1 U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 26/SB. 2, Sept. 12, 1958, p. 8.

2 W. W. Buckland, A Text Book of Roman Law 614, note 13.

3 Digest, 4.8.1.

4 Ibid. 4.8.2.

5 Gaius, Elements of Roman Law 496. In such a case a formula arbitraria is delivered to the iudex commanding the defendant to restore or produce the object, or face condemnation in its simple value. This demand by the defendant must be timely (i.e., before he leaves the court of the praetor) and “ a subsequent demand will not be granted.” (P. 497.)

6 Digest, 4.8.45: “ in an agreement to arbitrate, it is stated that the award shall be made by a certain person, this cannot be extended to others.“

7 Digest, 4.8.11.1, 4.8.11.4; Buckland, op. cit. 531: “ I f parties agreed to accept an arbiter in a dispute, and he accepted the responsibility, however informally, and the parties had undertaken to obey the decision, the Praetor would compel the arbitrator to act, apart from certain grounds of excuse.''

8 Lorenzen, Ernest G., ‘ ‘ Commercial Arbitration—International and Interstate Aspects, “ 43 Yale Law Journal 721 (1933).Google Scholar

9 Heinrich Kronstein, ‘ ‘ Business Arbitration—Instrument of Private Government,'’ 54 ibid. 52 (1944).

10 Lorenzen, loc. cit. 716. For Lord Coke's decision, see 6 K.B. 595, 597 (8 Co. 80a, 81b).

11 The damages for breach were nominal upon the theory that there is no actual damage in being compelled to face the King's justice. Ibid. 717.

12 Kill v. Hollister (1746), 24 K.B. 532 (1 Wills K.B. 129).

13 Lorenzen, loc. cit. 717.

14 35&52 Viet c. 49 (1889).

15 For Pennsylvania's limitations upon the validity of agreements to arbitrate future disputes, see Lorenzen, loc. cit. 719.

16 See “Commercial Arbitration and the Conflict of Laws,” Note, 56 Columbia Law Review 904, at note 11 (1956). At p. 913, the commentator concludes that “ It is one of the paradoxes of arbitration law that the forum will use the law of rendition to determine the validity of the award, but will use its own law to judge the enforceability of an executory agreement to arbitrate.“

17 Rosenthal, Morris S., “Arbitration in the Settlement of International Trade Disputes,“11 Law and Contemporary Practice 810 (1945-1946).Google Scholar

18 This term, in contrast to its usual conflict-of-laws meaning, is herein used to designate awards made in jurisdictions other than those contained in the continental United States and its territories.

19 Nussbaum, Arthur, ‘ ‘ Treaties on Commercial Arbitration—A Test of International Private Law Legislation,” 56 Harvard Law Review 221 (1942-1943).Google Scholar

20 Hereinafter referred to as “Protocol.“

21 27 League of Nations Treaty Series 158 (No. 678); 20 A.J.I.L. Supp. 194 (1926); 2 Hudson, International Legislation 1062 ff. (Wash., D. C, 1931).

22 Belgium, Brazil, British Empire, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Monaco, Panama, Rumania and Uruguay.

23 In chronological order: Spain, The Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Latvia, Salvador, Chile, The Netherlands three territories, Paraguay, Austria, Siam, Poland, New Zealand, and Djjfiig.

24 The signatories were given the option to limit this duty of recognition to agreements that are considered “commercial” under their municipal legislation. This option has been maintained in the ECOSOO Convention, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 26/81 Rev. 1, Art. I (3).

25 Art. 3. Loc. cit. note 21 above.

26 Art. 4, ibid.: ‘’ The tribunals of the contracting Parties, on being seized of a dispute regarding a contract made between persons to whom Article I applies and including an Arbitration Agreement … which is valid … and capable of being carried into effect, shall refer the Parties … to the decision of the Arbitrators.” (Emphasis added.)

27 92 League of Nations Treaty Series 302 (No. 2096); 27 A.J.I.L. Supp. 1 (1933); 3 Hudson, op. cit. 2153 ff. Hereinafter referred to as “Geneva Convention.“

28 U.N. Doc. E/2822, Annex I I , p . 4.

29 U.N. Doc. E/2704, par. 13. The claim is also made that 30 states ratified the Protocol in comparison to 29 listed in notes 22 and 23 above. According to Hudson, note 27 above, the following states ratified: Austria, Albania, Belgium, Brazil, Great Britain, New Zealand, India, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Danzig, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand and Israel (1951). Eleven have signed but not yet ratified: Bolivia, Chile, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Salvador and Uruguay.

