¹ U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Statement from Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on Airstrike in Somalia (Mar. 7, 2016), at http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/687305/statement-from-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-on-airstrike-in-somalia [hereinafter DOD Raso Statement]; Gibbons-Neff, Thomas, U.S. Airstrike Kills More Than 150 at Somalia Terrorist Camp, Military Says, Wash. Post (Mar. 7, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/07/u-s-drone-strike-kills-more-than-150-in-somalia/ Google Scholar.

² Ibrahim, Mohammed, Somalia Raid Aided by U.S. Kills Fighters From Shabab, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 2016, at A4Google Scholar.

³ DOD Raso Statement, supra note 1.

⁴ Gibbons-Neff, supra note 1.

⁵ Pentagon officials declined to disclose how they knew the targeted fighters were “training for a large-scale attack” against U.S. and AMISOM forces. It has been reported that the military was acting on intelligence gathered from local sources and American spy planes. Cooper, Helene, U.S. Strikes in Somalia Kill 150 Shabab Fighters, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 2016, at A1Google Scholar.

⁶ Id.; see also Gibbons-Neff, supra note 1.

⁷ Ibrahim, supra note 2. A Pentagon spokesman would not disclose whether the Americans remained on the helicopters during the entire operation, but he said the Americans did not “go all the way to the objective” and that the mission was a “Somali operation.” Id.

⁸ See Question to the Pentagon from Charlie Savage (Mar. 8, 2016), Answer from Lt. Col. Joe Sowers (Mar. 10, 2016) (2016), available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2757459/Shabab-DOD-Statement.pdf [hereinafter DOD Question-Answer] (referencing Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Global Deployment of United States Combat-Equipped Armed Forces, 2015 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 883 (Dec. 11, 2015)) (“The President has similarly reported that U.S. forces took a series of strikes to support U.S. and AMISOM forces in Somalia in June, July, and November 2015.”).

⁹ E.g., Raghavan, Sudarsan & Whitlock, Craig, Despite U.S. Airstrikes, a Somali Militia Is Rising Again, Wash. Post (Mar. 8, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/despite-us-airstrikes-a-somali-militia-is-rising-again/2016/03/08/2fdeeeb8-e537-11e5-a9ce-681055c7a05f_story.html Google Scholar.

¹⁰ DOD Question-Answer, supra note 8; see also Raghavan & Whitlock, supra note 9 (quoting Army Gen. David M. Rodriguez, head of U.S. military’s Africa Command) (“The camps [like Raso] are transitory” and pose a concern “because the last three times they did something similar to this, they had an ability to conduct a devastating attack on the [African Union] forces.”).

¹¹ DOD Raso Statement, supra note 1.

¹² The White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Mar. 7, 2016), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/07/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-372016 [hereinafter Earnest Statement].

¹³ See supra, note 9.

¹⁴ Raghavan & Whitlock, supra note 9.

¹⁵ Ibrahim, supra note 2.

¹⁶ See Chesney, Robert, What Is the Domestic Law Basis for U.S. Airstrikes Supporting AMISOM in Somalia?, Lawfare (July 31, 2015), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-domestic-law-basis-us-airstrikes-supporting-amisom-somalia Google Scholar; Deeks, Ashley, Defending Broadened U.S. Strikes Against al Shabaab?, Lawfare (July 29, 2015), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/defending-broadened-us-strikes-against-al-shabaab Google Scholar; see also Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Global Deployment of United States Combat-Equipped Armed Forces, 2015 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 428 (June 11, 2015) (emphasis added) (describing the purpose of U.S. attacks in Somalia as “to counter the terrorist threat posed by al-Qa’ida and associated elements of al-Shabaab” and identifying the victims of counter-terrorism strikes as “al-Shabaab operatives who are part of al-Qa’ida ”); Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 199 (2015) (explaining that targets of U.S. strikes in Syria were tied to Al Qaeda).

¹⁷ DOD Question-Answer, supra note 8.

¹⁸ Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).

¹⁹ Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 16, at 210.

