1 Article 25 of the UN Charter provides that “[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with die... Charter.” Pursuant to Article 39, the Council has the authority to impose measures to be taken by states to restore international peace and security.

2 SC Res. 731 (Jan. 21, 1992), 31 ILM 732 (1992).

3 SC Res. 1189 (Aug. 13, 1998).

4 The CTC is a committee of the “whole,” i.e., comprising all fifteen members of the Security Council.

5 SC Res. 1373, op. paras. 1, 2 (Sept. 28, 2001), 40 ILM 1278 (2001).

6 For a discussion of Resolution 1373 and the work of the CTC, see, for example, Rosand, Eric, Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter–Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AJIL 333 Google Scholar

7 Like the CTC, the 1267 Committee comprises all fifteen Security Council member states. SC Res. 1267, op. para. 6 (Oct. 15, 1999), 39 ILM 235 (2000)Google Scholar.

8 See, e.g., Bonner, Raymond & Don Van, Natta Jr., Regional Terrorist Groups Pose Growing Threat, Experts Warn, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2004 Google Scholar, at A1; Karen De, Young, U.S. and China Ask U.N. to List Separatists as Terror Group, Wash. Post, Sept. 11, 2002, at A13Google Scholar; Eckholm, Erik, U.S. Labeling of Group in China as Terrorist Is Criticized, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2002 Google Scholar, at A6; Hosenball, Mark, No More Watchdog, Newsweek, Feb. 2, 2004, at 8Google Scholar; Pisik, Betsy, 108 Nations Decline to Pursue Terrorists; UN List Includes Hotbeds of Al Qaeda Activity, Wash. Times, Dec. 2, 2003, at A1Google Scholar, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File; 3 Charities Added to Terror List, Chi. Trib., Nov. 20, 2002, at Metro 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File; Urgent Wake–Up Call on al–Qaida, Post & Courier (Charleston, S.C.), Dec. 4, 2003, at 12A (editorial), available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File; US Freezes JI out of Action—Terrorist Assets Targeted, Daily Telegraph (Sydney), Sept. 6, 2003, at 9, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File; M, Edith. Lederer, , U.N. Names Nations Not Honoring Sanctions, AP, Apr. 30, 2004 Google Scholar, available in 2004 WL, APWires; Russian Security Chief Blames Chechen Warlord Basayev for Suicide Bombings, AP, Dec. 19, 2003, available in 2003 WL, APWires.

9 Scholars and practitioners, however, have written on certain aspects of the work of the 1267 Committee. See, e.g., Alvarez, E. José. Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AJIL 873 (2003)Google Scholar; Miller, Elin, The Use of Targeted Sanctions in the Fight Against International Terrorism—What About Human Rights’? 2003 ASIL Proc. 46Google Scholar; Stromseth, Jane, The Security Council’s Antiterrorism Role: Continuity and Innovation, 2003 ASIL Proc. 41 (2003)Google Scholar.

10 The 1267 Committee was established in accordance with Rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/96/Rev.7 (1982), which states that the Council “may appoint a commission or committee . . . for a specified question.” See SC Res. 1267, supra note 7, op. para. 6.

11 SC Res. 1267, supra note 7, op. para. 4.

12 SC Res. 1390, op. para. 2 (Jan. 16,2002), 41 ILM 511 (2002). In addition, the Council requested that all states report to the committee on their efforts to implement the measures, and further that the secretary–general assign the monitoring group that was established to monitor implementation of the preexisting Afghanistan–focused sanctions regime to help the committee monitor states’ compliance with the broadened regime. Id., op. paras. 6, 9.

13 For example, it requested that (1) states submit reports to the committee on their efforts to implement the sanctions, (2) the chairman of the committee visit selected states to discuss implementation, (3) the monitoring group submit written reports to the committee on the state of implementation, and (4) the chairman of the committee report orally to the Council. SC Res. 1455, op. paras. 9, 11, 13, 14 (Jan. 20, 2003).

