1 See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, In Dealings on Syria, Security Council Exposes Its Failings, N.Y. Times, May 9, 2014, at A12.

2 On the term stabilization, see Robert Muggah, Introduction to Stabilization Operations, Security and Development: States of Fragility 1 (Robert Muggah ed., 2013).

3 On the term operational code, see W. Michael Reisman, Folded Lies: Bribery, Crusades, and Reforms 16 (1979).

4 UN Charter, Art. 39.

5 SC Res. 713, pmbl. paras. 3–4 (Sept. 25, 1991). More recently, see, for example, Resolution 2014 (Oct. 21, 2011).

6 SC Res. 1528, pmbl. para. 17 (Feb. 27, 2004).

7 SC Res. 688, pmbl. para. 3 (Apr. 5, 1991).

8 SC Res. 1529, pmbl. para. 9 (Feb. 29, 2004).

9 SC Res. 794, pmbl. para. 3 (Dec. 3, 1992); see also SC Res. 733, pmbl. paras. 3–4 ( Jan. 23, 1992).

10 SC Res. 929, pmbl. para. 10 ( June 22, 1994); cf. SC Res. 1078, pmbl. para. 18 (Nov. 9, 1996).

11 SC Res. 1556, pmbl. para. 17 ( July 30, 2004).

12 SC Res. 1970, pmbl. para. 2 (Feb. 26, 2011); see also SC Res. 1973, pmbl. para. 5 (Mar. 17, 2011).

13 SC Res. 2165, pmbl. para. 18 ( July 14, 2014).

14 SC Res. 1894, para. 3 (Nov. 11, 2009).

15 See, e.g., SC Res. 2178, pmbl. para. 1 (Sept. 24, 2014); SC Res. 2118, pmbl. para. 3 (Sept. 27, 2013); SC Res. 1540, pmbl. para. 1 (Apr. 28, 2004); SC Res. 1373, pmbl. para. 3 (Sept. 28, 2001); UN Doc. S/23500 ( Jan. 31, 1992).

16 See José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers 192 (2005).

17 SC Res. 2127, pmbl. para. 3 (Dec. 5, 2013) (emphasis added). This language was presaged in Resolution 2121, pmbl. para. 3 (Oct. 10, 2013), and repeated in Resolution 2134, pmbl. para. 3 ( Jan. 28, 2014). The only previous times that the Council had referred to the “general absence of the rule of law” were in Resolutions 161, pmbl. para. B2 (Feb. 21, 1961), and 814, pmbl. para. 7 (Mar. 26, 1993).

18 SC Res. 2127, supra note 17, pmbl. para. 5.

19 SC Res. 2117, pmbl. para. 4 (Sept. 26, 2013).

20 Id., pmbl. para. 8; cf. SC Res. 2195, pmbl. para. 13 (Dec. 19, 2014) (expressing deep concern that “terrorist groups benefiting from transnational organized crime may contribute to undermining affected States, specifically their security, stability, governance, social and economic development”).

21 SC Res. 2136, pmbl. para. 10 ( Jan. 30, 2014); see also SC Res. 2134, supra note 17, pmbl. para. 7; SC Res. 2146, pmbl. para. 5 (Mar. 19, 2014); SC Res. 2198, pmbl. para. 15 (Jan. 29, 2015).

22 SC Res. 2177 (Sept. 18, 2014); see also UN Doc. S/PRST/2014/24 (Nov. 21, 2014).

23 See, e.g., SC Res. 1308 ( July 17, 2000); SC Res. 1983 ( June 7, 2011); UN Doc. S/PRST/2005/33 ( July 18, 2005); UN Doc. S/PRST/2001/16 ( June 28, 2001); UN SCOR, 55th Sess., 4087th mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.4087 ( Jan. 10, 2000); UN SCOR, 58th Sess., 4859th mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.4859 (Nov. 17, 2003); UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6668th mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.6668 (Nov. 23, 2011).

24 See generally James Cockayne, The UN Security Council and Organized Criminal Activity: Experiments in International Law Enforcement (United Nations University Working Paper Series, No. 3, Mar. 2014), at http://unu.edu/publications/working-papers/the-un-security-council-and-organized-criminal-activity-experiments-in-internationallaw-enforcement.html.

25 See, e.g., UN Docs. S/PRST/2007/22 (June 25, 2007), S/PRST/2009/32 (Dec. 8, 2009), S/PRST/2010/4 (Feb. 24, 2010), S/PRST/2012/16 (Apr. 25, 2012), S/PRST/2012/29 (Dec. 20, 2012), S/PRST/2013/4 (Apr. 15, 2013).

