. J. ed. 1982)Google Scholar.

74 Franck, , Dulce et Decorum Est: The Strategic Role of Legal Principles in the Falklands War, Editorial Comment, 77 AJIL 109, 121 (1983)Google Scholar.

75 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.