14 SC Res. 1526 (Jan. 30, 2004).

15 Whereas the sanctions imposed by Resolution 1333, op. para. 23 (Dec. 19, 2000), were limited to one year, expiring on January 20, 2001, the measures imposed by Resolution 1390, supra note 12, and Resolution 1455, supra note 13, were not time limited. Rather, both provide that the sanctions “will be further improved in 12 months, if necessary.” The Council did, in fact, improve the measures within twelve months, with the adoption first of Resolution 1455, and then of 1526, supra note 14.

16 SC Res. 1452 (Dec. 20, 2002).

17 Guidelines of the Committee Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1267 for the Conduct of Its Work at 2 (Nov. 7, 2002, as amended Apr. 10, 2003), available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/> [hereinafter 1267 Committee Guidelines].

18 The New Consolidated List of Individuals and Entities Belonging to or Associated with the Taliban and A1-Qaida Organisation as Established and Maintained by the 1267 Committee, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm> (last modified July 6, 2004).

19 The Financial War on Terrorism: New Money Trails Present Fresh Challenges: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance 8 (Oct. 9, 2002)Google Scholar (Statement by James Gurule, U.S. under secretary of the Treasury), available in LEXIS, Leg. & Pol. Library, U.S. Congress File.

20 See, e.g., SC Res. 1343 (Mar. 7, 2001) (establishing Liberia Sanctions Committee, which was terminated in Resolution 1521 (Dec. 22, 2003), and charging it, inter alia, with designating the individuals subject to the sanctions imposed by the resolution); SC Res. 1132, supra note 12 (establishing Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee and charging it, inter alia, with “designating] expeditiously members of the military junta and adult members of their families whose entry or transit is to be prevented”); SC Res. 1127 (Aug. 28, 1997) (requesting the Angola Sanctions Committee to oversee “designation of officials and of adult members of their immediate families whose entry or transit is to be prevented and whose travel documents, visas or residence permits are to be suspended or cancelled”).

21 See, e.g., Stromseth, supra note 9, at 43 (noting that the focus of the A1 Qaeda/Taliban sanctions “is not on a particular state or conflict situation but on a worldwide terrorist organization”).

22 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9; Cooper, Christopher, Shunned in Sweden: How Drive to Block Funds for Terrorism Entangled Mr. Aden, Wall St. J., May 6, 2002, at AlGoogle Scholar.

23 The committee’s approach mirrored and essentially gave worldwide effect to that of the United States. On September 23, 2001, President George W. Bush signed an executive order, Exec. Order No. 13, 224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49, 077 (Sept. 25, 2001), which authorized the blocking of the property and interests in property, including bank accounts, of those designated by die president, as well as those determined by die president, secretary of state, or secretary of the treasury to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that “threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States,” as determined by die secretary of state, in consultation with the secretary of the treasury and the attorney general. In addition, Executive Order No. 13,224, unlike previous executive orders imposing sanctions, also allows for a “lesser action” than the complete blocking of assets to be taken if the secretary of the treasury, in consultation with the secretary of state and the attorney general, deems it to be consistent with the national interests of the United States. For a discussion of Executive Order No. 13, 224 and other steps taken by die United States following 9/11 to combat terrorist financing, see Das, Himumali, Responding to Rogue Regimes; From Smart Bombs to Smart Sanctions: The United States Sanctions Response to the Attacks of September 11,2001, 36 New Eng. Rev. 943, 946 (2001)Google Scholar.

24 Cooper, supra note 22. The names of those on the list forwarded by the United States to the committee had been designated in the United Status pursuant to Executive Order No. 13, 224, supra note 23.

