1 Certified copy of text appears in General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Official Records, Agenda Item 91, Annexes, Doc. A/C.1/946, Oct. 30, 1967; Documents on Disarmament 69-83 (1967).

2 As distinguished from such unpopulated regions as Antarctica and Outer Space.

3 Sen. Exec. H, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess.; Documents on Disarmament 461-465 (1968).

4 General Assembly, 17th Sess., Doc. A/PV.1125, Sept. 20, 1962, p. 19, par. 25.

5 General Assembly, 17th Sess., Doc. A/C.1/312, Nov. 3, 1962.

6 General Assembly, 18th Sess., Official Records, Agenda Item 74, Annexes, Doc. A/5415/Rev.1, Nov. 14, 1963. The Declaration was also circulated as ENDC/87, May 6, 1963.

7 General Assembly, 18th Sess., Official Records, Doc. A/Res/1911 (XVIII), Nov. 29, 1963.

8 Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay. See General Assembly, 18th Sess., Official Records, Doc. A/5618, Nov. 20, 1963.

9 General Assembly, 18th Sess., Doc. A/C.1/PV.1335, Nov. 13, 1963, pp. 32-33; Documents on Disarmament 582-583 (1963).

10 General Assembly, 19th Sess., Official Records, Doc. A/5824, Dec. 3, 1964; Garcia Robles, The Denuclearization of Latin America 73 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967).

11 Final Act of First Sess.: General Assembly, 19th Sess., Official Records, Doc. A/5912, April 15, 1965; Final Act of Second Sess.: General Assembly, 20th Sess, Official Records, Doc. A/5985, Sept. 22, 1965; Final Act of Third Sess.: General Assembly, 20th Sess., Doc. A/6328, May 12, 1966; Final Act of Fourth Sess.: General Assembly, 21st Sess., Official Records, Doc. A/6663, Feb. 23, 1967. The Final Act of the Fourth Sess. also appears in ENDC/186 of Feb. 21, 1967.

12 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela. See the Final Act of the Fourth Session, cited above. Cuba and Guyana were the only Latin American states not to attend. The Ambassador of Cuba to Mexico indicated in a letter to the Chairman of the Commission, Ambassador Garcia Robles, on July 21, 1966, that certain “conditions” made its participation in the work of the Commission inappropriate. The letter cited (1) the “illegal detention” of Guantanamo by the United States, (2) the need to “denuclearize“ United States military bases in Latin America “such as those in Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone and the Virgin Islands,” and (3) the “aggressive policies” of the United States towards Cuba. COPREDAL/46, July 21, 1966. [“COPREDAL” is the document series of the “Commision Preparada Denuclearizacidn America Latina.“] Out of sympathy with Cuba's position, the Soviet Union, while supporting the general concept of a nuclear free zone in Latin America, did not send observers to the sessions of the Preparatory Commission. Of the other nuclear Powers, the U. K. did send observers, but France and Communist China did not. As regards Communist China, the Preparatory Commission inquired “whether the Government of the People's Republic of China would be prepared to undertake to respect the legal instrument on the denuclearization of Latin America.” In response, the People's Republic took the position that it could not participate in the work of the Commission or support the treaty because of their relationship with the United Nations and because of the policies of the United States. Reported in Garcia Robles, The Denuclearization of Latin America (cited above) 154-158.

13 Argentina (Sept. 27, 1967), Barbados (Oct. 18, 1968), Bolivia (Feb. 14, 1967), Brazil (May 9, 1967), Chile (Feb. 14, 1967), Colombia (Feb. 14, 1967), Costa Rica (Feb. 14, 1967), Dominican Republic (July 29, 1967), Ecuador (Feb. 14, 1967), El Salvador (Feb. 14, 1967), Guatemala (Feb. 14, 1967), Haiti (Feb. 14, 1967), Honduras (Feb. 14, 1967), Jamaica (Oct. 26, 1967), Mexico (Feb. 14, 1967), Nicaragua (Feb. 15, 1967), Panama (Feb. 14, 1967), Paraguay (April 26, 1967), Peru (Feb. 14, 1967), Trinidad and Tobago (June 27, 1967), Uruguay (Feb. 14, 1967), and Venezuela (Feb. 14, 1967).

