* The views expressed herein are the personal views of the author.

¹ For text, see Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the Egyptian Government regarding the Suez Canal Base, October 19, 1954, Cmd. 9298 (London, 1954); also in 10 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International 297–352 (1954). The text in the Revue contains an annex to Note 7(b), which fails to appear in the Command Paper.

The agreement is effective as though it had entered into force on the date of signature; ratifications were exchanged at Cairo on Dec. 6, 1954. New York Times, Dec. 7, 1954, p. 3.

The term “agreement” was preferred to the term “treaty” by the Egyptian Government. Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Nāsir has explained this preference by pointing out that the word “treaty” is anathema to the Egyptian people, since “they think it means chains that tie them.” U. S. News and World Report, Sept. 3, 1954, p. 29.

² For text, see 31 A.J.I.L. Supp. 77–100 (1937). Ratifications were exchanged at Cairo on Dec. 22, 1936.

³ By an agreed minute attached to the agreement, Israel is expressly excluded from the definition “outside Power.”

⁴ The Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Co-operation between the States of the Arab League, better known as the Arab Collective Security Pact, was signed at Cairo on April 13, 1950. All signatories, i.e., Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, have ratified, and the treaty entered into force in April, 1952. Libya, which adhered to the Pact of the Arab League of March 22, 1945, on March 28, 1953, had not yet adhered to the Collective Security Pact in June, 1955. The general purpose of the Arab League Pact is the advancement of the collective interests of the Arab states; of the Security Pact, to further the objectives of the Arab League Pact, especially with respect to mutual assistance in the event of aggression by a non-Arab state, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter dealing with “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.” See B. Y. Boutros-Ghali, “The Arab League, 1945–55,” International Conciliation, No. 498 (May, 1954, but written and published in the spring of 1955); and Khadduri, Majid, “The Arab League as a Regional Arrangement,” 40 A.J.I.L. 756–777 (1946)Google Scholar. For text of Arab League Pact, see 39 A.J.I.L. Supp. 266–272 (1945); for text of Arab Collective Security Pact, see 49 ibid. 51–54 (1955).

⁵ See Khadduri, Majid, “The Anglo-Egyptian Controversy,” 24 Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 82–99 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. When evacuation is completed on June 18, 1956, it will have been accomplished just three weeks short of seventy-four years after the first entry of British forces on July 10, 1882. New York Times, Oct. 20, 1954, pp. 1, 9.

⁶ Beirut Daily Star, July 29, 1954, p. 1.

⁷ See Hallberg, C. H., The Suez Canal (N. Y., 1931)Google Scholar; Wilson, Arnold Sir, The Suez Canal (London, 1939)Google Scholar; Siegfried, Andre, Suez and Panama (London, 1940)Google Scholar; Schonfleld, H. J., The Suez Canal in World Affairs (London, 1952)Google Scholar; Marlowe, John, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800–1953 (London, 1954)Google Scholar; and Hoskins, H. L., “The Suez Canal as an International Waterway,” 37 A.J.I.L. 373–385 (1943)Google Scholar.

⁸ The status of the Canal Company is unusual. It is registered under Egyptian law as an Egyptian company, but is incorporated as a société anonyme or joint stock company and governed by the provisions of the French code respecting such companies. The Court of Appeal in Paris is designated as the tribunal of ultimate resort in legal matters affecting the company. The company's registered office (siége) is in Alexandria, while its administrative head office (domicile administratif) is in Paris. See The Suez Canal, Notes and Statistics, by the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez (London, 1952), especially at p. 23 et seq.; Hoskins, H. L., The Middle East 41–56 (N. T., 1954)Google Scholar; and Great Britain and Egypt, 1914–1951, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Information Papers No. 19 (London, 1952), pp. 202–203 Google Scholar. Under French law a société anonyme is a business association in which the liability of the shareholders is limited. Important company decisions on policy and finance are made in Paris. In the spring of 1955 sixteen of the company’s directors were French, nine British, five Egyptian, one Dutch, and one American (U. S.). Egypt is progressively securing greater representation on the Board of Directors, and a larger share in the company’s profits. Gradually a higher proportion of the company’s personnel is coming to be Egyptian. See article on the Suez Canal Company in Wall Street Journal, April 27, 1955, pp. 1, 6.

