¹ The treaties in question are: (1) The treaty of Tartu (Estonia), February 2, 1920, 1 Sbornik Deistvuiushtchikh Dogorovov (hereafter cited as Sbornik), 100–116, especially Arts. 3–7; (2)Treaty of Moscow (Georgia), May 7, 1920, 1 Sbornik, 27–33, especially Arts. 2–6; (3)Treaty of Moscow (Lithuania), July 12, 1920, 1 Sbornik, 50–62, especially Arts. 4–5; (4)Treaty of Riga (Latvia), August 11, 1920, 1 Sbornik, 35–49, especially Art. 4; (5)Preliminary Peace of Riga (Poland), October 12, 1920, 1 Sbornik, 63–73, especially Art. 2; (6)Treaty of Dorpat (Finland), October 14, 1920, 1 Sbornik, 76–99, especially Arts. 12–16; (7)Treaty of Moscow (Persia), February 26, 1921, 2 Sbornik, 36–41, especially Arts. 2–7; (8)Treaty of Moscow (Afghanistan), February 28, 1921, 2 Sbornik 15-17; (9) Treaty of Moscow (Turkey), March 18, 1921, 2 Sbornik, 72–77; (10) the final Treaty of Riga (Poland), March 18, 1921, 2 Sbornik, 43–71, especially Art. 5; (11) Treaty of Kars (Turkey), October 13, 1921, 3 Sbornik, 49–57, and (12) the Provisional Agreement of Prague (Czechoslovakia), June 5, 1922, 4 Sbornik 17–21.

² Cf. the remarks of M. Litvinov at the Moscow Conference: “The Russian delegation conceives the difficulty there is in talking of disarmament as long as peace has not been guaranteed politically. But we believe that the treaties bearing our signature constitute a guarantee of peace and non-aggression as real as any other new paper bearing our signature…But, independently of the result of the present negotiations, Russia renounces the use of armed force for the solution of conflicts…On my side, in my capacity as President of the Russian Delegation and Commissar ad interim of the People for Foreign Affairs, I declare categorically in the name of the Russian Government that Russia has no intention of attacking the territory of its neighbors far or near, nor of resolving its controversies by force of arms” (Conference de Moscou pour la Limitation des Armements (Moscow, 1923), pp. 100, 102, 103). The viewpoint of the Soviet Government as regards the League of Nations was likewise made clear by M. Litvinov: “It must be borne in mind that among the states disposed to sign the agreement we are drafting is Russia, which is not a member of the League of Nations and which, according to all probabilities will not soon be…There may arise a situation where all the states represented may unite either among themselves or with other states members of the League of Nations, to annul or modify unilaterally the projected treaty. It is evident that Russia can in no way admit such an eventuality.” Ibid., p. 133.

³ This view was expressed by Litvinov in the following language: “It is desirable that a convention relative to arbitration should be signed by the states represented at the conference. The Russian delegation has never rejected in principle the idea of arbitration and does not do so now. It confines itself to pointing out its insufficiency and to indicating that the fact of signing such an agreement would not yield the desired results” (in the direction of disarmament). Ibid., p. 97. It should be noted, however, that while, in the draft proposals of the disrupted conference Russia gave her assent in principle to the arbitration of a limited category of disputes, she was not bound, after the failure of the negotiations, to adhere to the specific modalities of liquidation there mentioned.

⁴ Such was the statement of the Russian representative, Admiral Berens. Cf. Le Temps, February 17, 1924.