30 Lorenzen, Ernest G., ‘ ‘ Commercial Arbitration—Enforcement of Foreign Awards,'’ 45 Yale Law Journal 64 (1935).Google Scholar

31 Art. 1.

32 Art. 2 established additional conditions of validity: (a) the award must not have been annulled in the forum of award; (b) the parties must have received due notice and representation; (e) the arbitration must have dealt with differences contemplated by the parties; (d) and it must have settled all such differences. Should these conditions not be met, conditional acceptance or postponement of either recognition or enforcement was permitted.

33 Sanders, Pieter, International Commercial Arbitration 31 (Paris, 1956).Google Scholar

34 Nussbaum, loc. cit. 222-223; Domke, Martin, “On the Enforcement Abroad of American Arbitration Awards,” 17 Law and Contemporary Problems 547 (1952).Google Scholar

35 Lorenzen, loc. cit. 64 (1935) : “The [Geneva] convention extends only to submission agreements falling within the Protocol, which applies to agreements between parties of different contracting states, but not to submission agreements between nationals of the same contracting state for arbitration in some other contracting state.“

36 Note 24 above.

37 Sanders, op. cit. 31: “enforcement [under the Geneva Convention] can only take place after the intervention of a judicial authority who will grant leave for enforcement only after examining the award. This examination … is largely similar to [ … that] of national arbitral awards,” and enforcement of a foreign award may be refused for the same reasons for which a national award may be set aside.

38 Nussbaum, loc. cit. 229-230, and cases cited therein,

39 Rosenthal, loc. cit. 821-822.

40 Lorenzen, loc. cit. 67. With a touch of prophecy, the Yale Law School professor continued: ‘ ‘ The best means … at present would appear to be bilateral treaties between countries having the same procedural background … as between countries having widely different legal institutions or modes of procedure, useful results would seem to be obtainable only if the treaty include also rules for arbitral procedure.” (Emphasis added.)

41 Nussbaum, loc. cit. 244.

42 International Chamber of Commerce, ‘ ‘ Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards,” Report and Preliminary Draft Convention, p. 6, circulated by the U.N. Secretary General as Doc. E/C. 2/373 (brochure 174); see also Doc. E/C. 2/373/Add. 1, pp. 2, 3.

43 U.N. Doc. E/C. 2/373, p. 7. The Committee realized that ‘ ‘ Legal circles have until recently shown a marked opposition to recognizing autonomy of the will as a valid source of private international law which, being ideally the science of conflict of laws, presupposes that all legal relationships are subject to some national law.” Nevertheless, it understood clearly, as did Professor Lorenzen, that ‘ ‘ it would be hard to imagine the sense of frontier and of sovereignty disappearing … without the simultaneous establishment of international forms of procedure along similar lines.” See also U.N. Doc. E/C. 2/373, Add. 1, pp. 2, 3.

44 This would be realized by the deletion of the last two paragraphs of Art. 2 and all of Art. 3 of the Geneva Convention. Doc. E/C. 2/373 Add. 1, p. 3.

45 .ECOSOC Res. 520 (XVII), April 6, 1954. The Member States were Australia, Belgium, Ecuador, Egypt, Great Britain, India, Sweden, and the TJ.S.S.B. The representatives of Great Britain and Pakistan in the Economic and Social Council suggested a six-month interval before the Committee met to enable governments to instruct their representatives. Economic and Social Council, 17th Sess., Official Records, 763rd Meeting, April 6, 1954, pars. 4, 5.

46 U.N. Doc. E/2704, pars. 4, 16.

47 U.N. Doc. E/AC 42/1.

48 Greece,” India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, The Philippines, Sweden, and Yugoslavia.

49 ECOSOC Res. 570 (XIX), May 20, 1955.

50 U.N. Doc. E/2704, March 28, 1955, par. 14.

51 Ibid., par. 16. The vote was 7 to 0, with one abstention. The U.S.S.R.'s abstention resulted from its objection to certain articles of the draft. ECOSOC, 19th Sess. Official Records, 852nd Meeting, May 19, 1955, par. 17. For these objections, see ibid.,, pars. 18-21.

