¹ E.g., Ex parte State of New York, No. 1, 256 U. S. 490; The Western Maid, 257 U. S. 419; Ex parte Simons, 247 U. S. 231; Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 305; Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378; Ex parte Uppercu, 239 U. S. 435; Matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193; United States v. Peters, 3 Dali. 121.

² Ex parte United States, 287 U. S. 241; Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U. S. 9, 27–28; Maryland v. Soper (No. 2), 270 U. S. 36; Maryland v. Soper (No. 3), 270 U. S. 44; Colorado v. Symes, 286 U. S. 510; McCullough v. Cosgrave, 309 U. S. 634; Ex parte Kawato, 317 U. S. 69; see Los Angeles Brush Corp. v. James, 272 U. S. 701.

³ See particularly the discussion in Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U. S. 9, 28–30, and in Ex parte United States, 287 U. S. 241. Compare Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371.

Ex parte United States, supra, was not and could not have been a case of original jurisdiction. The Constitution confers original jurisdiction only in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and “those in which a State shall be Party” (Art. III, § 2, cl. 2). No state was made a party to Ex parte United States. The United States has never been held to be a “State” within this provision—and it obviously is not—nor has it any standing to bring an original action in this Court which does not otherwise come within one of the provisions of Article III, § 2, cl. 2. United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, relied upon to sustain a different view, was within the original jurisdiction because the state of Texas was the party defendant. And until now it has never been suggested that necessity, however great, warrants the exercise by this Court of original jurisdiction which the Constitution has not conferred upon it. Moreover, even if Congress had withdrawn this Court’s appellate jurisdiction by the 1925 Act, there would have been no necessity in Ex parte United States for inventing an original jurisdiction which the Constitution had withheld, since a writ of mandamus could have been applied for in the circuit court of appeals.

⁴ The suggestion that the Judiciary Act of 1925 was intended to curtail the jurisdiction previously exercised by this Court in granting such writs to the district courts finds no support in the history or language of the Act. The Act was originally prepared by a committee of justices of this Court, by whom it was submitted to Congress for consideration. Four members of this Court gave testimony before Congressional committees in explanation of the purposes and meaning of the Act, and Chief Justice Taft submitted a detailed statement of the changes which the Act would effect. These disclose that the great purpose of the Act was to curtail the Court’s obligatory jurisdiction by substituting, for the appeal as of right, discretionary review by certiorari in many classes of cases. In all the oral and written submissions by members of this Court, and in the reports of the committees of Congress which recommended adoption of the bill, there is not a single suggestion that the Act would with-draw or limit the Court’s existing jurisdiction to direct the common law writs to the district courts when, in the exercise of its discretion, it deemed such a remedy appropriate. [See Résumé, together with Citations Affecting Sections of Senate Bill 3164, submitted by Chief Justice Taft, printed for use of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearing on S. 2060 and S. 2061, before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Feb. 2, 1924, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.; Hearing on H. R. 8206 before House Committee on the Judiciary, Dec. 18, 1924, 68th Cong., 2d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 362, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. Rep. No. 1075, 68th Cong., 2d Sess.] The changes in existing law proposed to be made by the Act were set forth with painstaking detail. It is hardly conceivable that the justices of this Court, fully familiar with its practice, would have left unexpressed an intention—had such intention really existed—to curtail drastically a jurisdiction which the Court had exercised under statutory authority from the beginning of its history. Ex parte United States, and most of the other cases cited in note 2, supra, were decided at a time when members of the Court’s committee responsible for the 1925 Act were still members of the Court. The Court’s unanimous concurrence in the existence of its jurisdiction in the cases subsequent to the 1925 Act establishes a practice (cf. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 309) which would be beyond explanation if there had been any thought that any provision of the Act had placed such a restriction on the Court’s jurisdiction to issue the writs.

Nor can it be said that this legislative history gives any support to the suggestion that the failure of the 1925 Act to cut off the jurisdiction of this Court to issue the common law writs to district courts was inadvertent, and that the Act should therefore be construed as though it had done what it failed to do. The jurisdiction of this Court to issue such writs, like its jurisdiction to grant certiorari, is discretionary. The definite aim of the 1925 Act was to enlarge, not to destroy, the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction. That aim can hardly give rise to an inference of an unexpressed purpose to amend or repeal the statutes of the United States conferring jurisdiction on the Court to issue the writs, or an inference that such would have been the purpose had repeal been proposed. The exercise of that jurisdiction has placed no undue burden on this Court. It is significant that, since 1925, less than ten of the numerous applications to this Court for such writs have been granted. Only in rare instances has their denial been the occasion for an opinion dealing with questions of public importance. See, e.g., Los Angeles Brush Corp. v. James, 272 U. S. 701; Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U. S. 610; Ex parte Colonna, 314 U. S. 510; cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103. And whatever the scope of the jurisdiction of this Court, in no case does it decline to examine an application in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction.

¹ “Sec. 238. A direct review by the Supreme Court of an interlocutory or final judgment or decree of a district court may be had where it is so provided in the following Acts or parts of Acts, and not otherwise:

“(1) Section 2 of the Act of February 11,1903, ‘ to expedite the hearing and determination ’ of certain suite brought by the United States under the antitrust or interstate commerce laws, and so forth.

“(2) The Act of March 2,1907, ‘ providing for writs of error in certain instances in criminal cases’ where the decision of the district court is adverse to the United States.

“(3) An Act restricting the issuance of interlocutory injunctions to suspend the enforcement of the statute of a State or of an order made by an administrative board or commission created by and acting under the statute of a State, approved March 4, 1913, which Act is hereby amended by adding at the end thereof, ‘The requirement respecting the presence of three judges shall also apply to the final hearing in such suit in the district court; and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken from a final decree granting or denying a permanent injunction in such suit.’

“(4) So much of ‘An Act making appropriations to supply urgent deficiencies in appropriations for the fiscal year 1913, and for other purposes,’ approved October 22, 1913, as relates to the review of interlocutory and final judgments and decrees in suits to enforce, suspend, or set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission other than for the payment of money.

“(5) Section 316 of ‘An Act to regulate interstate and foreign commerce in livestock, livestock products, dairy products, poultry, poultry products, and eggs, and for other purposes ’ approved August 15, 1921.” 43 Stat. 936, 938.