¹ See the report on the recent plebiscite, conducted in the Marianas and resulting in a more than three to one vote in favor of a commonwealth-style association with the United States on the Puerto Rican model. Washington Post, June 18, 1975; and cf. the critical editorial, id. June 21, 1975.

² See, e.g., Wilson’s addresses of September 6, 1919 at Des Moines and September 18, 1919 at San Francisco, in 2 Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), War and Peace: Presidential Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers (1917–1924) 17–18, 259–60 (1927). Hereinafter cited as Baker and Dodd, War and Peace.

³ Arnold J. Toynbee, Self-Determination, The Quarterly Rev. (London), No. 484, at 318 (1925). The “language” from which it was borrowed was German, and the term used was “selbstbestimmungsrecht.”

⁴ Wentworth B. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, “Self-Determination in International Law: Towards a Definition of the Principle” (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1970), at 41–42.

⁵ The Bolshevik slogan was: “Peace without annexations and indemnities on the basis of the self-determination of peoples.” The first official statement of war aims to employ the term “self-determination” was made by the Russian Provisional Government on April 9, 1917, apparently as a result of Soviet pressures. Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy 1917–1918, at 75 (1959).

⁶ See, generally, id. 341–44, 352–53.

⁷ See, e.g., 1 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 65, 66, 98. For Wilson’s thought on self-government, see generally, Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, passim, especially 651–52 (1937).

⁸ In that address he emphasized America’s belief in “the right of every people to choose their own allegiance and be free of masters altogether.” 1 Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The New Democracy: Presidential Messages, Addresses, and Other Papers, 389 (1926). Hereinafter cited as Baker and Dodd, New Democracy.

⁹ 2 id. 187.

¹⁰ Id. 411; see also 414.

¹¹ The terms “realist” and “radical” are here used in the sense in which they are employed in Jerald A. Combs (ed.), Nationalist, Realist, and Radical: Three Views of American Diplomacy (1972). On the “realist” approach to international relations, see also Robert L. Rothstein, On the Costs of Realism, 87 Pol. Science Q. 347 (1972).

¹² Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, at 70 (1933).

¹³ See the arguments of Wilson against creating an autonomous Saar territory, cited in Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference 185 (1961).

¹⁴ It was, according to Stephen Bonsal, one of the Fourteen Points “nearest to President Wilson’s heart.” Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles 94 (1946).

¹⁵ See Tillman, supra note 13, at 219–28.

¹⁶ Salvador de Madariaga, The World’s Design 7 (1938); cited in Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares 321 (3rd rev. ed., 1964).

¹⁷ See, generally, John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace 36–50 (1919).

¹⁸ Id. 40. Freud and Bullitt attribute what they term his “femininity of character” to his too great “passivity to his father.” Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullitt, Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study passim (1966).

¹⁹ See the views cited in Bonsal, supra note 14, at 104.

²⁰ Charles Seymour, Woodrow Wilson and Self-Determination in the Tyrol, 38 Virginia Q. Rev. 582 (1962).

²¹ Charles Seymour, The Paris Education of Woodrow Wilson, 32 id. 583 (1956).

²² See Wilson’s speech of February 11, 1918, 1 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 182.

²³ Keynes, supra note 17, at 39; and see Seymour, supra note 21, at 584–85.

²⁴ Id. 584. For a glorification by Wilson of American improvisation, see 1 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 82–88.

²⁵ See Seymour, supra note 21, at 584. As an illustration of Wilson’s belief that he was the spokesman for the “silent mass of mankind everywhere,” see 2 Baker and Dodd, New Democracy, supra note 8, at 413.

²⁶ Seymour, supra note 21, at 584; and see Daniel P. Moynihan, Was Woodrow Wilson Right? 57 Commentary 30 (1974).

²⁷ See Seymour, supra note 20, at 568; and Louis L. Gerson, Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland 1914–1920: A Study in the Influence on American Policy of Minority Groups of Foreign Origin Ch. 6 (1953).

²⁸ See Gerson, supra note 27, passim. Winston Churchill, commenting on Wilson’s unequal handling of the Fiume and Polish questions, asserted: “Cynics pointed to the fact that Italian emigrants to America usually return without acquiring voting rights, while the Polish vote was a formidable factor in the domestic politics of the United States.” 4 The World Crisis, 1918–1928, The Aftermath 219 (1929). But, as Tillman notes, Churchill was misinformed about the habits of Italian-Americans. Supra note 13, at 208. Wilson’s failure to woo the Irish-American vote could be attributed to his recognition that that vote was lost to him in any event. See, e.g., H. C. F. Bell, Woodrow Wilson and the People 202 (1945).