52 ECOSOC, 19th Sess., Official Records, 852nd Meeting, May 19, 1955, p a r . 7.

53 Ibid., pars. 6, 29, 30.

54 ECOSOC Bes. 570 (XIX), May 20, 1955. This was basically the action suggested by the Committee. Cf. Res. 570 (XIX) with Doc. E/2704, par. 70.

55 Chamber of Commerce of the United States, International Chamber of Commerce, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, International Law Association, Société Beige d'Etudes et d'Expansion, and the Society of Comparative Legislation.

56 They are compiled by the Secretary General in his report to the Council. U.N. Doc. E/2822, Corr. 1 and Add. 1-6.

57 Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Ceylon, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Japan, Norway, The Philippines, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands, U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. Ibid. Great Britain added the condition that it would attend only if a “substantial number” of other governments would also attend. Hid., Add. 4, par. 2. Czechoslovakia agreed to attend during the Council's discussion of the report, making a total of 22. ECOSOC, 21st Sess., Official Records, 932nd Meeting, May 3, 1956, par. 22. See also General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 3, par. 395.

58 China, Egypt, and Mexico.

59 Lebanon.

60 Canada, and also the Union of South Africa.

61 U.N. Doc. E/2840, par. 4.

62 Ibid.: “In their comments some governments [… feel] that the draft Convention still contains too many limitations and restrictions, while others have indicated that in their opinion the draft Convention goes too far in some respects.''

63 ECOSOC, 21st Sess., Official Records, 923rd Meeting, May 3, 1956, par. 16.

64 Canada and the United States.

65 ECOSOC Res. 604 (XXI), May 3, 1956, Part 1.

66 General Assembly Res. 366 (IV), Dec. 3, 1949.

67 ECOSOC Res. 604 (XXI), May 3, 1956, Part 2.

68 U.N. Doc. E / L 715/Add. 1, par. 2.

69 ECOSOC, 21st Sess., Official Records, 923rd Meeting, May 3, 1956, par. 34.

70 U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/9/Bev. 1, pars. 3, 4, 6, 8.

71 U.N. Doc. E/CONP. 26/2. Among the valuable suggestions contained in the document which were subsequently adopted by the Conference are: (a) that awards made in the forum of enforcement but not considered domestic and, therefore, subject to enforcement in that forum, should be encompassed within the Convention (pars.3-4) ; (b) that all foreign awards be recognized, with provision for reciprocity limiting such recognition o other signatories (par. 6 ) ; (c) that the procedure of enforcement should not be more onerous than that demanded for domestic awards (par.8) ; (d) that full re examination of an award by the forum of enforcement should not be permitted, particularly if it deals with the substance of the decision (par.9) ; (e) that the complete control over the regularity of an award be exercised by competent authorities of the forum of enforcement (par. 16); and (f) that, “ I f the award satisfies the conditions set forth in the Convention, a request for its enforcement would be granted without requiring a proof that no further opportunities for appeal or annulment proceedings against the award exist in the country where it was rendered.” (Par. 18.)

72 U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/4.

73 U.N. Doc. E/CONP. 26/5.

74 U.N. Doc. E/CONP. 26/8.

75 U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/9/Bev. 1. For text of convention and comments thereon, see note by Martin Domke, 53 A.J.I.L. 414 (1959).

76 U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/SR.25, p. 2.

77 See p. 809 above; Wilco v. Swan et al., 346 U.S. 247, 74 Sup. Ct. 182 (1953); also Mosk, Stanley, “The Lawyer and Commercial Arbitration: The Modern Law,” 39 A.B.A. Journal 194 (1953).Google Scholar

78 U.S. Code, Title 9, Sec. 2, July 30, 1947.

79 Page 809 above. Cf. Czyzak, J. J. and Sullivan, C. H., ‘ ‘ American Arbitration Law and the United Nations Convention,” 13 Arbitration Journal 202 (1958)Google Scholar. For the view that “only one third of the jurisdictions yet have relatively adequate modern arbitration laws,” see also Walker, Herman Jr., “Commercial Arbitration in United States Treaties,” 11 Arbitration Journal 83 (1956).Google Scholar