⁵ These are (1) The Treaty of Paris (Turkey), December 17, 1925, 4 Sbornik (U. S. S. R.), No. 2, 15–16; (2) the Treaty of Berlin (Germany), April 24, 1926, 53 League of Nations Treaty Series, 392-396; (3) the Treaty of Paghman (Afghanistan), August 31, 1926, Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporiadjenii, Part 2, No. 3, January 20, 1928, Document 16, pp. 45–48; (4) the Treaty of Moscow (Lithuania), September 28, 1926, Izvestia, No. 225, September 30, 1926; (5) the initialed Treaty of Riga (Latvia), March 9, 1927, Izvestia, March 11, 1927; and (6) the Treaty of Moscow (Persia), October 1, 1927, Ekonomitcheskaia Jim, October 2, 1927, while the ancillary treaties, of no little importance to the working of the general system, are (1) the Treaty of Teheran (Persia–Turkey), April 22, 1926, Echo de la Turquie, June 16, 1926, reinforced by the Additional Protocol of Teheran, June 15, 1928, European Economic and Political Survey, Vol. 3, No. 21, July 15, 1928, p. 718, and (2) the Treaty of Kabul (Persia–Afghanistan), November 28, 1927, Le Messager de Teheran, February 10, 1928, reinforcing the briefer Treaty of Teheran, June 22, 1921, 33 League of Nations Treaty Series, 285–302, which embodied the germinal principles of the later pact. The recent treaty between Turkey and Afghanistan, May 25, 1928 (European Economic and Political Survey, Vol. 3, No. 18, May 15–31, 1928, p. 590), is not included as it lacks, for reasons of non–contiguity of the signatory states, most of the earmarks of the other treaties.

⁶ Cf.“Verhandlungen Ober einen Ostpakt,” Europäische Gespräche, Vol. IV (1926), pp. 398-401, 621–625; Bredt, D., “Russische Rtickversicherung,” ibid., pp. 403–417, and “Baltic Security Pact Negotiations,” European Economic and Political Survey, Vol. I, No. 18, May 31, 1926, pp. 14ff., and Vol. II, pp. 51ff., for general discussions of the negotiations. An interesting survey of the situation from the Russian standpoint is given by A. Rykov in Izvestia, April 20, 1927.

⁷ Cf. the remarks of M. Litvinov, Acting People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on December 23, 1925, à propos the Treaty of Paris, characterizing it as “an important step along the road to general peace”: “The best indication of the peaceful tendency of the agreement is the readiness of the Soviet Government to conclude analogous agreements with all countries with which it is in normal relations. Only a system of concluding between all nations agreements similar to the Soviet-Turkish one will preclude the possibility of the formation of political groups and combinations antagonistic to one another and thereby really foster the prevention of wars, something that cannot be accomplished through the machinations of the League of Nations or those of the Locarno sort” (Russian Review, Vol. IV, No. 2, January 15, 1926, pp. 28–29).

⁸ Such is the actual expression in the preamble to the Treaty of Moscow with Persia, October 1, 1927; similar expressions are found in the preambles of the Treaty of Paris and the Turco-Persian Treaty of Teheran, indicating the conscious desire, in the post-war period in the Middle East, to establish objective rules governing international conduct.

⁹ Each of the contracting parties binds itself to abstain from any attack upon the other; each likewise binds itself not to take part in any alliance or agreement of a political character with one or more outside powers directed against the other contracting party, as well as in any affiance or agreement with one or more outside powers directed against the military or naval security of the other contracting party. In addition to this, each of the two contrading Powers binds itself not to participate in any hostile act by one or more Powers aimed against the other contracting party.” Treaty of Paris (Turkey), Art. 2. In this, the first of the security treaties, the non-aggression stipulations are combined indiscriminately with the anti-blockade features. Cf. Treaty of Teheran (Turkey-Persia), Art. 3; Treaty of Paghman (Afghanistan), Art. 2; Treaty of Moscow (Lithuania), Art. 3; Treaty of Moscow (Persia), Art. 2, par. 1: “Each of the contracting parties undertakes to abstain from every attack and aggressive action against the other party and from advancing its armed forces into the territory of the other party” and Art. 3, par. 1. “Each of the contracting parties undertakes not to participate either de facto or formally in political alliances or agreements directed against the security of the other party, on land or at sea, or against its integrity, independence or sovereignty.” These provisions are virtually identic with the corresponding paragraphs of the Treaty of Kabul. Interestingly there is no express pledge of this character in either the Treaty of Berlin or the Treaty of Riga, the latter simply stating that “both parties undertake not to join any coalition which would be directed against the political independence or against the territorial integrity of the other party” without explicitly promising nonaggression in blanket form.