25 Abdirisak Aden, Abdulaziz Abdi Ali, and Yusaf Ahmed Ali.

26 The Security Council’s A1 Qaeda/Taliban sanctions were implemented in the European Union through both the adoption of common positions within die European Union’s foreign and security policy and a European Council regulation. Council Reg. 467/2001 (Mar. 6, 2001), replaced by Council Reg. 244/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 33) 28 (amending for the eleventh time Council Reg. 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Osama bin Laden, the Qaeda network, and die Taliban, and repealing Council Reg. 467/2001), available at <http://www.europa.eu.int/eur–lex/en/search/search_lif.html> ; see also Miller, supra note 8, at 48.

27 Miller, supra note 8, at 48.

28 Zagaris, Bruce, Somali Swedes Challenge Terrorism Freeze Procedures, 18 Int’l Enforcement L. Rep. (July 2002)Google Scholar, available in LEXIS, Criminal Law Library, Legal News File.

29 Lawyers for the Somali Swedes also filed suit against the Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Community before the European Court of Justice, arguing that the ECJ should annul the European Council regulation, and that the Council does not have the power to adopt sanctions against individuals and organizations. Action Brought on 10 December 2001 by Abdirisak Aden and Others Against the Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Communities (Case T–306/01), 2002 O.J. (C 44) 27.

30 Id.

31 U.S. under secretary of the treasury for enforcement Jimmy Gurule said that the United States agreed to remove the individuals because they signed pledges saying that “they have severed and disassociated themselves in every conceivable way from the Al–Barakaat–related businesses.” Jayamaha, Dilshika, U.S. Requests Removals Off U.N. List, AP Online, Aug. 22, 2002 Google Scholar, available in 2002 WL 25672983.

32 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 22; Schmemann, Serge, A Nation Challenged: Sanctions and Fallout, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2002 Google Scholar, at A9.

33 1267 Committee Guidelines, supra note 17. The vast majority of the roughly one hundred states that submitted reports on their implementation of the sanctions to die committee indicated that the listed individuals and endues had neither brought lawsuits nor engaged in any legal proceedings because their names were included on the list. As of late 2003, only five states reported that lawsuits were filed challenging the listing and seeking either de–listing or the unfreezing of their assets. Second Report of the Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1363 (2001)Google Scholar and Extended by Resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003), UN Doc. S/2003/1070, enclosure, at 69, available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267mg.htm> [hereinafter 1455 Second Report].

34 1267 Committee Guidelines, supra note 17, para. 5.

35 Id., para. 6.

36 1455 Second Report, supra note 33, at 11.

37 Second Report of the Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1363 (2001)Google Scholar and Extended by Resolution 1390 (2002), UN Doc. S/2002/1050, enclosure, at 8, available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1050E02.pdf> . The Security Council sought to address this issue through the adoption of Resolution 1452, which allows states to provide listed individuals with access to funds for “basic” (e.g., rent/ mortgage payments, money for food, and medical/legal expenses) and “extraordinary” expenses. SC Res. 1452, supra note 16, op. para. 1.

38 See, e.g., Parry, Emyr Jones, permanent representative of the United Kingdom to die United Nations, Statement, UN Doc. S/PV.4892, at 13 (Jan. 12, 2004)Google Scholar.

39 SC Res. 1526, supra note 14, op. para. 16.

40 See, e.g., 1455 Second Report, supra note 33, at 67.

41 Id.; see also Report of the Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to Resolution 1363 (2001)Google Scholar and Extended by Resolutions 1390 (2002)Google Scholar and 1455 (2003), UN Doc. S/2003/669, enclosure, at 9, available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267mg.htm> [hereinafter 1455 First Report].

42 According to the committee’s guidelines, this includes: “For individuals: name, date of birth, place of birth, nationality, aliases, residence, passport or travel document number;... For groups, undertakings or entities: name, acronyms, address, headquarters, subsidiaries, affiliates, fronts, nature of business or activity, leadership.” 1267 Committee Guidelines, supra note 17, §5(c).

43 1455 First Report, supra note 41, at 33. The Security Council recently reinforced this point in Resolution 1526, supra note 14, op. para. 17 (urging all states, “when submitting new names to the Committee’s list, to include identifying information and background information, to the greatest extent possible, that demonstrates the individual(s)’ and/or entity(ies)’ association with Usama bin Laden or with members of the A1–Qaida organization and/or the Taliban, in line with the Committee’s guidelines”).