14 See discussion on Art. 25 below, pp. 290-292.

15 Barbados (April 25, 1969), Bolivia (Feb. 18, 1969), Costa Rica (Aug. 25, 1969), Dominican Republic (June 14, 1968), Ecuador (Feb. 11, 1969), El Salvador (April 22, 1968), Guatemala (Feb. 6, 1970), Haiti (May 23, 1969), Honduras (Sept. 23, 1968), Jamaica (June 26, 1969), Mexico (Sept. 20, 1967), Nicaragua (Oct. 24, 1968), Paraguay (March 19, 1969), Peru (March 4, 1969) and Uruguay (Aug. 20, 1968).

16 See discussion on Art. 28 below, p. 292.

17 IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, Sept. 16, 1968.

18 Art. 1: “1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories: (a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way, and (b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way. “2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon.“

19 Earlier drafts, such as that included in the Final Act of the Second Session, cited above, had included delivery vehicles in the definition, of “nuclear weapons.” However, at the Third Session, it was decided that from a technical standpoint, a “more concise and appropriate” definition was needed. COPREDAL/CC/DT/1, March 14, 1966. The final text of Art. 5 includes the sentence: “An instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it is separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof.“

20 Art. II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.“

21 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U. S. Treaties 1313, T.I.A.S., No. 5433, 480 U.N. Treaty Series 43; 57 A.J.I.L. 1026 (1963).

22 See discussion below at pp. 301-302.

23 See discussion below at pp. 294-298.

24 See discussion below at p. 292.

26 A report on the First Session is contained in General Assembly, 24th Sess., Official Records, Doc. A/7741, Nov. 3, 1969, at CCD/268, Sept. 15, 1969.

26 Art. 7, Par. 1.

27 As compared to parties to the two Additional Protocols to the treaty.

28 Art. 12, Par. 1.

29 Ibid., Par. 2.

30 Sen. Exec. H, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess.; Documents on Disarmament 461-465 (1968).

31 Agreement between the IAEA and Mexico for the Application of Safeguards under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, signed at Vienna, Sept. 6, 1968. IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/118, Sept. 23, 1968, U.N. Registration number 9318.

32 Art. 14, Par. 1.

33 Art. 16, Par. 1(b) (i) and (11).

34 E,g., the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States of Oct. 1, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 35/10.

35 ENDC/PV.280, Aug. 9, 1966, pp. 13-16; Documents on Disarmament 525 (1966).

36 Final Acts of Second and Third Sessions, cited note 11 above, as quoted in Garcia Robles, The Denuclearization of Latin America at 103-104 and 124-125.

37 General Assembly, 20th Sess., Doc. A/6328, May 12, 1966; Garcia Robies, The Denuclearization of Latin America 115, cited above.

39 Documents on Disarmament 622-628 (1966).

40 Ibid.622-624.

41 Art. 18: ”… 2. Contracting Parties intending to carry out, or to co-operate in carrying out, such an explosion shall notify the Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as far in advance as the circumstances require, of the date of the explosion and shall at the same time provide the following information: (a) The nature of the nuclear device and the source from which it was obtained, (b) The place and purpose of the planned explosion, (c) The procedures which will be followed in order to comply with paragraph 3 of this article, (d) The expected force of the device, and (e) The fullest possible information on any possible radioactive fall-out that may result from the explosion or explosions, and measures which will be taken to avoid danger to the population, flora, fauna and territories of any other Party or Parties. “3. The General Secretary and the technical personnel designated by the Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency may observe all the preparations, including the explosion of the device, and shall have unrestricted access to any area in the vicinity espeof the site of the explosion in order to ascertain whether the device and the procedures followed during the explosion are in conformity with the information supplied under paragraph 2 of this article and the other provisions of this Treaty. “4. The Contracting Parties may accept the collaboration of third parties for the purpose set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof.“