⁹ For the text of the concession agreements of Nov. 30, 1854, and Jan. 5, 1856, see 55 British and Foreign State Papers (1864–65), 970–973, 976–981. For the statutes of the company, signed at Alexandria on Jan. 5, 1856, see ibid. 981–995. The final terms of the concession are incorporated in the contract of Feb. 22, 1866, between the Egyptian Government and the company, 56 ibid. 277–283 (1865–66).

¹⁰ The Sultan authorized the execution of the contract by a firman (decree) of March 19, 1866, 56 British and Foreign State Papers 293–294 (1865–66). Although Egypt had been virtually independent of the Ottoman Empire since 1806, it remained under nominal Turkish suzerainty until 1914.

¹¹ Great Britain and Egypt, op. cit., note 8 supra, p. 202. The article in the Wall Street Journal, cited note 8 supra, commenting on what will happen if Egypt fails to renew the Acts of Concession in 1968, states that “politically the question is whether the Egyptians will follow the company’s principles of permitting free and equal passage to the ships of all nations at reasonable tolls.” It might be pointed out that the Constantinople Convention of 1888 (see 3 Moore's Digest 264–266) provides that the parties agree that the engagements resulting from the convention shall not be limited by the duration of the Acts of Concession (Art. XIV); that the Canal shall always be free and open to all vessels, without distinction of flag (Art. I); and that the principle of equality as regards the free use of the Canal forms one of the bases of the convention (Art. XII).

In 1908, when the concession still had 60 years to run, it was proposed to extend its duration until Dec. 31, 2008, on terms very favorable to Egypt. Public opinion in Egypt was opposed to this proposal, considering that the prolongation of the concession meant the prolongation of foreign—and particularly British—interference in Egypt’s internal affairs. The Egyptian General Assembly rejected the proposal by all but one vote in April, 1910. Schonfield, op. cit. 65.

¹² Ibid. 51.

¹³ By the Treaty of Lausanne of July 23, 1923, Turkey renounced all its rights in Egypt retroactively to Nov. 5, 1914. See 117 British and Foreign State Papers 543–591, 549 (1923). On the legal status of the Canal under Turkey and Great Britain, see O’Rourke, Vernon A., The Juristic Status of Egypt and the Sudan (Baltimore, 1935)Google Scholar; on problems of suzerainty and protectorate, see Alexandrowicz-Alexander, Charles H., “The Legal Position of Tibet,” 48 A.J.I.L. 265–274 (1954)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ For text, see 3 Moore’s Digest 264–266; 3 A.J.I.L. Supp. 123 (1909).

¹⁵ John Colombos, C., The International Law of the Sea 152–153 (3rd rev. ed. London, 1954)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ 97 British and Foreign State Papers 39–41 (1903–1904); 2 Hackworth's Digest 816; O'Rourke, op. cit. 35–36. According to a British information paper, Britain's “special position” in Egypt was given official recognition by the great Powers through the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 and similar declarations by Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy. See Great Britain and Egypt, op. cit. note 8 supra, p. 2.

¹⁷ Arts. I and IV.

¹⁸ Arts. IX and X. By Art. IX Egypt may call on Turkey to assist in insuring the execution of the treaty; by Art. X Turkey may assist Egypt in the defense of Egypt. After World War I the Central Powers signatory of the 1888 convention agreed to the transfer of Turkey's special rights in Egypt to the United Kingdom. This was done by Germany through Art. 152 of the Treaty of Versailles; by Austria through Art. 107 of the Treaty of St. Germain; by Hungary through Art. 91 of the Treaty of Trianon; and Turkey through Art. 109 of the Treaty of Sèvres and Art. 99 of the Treaty of Lausanne. 2 Hackworth's Digest 816–817.

¹⁹ Art. XI.

²⁰ Art. XIII.

²¹ John Bassett Moore categorically states that the 1888 convention does not neutralize the Canal, pointing out that if it were neutralized it would be closed to the ships of belligerents. 3 Moore’s Digest 267. Columbos, op. cit. 153, and Hoskins, 37 A.J.I.L. 376 (1943) agree. But cf. Judge Schücking in his dissenting opinion in the Wimbledon case, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 1, 1 Hudson’s World Court Reports 187 (1922–26), and L. Oppenheim, International Law (7th ed., by H. Lauterpacht), Vol. II (London, 1952), p. 245.

