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Send back the Lifeboats: Confronting the Project of Saving International Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2017
Extract
The idea that international law is in crisis—needing the inspired thinking and skilled practice of many kinds of international lawyers to save it—has a rich history in those countries where the enterprise of international law has been most deeply established and embraced. Unsurprisingly, saving international law remains a project shared by many twenty-first-century international lawyers. Such a commitment is certainly not confined to legal academics. Even some legal advisers, counsel, judges, and activists think of themselves as having a role to play in rescuing international law. Being a disengaged bystander while grave hazards supposedly threaten international law has not seemed to be a proper option for many of these professionals who share a calling for heroic self-sacrifice to salvage the ostensibly endangered entity of international law.
- Type
- Agora: Reflections on Anthony D’Amato’s “Groundwork for International Law”
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- Copyright © American Society of International Law 2014
References
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