41 ENDC/195, Aug. 30, 1967; Documents on Disarmament 322 (1967). As regards the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Brazil has not signed and at the present time is unlikely to sign, Brazil has taken the position that ”… we shall not waive the right to conduct research without limitation and eventually to manufacture or receive nuclear explosives which will enable us to perform great engineering works … to ensure the economic development and the welfare of the Brazilian people.” ENDC/PV.297, May 18, 1967, par. 48; Documents on Disarmament 227 (1967). It is well to remember that excavation projects utilizing nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes may be prohibited unless there is an amendment to the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

42 For Argentine statement upon signature, see Government of Mexico note to Government of the United States, Oct. 3, 1967, MS Department of State File #DEF 18-4. For Nicaraguan statement upon ratification, see Government of Mexico note to Government of the United States, Nov. 5, 1968, MS Department of State File #DEF 18-9 LA.

43 The U. S. took a similar view in a statement by the U. S. Ambassador to Mexico on Feb. 13, 1967, before the Preparatory Commission. Documents on Disarmament 65 (1967). During debate on Oct. 23, 1967, in the First Committee of the United Nations on a resolution supporting the treaty, Ambassador Garcia Robles noted that ”… special care was exercised to avoid any attempts to test or manufacture nuclear weapons under the pretext of carrying out such explosions for peaceful purposes, attempts which would completely negate the fundamental purpose involved, the very raison d'etre, of the Treaty… . To this end, the first paragraph of Article 18 contains the provision that the Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, but on a single condition; that they can show that such explosions are feasible without violation of the provisions of this article and the other articles of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5. In the last analysis, this means that the explosions in question may be carried out directly by the parties to the Treaty only if they do not require the use of a nuclear device as such device is defined in Article 5 of the Treaty.” General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.l/PV. 1504, Oct. 23, 1967, p. 63.

44 Art. 25: “ 1 . This Treaty shall be open indefinitely for signature by: (a) All the Latin American Republics, and (b) All other sovereign States situated in their entirety south of latitude 35° north in the western hemisphere; and, except as provided in paragraph 2 of this article, all such States which become sovereign, when they have been admitted by the General Conference. “2. The General Conference shall not take any decision regarding the admission of a political entity part or all of whose territory is the subject, prior to the date when this Treaty is opened for signature, of a dispute or claim between an extra-continental country and one or more Latin American States, so long as the dispute has not been settled by peaceful means.“ The distinction between “Republics” and “all other sovereign States” in par. 1 of Art. 25 recognizes the presence of members of the British Commonwealth within the treaty's zone of application. These nations are sovereign, but since the Queen remains titular head of state, they are not considered “Republics.” The Preparatory Commission decided that it was necessary “to give the new states that could be assimilated to the Latin American Republics—as is already true of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago—the possibility of becoming Parties to the Treaty …” COPREDAL/CC/OAT/1, February 1, 1966. Island states, such as those in the Caribbean Sea, are eligible to sign under the geographical limitation in par. 1 (b) of Art. 25. The outer limits of this provision are presumably those contained in par. 2 of Art. 4 of the treaty cited above.

45 See Res. 20 (IV) in the Final Act of the Fourth Session, cited above.

46 The Feb. 27, 1967, amendment to the O.A.S. Charter, originally contained in the Act of Washington of December 8, 1964 (O.A.S. Doc. #31) has not entered into force. See Senate Exec. L, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.

47 The resolution is found in General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.1/L.406/Rev.2, Nov. 21, 1967, and General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/Res./2286 (XXII), Dec. 8, 1967; Documents on Disarmament 620-621 (1967).

48 General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/PV. 1581, Oct. 5, 1967, p. 7. Also see Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1531, Nov. 17, 1967, pp. 11-13; Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1533, Nov. 21, 1967; and Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1538, Nov. 28, 1967, pp. 5-16.

49 General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/Res/2286 (XXII), Dec. 8, 1967; Documents on Disarmament 620-621 (1967).