26 UN Scor, 67th Sess., 6760th mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.6760 (Apr. 25, 2012).

27 See, e.g., SC Res. 1459 ( Jan. 28, 2003); SC Res. 1817 ( July 11, 2008); SC Res. 1840 (Oct. 14, 2008); SC Res. 1885 (Sept. 15, 2009); SC Res. 1890 (Oct. 8, 2009); SC Res. 1892 (Oct. 13, 2009) (Haiti); SC Res. 2017 (Oct. 31, 2011).

28 See Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw & Arthur Boutellis, The Elephant In the Room: How can Peace Operations deal with Organized Crime?, annex (2013); SC Res. 2078, para. 4(g) (Nov. 28, 2012).

29 The term rule of law has been used in many presidential statements and resolutions, and the Council has hosted six open debates on the topic (including one in February 2014). See, e.g., S/PRST/2014/5 (Feb. 21, 2014). On the Council’s consideration of the rule of law, see generally Jeremy Matam Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and Therule of law (2007), and Jeremy Farrall, Impossible Expectations? TheUNSecurity Council’s Promotion of the Rule of Law After Conflict, in The Role of International Law in Rebuilding Societies After Conflict: Great Expectations 134 (Brett Bowden, Hilary Charlesworth & Jeremy Farrall eds., 2009).

30 See Stephen Humphreys, Theatre of the rule of Law: Transnational Legal Intervention in Theory and Practice (2010); Per Bergling, Erik Wennerstro¨m & Richard Zajac Sannerholm, Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform: Casual Assumptions, Unintended Risks and the Need for Norms, 4 Hague J. On rule L. 98 (2012); Richard Zajac Sannerholm, Looking Back, Moving Forward:UNPeace Operations and Rule of Law Assistance in Africa, 1989–2010, 4 Hague J. On rule L. 359 (2012).

31 See Jake Sherman, Peacekeeping and Support for State Sovereignty, 2012 Ann. Rev. Global Peace Operations 12.

32 See, e.g., SC Res. 2141 (Mar. 5, 2014).

33 Compare SC Res. 1983, supra note 23, pmbl. para. 16, with SC Res. 2177, supra note 22, pmbl. para. 5.

34 See, e.g., SCOR, 68th Sess., 6982nd mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.6982 & Resumption 1 ( June 19, 2013).

35 See UN Charter, Art. 2(7).

36 SC Res. 2098, para. 9 (Mar. 28, 2013). The idea for establishing a peace-enforcement force was first raised by governments in the region and subsequently recommended to the Council by the secretary-general. See Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region, para. 60, UN Doc. S/2013/119 (Feb. 27, 2013).

37 SC Res. 2098, supra note 36, para. 9.

38 Id.

39 SC Res. 2100, paras. 16(a)(i)–(ii), 17 (Apr. 25, 2013).

40 SC Res. 2149, paras. 30(a)(i), (f), 40 (Apr. 10, 2014). A subsequent resolution required MINUSCA to “assist … in the establishment of the national Special Criminal Court” and “arrest[] and hand[] over to the CAR authorities those responsible for serious human rights violations and abuses and serious violations of international humanitarian law in the country so that they can be brought to justice.” SC Res. 2217, paras. 32(g), 33(a) (Apr. 28, 2015).

41 SC Res. 1925, paras. 11, 12(a) (May 28, 2010); see also, e.g., SC Res. 1967, para. 8 ( Jan. 19, 2011). A 2014 report by theUNOffice of Internal Oversight Services noted, however, “a persistent pattern of peacekeeping operations not intervening with force when civilians are under attack,” even when their mandates bestowed on them such authority. Office of Internal Oversight Services, Evaluation of the Implementation and Results of Protection of Civilians Mandates in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, at 1, UN Doc. A/68/787 (2014).

42 See Twenty-Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, paras. 4–8, UN Doc. S/2011/387 (June 24, 2011); Adam Nossiter, U.N. and France Strike at Ivory Coast Strongman’s Bases and Residence, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 2011, at A8; see also, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, para. 15, UN Doc. S/2012/ 355 (May 23, 2012) [here in after May 2012 MONUSCO Report] (reporting on a joint operation of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and Forces armeés de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) “to enhance the protection of civilians”).

43 See Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations Peace keeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines 34 (2008). Among the voluminous literature on UN peace keeping operations and the use of force, see, for example, Trevor Find Lay, The Use of Force in UN Peaceoperations (2002), and James Sloan, The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century (2011).

44 SC Res. 2098, supra note 36, para. 12(b) (emphasis added). The Council’s mandate that the Intervention Brigade was to “neutraliz[e] armed groups” seemed to imply that the brigade was a party to the conflict. That would mean that the brigade was a lawful target itself and subject to international humanitarian law. If the brigade was a party, questions would arise as to whether MONUSCO as a whole was also a party. See generally Peace Forces at War: Implications Under International Humanitarian Law, 108 ASIL PROC. 149 (2014).

45 SC Res. 2164, para. 13(a)(i) ( June 25, 2014).

46 SC Res. 2149, supra note 40, para. 30(a)(i).

47 Created in 2004, theUNStabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is the lone prior “stabilization mission.”

48 See United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, supra note 43, at 23 (listing one of the core functions of peacekeeping as “[c]reat[ing] a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights”). One of the possible consequences of this focus on stabilizing existing governments is to decrease the mission’s ability to play a constructive role in a peace process, given that the mission’s impartiality would be called into question.

49 SC Res. 2178, supra note 15.

50 UN Doc. S/2014/648, annex (Sept. 3, 2014).

51 Supra note 15.

52 Supra note 15.

53 By contrast, Resolution 1624, para. 1 (Sept. 14, 2005), only “called upon” members to adopt measures to prohibit the incitement to commit terrorist acts.

54 See Jan Wouters & Jed Odermatt, Quis custodiet consilium securitatis? Reflections on the Lawmaking Powers of the Security Council, in The Security Council as Global Legislator 71 (Vesselin Popovski & Trudy Fraser eds., 2014).

55 SC Res. 2178, supra note 15, para. 5.

56 Id., para. 6.

57 Id., para. 8.

58 Id., para. 9.

59 SC Res. 1373, supra note 15, para. 2(g).

60 In Resolution 2086, para. 8 ( Jan. 21, 2013), the Council set out ten possible components of contemporary UN multi dimensional peacekeeping missions.

61 See, e.g., Report of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office on Human Rights Violations Committed by Agents of the Congolese National Police, at 11 (Oct. 2014) [here in after Likofi Report] (concluding that “at least nine men, including a minor, were victims of summary and extra judicial executions, and at least 32 men, including three minors, who were victims of enforced disappearances by [Congolese National Police] agents in the scope of Operation Likofi”); UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report 51 (May 2014) (concluding that “[t]here are reasonable grounds to believe that both parties to the conflict have perpetrated violations” of human rights and international humanitarian law); Report of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office on Human Rights Violations Perpetrated by Soldiers of the Congolese Armed Forces and Combatants of the M23 in Goma and Sake, North Kivu Province, and in and Around Minova, South Kivu Province, from 15 November to 2 December 2012, at 15 (May 2013) [herein after UN Joint Human Rights Office Report] (concluding that FARDC soldiers and combatants of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) armed group are responsible for “gross violations of human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law”).

62 Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations 18, UN Doc. A/CN.4/637/Add.1 (2011) (comments of the United Nations on then draft Article 13 of the International Law Commission’s draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations).

63 The possible responsibility of international organizations for aiding or assisting a state or another international organization in the commission of an internationally wrongful act is set out in draft Article 14 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations. See Report on the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, para. 87,UNDoc. A/66/10 (2011). Draft Article 14 and its commentary establish a high threshold for aiding and assisting; they required, among other things, that the organization have prior “knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act,” that the organization intended that its actions would facilitate the wrongful act, and that the organization’s aid or assistance contributed significantly to the commission of that act. See id., para. 88 (commentary on Draft Article 14). Aside from its possible aiding and assisting responsibility, the organization itself may have an obligation under international law not to assist states if it knows that those states are committing violations of international humanitarian law. Cf. Marco Sasso`li, State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 401, 413 (2002). There does not appear to be a due diligence obligation, however, that required the organization to implement the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP),UNDoc. A/67/775–S/2013/110, annex (Mar. 5, 2013). Thus, the secretary-general simply wrote that the HRDDP seeks to ensure that UN support to non-UN forces is “consistent with the purposes and principles as set out in the Charter of the United Nations and with its responsibility to respect, promote and encourage respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.” UN Doc. A/67/775–S/2013/110. Some states have rules that are similar to the HRDDP, such as the “Leahy Law.” See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, sec. 620M, 22 USC 2378d; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. 113-76, Div. C, Dept. of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014, sec. 8057 ( Jan. 17, 2014).