80 N.Y. Civil Practice Act, Sec. 1448 (N.Y.C.P.A., Sec. 1448).

81 Ibid., Sec. 1463; 9 U.S.C., Sec. 3, July 30, 1947.

82 N.Y.C.P.A., Sec. 1462; 9 U.S.C., Sec. 10, July 30, 1947.

83 N.Y.C.P.A., Sec. 1461; 9 U.S.C., Sec. 9, July 30, 1947.

84 N.Y.C.P.A., Sec. 1450; 9 U.S.C., Sec. 4, as amended, Sept. 3, 1954.

85 Domke, loc. cit. note 34, p. 546; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 165 Sup. Ct. 139, 40 L. Ed. 95 (1895). See also Herbert F. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sees. 7, 73, 207 (St. Paul, 1949); Elliott E. Cheatham et al., Conflict of Laws 342 ff. (Brooklyn, N.Y., 1957), and Sanders, op. cit. 211 (per Mr. Domke).

86 Domke, loc. cit. 546.

87 Ibid. 545.

88 Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.T. 348, 174 N.E. 706, 73 A.L.B. 1453 (1931).

89 Kronstein, loc. cit. 46-47. See also 56 Columbia Law Beview 911: ‘ ‘ The language of Gilbert v. Burnstine . . . expressed a strong policy of furthering the development of the arbitral procedure by all possible means… . “

90 Bosenthal, loc. cit. 823.

91 The court, per O'Brien, J., held (174 N.E. 709) “ t h a t there was an implied submission to the terms of the act itself, and to any rules or procedural machinery adopted by competent authority in aid of its provisions.“

92 Mittelman v. Spies, 129 N.T.S. 2d. 822 (1954); Farr v. Cia, 243 F.2d 342 (1957), rehearing denied April 23, 1957, which follows the reasoning of the Gilbert case, although it is not controlling on the court.

93 Domke, loc. cit. 547-548; Rosenthal, loc. eit. 823: ‘ ‘ The Gilbert case and subsequent eases which have followed it have probably done more within the United States for the enforcement of arbitration awards rendered by foreign arbitration tribunals than the Geneva Convention of 1927 did for the states which ratified it . “ See also Martin Domke, “Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards in the United States,” 13 Arbitration Journal 94-97 (1958).

94 U. S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62 Sup. Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942).

95 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 Sup. Ct. 382, 64 L.Ed. 641 (1920).

96 ECOSOC, 19th Sess., Official Eecords, 852nd Meeting, May 19, 1955, par. 12.

97 Ibid., par. 13.

98 Ibid., par. 12, italics added. Canada followed suit, holding that, being a federal state, “commercial arbitration was within the jurisdiction of the provincial courts.” Ibid., par. 48.

99 ECOSOC, 21st Sess., Official Records, 923rd Meeting, May 3, 1956, par. 30.

100 Czyzak and Sullivan, loc. cit. 203.

101 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824) : “ I t is obvious, that the government of the Union, in the exercise of its express powers … of regulating commerce with foreign nations … may use means that may also be employed by a State, in the exercise of its acknowledged powers… . “

102 National Labour Relations Board v. Jones&Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937): “ I t is a familiar principle that acts which directly burden or obstruct … foreign commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of congressional power … “ (per Mr. Chief Justice Hughes). See also his decision in Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labour Relations Board, 303 U.S. 453, 58 Sup. Ct. 657 (1938): “The power of Congress extends … to the protection of … interstate commerce from burdens, obstructions, and interruptions, whatever may be their source.“

103 Wright, Quincy, ‘ ‘ Arbitration as a Symbol of Internationalism,'’ International Trade Arbitration 10 (New York, 1958).Google Scholar

104 Czyzak and Sullivan, loc. tit. 202-203.

105 Domke, note in 53 A.J.I.L. 419 (1959).

106 U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/81/Bev. 1.

107 American Almond Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co. Inc., 144 P. 2d. 448, 451.

108 Domke, loc. cit. 546-547. The Western Hemisphere treaties are the Montevideo Treaty of International Procedural Law, Feb. 12, 1889; Code of International Private Law, Feb. 20, 1928; and the Treaty of International Procedural Law, March 19, 1940.

109 Domke, loc. cit. 540. When the author wrote in 1952, treaties had been concluded with China (1946), Ireland (1950), Colombia, Denmark, Greece, Israel, and Italy (all 1951). See S. A. Bayitch, “Treaty Law of Private Arbitration,” 10 Arbitration Journal 190, note 5 (1955).