¹⁰ Treaty of Paris, Art. 2, embracing, according to Protocol 2, “all financial and economic agreements”; Treaty of Teheran, Art. 3; Treaty of Berlin, Art. 3, referring solely to non-participation in economic and financial boycott; Treaty of Paghman, Art. 2, mentioning both boycott and blockade; Treaty of Moscow (Lithuania), Art. 4, closely modeled on the Treaty of Berlin; Treaty of Riga, Art. 2; Treaty of Moscow (Persia), Art. 3, par. 2: “Moreover, both contracting parties are to refuse participation in economic boycotts and blockades organized by outside Powers against either of the contracting parties”; Treaty of Kabul, Art. 3, virtually identic with the corresponding clause of the Treaty of Moscow with Persia.

¹¹ In this the Soviet Union was influenced by manifold considerations of a political character, such as the possibility of creating a new balance of power between communist and capitalist states, but these are beyond the scope of this discussion.

¹² Treaty of Paris, Art. 1; Treaty of Teheran, Art. 2; Treaty of Paghman, Art. 1. These refer to “military action or operations” in a colorless, objective, non-moral way. Persia and Afghanistan had already paved the way for these expressions in Art. 9 of the Treaty of Teheran of June 22,1921, which reads: “In the event of one party becoming involved in a war with a third Power, the other party, in accordance with the rules of neutrality, binds itself not to favor the third Power in any respect” (33 League of Nations Treaty Series, 285-302). It will be noted that this article did not prescribe neutrality, but proscribed any type of benevolent neutrality, doubtless due to Persia’s experiences in the World War. Contrast this stipulation with the phraseology of the Treaty of Kabul, infra.

¹³ Treaty of Berlin, Art. 2; Treaty of Moscow (Lithuania), Art. 3, both of which stress pacific behavior, and Treaty of Riga, Art. 1, all of which specifically speak of “attack” and imply moral censure. Peculiarly, the Lithuanian treaty stringently avoided the use of the word “neutrality,” in order not to affront Geneva, much as Washington avoided the term in his first proclamation of neutrality in 1793 in order not to affront Paris. The meaning of the clause is, however, beyond question.

¹⁴ Treaty of Moscow (Persia), Art. 2, par. 2; and Treaty of Kabul, Art. 2, pars. 2,3. These are phrased to condemn attack, and then impose a new obligation on the attacked party “regardless of any strategical, tactical or political considerations or advantages” not to violate the neutrality of the other party.

² Protocol 3 of the Treaty of Paris, the final paragraph of the notes exchanged at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Berlin, Art. 4 of the Treaty of Paghman, and Art. 5 of the Treaty of Moscow with Persia all make blanket promises to settle all kinds of differences “by peaceful means suitable in each particular case.” This is paralleled in Art. 8 of the Treaty of Teheran. Art. 5 of the Treaty of Moscow and an uninitialled article to be included in the Treaty of Riga both provide for conciliation commissions, in the latter case to be headed by a neutral chairman. (Cf. Le Temps, March 12, 1927, p. 2, c. 2.) Only the special protocol attached to the Treaty of Kabul makes provision for “arbitrators” as such, whereas the description of their rôle in fact makes them conciliators. Russia, it will be recalled, is not a signatory of the Treaty of Kabul.