64 Supra note 63. The secretary-general initially decided to institute this policy on July 13, 2011, in his Decision 2011/18. On October 25, 2011, the secretary-general advised member states of the policy. But the policy’s full text was transmitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council (and published as a UN document) only in February 2013. The HRDDP originated in the organization’s response to FARDC abuses in 2008–09 while that army was being supported by the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, MONUSCO’s predecessor). See Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations, supra note 62, at 18; SC Res. 1856 (Dec. 22, 2008), para. 14; Jeffrey Gettleman, U.N. Told Not to Join Congo Army in Operation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2009, at A8. By late 2009, the secretary-general instituted a “conditionality policy” whereby MONUC would

immediately intercede with the FARDC command if the Mission ha[d] reason to believe that elements of a unit receiving its support [was] committing grave violations of human rights, international humanitarian law or refugee law, and it [would] suspend support for a unit if FARDC takes no action against those responsible or if the elements of the unit nevertheless continue[d] to commit violations.

Thirtieth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, para. 13, UN Doc. S/2009/623 (Dec. 4, 2009). This approach was subsequently codified by the Council in December 2009. See SC Res. 1906, para. 22 (Dec. 23, 2009) (“the support of MONUC to FARDC-led military operations against foreign and Congolese armed groups is strictly conditioned on FARDC’s compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law”). In 2010 and 2011, the conditionality policy that applied to UN operations in the DRC was generalized to all UN entities in the form of the HRDDP. See Jérémie Labbé & Arthur Boutellis, Peace Operations by Proxy: Implications for Humanitarian Action of UN Peacekeeping Partnerships with Non-UN Security Forces, 95 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 539, 554–55 (2013). On the HRDDP, see also Helmut Philipp Aust, The UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy: An Effective Mechanism against Complicity of Peacekeeping Forces?, 20 J. Conflict & Security L. 61 (2015).

65 HRDDP, supra note 63.

66 Id. While “support” is broadly defined, the United Nations does work with non-UN security forces in ways that might not constitute “support” (for example, by coordinating parallel operations) and hence not trigger the policy even when grave violations of human rights have been committed. See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, French Army Investigates an Allegation of Sex Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2015, at A11.

67 HRDDP, supra note 63.

68 Id.

69 Id.

70 Id.

71 SC Res. 2106, pmbl. para. 12 ( June 24, 2013) (women, peace, and security); SC Res. 2143, para. 21 (Mar. 7, 2014) (children and armed conflict); SC Res. 2185, para. 23 (Nov. 20, 2014) (UN policing in peacekeeping and peace building).

72 SC Res. 2217, supra note 40, para. 44; SC Res. 2149, supra note 40, para. 39; SC Res. 2127, supra note 17, para. 40.

73 SC Res. 2162, para. 22 ( June 25, 2014); SC Res. 2112, para. 23 ( July 30, 2013).

74 SC Res. 2147, paras. 4(b), 5(f), (i) (Mar. 28, 2014); SC Res. 2098, supra note 36, paras. 12(b), 15(f).

75 SC Res. 2190, para. 12 (Dec. 15, 2014).

76 SC Res. 2100, supra note 39, para. 26; SC Res. 2164, supra note 45, paras. 13(a)(vi), 16.

77 SC Res. 2093, para. 4 (Mar. 6, 2013); SC Res. 2102, para. 11 (May 2, 2013); SC Res. 2124, paras. 15–16 (Nov. 12, 2013); SC Res. 2158, para. 9 (May 29, 2014).

78 SC Res. 2109, para. 16 ( July 11, 2013); SC Res. 2155, paras. 4(a), 14 (May 27, 2014); SC Res. 2187, paras. 4(a)(vi), 14 (Nov. 25, 2014).

79 SC Res. 2113, para. 18 (July 30, 2013); SC Res. 2173, para. 20 (Aug. 27, 2014).

80 See, e.g., SC Res. 2190, supra note 75, para. 12.

81 Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (1999).

82 Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, UN Doc. ST/SGB/2003/13 (2003).