50 General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.1/1573, May 24, 1968, pp. 58-60.

51 General Assembly, 20th Sess., Doc. A/6328, May 12, 1966, and Corr. 1, June 7, 1966; Documents on Disarmament 268-269 (1966). The Brazilian proposal also required the conclusion of the necessary agreements with the IAEA.

52 ENDC/PV.287, Feb. 21, 1967, par. 71; Documents on Disarmament 102-103 (1967).

53 Note 15 above.

54 See discussion of Cuba's position on the treaty, above, at p. 284, and discussion of Protocols I and II, below, pp. 294-299.

55 P. 283 above.

56 General Assembly, 18th Sess., Doc. A/C.l/PV. 1320, Oct. 29, 1963; Documents t on Disarmament 553-554 (1963).

57 52 Department of State Bulletin 329 (1965).

58 Disarmament Commission, Official Records, 82nd Meeting, May 17, 1965, pars. 70-74; Documents on Disarmament 178-179 (1965).

59 53 Department of State Bulletin 994 (1965); Documents on Disarmament 535- 536 (1965).

60 E.g. statement by Ambasador Foster in the ENDC, ENDC/PV.1257, April 19, 1966, pp. 15-19; Documents on Disarmament 226-230 (1966). Also letter of Aug. 29, 1966, from U. S. Ambassador Freeman to Chairman Garcia Robles, indicating general support but recommending changes in the treaty draft. Documents on Disarmament 622-628 (1966).

61 56 Department of State Bulletin 436-437 (1967); Documents on Disarmament 65 (1967).

62 See discussion of Art. 25 of the treaty, pp. 290-292 above.

63 Defined in Art. 4 of the treaty. See discussion, pp. 286-287 above.

64 See discussion at pp. 298-299 below.

65 See Art. 2 of the treaty.

66 See Government of Mexico note to Government of the United States, Jan. 12, 1968; MS Department of State File #DEF 18-9 LA.

67 See Government of Mexico note to Government of the United States, April 1, 1968; MS Department of State File #DEF 18-9 LA.

68 See the Final Act of the Third Session, cited above.

69 30 Stat. 1754; Treaty Series, No. 343; II Malloy 1690.

70 P.L. 600, July 3, 1950; 48 U.S.C. 731 (d); 64 Stat. 319.

71 39 Stat. 1706; Treaty Series, No. 629; III Redmond 2558.

72 4 8 U.S.C. 1541.

73 33 Stat. 2234; Treaty Series, No. 431; II Malloy 1349.

74 COPREDAL/CC/S/7, Aug. 6, 1965.

75 General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.l/PV. 1575, May 28, 1968, p. 36.

76 Treaty Series, No. 418; I Malloy 358.

77 48 U.S.C. 1411 (R.S. 5570).

78 39 Stat. 1763.

79 U. S. Treaty Series, No. 760%; IV Trenwith 4023.

80 39 Stat. 1661; Treaty Series, No. 624; III Redmond 2740.

81 Documents on Disarmament 626-627 (1965).

82 For discussion on transit, see below at pp. 301-302.

83 P. 289 above.

84 E.g.1936 Convention of the International Labour Organization Concerning the Minimum Requirement of Professional Capacity for Masters and Officers on Board Merchant Ships, 54 Stat. 1683, Treaty Series, No. 950; 1954 Treaty on Customs Facilities for Touring, T.I.A.S., No. 3879, 8 U. S. Treaties 1293.