²⁰ Slightly confusing the matter, the U.S. government describes al-Shabaab as “affiliated with” or as “an affiliate of” Al Qaeda. See DOD Raso Statement, supra note 1. Furthermore, there are reports of the administration internally debating the status of al-Shabaab due in part to the varying ambitions of its membership: while the group shares common ideologies with Al Qaeda, many of its members are solely focused on controlling Somalia and so do not qualify as”associated forces.” See Savage, Charlie, at White House, Weighing Limits of Terror Fight, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 2011, at A1Google Scholar.

²¹ Chesney & Deeks, supra note 16.

²² DOD Question-Answer, supra note 8.

²³ Id.

²⁴ Id.

²⁵ Savage, Charlie, Is the U.S. Now at War with the Shabab? Not Exactly, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 2016, at A11Google Scholar.

²⁶ Gibbons-Neff, supra note 1.

²⁷ Savage, supra note 25.

²⁸ At least one scholar has noted the seemingly paradoxical meaning of a threat that is both “continuing” and “imminent.” Chesney, Robert, Airstrikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities: Attacks in Somalia and Questions About the Current Shape of the Policy, Lawfare (Mar. 7, 2016), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/airstrikes-outside-are as-active-hostilities-attacks-somalia-and-questions-about-current-shape-policy Google Scholar. Nevertheless, the U.S. government has understood “imminence” broadly such that “[t]he requirement that a targeted person pose an imminent threat ‘does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future.’” Crook, John R., Contemporary Practice of the United States, 107 AJIL 462, 466 (2013)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Savage, supra note 25 (quoting Robert S. Taylor, acting Pentagon general counsel).

³⁰ Id.

³¹ Id.

³² See Gaston, Erica, Do the Strikes on al Shabaab Stretch the AUMF or The Unit Self-defense Doctrine?, Lawfare (Mar. 18, 2016), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/do-strikes-al-shabaab-stretch-aumf-or-unit-self-defense-doctrine Google Scholar.

³³ Id. (quoting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instr. 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement(SROE)/Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) for U.S. Forces (13 June 2005)).

³⁴ Id.

³⁵ See, e.g., Crook, supra note 28, at 464 (quoting a 2013 Department of Justice White Paper) (“Targeting a member of an enemy force who poses an imminent threat of violent attack to the United States is not unlawful. It is a lawful act of national self defense.”); Crook, John R., Contemporary Practice of the United States, 106 AJIL 670, 671 (2012)Google Scholar (“[A]s a matter of domestic law, the Constitution empowers the president to protect the nation from any imminent threat of attack.”) (quoting John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Wilson Center: The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy (April 30, 2012), at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy#).

³⁶ See, e.g., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 1 (Apr. 1, 2011) (“[W]e believe that... the President had constitutional authority, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant to his foreign affairs powers, to direct such limited military operations abroad, even without prior specific congressional approval.”).

³⁷ Earnest Statement, supra note 12.

³⁸ DOD Raso Statement, supra note 1.

³⁹ UN Charter, Arts. 2(4), 51.

⁴⁰ See Brian Egan, State Dept. Legal Adviser, Keynote Address at the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting:International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign (Apr. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Egan Speech], available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/255493.htm.

⁴¹ Id.

⁴² Id.

⁴³ DOD Raso Statement, supra note 1.

⁴⁴ Egan Speech, supra note 40.

⁴⁵ Id. (referencing the Caroline incident). At least one scholar has argued that imminence is best understood as an application of the necessity requirement (discussed infra ) rather than as a distinct requirement for the use of force in self-defense. Lederman, Marty, ASIL Speech by State Legal Adviser Egan on International Law and the Use of Force Against ISIL, Just Security (Apr. 4, 2016), at https://www.justsecurity.org/30377/asil-speech-state-legal-adviser-international-law-basis-for-limits-on-force-isil/ Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Id. (citing, among other things, factors first proposed by SirBethlehem, Daniel in his article, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AJIL 770, 775 (2012)Google Scholar).

⁴⁷ Raghavan & Whitlock, supra note 9.