44 1455 Second Report, supra note 33, at 11.

45 Id. at 5.

46 See, e.g., DeYoung, supra note 8; Eckholm, supra note 8; see also Caryl, Christian, Mysteries of the Caucus, N.Y. Rev. Books, Mar. 11, 2004 Google Scholar, at 29, 30 (noting increased willingness of United States “to accept Russian arguments that the Chechen fighters were connected to Osama bin Laden” in return for Russian president Putin’s eagerness to support the United States in the war on terrorism).

47 Discussions of the author with representatives on the 1267 Committee.

48 Miller, supra note 8, at 50; Gunther Pleuger, representative of Germany to the United Nations, Statement, UN Doc. S/PV.4798, at 14 (July 29, 2003)Google Scholar; Marcello Spatafora, permanent representative of Italy to the United Nations, Statement (on behalf of the European Union), id. at 21.

49 Pleuger, supra note 48, at 14.

50 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 8, at 48; Individual Sanctions—How to Improve Legal Safeguards for Individuals (nonpaper prepared by Swedish government for EU workshop on terrorism and targeted sanctions, Nov. 24, 2003) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Swedish Nonpaper].

51 Gunther Pleuger, permanent representative of Germany to the United Nations, Statement, UN Doc. S/PV. 4892, at 14 (Jan. 14, 2004)Google Scholar; Richard Ryan, permanent representative of Ireland to the United Nations, Statement on Behalf of European Union, id. at 23 [hereinafter Ryan Statement].

52 Swedish Nonpaper, supra note 50; see also Alvarez, supra note 9, at 878 (criticizing the 1267 Committee for failing to “accept[ ] the basic premise that those whom it stigmatizes as terrorists ought to be entitled to impartial or judicial scrutiny prior to being targeted for sanctions”).

53 Ryan Statement, supra note 51, at 23 (stating that the EU hopes “that the proposals discussed at the [November 24, 2003] workshop will be reflected in the new resolution now under consideration”).

54 SC Res. 1363, op. para. 4(a) (July 30, 2001). The initial mandate of the monitoring group was “for a period running concurrently with the application of the measures imposed by resolution 1333 (2000)Google ScholarPubMed,” i.e., January 20, 2002. Id., para. 3. The monitoring team was composed largely of former/retired diplomats and military officials with generally limited counterterrorism expertise.

55 SC Res. 1455, supra note 13.

56 Ryan Statement, supra note 51, at 24.

57 For the preparation of its last report, the group traveled to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Morocco. 1455 Second Report, supra note 33, at 10–11.

58 The governments of Italy, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland were angered by the monitoring group report of December 2003 that depicted how two individuals on the consolidated list lived, traveled, and operated multimillion– dollar business in their countries, in contravention of the sanctions imposed by the Council. According to Liechtenstein’s ambassador to the United Nations, die group did not consult the relevant countries to verify basic facts in its report. Christian Wenaweser, permanent representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations, Statement, UN Doc. S/PV.4892, supra note 51, at 25 [hereinafter Wenaweser Statement]; see also Lynch, Colum, UN Dissolves Panel Monitoring Al Qaeda, Wash. Post, Feb, 2, 2004 Google Scholar, at A14.

59 1455 First Report, supra note 41, at 31.

60 Washington Insistent links Exist Between Al–Qaeda, Iraq, Agence France–Presse, June 27, 2003, available in 2003 WL 69214539; see also, e.g. Brien, O. Timothy, Threats and Responses: Monitoring; U.N. Group Finds No Hussein–Al– Qaeda Link, N.Y. Times, June 27, 2003 Google Scholar, at A13; UN Probe Finds No Al–Qaida Links to Iraq, Gazette (Montreal), June 27, 2003, at A14.