110 ECOSOC, 19th Sess., Official Records, 852nd Meeting, May 19, 1955, par. 12. Also Walker, loc. cit. 68-69.

111 They are with China, Colombia, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Haiti, Ireland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, The Netherlands and Nicaragua. See also Bayitch, loc. cit. 190, note 5.

112 Bayitch, loc. cit. 139.

113 Cf . treaties with Haiti and Iran (1955), Korea and Nicaragua (1956), Japan (1953) and Germany (1954). Walker, loc. cit. 72, note 13; p. 73, notes 16 and 19.

114 Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts (T.I.A.S.), No. 1871, Art. VI, par. 4, Nov. 4, 1946. See also Bayitch, loc. cit. 188; Walker, loc. cit. 70-71.

115 T.I.A.S., No. 2155, Jan. 21, 1950.

116 See Walker, loc. cit. 71-72.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 T.I.A.S., No. 2948, Art. V (2), Aug. 23, 1951.

120 Supplementary Agreement of 1951, Art. V I : Walker, loc. cit. 72, note 13.

121 T.I.A.S., No. 3947, Art. V (2), Nov. 28, 1956.

122 T.I.A.S., No. 4024, Art. V (2), Jan. 21, 1956.

123 Walker, loc. cit. 73.

124 T.I.A.S., No. 3593, Art. VI (2), Oct. 29, 1954.

125 T.I.A.S., No. 3057, Art. VI (2), Aug. 3/Dec. 26, 1951.

126 T.I.A.S., No. 2863, Art. IV (2), April 2, 1953.

127 The term is used in the conflict-of-laws sense, and not the “non-technical” use of the term in the 1946 treaty with the Republic of China. See Bayitch, loc. cit. 194, note 18.

128 Walker, loc. cit. 72-73; Bayitch, loc. cit. 193, and note 14: “ I t may be added at this point that this provision applies to state as well as federal courts, the latter having concurrent jurisdiction in matters of treaty law, provided other jurisdictional requirements are met.“

129 T.I.A.S., No. 3942, Art. V 2b (2), March 27, 1956: “ a s regards enforcement in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, such awards shall be dealt with in the same way as awards referred to in the Convention … concluded at Geneva on September 26, 192.

130 3 Hudson, op. cit. 2156.

131 Walker, loc. cit. 73.

132 U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/81/Rev. 1, Art. VII (2). For the view that the friendship, commerce and navigation treaties have not produced their intended results, see the remarks of Professor Richard N. Gardner, Regional Meeting, American Society of International Law, U.N. Headquarters, March 4, 1959.

133 Kronstein, loc. cit. 68. The author concludes that modern arbitration is “ an instrument of cartels and monopolistic trade associations,” as well as being “incompatible with general concepts of positive law,” and that it attacks “ i n principle, the practical mandates of the Constitution.'’ See also Phillips, Philip G., ‘ ‘ The Paradox in Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied to a Voluntary Proceeding,'’ 46 Harvard Law Review 1258 (1933).Google Scholar

134 In its comments on the ECOSOC draft, Great Britain claimed that “there appears … to be no demand from commercial interests in the United Kingdom for the conclusion of a new Convention. [… I t is not] a pressing problem and existing arrangements appear to be working reasonably well.'’ U.N. Doc. E/2822/Add. 4, p. 3.

135 Notwithstanding instances where these problems have been rectified by subsequent legislation, thereby implementing treaty obligations (see note 34 above). This point is still advanced as a basis for non-participation in the ECOSOC Convention. Walker, loc. cit. 83; Czyzak and Sullivan, loc. cit. 202-203.

136 Domke, loc. cit. 547-548.

137 Ibid. 550, 552, citing recent New York cases where ‘ ‘ foreign arbitration awards were recognized as valid titles and summarily enforced“: (1) Coudenhove-Kalergi v. Dueterle, 36 N.Y.S. 2d 313 (1942) ; (2) Stern v. Friedman, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 21, 1945, p. 691, col. 7 (N. Y. City Ct.); (3) H. P. Drewry, S.A.E.L. v. Onassis, 179 Misc. 578, 39 N.Y.S. 2d 688; aff'd, 266 App. Div. 292, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 74; aff'd 291 N.Y. 779, 53 N.E. 2d 243 (1944).