²² Sehonfield, op. cit. 72.

²³ Ibid. 73–74; see note 18 supra.

²⁴ Ibid. 111.

²⁵ 108 British and Foreign State Papers 185 (1914-Part II); see notes 13 and 18 supra.

²⁶ 116 British and Foreign State Papers 84–85 (1922); 2 Hackworth’s Digest 817–818.

²⁷ Op. cit. 107.

²⁸ Schonfleld, op. cit. 75.

²⁹ Survey of International Affairs, 1936, ed. by A. J. Toynbee (London, 1937), p. 672.

³⁰ Note 2 supra. See Great Britain and Egypt, op. cit. 33–56.

³¹ The Annex provided in par. 1: “ Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 7, the number of the forces of His Majesty The King and Emperor to be maintained in the vicinity of the Canal shall not exceed, of the land forces, 10,000, and of the air forces, 400 pilots, together with the necessary ancillary personnel for administrative and technical duties. These numbers do not include civilian personnel, e.g., clerks, artisans and laborers.”

³² Note 31 supra.

³³ The Sidqi-Bevin Protocol; see Kirk, George, A Short History of the Middle East 226–231 (Wash., D. C, 1949)Google Scholar.

³⁴ See Briggs, Herbert W., “ Rebus Sic Stantibus Before the Security Council: The Anglo-Egyptian Question,” 43 A.J.I.L. 762–769 (1949)Google Scholar.

³⁵ See New York Times, News of the Week in Review, Dec. 14, 1952, p. 4; and Time Magazine, Aug. 10, 1953.

³⁶ See ‘Anglo-Egyptian Conversations on the Defense of the Suez Canal and on the Sudan, Dee. 1950-Nov. 1951,” Cmd. 8419 (London, 1951), commonly referred to as the “British White Paper,” and “Records of Conversations, Notes and Papers Exchanged between the Royal Egyptian Government and the United Kingdom Government, March 1950–Nov. 1951,” (Cairo, 1951), commonly referred to as the “Egyptian Green Paper.”

³⁷ Marlowe, op. cit. 385.

³⁸ Documents on International Affairs, 1951, ed. by Stephen Heald and John W. Wheeler-Bennett (London, 1952), pp. 455–461; Great Britain and Egypt, op. cit. 143–144.

³⁹ British White Paper, op. cit. note 36 supra, 43–45.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 46–47; Great Britain and Egypt, op. cit. 147–151.

⁴¹ Marlowe, op. cit. 383.

⁴² See New York Times, March 2, 16, 28, and 30, and May 11, 1952; London Economist, May 17, 1952.

⁴³ See Mohammed Neguib (Muhammad Nagīb), Egypt’s Destiny (London, 1955). General Nagīb’a resignation as President of Egypt was accepted in early November, 1954.

⁴⁴ See Hoskins, The Middle East 95–97.

⁴⁵ New York Times, Feb. 13, 1953, p. 5; ibid., editorial, Feb. 28, 1953.

⁴⁶ Ibid., April 29, May 7, Sept. 5, 21, 29, Oct. 6 and 22, 1953.

⁴⁷ Ibid., May 14, July 15, Aug. 13, and Nov. 25, 1953, and March 20, 1954.

⁴⁸ Ibid., Dec. 16, 1953.

⁴⁹ Ibid., July 11, 1954.

⁵⁰ Ibid., July 28, 1954, p. 1. The term “Heads of Agreement” refers to a preliminary agreement on basic principles, leaving details and technicalities to be worked out through further negotiations. For text, see Cmd. 9230, Egypt No. 1 (1954); New York Times, July 28, 1954, p. 2; 8 Middle East Journal 460 (1954); and 10 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International 141–142 (1954).

⁵¹ See comment on signing of agreement in New York Times, Oct. 20, 1954, p. 9.

⁵² Ibid., Dec. 7, 1954, p. 3.

⁵³ See reference to British and Egyptian announcements to that effect in New York Times, June 19, 1955, p. 27.

⁵⁴ For example, a “hand-over document” of each installation is to be prepared by the British forces in such detail as may be agreed upon between the respective headquarters, and to be handed over to the Egyptian authorities in advance of the transfer to enable the latter to assess the security and maintenance problems and to make appropriate arrangements to deal with them. Annex I, Pt. B, Sec. 8.