61 Agence France–Presse, supra note 60.

62 Burkeman, Oliver, Al–Qaida Rich and Ready to Strike, Says UN, Guardian (London), Aug. 29, 2002 Google Scholar, at 12; Lynch, Colum, War on Al Qaeda Funds Stalled; Network ‘Fit and Well,’ Ready to Strike, Draft of U.N. Report Says, Wash. Post, Aug. 29, 2002 Google Scholar, at A1.

63 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, Treasury Statement on UN Terrorism Report (Aug. 29, 2002), available at <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3382.htm>>Google Scholar .

64 See, e.g., Wenaweser Statement, supra note 58, at 25.

65 The Big Story with John Gibson (Fox News broadcast, June 27, 2003), available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.

66 1455 First Report, supra note 41, at 4.

67 1455 Second Report, supra note 33, at 12 (citing a study by the U.S. Department of the Treasury). As of March 24, 2004, more than 170 countries had issued orders freezing or seizing approximately $200 million in terrorism–related financial assets and accounts, although it is not clear how many of these assets and accounts belonged to those on die consolidated list.

68 Id. at 4. This conclusion was not, however, supported by all committee members.

69 Id.

70 Id. at 38. See id. at 38–39 for a list of recommendations.

71 Id. at 38.

72 SC Res. 1526, supra note 14, op. para. 4.

73 These are two of the nonbinding eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing issued by the OECD’s Financial Action Task Force, available at <http://www.oecd.org/fati7SRecsTF_en.htm> (last modified Dec. 2, 2003).

74 The travel ban imposed by Security Council Resolutions 1390, 1455, and 1526 requires all states to prevent those included on the consolidated list from entering or transiting their territory. Exceptions are made with respect to the entry of a country’s own nationals and when transit is necessary for fulfillment of a judicial process. The committee may also grant exceptions on a case–by–case basis.

75 1455 Second Report, supra note 33, at 5.

76 1455 First Report, supra note 41, at 19.

77 Id.

78 Id. at 21.

79 The arms embargo requires all states to

80 1455 Second Report, supra note 33, at 28–29.

81 Id. at 30.

82 Id. at 40.

83 But see Lynch, supra note 58 (quoting disgruntled former member of the group).

84 SC Res. 1526, supra note 14, op. para. 6 & annex.

85 According to the monitoring group, as of October 2003, 83 states had submitted a report under Security Council Resolution 1455,86 had submitted a report under Security Council Resolution 1390,66 had submitted a report under both resolutions, and 88 had not submitted a report under either resolution. 1455 Second Report, supra note 33, at 62. As of August 18, 2004,137 states had submitted a report pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1455. The list is available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/> . See also Lederer, supra note 8.

86 Guidance for Reports Required of All States Pursuant to Paragraphs 6 and 12 of Resolution 1455 (2003), available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/guidanc_en.pdf>>Google Scholar .

87 Heraldo Muñoz, permanent representative of Chile to the United Nations, Statement, UN Doc. S/PV.4892, supra note 51, at 6 [hereinafter Muñoz Statement].

88 Id.; see also Munir Akram, permanent representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, Statement, id. at 18; Ismael Gaspar Martins, permanent representative of Angola to the United Nations, Statement, id. at 19.

89 Muñoz Statement, supra note 87, at 6.

90 Pisik, supra note 8.

91 SC Res. 1526, supra note 14, op. para. 22.

92 Report of the A1–Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee to the Security Council Pursuant to Paragraph 23 of Resolution 1526 (2004), UN Doc. S/2004/349 (Apr. 26).

93 Id.

94 Heraldo, Muñoz, permanent representative of Chile to the United Nations, Statement, UN Doc. S/PV.4976, at 3–4 (May 24, 2004)Google Scholar.

95 Id. The monitoring team’s conclusions should not have come as a surprise. For the most part, those countries for which capacity was not a problem submitted their reports to the 1267 Committee on a timely basis, i.e., by the end of April 2003. Generally, those lacking the capacity to implement the sanctions submitted late reports. Thus, since the team was only considering reports submitted after October 2003, i.e., at least five months late, it likely only considered reports submitted by those lacking capacity.