138 Domke, loc. cit. 547, 548.

139 Walker, loc. cit. 83.

140 Ibid. 84.

141 Canada joined the United States in abstaining from the vote convening the 1958 Conference: “Canada was a federal State, and commercial arbitration was within the jurisdiction of the provincial Courts. The federal Government, therefore, could not support the holding of a conference on its own initiative and would probably be unable to participate in i t . “ See ECOSOC, 21st Sess., Official Records, 923rd Meeting, May 3, 1956, par. 48.

142 U.N. Doc. E/2704, par. 69, and note 2 thereto.

143 U.N. Doc. E/2840, par. 5: “ The recognition of foreign arbitral awards is but an aspect of international commercial arbitration [… The] development of arbitration as a means to settle international commercial disputes between persons has been hampered mainly by the existing differences in the legislation of various countries on the subject of arbitration procedures and the effect of arbitration, the lack of uniformity in the rules of arbitral tribunals, and the complications deriving from the conflict of laws in this area.” To buttress his position, he called the Council's attention to no less than eight organizations and two United Nations Commissions interested in developing uniform arbitration laws. In addition, member governments and nongovernmental organizations have been sensitive to the problem.

144 U.N. Doc. E/2822, A II, p. 3 (emphasis added).

145 General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Eecords, Supp. No. 1, p. 97.

146 General Assembly Res. 797 (VIII), Dec. 7, 1953. Subsequently the Sixth Committee (Legal) of the General Assembly discussed and commented upon the Draft at its Eighth and Tenth Sessions.

147 General Assembly, 13th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 9 (A/3859), par. 22; 53 A.J.I.L. 239 (1959).

148 General Assembly, 13th Sess., 6th Committee, Official Becords, 554th-567th Meetings, Oct. 2-23, 1958.

149 See, for example, General Assembly, 13th Sess., 6th Committee, Official Records, 554th Meeting, Oct. 2, 1958, pars. 8-9; 559th Meeting, Oct. 13, 1958, par. 13; U.K. position at 555th Meeting, Oct. 6, 1958, par. 3; U. S. position, 559th Meeting, Oct. 13, 1958.

150 General Assembly Res. 1262 (XIII) , Nov. 14, 1958.

151 U.N. Doc. A/3983, par. 2.

152 U.N. Doc. E/2822, A II, pp. 4-5.

153 See comments of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. U.N. Doe. E/2822, A II.

154 Ibid., A II , pp. 4-5.

155 Richard N. Gardner, ‘ ‘ Economic and Political Implications of International Commercial Arbitration,” International Trade Arbitration, op. cit. 15.

156 Wright, loc. cit. 14.

157 Morris S. Rosenthal, “ A Businessman locks at Arbitration,” International Trade Arbitration, op. cit. 31.

158 Rosenthal, loc. cit. 45.

159 See, for example, the remarks of Professor Philip C. Jessup, Begional Meeting, American Society of International Law, U.N. Headquarters, March 4, 1959. See also Murdock, James O., “International Law for Individuals through Arbitration,” 11 Arbitration Journal 41 (1956)Google Scholar: “there will gradually develop a case law basis for International Private Law [… which] will grant to the individual ‘direct, effective remedies in international forums of first instance.’ ‘ ‘

160 See Hearings Before Ways and Means Committee, House of Representatives, 86^th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.B. 5., “A Bill to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to Encourage Private Investment Abroad and Thereby Promote American Industry and Reduce Government Expenditures for Foreign Economic Assistance” (Wash., D.C., 1959). Note, generally, the remarks of Hon. Henry Kearns, Asst. Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs, at pp. 9-13, and specifically those of Mr. Donald H. Gleason, National Association of Manufacturers: “ i t is clearly a matter of national self-interest to remove barriers to the most efficient conduct of American business operations abroad.” (p. 326); of Hon. C. Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State: “We must provide additional impetus for the economic development process. Governmental resources and capabilities are of necessity limited, so new actions to stimulate the flow of private capital … have become an urgent necessity.” (p. 79); and of Prof. Ezra Solomon, University of Chicago: “The problem of increasing private U.S. investment abroad has been explored extensively since World War II. Few avenues of national policy have had the unanimous support of the broad range of opinion which favours an increase in private foreign investment. The wide variety of economic, political, and human benefits expected from such an increase have already been well documented … “ (p. 291).