¹⁶ It is interesting to note the frequent insistence by essentially conservative members of the legal profession upon judicial settlement as the all-important, if not exclusive means of solution of international difficulties. There is also the general tendency of the public at large, almost the world over, to think of arbitration as the term synonymous with pacific settlement, and to advocate it for all types of controversies indiscriminately; this seems to be thoroughly representative of the broad, middle-of-the-road type of mind. Lastly there is the insistence just noted on the part of Soviet diplomats, on conciliation as the all-sufficient form of pacific settlement. (Cf. on this point the Russo-German Conciliation Convention signed at Moscow on January 25, 1929, L’Europe Nouvelle, 12me mink, No. 574, Feb. 9, 1929, pp. 190-191. In all likelihood it is the fluid, supple character attaching to the conciliatory process, the wide latitude of discretion which it affords, its comparative freedom from rigid procedural trammels and conceptions, say, of vested rights of a legal character —in short, it is its dependence upon the inherent reasonableness and fairness of recommendations of conciliators rather than upon stratified conceptions derived from pre-existing social, political and economic systems that gives to conciliation an unusual appeal to the radical, if not revolutionary, mind.

¹⁷ Three possible meanings suggest themselves as within the range of usage: (1) the sense in which a “neutral” chairman would be chosen from a country other than Russia or Latvia—this in the strictest sense of the word neuter; (2) as referring to a national of a country not a participant in the World War or, alternatively, in the Russian civil war—a sense which would exclude nationals of most countries members of the League of Nations; (3) as referring to a national of a country which has pre-pledged to the Soviet Union its future political and military neutrality. In this sense citizens of all the nations which have concluded security and neutrality treaties with the Soviet Union would be eligible; likewise those of Estonia and Lithuania merely in the light of the policies of permanent neutrality for those countries predeterminedly outlined in 1920 in the Treaties of Tartu (Art. 5) and Moscow (Art. 5.)

¹⁸ On August 27, 1928, through its ambassador at Moscow, the French Government extended to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics the invitation to adhere to the Pact of Paris. On August 29 the proposal of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to adhere to the pact was duly ratified and the formal act of adhesion, accompanied by a long note of explanation, was forwarded on August 31 to the French Government for transmission to Washington, where it was received on October 1. Cf. State Department press releases reproduced in the United States Daily, October 2, 3, 1928. A TASS dispatch from Moscow under date of September 18, 1928, cites Izvestia as pointing out that the resolution of ratification was passed on the same day on which the Soviet Government decided to adhere. “The resolution was passed by the presidium in the interval between two sessions of the Central Executive Committee and, according to the Constitution, such a resolution is an act substituting for the decision of the committee itself. Regarding international treaties concluded by Russia as well as acts of adhesion, a resolution of the presidium is an act of ratification.”

¹⁹ Cf.on these points paragraph 10 of the British note of May 19, 1928, reserving Britain’s “freedom of action” with regard to “certain regions” (not specified in the correspondence) “the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety” and in regard to which “His Majesty’s Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered.” The British Government also concurs in the view of Secretary of State Kellogg, expressed on April 28, 1928, that “That right (self-defence) is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty” as well as “inalienable.” Cf. Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1928, p. 143, and Notes Exchanged between the United States and other Powers on the Subject of a Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War, reprinted in the United States Daily, Aug. 10, 1928, and Supplement to this Journal, January, 1929, pp. 1–13.

²⁰ The problem here involved is, of course, a purely practical one, which will cease to exist if the Pact of Paris is universally accepted. Meanwhile a rapidly diminishing theoretical problem exists whose solution is, of necessity, governed by the positive rules of international law applicable as between potential parties to such a conflict.