²⁹ Wilson’s own attempts to distinguish between Italy’s northern and eastern frontiers offer some basis for this accusation. See, e.g., 1 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement 275 (1922).

³⁰ Despite noninclusion of Wilson’s draft provision on self-determination in the Covenant, Wilson retained his faith in the League as the rectifier of old wrongs and legitimizer of new demands relating to self-determination. See the discussion in section V, infra.

³¹ See Tillman, supra note 13, at 340–41.

³² In fact, the Irish question placed Wilson in a peculiar dilemma with respect to actualization of his League of Nations idea—a dilemma which he probably did not recognize until too late. In his anxiety to ensure British support for the League by treading gently on the Irish question he alienated the Irish-American support which, as it turned out, was required for U.S. adoption of the Covenant.

³³ Nicolson, supra note 12, at 204.

³⁴ Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After 6 (1941).

³⁵ Hajo Holborn, The Political Collapse of Europe 103 (1951).

³⁶ William G. Carleton, A New Look at Woodrow Wilson, 38 Virginia Q. Rev. 559 (1962).

³⁷ Tillman, supra note 13, at 176–93.

³⁸ See, in general, Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War (1933). On the reasons for Wilson’s initial reluctance to accede to German and British demands for a plebiscite in Upper Silesia, see infra note 108 and accompanying text.

³⁹ See, in general, Solomon Slonim, South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute Ch. 1 (1973). On the question whether self-determination was the goal for all colonies, see section V, infra.

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Tillman, supra note 13, at 83–84. But cf. id. 212, and Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination 61 (1970), where it is noted that expert commissions were resorted to mainly in respect of the claims of small powers regarding which the United States and Britain were truly impartial. Wilson apparently placed greater reliance on experts than either did Lloyd George or Clemenceau. See Edward Mandell House and Charles Seymour (eds.), What Really Happened at Paris 456–57 (1921).

⁴¹ E.g., with respect to Western Thrace, Wilson based himself on the ethnographic and economic considerations adduced by his experts and upheld the Bulgarian against the Greek claims; the latter had been favored by the British. Tillman, supra note 13, at 387.

⁴² Id. 202, 366–67.

⁴³ See Seymour, supra note 21, at 591–92.

⁴⁴ See, e.g., the remarks of Brandeis, cited in Tillman, supra note 13, at 226; and the explanations of William Linn Westennann (Chief of the Near Eastern Division of the American Peace Commission), in House and Seymour, supra note 40, at 177 and 466.

⁴⁵ See, e.g., with respect to the frontiers of Italy and the Balkans, 3 Baker, supra note 29, at 35 and 37; and House and Seymour, supra note 40, at 460.

⁴⁶ Address of September 4, 1919 at Indianapolis, 1 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 618.

⁴⁷ Tillman, supra note 13, at 315, 333–35. “Unequal” treaties and treaty obligations exacted under duress were not assumed to be invalid under the international law of the time.

⁴⁸ See the official American reply to the Austrian Government of October 18, 1918, in 1 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 281–82.

⁴⁹ Address of September 4, 1919 at Indianapolis, id. 616–17.

⁵⁰ However, cf. the statement of Lloyd George (who has not generally been accused of similar naivete) to the House of Commons, in which he affirmed his faith that the League would “remedy… repair, and… redress” the imperfections of the peace settlement 1 The Truth About the Peace Treaties 734 (1938).

⁵¹ Robert Lansing, Self-Determination. Saturday Evening Post, April 9, 1921, at 6–7, 101–02.

⁵² Cited id. 7.

⁵³ See, in general, the criticism of Cobban in this regard, supra note 40, Ch. 4.

⁵⁴ On the elitist bias of the “realists” (especially of realist-practitioners) and their “underlying contempt for the manner in which democracies make foreign policy,” see Rothstein, supra note 11, at 353–54.

⁵⁵ See, in general, the Report of the American Inquiry to Wilson regarding “War Aims and Peace Terms,” in 3 Baker, supra note 29, at 23–41.

⁵⁶ In his speeches Wilson frequently cited practical considerations in this connection. See, e.g., 1 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 51, 542, 597–98; 2 id. 91, 278.

⁵⁷ See Tillman, supra note 13, at 32, 404.

⁵⁸ See Slonim, supra note 39, at 18–19; see also Tillman, supra note 13, at 98–100; and Russell H. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East: The Diplomacy of the Shantung Question 120–39 (1952).

⁵⁹ The argument was pressed by House. See Bonsal, supra note 14, at 127, 129–30.

⁶⁰ See, generally, the views excerpted in Combs, supra note 11. On Wilson’s insistence that the breakup of empires be orderly and his simultaneous opposition to the forces of reaction and Bolshevist revolution, see N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s Response to War and Revolution (1968).

⁶¹ For a contrast between Wilson and Lenin in this respect, see id. 248–49.

⁶² See, generally, Levin’s incisive treatment of the Wilsonian approach to Bolshevism in relation to Eastern Europe, id. Ch. 6.

⁶³ Address of September 10, 1919 at Bismarck, North Dakota, 2 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 91.

⁶⁴ See, e.g., Levin, supra note 60, at 192; and see memorandum by General Bliss in 3 Baker, supra note 29, at 449–57.

⁶⁵ See Levin, supra note 60, at 184; and cf. Tillman, supra note 13, at 151.

⁶⁶ Levin, supra note 60, at 190–91.

⁶⁷ Cited in Notter, supra note 7, at 275.

⁶⁸ F. S. C. Northrup, The Meeting of East and West: An Inquiry Concerning World Understanding 43 (1960). Mexico had invoked Wilson’s own assertion that human rights were above property rights.

⁶⁹ Address of January 6, 1919 at Turin Philharmonic Club, 1 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 383.

⁷⁰ See, e.g., 2 id. 20, 55–56, 62–63, 92–93, 127, 146, 176, 219–20, 252.

⁷¹ See, e.g., id. 15–16, 101, 107–08. The dangers of Bolshevism were apparently regarded with even greater horror by Wilson’s advisers. See, e.g., the memorandum by General Bliss, in 3 Baker, supra note 29, at 449–57; and the views cited by Levin, supra note 60, at 188.

⁷² 2 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 55; see also id. 20, 63, 93, 127, 146, 176, 219.

⁷³ See, e.g., id. 93; and see Notter, supra note 7, at 194, 229, 231, 260, 267, 271, 291, and passim.

⁷⁴ Address of September 17, 1919 at San Francisco, 2 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 241.

⁷⁵ On Wilson’s linking of recognition in Mexico and Latin America to constitutionalism and self-government, see 1 Green H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law 180–85, 239–42, 249–52, 257–63 (1940). (And cf. id., 298–300, for the cognate considerations which underlay Wilson’s Russian nonrecognition policy.) Although the United States was not a signatory to the Central American Treaty of 1907 embodying the Tobar Doctrine (with its emphasis on constitutionalism as a basis for recognition), Wilson lent it support in practice. In certain instances, at least, Wilson’s policies may well have run counter to the interests of American business, for whom the rule of dictators was not necessarily disadvantageous. I am grateful to Professor Oliver J. Lissitzyn for drawing my attention to this point.

⁷⁶ See, e.g., Tillman, supra note 13, at 151; and cf. Wilson’s policy toward the Bela Kun regime in Hungary, discussed in Levin, supra note 60, at 191–97.

⁷⁷ Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government 55–56 (1956).

⁷⁸ J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective 323 (1968).

⁷⁹ See supra note 7.

⁸⁰ More and more the two connotations tended to merge in his thought. See, generally, Notter, supra note 7, passim, and especially 68–69, 102, 241, 291, and 651–52.

⁸¹ Id. 291; see also 306 and 651–52.

⁸² See id. 79, 82, 106, 111–12, 119, 143, and passim.

⁸³ The line between “internal” and “external” self-determination is a thin one for, clearly, the absence of “internal” self-determination may be deemed tantamount to “alien” rule.

⁸⁴ On the theoretical distinction between the two concepts, see Nathan Feinberg, The Arab-Israel Conflict in International Law 45, n. 96 (1970).

⁸⁵ Notter, supra note 7, at 104.

⁸⁶ Id. 116; see also 91 and 305.

⁸⁷ Address of January 22, 1917 to U.S. Senate, 2 Baker and Dodd, New Democracy, supra note 8, at 411; see also id. 414, as well as the address of November 4, 1915, 1 id. 389.

⁸⁸ 2 id. 411.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ See Point X concerning the Austro-Hungarian empire and Point XII regarding the Ottoman empire. 1 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 160–61.

⁹¹ Address of December 4, 1917, id. 132. (emphasis supplied.) But cf. Wilson’s views in the initial stage of the war that “Austria-Hungary will go to pieces altogether—ought to go to pieces for the welfare of Europe.” New York Times report of December 14, 1914 interview with Wilson, cited in Notter, supra note 7, at 373.

⁹² 3 Baker, supra note 29, at 28. (emphasis in original.)

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Holborn, supra note 35, at 95.

⁹⁵ 1 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 11–12.

⁹⁶ See, e.g., Notter, supra note 7, at 379, 387, and 513.

⁹⁷ 2 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 272.

⁹⁸ Id. 84; see also id. 71.