85 See discussion below at pp. 307-308.

86 A similar provision is found in Art. 3 of Protocol I. Unlike Art. 1 of Protocol I, which limits application to only certain provisions in the treaty, Art. I of Protocol II is a comprehensive undertaking to respect “the statute of denuclearization … as defined … in the Treaty … in all its express aims and provisions.” Earlier drafts of the treaty, including the final text contained in the Final Act of the Fourth Session, cited above, had used the term “status of denuclearization” rather than “statute of denuclearization.” The word “statute” was introduced for the first time in certified copies of the text distributed by the Government of Mexico as depositary. General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C. 1/946, Oct. 30, 1967. Since this change did not receive the approval of the Preparatory Commission, it would appear to be in error and should not be regarded as significant. “Status of denuclearization” seems a more appropriate phrase, since it constitutes a general reference to the objectives which the provisions of the treaty are intended to accomplish. If the reference were to the agreement itself, the term “treaty” would probably have been used and not “statute.“

87 For full text, see 58 Department of State Bulletin 555-556 (1968); Documents on Disarmament 204-205 (1968).

88 General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1507, Oct. 26, 1967, p. 27.

89 P. 297 above. »

90 Pp. 291 above.

91 For the cause of Guyana's abstention, see the discussion of Art. 25, pp. 290-292 above.

92 58 Department of State Bulletin 313-314 (1968).

93 Cf.the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, 12 U. S. Treaties 794, T.I.A.S., No. 4780, 402 U.N. Treaty Series 71; and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, 87 U. S. Treaties 2410, T.I.A.S., No. 6347, both of which involve unpopulated areas.

94 58 Department of State Bulletin 554-555 (1968).

95 P. 286 above.

96 P. 289 above.

97 Note the difference in the draft language for the definition of “territory” between that proposed in the Final Act of the Second Session, and that in the Final Act of the Third Session, cited note 11 above.

98 E.g. the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 15 U. S. Treaties 1606; T.I.A.S., No. 5639; 516 U.N. Treaty Series 205.

99 Parties to Protocols I or II are non-Contracting Parties to the treaty.

100 See the Final Act of the Third Session, cited above.

101 Ibid.See also COPREDAL/CC/23/Annex 1, Dec. 28, 1966.

102 P. 289 above.

103 See the Final Act of the Fourth Session, cited above, for a statement by Argentina.

104 Text of statement: “At its fortieth plenary meeting on 7 February, the Preparatory Commission decided to place on record the correct interpretation of the omission, from Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), of the Treaty, of the term ‘transport,’ which had appeared in one of the alternative texts… . The Commission accordingly decided to include the following statement in the Final Act: “The Commission deemed it unnecessary to include the term ‘transport’ in article 1, concerning ‘obligations,’ for the following reasons. “1. If the carrier is one of the Contracting Parties, transport is covered by the prohibitions expressly laid down in the remaining provisions of article 1 and there is no need to mention it expressly, since the article prohibits ‘any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way.' “2. If the carrier is a state not a Party to the Treaty, transport is identical with 'transit,’ which, in the absence of any provision in the Treaty, must be understood to be governed by the principles and rules of international law; according to these principles and rules it is for the territorial state, in the free exercise of its sovereignty, to grant or deny permission for such transit, in each individual case, upon application by the State interested in effecting the transit unless some other arrangement has been reached in a Treaty between such states.“

105 It is of interest to note that Ambassador Garcia Robles has held that the Preparatory Commission considered “land” transit of nuclear weapons by non-Contracting Parties as prohibited. General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1511, Oct. 30, 1967, p. 12. How he reached this result is unclear. If the prohibition in par. 1 (b) of Art. 1 of the treaty against “any form of possession of any nuclear weapons” in the territories of the parties does not include the transit of nuclear weapons by non-Contracting Parties, it is difficult to determine how land transit by such parties is prohibited.

106 The right of innocent passage is included in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, cited note 98 above. Ambassador Garcia Robles has recognized that the right of innocent passage is preserved. See General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1511, Oct. 30, 1967, p. 12.

107 The Soviet Union on the other hand has introduced and supported world-wide non-use” proposals for years. See, for example, the Memorandum of the Soviet Government Concerning Urgent Measures to Stop the Arms Race and Achieve Disarmament, July 1, 1968. General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/7134, July 8, 1968; Documents on Disarmament 466-470 at 466-467 (1968). The U. S. supported a Security Council resolution regarding positive security assurances in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Security Council Doc. S/PV.1430, June 17, 1968. See also the U. S. declaration in connection with this resolution, Security Council Doc/Res.255, June 19, 1968.