²¹ This principle of the recovery of liberty of action is implicit in the preamble but most explicit in the correspondence preceding the signature of the Pact. For examples of the understandings on this point cf. the French note of March 30, 1928, declaring that “if one of the signatory states were to fail to keep its word, the other signatories should be released from their engagement with respect to the offending State.” This was inserted as Article 3 of the French draft treaty of April 20, 1928. Similarly the German Government declared: “It is self-evident that if one state violates the pact the other contracting parties regain their freedom of action with reference to that state. The state affected by the violation of the pact is therefore not prevented from taking up arms on its own part against the breaker of the peace” (Note of April 27, 1928). The same view is set forth in paragraphs 6-8 of the British note of May 19, 1928. The Canadian Government, in its note of May 30, 1928, made it clear that in its view the treaty did not “impose any obligation upon a signatory in relation to a state which has not signed the treaty or has broken it,” and added that “any decision to apply sanctions … would not appear to conflict with the obligations of the treaty.” The Government of the Union of South Africa took it for granted, in its note of June 15, 1928, “that a violation by any one of the parties of any of the provisions of the proposed treaty will free the other parties from obligation to observe its terms in respect of the party committing such violation.” This is also confirmed in paragraph 3 of the Czechoslovak note of acceptance of July 20, 1928.

²² During most of the diplomatic correspondence preliminary to the signing of the Pact of Paris the phrase “treaties guaranteeing neutrality” was used (cf. the American notes of February 27, April 13, and June 23, 1928, and the French note of March 30, 1928), although the topic was initially mentioned in the discussion of the commitments of the Powers, including “international conventions relative to guarantees of neutrality” “which engagements impose upon them duties which they cannot contravene.” Without explicitly mentioning the neutrality commitments, Baron Tanaka, in his note of May 26, 1928, referred blanketly to “agreements guaranteeing the public peace.” In all the correspondence after June 23, reference was made to “neutrality treaties” or “treaties of neutrality” (American note of June 23, French note of July 14, Czechoslovak note of July 20). It is not impossible that a change in the meaning of the phrase used, to make it more inclusive, was consciously intended by M. Briand and Dr. Beneš, especially as the obligations undertaken in the preamble of the Provisional Agreement of Prague of June 5, 1922, to maintain neutrality under all circumstances affecting Russia and Czechoslovakia, form a basic element in Czechoslovak foreign policy.

²³ Cf. Graham, M. W., “The Effect of the League of Nations Covenant upon the Theory and Practice of Neutrality,” California Law Review, July, 1927, Vol. 15, No. 5, pp. 357–377, for an exposition of this point of view.Google Scholar

²⁴ The Persian attitude was made clear in Art. 9 of the Treaty of Teheran, leaving Persia free to undertake any other commitments. This was reiterated in Art. 6 of the Treaty of Moscow, and Art. 7 of the Treaty of Kabul. On signing the Treaty of Moscow, however, Persia made it clear that it had assumed no contradictory commitments, and yet declared that the Persian Government would respect and carry out all its obligations under the Covenant (Protocol I and exchange of notes of October 1, 1927, Ekonomitcheskaia Jizn, October 2, 1927). This would make it appear that Persia sees no conflict between her obligations under the three treaties in question and the Covenant.

The German attitude was made clear in the third paragraph of the notes exchanged at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, whereby no clash between the obligations of the treaty and those of the Covenant was envisaged (53 League of Nations Treaty Series, 395). Similar views were expressed by the Lithuanian Government in the exchange of notes at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Moscow (Izvestia, September 30, 1926), and by the Latvian Government in the negotiations preceding the Treaty of Riga (cf. sec. 2 of the Latvian note of April 28, 1926, Riga Sevodnia, May 8, 1926). The Estonian and Finnish Governments seem to have shared this opinion in their negotiations with the Soviet Union (Riga Sevodnia, May 7, 1926; Izvestia, August 3, 1926).

²⁵ The same reasoning applies to the proposal made by M. Litvinov on December 29, 1928, to Poland, to put the provisions of the Pact of Paris immediately into force as between Russia and Poland. The result of this move, viz., the signing of the so-called Litvinov Protocol, at Moscow, February 9, 1929, between Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union, in nowise changes the principles involved. For the text of the protocol, cf. L’Europe Nouvelle, 12me armee, No. 578, March 9, 1929, pp. 325–326.

²⁶ The similarities may best be noted in the following manner: