¹ It is admirable to see with what steadfastness of purpose the German delegate, Zorn, Philipp , professor in the university of Bonn, advocates the world arbitral treaty in Germany. Within the first five years following the Second Hague Conference, he has devoted not less than five addresses and articles to this problem, namely:(1) “Das vOlkerrechtliche Werk der beiden Haager Friedenskonferenzen,” in Zeits-chrift far Politik, 1909, pp. 321 et seq.; (2) “Zur neuesten Entwicklung des Volker-rechts,” in Festgabe far Gaterbock, 1910, pp. 197 et seq.; (3) “Das Deutsche Reich und die internationale Schiedegerichtsbarkeit,” address delivered as Rector Magnificus, 1911; (4) “Die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in dem Leben der Volker und im internationalen Recht,” address delivered at the 19th annual session of the Interparliamentary Union, at Geneva, 1912; and (5) “Die internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit,”in Handbuch der Politik, Vol. II, 1912, pp. 798 et seq.Google Scholar

² Cf. Schticking, Der Staate tverband der Haager Konferenzen, 1912, pp. 88 et seg.

³ Trait & generaux d'arbitrage, communiques au bureau international de la Cour permanente d'Arbitrage, premiere aerie, La Haye, 1911.

⁴ As an illustration of such a treaty, we reproduce Article 1 of the treaty between Italy and Denmark, ratified May 22, 1906: “The high contracting parties pledge themselves to submit to the Permanent Court of Arbitration established at The Hague by the convention of July 29, 1899, all differences of whatever nature that might arise between them and which it might not be possible to settle through diplomatic channels, even in case these differences should arise from facts anterior to the conclusion of the present convention.”

⁵ I have not been able to ascertain whether this treaty has been ratified.

⁶ Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty concluded between Spain and Uruguay, ratified November 21, 1902, declare: “The high contracting parties pledge themselves to submit to arbitration all controversies of whatever nature which for any reason might arise between them, provided that they do not affect the fundamental precepts of the Constitution of either the one or the other country and always provided they cannot be settled by direct negotiations.” “In virtue of this convention, those questions which may have been the object of definitive settlement between the high parties cannot be reconsidered and changed. In such case, arbitration shall be exclusively confined to questions arising in regard to the validity, interpretation and execution of the said settlements.”

⁷ Article 1 of the treaty ratified between Denmark and Spain, May 19, 1906, is an example: “The high contracting parties pledge themselves to refer to the Permanent Court of Arbitration established at The Hague by the convention of July 29, 1899, the differences which might arise between them and which it might not have been possible to settle through diplomatic channels; provided, however, that they do not concern either the vital interests or the independence of the respective countries.”

⁸ For example, we quote Articles 1 and 3 of the treaty concluded between Belgium and Denmark: “The high contracting parties pledge themselves to submit to the Permanent Court of Arbitration established at The Hague by the convention of July 29, 1899, all differences that might arise between them in the cases enumerated in Article 3, provided they do not concern either the vital interests or the independence of the contracting countries, and provided an amicable settlement shall not have been reached through direct diplomatic negotiations, or any other conciliatory agencies.” “Arbitration shall be obligatory between the high contracting parties: (1) With the reservations indicated in Article 1, in case of disagreement concerning the application or the interpretation of all conventions already or to be concluded between them, excepting those in which third Powers might be concerned or to which they might have adhered. * * *”

⁹ In illustration, we cite Article 1 of the Anglo-American arbitration treaty, ratified June 4, 1908: “Differences which may arise of a legal nature or relating to the interpretation of treaties existing between the two contracting parties and which it may not have been possible to settle by diplomacy, shall be referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration established at The Hague by the convention of the 29th of July, 1899, provided, nevertheless, that they do not affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the two contracting states, and do not concern the interests of third parties.”

¹⁰ As an example of such treaties, we quote Articles 1 and 3 of the arbitration treaty between Greece and Spain, ratified March 11/24, 1910: “The high contracting parties engage themselves to submit to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, established at The Hague by the convention of July 29, 1899, the differences which might arise between them, in the cases enumerated in Article 3, provided they concern neither the honor nor the vital interests, the independence nor the sovereignty of the contracting countries. * * * ” “ With the reservations specified in Article 1, arbitration shall be obligatory between the high contracting parties: (1) In case of disagreement concerning the application or the interpretation of all conventions already concluded or to be concluded between them, excepting those in which third Powers have participated or to which they have adhered. * * *”

¹¹ Die Foribildung dea Verfahrena in Wilcerrechilichen Streitigkeiten, 1907, p. 221.

¹² It is a fact that differences of real vital interests have never yet been composed arbitrally. It cannot be said that even the. Alabama dispute or Newfoundland dispute comes within this class of most difficult questions.

¹³ In saying this, I do not wish to appear as opposing the new project of an Anglo American arbitration treaty, to which I have, on the contrary, given a different interpretation and shown proof of my sympathetic interest. Cf. my essay “Der englisch-amerikanische Schiedsvertrag,” in Zeitschrift far Vigkerrecht and Bundesstaatsrecht,” 1912, No. 3.

¹⁴ Cf. also the other contributions of Zorn, referred to above. Lammasch is of a different opinion in Jahrbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts, 1912, p. 109, and Se/nicking, before cited, p. 131.

¹⁵ Lammasch agrees with this conclusion, before cited, p. 102.

¹⁶ Cf. my commentary upon the Hague convention for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, 1911, pp. 63 et seq.

¹⁷ Cf. Zeitschrife ftzr Politik, II, p. 361. I find that Zorn does not draw a sharp enough distinction between the stipulations concerning national honor and vital interests.

¹⁸ Cf. de Jong, “Volkerreehtskodidation and Genfer Friedens-kongrees,” in Friedenawarte, 1912, p. 329.