108 See Art. 60, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969.

109 See discussion of Art. 5 of the treaty, pp. 285-286.

110 General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.1/PV.1511, Oct. 30, 1967, p. 17.

111 See the definition of “reservation” in Art. 2(d) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Also see Comment C to Sec. 124 of the Restatement 2nd on Foreign Relations Law, which refers to an interpretation as a “declaration which indicates the meaning it [the party] attaches to a provision of an agreement but which it does not regard as changing the legal effect of the provision.” The U. S. statement would appear to meet this test. It is more difficult to regard the British statement on “non-use” as an interpretation and not as a reservation. However, Ambassador Garcia Robles indicated no objection to the following U.K. statement and referred to it as a “pleasant“ declaration (General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1511, Oct. 30, 1967, p. 17): “In the event of any act of aggression committed by one of the Contracting Parties of the Treaty, in which the said Party was supported by a State possessing nuclear weapons, the Government of the United Kingdom could freely reconsider to what extent it might consider itself bound by the provisions of Additional Protocol II.” Government of Mexico note to Government of the United States, Jan. 12, 1968, note 66 above.

112 Text: “The United States wishes to point out again the fact that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons and the fact that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore we understand the definition contained in Article 5 of the Treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is our understanding that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18. “The United States further notes that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the Treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with our policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection the United States reaffirms its willingness to make available nuclear explosion services for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis under appropriate international arrangements and to join other nuclear-weapon States in a commitment to do so.“

113 For the text of Art. 18, see above at p. 289.

114 General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1569, May 16, 1968, pars. 41 and 42; Documents on Disarmament 353 (1968).

115 Art. 2 of the treaty, p. 285 above.

116 P. 304 above.

117 P. 284 above.

118 General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1509, Oct. 27, 1967, pp. 22-42; Documents on Disarmament 539-546 (1967). Also General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1510, Oct. 27, 1967, pp. 43-46, and ibid., Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1538, Nov. 28, 1967, pp. 47-52.

119 For the Cuban position see p. 284 above.

120 General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1509, Oct. 27, 1967, p. 26.

121 The Soviets also equate nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes with nuclear weapons. See General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1509, Oct. 27, 1967, pp. 27-34.

122 If all the provisions of par. 1 of Art. 28 are met, the “broad” zone of application under Art. 4 of the treaty would come into effect. Transit on the high seas would not be affected under the Preparatory Commission statement in the Final Act. However, it is arguable whether Protocol II Parties would be prohibited from deploying nuclear weapons on the high seas when and if the broad zone became effective. Of course, the line between what is “transit” and what is “deployment” is not easily drawn. In this connection, it is important to note that for the broad zone to become effective, the United States must ratify Protocol I as well as Protocol II. U. S. ratification of Protocol II alone is not relevant to the issue of the treaty's relation to deployment on the high seas.

123 For the position of Ambassador Garcia Robles on the U.K. statement, see p. 304 above.

124 General Assembly, 22nd Sess. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1538, Nov. 28, 1967, p. 52.

125 General Assembly, 23rd Sess., Doc. A/Res/2456 (XXIII), Jan. 10, 1969.

126 Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, p. 288 above.

127 Documents on Disarmament 799 (1968).

128 General Assembly, 23rd Sess., Official Records, Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1643, Dec. 17, 1968; Documents on Disarmament 787 (1968).

129 COPREDAL/47, July 26, 1966; Garcia Robles, The Denuclearization of Latin America (cited above) 140-141.

130 General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1510, Oct. 27, 1967, pp. 33-35.

131 General Assembly, 22nd Sess., Doc. A/PV. 1672, June 12, 1968, pp. 3-7.

132 See Government of Mexico note to Government of the United States, Feb. 9, 1968; MS Department of State File #DEF 18-4.

133 General Assembly, 23rd Sess., Doc. A/7741, Nov. 3, 1969, at CCD/268, Sept. 15, 1969.