⁵⁵ This port, considered the largest military port in the Middle East, apparently was turned over to the Egyptian authorities in September, 1954.

⁵⁶ Note 1 provides that “Members of the British Forces shall not be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the Courts of Egypt, or to the civil jurisdiction of those Courts in any matter arising out of their official duties.”

⁵⁷ Note 7. The annex to Note 7(b) gives details regarding the pipeline system and its installations which are to be handed over. On Jan. 1, 1955, the British authorities turned over to Egypt the control of this 87-mile pipeline, which, however, will be made available to British forces in the event the base is reactivated. New York Times, Jan. 2, 1955, p. 2.

⁵⁸ Note 13, dealing with this matter, also provides that British inspectors of installations shall wear civilian clothes when paying visits of inspection.

⁵⁹ See note 14 supra.

⁶⁰ The 1936 treaty provided for a continuing alliance after 1956.

⁶¹ New York Times, July 31, 1954, p. 6.

⁶² Great Britain, Parl. Deb. (Hansard), House of Commons, Official Report, Vol. 532, No. 171, Nov. 2, 1954, col. 222.

⁶³ New York Times, July 30, 1954; Beirut Daily Star, July 29, 1954, p. 1.

⁶⁴ See Heyworth-Dunne, J., Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt (Wash., D. C, 1950)Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ London Times, Aug. 4, 1954, p. 7.

⁶⁶ New York Times, July 30, 1954.

⁶⁷ Ibid., July 29, 1954.

⁶⁸ New York Times, July 29, 1954.

⁶⁹ A number of Israeli-Egyptian border clashes have occurred along the border of the Gaza strip during 1955. See ibid., June 5, 1955, p. 1.

⁷⁰ According to an article in the New York Times, Major Salāh Sālim had suggested that ceding the Negev to Arab control, and thus creating a land link between Egypt and her Arab neighbors to the East, might influence Egypt to join a Western defense alliance. An Israeli Foreign Office spokesman, referring to Sālim’s suggestion, stated that Israeli territory would not “serve as a quid pro quo for a political or military arrangement of any kind.” Loc. cit., March 22, 1955, p. 14.

⁷¹ Ibid., Aug. 31, 1954, pp. 1, 4.

⁷² For text thereof see New York Times, May 26, 1950, p. 6; comment appears ibid., pp. 1, 6.

⁷³ Hansard, cited note 62 supra, cols. 326–328.

⁷⁴ New York Times, June 19, 1955, p. 16.

⁷⁵ See Hurewitz, J. C., “Arab-Israel Tensions,” 24 Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 73–81 (1952), especially at 78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

On Nov. 2, 1954, Minister of State Anthony Nutting denned the extent of these restrictions. He said in the House of Commons that “it is only those ships carrying strategic cargoes for Israel, together, of course, with all Israeli shipping whatever the cargo, that are denied passage … the sort of cargoes which are allowed through, in non-Israeli ships, are food supplies, meat supplies, and so on�non-strategic cargoes. In other words, cargoes outside the range of such things as oil supplies, which are included in strategic cargoes for this purpose.” Hansard, loc. cit., cols. 219–220.

⁷⁶ See statement by Egyptian Delegate Fawzi before the Security Council, Official Records, 550th Meeting, Aug. 1, 1951, Doc. S/P.V. 550, pp. 4–6; statement by RCC member Salāh Sālim, New York Times, Sept. 29, 1954, p. 1; and statement by Egyptian Delegate Azmi before the Security Council, Verbatim Record, 682nd Meeting, Oct. 14, 1954, Doc. S/P.V. 682, p. 52.

⁷⁷ For text, see Security Council, Official Records, 4th year, Spec. Supp. No. 3.

⁷⁸ Official Records, 549th Meeting, July 26, 1951, Doc. S/P.V. 549, pp. 2–14, at p. 12.

⁷⁹ Pamphlet entitled “The United Nations and the Egyptian Blockade of the Suez Canal” (Lawyers Committee on Blockades, N. Y.). Conclusions appear on p. 25.

⁸⁰ Resolutions of Aug. 11, 1949 (S/1376), Nov. 17, 1950 (S/1907), and Sept. 1, 1951 (S/2322). And see U.N. Press Release (SC/1567), Jan. 28, 1954, entitled “The Suez Canal Shipping Issue.”