⁹⁹ 2 Baker and Dodd, New Democracy, supra note 8, at 187; see also id. 410–11.

¹⁰⁰ See generally, Cobban, supra note 40, at 49–51.

¹⁰¹ See, e.g., 1 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 3, 92, 95, 162, and 181.

¹⁰² See Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples 386–87 (1960).

¹⁰³ See, e.g., Emerson’s observation that “the Declaration of Independence and other formulations of the American case were, in good eighteenth-century fashion, couched in terms of the natural rights of individuals (and of Englishmen) and not in the next century’s terms of the rights of nations.” Id. 190.

¹⁰⁴ The point has often been made. For a particularly incisive discussion of the issue, see id. Chs. 5–9.

¹⁰⁵ See, generally, Ofuatey-Kodjoe, supra note 4, passim.

¹⁰⁶ Lansing, supra note 51, at 7.

¹⁰⁷ Bonsai, supra note 14, at 188.

¹⁰⁸ See 3 Baker, supra note 29, at 481 ff.; Birdsall, supra note 34, at 189–94; and Gerson, supra note 27, at 128–37.

¹⁰⁹ Tillman, supra note 13, at 193.

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., the complicated scheme adopted for the plebiscite in Schleswig, and the issue of division of the Klagenfurt basin for the purpose of the plebiscite, id. 195–96, 216. It is interesting to note, too, Wilson’s refusal to accede to a French plan for a “progressive plebiscite” in the Saar which would have permitted cession to France of individual communes. Harold S. Johnson, Self-Determination Within the Community of Nations 102 (1967).

¹¹¹ Toynbee, supra note 3, at 319.

¹¹² See, e.g., the following statement by Wilson: “When strategic claims were urged, it was matter of common counsel that such considerations were not in our thought.” 1 Baker and Dodo, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 596.

¹¹⁸ 2 David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant 12–13 (1928).

¹¹⁴ Id. 99.

¹¹⁵ Id. 71.

¹¹⁶ Id. 71–72. He also noted that the United States had not acted on that principle in rejecting the suggestions for U.S.-Mexican boundary rectifications contained in the Zimmerman note.

¹¹⁷ 1 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 617; see also 2 id. 9, 244.

¹¹⁸ 1 Id. 632.

¹¹⁹ The more recent Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations (G.A. Resolution 2625 (XXV) of October 24, 1970) continues this pattern.

¹²⁰ See Michla Pomerance, Methods of Self-Determination and the Argument of “Primitiveness,” 12 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 38–66 (1974).

¹²¹ See, generally, Julius Stone, International Guarantees of Minority Rights (1932) and Inis L. Claude, Jr., National Minorities: An International Problem (1955).

¹²² See, e.g., Manley O. Hudson’s comments in House and Seymour, supra note 40, at 213; and see Wilson’s remarks in 1 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 306.

¹²³ See the discussion of “negative” and “positive” minority protection in Claude, National Minorities, Part I, supra note 121. See also House and Seymour, supra note 40, at 217, 474.

¹²⁴ See 1 Miller, supra note 113, at 267–69; 2 id. 91, 105, 141, 145, 154, 237, 273–74, 282, 283, 286–87, 307, 315, and 323–25; and 3 Baker, supra note 29, at 110, 128–29, and 150. Japan’s introduction of a racial equality amendment led to the ultimate defeat of the article. 1 Miller, supra at 269; Fifield, supra note 58, at 158–69.

¹²⁵ Claude, National Minorities, supra note 121, at 14; Tillman, supra note 13, at 217–19.

¹²⁶ See, e.g., his address of September 17, 1919 at San Francisco, 2 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, supra note 2, at 230; and see Notter, supra note 7, at 299; Bell, supra note 28, at 100–01, 202; and Claude, National Minorities, supra note 121, at 81.

¹²⁷ Moynihan, supra note 26, at 30.

¹²⁸ The attitude of Manley O. Hudson, Legal Adviser to the American Peace Commission, was similar. See House and Seymour, supra note 40, at 473–74.

¹²⁹ See, e.g., 3 Baker, supra note 29, at 109, 126–28, and generally, Slonim, supra note 39, Ch. 1.

¹³⁰ Cf. Levin’s discussion of the contrast between the views of Wilson and Lenin in this regard, supra note 60, at 248–49.

¹³¹ See section IV on the “radical” perspective, supra. Nevertheless, Wilson’s opposition to the Banking Consortium in China was premised, at least in part, on the threat which he deemed it to pose to Chinese political and economic independence. See Notter, supra note 7, at 233; and Levin, supra note 60, at 18–19.

¹³² cited in Clyde Eagleton, Self-Determination in the United Nations, 47 AJIL 91 (1953).