83 While the United Nations has not explicitly conditioned its support for non-UN forces on adherence to these other policies, as it has with the HRDDP, the organization has still sought their application. See, e.g., SC Res. 2093, supra note 77, paras. 1, 14 (authorizing the African Union Mission in Somalia to “to take all necessary measures, in full compliance with its obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law” and requesting that that mission “apply[] policies consistent with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse in the context of peacekeeping”).

84 HRDDP, supra note 63, para. 14(b), (c); see also id., paras. 26–27.

85 See Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, para. 59,UN Doc. S/2014/453 (June 30, 2014) (“The conduct of joint military operations in the context of the implementation of the MONUSCO human rights due diligence policy created additional opportunities to advocate the protection of children with the FARDC military authorities.”).

86 Reports made by the Secretary-General to the Security Council indicate that UN missions are taking seriously their obligation to implement the HRDDP. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, paras. 70, 82, UN Doc. S/2014/158 (Mar. 6, 2014); Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, para. 38, UN Doc. S/2014/157 (Mar. 5, 2014); Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, paras. 46, 76, 78, UN Doc. S/2014/140 (Mar. 3, 2014).

87 See Likofi Report, supra note 61, at 5. Scott Campbell, director of the UN Joint Human Rights Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was expelled from the country following the publication of the Likofi Report. See Nicholas Bariyo, Congo Expels U.N. Human Rights Official After Report on Police, Wall ST. J. (Online), Oct. 17, 2014.

88 See Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report, supra note 61.

89 Compare SC Res. 2109, supra note 78, with SC Res. 2155, supra note 78.

90 SC Res. 2155, supra note 78, para. 4(a)(vi).

91 SeeUN Joint Human Rights Office Report, supra note 61; May 2012 MONUSCO Report, supra note 42, para. 15 (noting that a MONUSCO-FARDC joint operation was taken only “following the screening of FARDC battalion commanders in accordance with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy”); Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, para. 70, UN Doc. S/2014/450 ( June 30, 2014) (reporting that MONUSCO confirmed that FARDC soldiers raped at least eleven women in North Kivu and that “[h]igh-level advocacy was undertaken with the leadership of FARDC to hold the perpetrators accountable, in line with the human rights due diligence policy, urging action and warning that MONUSCO support to the regiment involved would be cut, should no action be taken”).

92 See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, paras. 37, 51, UN Doc. S/2015/172 (Mar. 10, 2015); UN Doc. S/PV.7410, 3–4 (Mar. 19, 2015) (statement of Martin Kobler); Michelle Nichols, U.N. Peacekeepers Previously Supported Blacklisted Congo Generals, Reuters, Mar. 19, 2015;UN Waived Human Rights Concerns over 2 Congo Generals, Associated Press, Mar. 19, 2015.

93 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has stated that “[i]n some cases, the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy has led to improvements in the behaviour of FARDC troops and has resulted in a generally safer environment for civilians.” Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation and the Activities of Her Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, para. 23, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/42 (Sept. 1, 2014).

94 See Human Rights Watch, “The Power These Men Have Over Us”: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia (Sept. 2014), at https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-over-us/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-african-union-forces. The African Union rejected these claims. See Press Release, The African Union Strongly Rejects the Conclusions Contained in the Report of the Human Rights Watch on Allegations on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by [the African Union Mission in Somalia] (Sept. 8, 2014), at http://au.int/en/content/african-union-strongly-rejects-conclusions-contained-report-human-rights-watch-allegations-s.

95 See, e.g., SC Res. 794, supra note 9, pmbl. paras. 2–3; SC Res. 808, pmbl. para. 9 (Feb. 22, 1993); SC Res. 940, pmbl. para. 4 ( July 31, 1994); SC Res. 929, supra note 10, pmbl. para. 9; SC Res. 955, pmbl. para. 7 (Nov. 8, 1994); see also supra text accompanying notes 7–12.

96 See, e.g., SC Res. 1973, supra note 12, pmbl. para. 10; SC Res. 1078, supra note 10, pmbl. para. 9.

97 SC Res. 2098, supra note 36, para. 9. When the force’s mandate was subsequently renewed, the Council reiterated the point. See SC Res. 2211, para. 1 (Mar. 26, 2015); SC Res. 2147, supra note 74, para. 1.

98 SC Res. 2149, supra note 40, para. 40. The point was emphasized again when MINUSCA was renewed. See SC Res. 2217, supra note 40, para. 32(f).

99 SC Res. 2127, supra note 17, pmbl. para. 3 (emphasis added).

100 SC Res. 2177, supra note 22, pmbl. para. 5 (emphasis added).