⁸¹ On March 23, 1954, New Zealand introduced in the Security Council a draft resolution intended to reaffirm the Sept. 1, 1951, resolution, but it was vetoed on March 29, 1954, by the Soviet Union. New York Times, March 24 and 30, 1954.

⁸² Official Records, 664th Meeting, March 29, 1954, Doc. S/P.V. 664, p. 23.

⁸³ Verbatim Record, 682nd Meeting, Oct. 14, 1954, Doc. S/P.V. 682, pp. 57–58.

⁸⁴ See Ereli, Eliezer, “The Bat Galim Case before the Security Council,” 6 Middle Eastern Affairs 108–117 (1955)Google Scholar.

⁸⁵ New York Times, Sept. 29, 1954, p. 2; ibid., Sept. 30, 1954, p. 13.

⁸⁶ Ibid., Oct. 5, 1954, p. 13.

⁸⁷ Ibid., Dec. 8, 1954, p. 5.

⁸⁸ ibid., Jan. 2, 1955, p. 2.

⁸⁹ Ibid., Jan. 5, 1955, p. 8.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Hansard, loc. cit., col. 235.

⁹² Ibid., col. 331.

⁹³ See note 81 supra.

⁹⁴ Verbatim Record, 688th Meeting, Jan. 13, 1955, Doc. S/P.V. 688, p. 39.

⁹⁵ Nasser, Gamal Abdel (Gamal ‘Abd al-Nāsir), “The Eyyptian Revolution,” 43 Foreign Affairs 199–211 (1955), material quoted at p. 210CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁶ New York Times, Feb. 25, 1955, pp. 1, 5. Both parties ratified on Feb. 26, 1955, whereupon ratifications were exchanged. See Washington Sunday Star, Feb. 27, 1955, p. 34. For the text of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey, see 9 Middle East Journal 177–178 (1955), comment, ibid. 163–166.

⁹⁷ For text see 8 Middle Bast Journal 337–338 (1954). The agreement was signed at Karachi on April 2, 1954, and entered into force on the exchange of instruments of ratification at Ankara on June 12, 1954. It provides that the parties will consult to determine how co-operation might be effected in accordance with Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter, should an unprovoked attack occur against them from the outside. It contains an accession clause.

⁹⁸ See note 63 supra.

⁹⁹ New York Times, March 31, 1955, p. 6.

¹⁰⁰ The Treaty of Alliance Between His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom and His Majesty the King of Iraq, signed on June 30, 1930. For text see Davis, Helen Miller, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East 191–196 (2nd ed., Durham, N. C., 1953)Google Scholar.

¹⁰¹ New York Times, May 3, 1955, p. 6.

¹⁰² 33 Dept. of State Bull. 534, 653.

¹⁰³ See “Turkey-Iraq Pact Opens New Chapter in Mideast,” New York Times, News of the Week in Review, Feb. 27, 1955, p. 5; March 3, 1955, p. 5. Iraq does not regard its membership in the Turco-Iraqi pact as inconsistent with its commitments to the ACSP, and Art. IV of the former agreement declares that the obligations of the pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of the parties with any third state or states.

¹⁰⁴ Statement made in Calcutta on way home from the Bandung Conference, noted in The Reporter, June 16, 1955, pp. 24–25; the article discusses the problem of Middle Eastern pacts.

¹⁰⁵ The Hashemite dynasty today rules in Iraq and Jordan; it formerly ruled the Hejaz, its ancestral home, from which it was ousted in 1925 by the Saudis, who incorporated the Hejaz in their domain in 1926. In 1932 King Ibn Saud changed the name of his Kingdom from the Kingdom of the Hejaz and Nejd to Saudi Arabia, the “Arabia of the Sands.” See Sanger, R. H., The Arabian Peninsula 32–34 (Ithaca, 1954)Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁶ Note entitled “Arab Leaguelet,” The Economist (London), “Vol. 174, March 12, 1955, p. 884; and see “Egyptian-Iraq Differences Generating New Defense Alignments in Middle East,” in Middle East Report, Vol. VII, Feb. 28, 1955, pp. 1, 4Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁷ New York Times, Feb. 26, 1955, p. 4; and March 3, 1955, p. 5.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., June 4, 1955, p. 2.

¹⁰⁹ See notes 37 and 38 supra.