⁴⁸ Id.

⁴⁹ Savage, supra note 25.

⁵⁰ Egan Speech, supra note 40.

⁵¹ UN Charter, Art. 51 (“Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council.”).

⁵² Egan Speech, supra note 40.

⁵³ Id.

⁵⁴ Id.

⁵⁵ Id. (noting that the UN Charter “does not prohibit an otherwise lawful use of force when undertaken with the consent of the State upon whose territory the force is to be used”). See also id. (“In Iraq, U.S. operations against ISIL are conducted with Iraqi consent and in furtherance of Iraq’s own armed conflict against the group. And in Syria, U.S. operations against ISIL are conducted in individual self-defense and the collective self-defense ofIraq and other States.”).

⁵⁶ See Keopka, Leslie, U.S., AMISOM Hone Operational Military Decision Making Processes, U.S. Africa Com Mand (June 26, 2014), at http://www.africom.mil/NewsByCategory/article/23262/u-s-amisom-hone-operation al-military-decision-making-processes Google Scholar; The White House Press Release, Fact Sheet: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa (Aug. 6, 2014), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-us-support-peacekeeping-africa.

⁵⁷ AMISOM Background, AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia, at http://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/ (last visited July 13, 2016); Frequently Asked Questions, AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia, at http://amisom-au.org/frequently-asked-questions (last visited July 12, 2016) (stating that the principal aim of AMISOM is “to provide support for the Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to stabilize the country and foster political dialogue and reconciliation”).

⁵⁸ AMISOM Mandate, AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia, at http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/ (last visited July 13, 2016).

⁵⁹ See, e.g., AMISOM Press Release, AU Chairperson Condemns Attempted Attack Against AMISOM in Somalia (June 9, 2016), at http://amisom-au.org/2016/06/au-chairperson-condemns-attempted-attack-against-amisom-in-somalia/ (describing defensive operations carried out jointly by AMISOM and the Somali National Army); AMISOM Press Release, Remarks by Ambassador Francisco Caetano Jose Madeira, African Union Special Representative for Somalia and Head of AMISOM at the Security Council Briefing on Somalia (Jan. 28, 2016), at http://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/REMARKS-BY-AMBASSADOR-FRANCISCO-CAETANO-JOSE%CC%81-MADEIRA.pdf (describing “joint operations” between the Somali National Army and AMISOM troops, which “facilitate continued offensive operations”).

⁶⁰ DOD Question-Answer, supra note 8.

⁶¹ DOD Raso Statement, supra note 1.

⁶² Egan Speech, supra note 40.

⁶³ Id. The Obama administration has previously discussed these jus in bello principles with respect to targeted strikes. See Crook, John R., Contemporary Practice of the United States, 106 AJIL 670, 671 (2012)Google Scholar (quoting a speech by John O. Brennan, then Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, who defines the principles of necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity, and asserts that U.S. targeted strikes conform to all of them).

⁶⁴ Id.; see also Crook, John R., Contemporary Practice of the United States, 107 AJIL 674 (2013)Google Scholar (announcing the codification of the PPG as “a framework that governs [U.S.] use of force against terrorists—insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight and accountability”). Scholars have debated whether Somalia qualifiesas an “area of active hostilities.” See, e.g., Robert Chesney, supra note 28 (observing that it is unclear whether Somalia is an area of active hostilities and questioning whether the Raso Camp strikes were consistent with the PPG). Although Egan did not discuss Somalia specifically, he said that “[f]or the purposes of the PPG, the determination that a region is an ‘area of active hostilities’ takes into account, among other things, the scope and intensity of the fighting.” Egan Speech, supra note 40.

⁶⁵ Egan Speech, supra note 40. Egan focused on one of the PPG standards—namely, the “threshold of ‘near certainty’ that non-combatants will not be injured or killed.” He described this standard as “higher than that imposed by the law of armed conflict, which contemplates that civilians will inevitably and tragically be killed in armed conflict.” Id.

⁶⁶ Id.