96 See, for example, the statements by Security Council and other UN members at a Council meeting on January 12, 2004, that discussed the Al Qaeda/Taliban sanctions regime and the work of the 1267 Committee, UN Doc. S/PV.4892, supra note 51. See also Foreign Assistance and International Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations (Apr. 21, 2004) (testimony of Amb. Cofer Black, coordinator for counterterrorism), available in LEXIS, Leg. & Politics Library, Hearings File [hereinafter Black Statement].

97 See, e.g., Jean–Marc De La Sablière, permanent representative of France to the United Nations, Statement, UN Doc. S/PV.4892, supra note 51, at 9–10.

98 In fact, Resolution 1526 requests that the committee “circulate to the Council a list of those States that have not submitted by 31 March 2004 reports pursuant to . . . resolution 1455 (2003), including an analytical summary of the reasons put forward by States for non–reporting.” SC Res. 1526, supra note 14, op. para. 23.

99 See, e.g., Pisik, supra note 8; Lederer, Edith, U.N. Imposes Sanctions on Saudi Charity, AP Online, Jan. 30, 2004 Google Scholar, available in 2004 WL 56486820; see also Munoz Statement, supra note 87, at 6 (stating that the committee should identify the nonreporting states as having failed to comply with Security Council resolutions).

100 Black Statement, supra note 96, at 3.

101 1455 Second Report, supra note 33, at 37.

102 See the statements in the Security Council by representatives of a number of UN member states, UN Doc. S/PV.4892, supra note 51.

103 Some committee members have been accused of acquiescing in the listing of such groups in an effort to preserve the committee’s unity and for larger geopolitical reasons. See, e.g., Gutterman, Steve, Russian Security Chief Blames Chechen Warlord Basayev for Suicide Bombings, AP, Dec. 19, 2003 Google Scholar, available in 2003 WL, Allnewsplus (reporting that Russian officials have sought to include Chechen rebel groups on die consolidated list as part of an effort to show the world that these groups are “international terrorists as opposed to rebels fighting for a separatist cause”); Eckholm, supra note 8 (arguing that the United States supported the listing of East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a Chinese separatist group, as part of an effort to lessen Chinese opposition to possible attack on Iraq).

104 First Report of the Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to Resolution 1363 (2001)Google Scholar and Extended by Resolution 1390 (2002)Google Scholar, UN Doc. S/2002/541, at 4–6, available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/541e.pdf> .

105 For example, in the CTC chairman’s report on the difficulties states were having implementing the obligations relating to terrorist financing under Resolution 1373, the chairman focused on the need of many states to improve the monitoring of informal banking systems, charities, and other nonprofit associations, as well as on the need to create an administrative mechanism to freeze or block terrorist funds, i.e., the same issues highlighted by the monitoring group in its reports. Report by the Chair of the Counter–Terrorism Committee on the Problems Encountered in the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)Google Scholar, UN Doc. S/2004/70, at 5–6, available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/reports_chair.html> .

106 As will be discussed below, consideration should be given to combining these two bodies into a single Security Council counterterrorism body.

107 SC Res. 1456 (Jan. 20, 2003) (annexed declaration); SC Res. 1377 (Nov. 12, 2001) (annexed declaration).

108 SC Res. 1526, supra note 14, op. para. 23.

109 See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 58; Pisik, supra note 8.

110 See, e.g., Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelines For The Implementation of Un Policy Options, pt. III (Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano, & Mikael Eriksson eds., 2003), available at <http://www.smartsanctions.se/stockhobn_process/reports/Final%20report%20complete.pdf> (discussing the important role that capacity building plays in the implementation of targeted UN sanctions such as the A1 Qaeda/Taliban sanctions).

111 SC Res. 1535 (Mar. 26, 2004).